IA: Defendant was “arrested” for invoking speedy trial when he was taken in for questioning in handcuffs

Defendant was “arrested” for invoking speedy trial when he was taken in for questioning in handcuffs. He was told he was not under arrest, but he was also told he was not free to leave; 91 days later he was charged. State v. Hansen, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 93 (January 23, 2014):

Hansen contends he was arrested on March 7, 2012, because a reasonable person in his shoes would have believed an arrest occurred when police asked for his identification at the scene of Fowler’s overdose, patted him down, read his Miranda rights, handcuffed him, placed him in a squad car, transported him to the police station without his permission, kept him in handcuffs for another twenty minutes at the station, and then questioned him over the course of two hours—all the while telling him he was not free to leave. We agree a person subjected to this extent and duration of police restraint would have reasonably believed he was under arrest. See id. at 252 (finding arrest occurred when police objectively evidenced purpose to arrest and suspect submitted to that authority); see also State v. Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (finding arrest occurred when law enforcement gave Delockroy no choice but to accompany them to the sheriff’s office).

…

… The circumstances listed by the district court cannot overcome the significant restraint placed on Hansen’s freedom by the Davenport police. The court’s first and fourth reasons allude to the ongoing gathering of evidence and suggest the police could not have arrested Hansen because they did not have probable cause to do so before completing their investigation. The parties devote a large share of their briefs to arguing whether the police had probable cause to arrest Hansen the night of March 7. Initially, we note criminal investigations do not come to a halt the moment police have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of proof which may fall short of that necessary to support a conviction. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). Moreover, the probable cause debate is not central to the Wing analysis. A reasonable person’s belief that he or she has been arrested is formed without knowledge of the amount of evidence available to the police; rather, it is based on how the person experiences the coercive nature of the police actions. See Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 249 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect’s position would have understood [the] situation”)).

We also reject the court’s second reason for not finding an arrest—that police removed Hansen’s handcuffs before the interview and released him after two hours of questioning. Once the officers took steps to deprive Hansen of his freedom that went beyond a Terry detention they could not turn back the clock. See State v. Davis, 525 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Iowa 1994) (holding a person cannot be arrested and later “unarrested” to stop the tolling of the speedy indictment period).

Finally, we address the most vexing detail—that the police repeatedly told Hansen he was not under arrest. As Hansen admits in his brief: “This was the only fact that could have caused [him] to doubt whether he was under arrest.” But simply telling a person he or she is not under arrest does not make it so. Peace officers cannot avoid the impact of Wing by professing they are not making an arrest while holding a suspect in custody. An arrest may objectively occur even if the officer does not formally announce the arrest and even if the officer does not possess a subjective intent to arrest. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 248-49 (explaining what a suspect is told about his arrest status is one factor to be considered). Hansen was repeatedly told he was not under arrest but also told he was not free to leave. The officers’ mixed messages did not support the district court’s conclusion that Hansen had not been arrested.

We conclude that for purposes of the speedy indictment rule, Hansen was arrested on March 7, 2012. The State did not file a trial information until June 6, 2012—ninety-one days later. The district court erred by denying Hansen’s motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand for entry of a dismissal.