E.D.Pa.: Even though there was no hot pursuit, there was still exigency for warrantless entry

Officers can have exigency without hot pursuit. The Dorman analysis still prevails, and exigency supported the entry. United States v. Anderson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41773 (E.D. Pa. March 27, 2014):

I agree that this is not a hot pursuit case. Describing what it called a “true hot pursuit,” the Supreme Court noted that “hot pursuit means some sort of chase, but it need not be an extended hue and cry in and about the public streets.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defendant attempted to evade arrest on her front porch by retreating inside her home). In a second case, the Court found that there was no hot pursuit because there was no “immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (police arrested defendant in his home for a DUI based on another driver’s account and vehicle registration found in defendant’s abandoned vehicle). The Court has also suggested, in dicta, that there is no hot pursuit when a fleeing felon is unaware he is being followed. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n. 7 (1948) (“[W]e find no element of ‘hot pursuit’ in the arrest of one who was not in flight, was completely surrounded by agents before she knew of their presence, who claims without denial that she was in bed at the time, and who made no attempt to escape.”). While I decline to accept defendant’s definition of hot pursuit in full, I gather from these cases that Officer Lister’s covert pursuit of the suspect is not the type of chase covered by the hot pursuit exception.

Even though I find that there was no hot pursuit, the exigencies of the situation justify the police conduct in this case. Hot pursuit “is not a limitation but rather an illustration of the kind of exigent circumstance justifying entry without a warrant to arrest a suspect.” Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In what the Supreme Court called “a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances,” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751-52, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia outlined several factors which support a finding of exigent circumstances including:

1.) A crime of violence has occurred;
2.) Reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed;
3.) Probable cause that the suspect committed the crime based on reasonably trustworthy information;
4.) Strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises;
5.) Likelihood of escape if the suspect is not swiftly apprehended;
6.) Police make a peaceful, not forcible, entry.

Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392-93.

Consideration of the Dorman factors compels a finding of exigent circumstances. The robbery of the 7-Eleven store at gun point was a violent crime. Officer Lister witnessed the crime and followed the suspect to 2216 Bonsall Street. This information gave officers probable cause that the person who committed the crime was armed and located at the property to be searched. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 342 (3d Cir.1992) (“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe an offense had been committed.”). Officer Lister testified he thought the suspect would escape if not immediately arrested. Finally, the police did not forcefully enter Mr. Anderson’s residence; rather, the front door was unlatched and it opened when the officers knocked.