S.D.N.Y.: Records of ownership in a car doesn’t get “stale”

Records of ownership in a car are likely to be kept there for the life of ownership. Therefore, staleness is hard to prove. There was probable cause to believe the car was involved in a robbery and it was found much later in a parking garage. The probable cause for records of ownership didn’t dissipate. United States v. Salomon-Mendez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7312 (S.D. N.Y. January 20, 2014):

Central to the staleness question in this case is “the nature of the property sought” and its relationship to the location in which it was sought. Paul, 692 F. Supp. at 193. Courts have emphasized that “[i]f the property sought is the type which can be expected to remain in one location over a period of time, … probable cause reasonably continues to exist over a more extended period of time.” Id. (collecting cases). In this regard, courts tend to distinguish between personal property that is moveable or likely to dissipate over time, such as drugs or cash, and property of a more permanent nature that is likely to be maintained in one place for longer periods of time, such as business records. See, e.g., United States v. LaMorte, 744 F. Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Unlike drugs or cash, records of past activity are likely to be maintained over time ….”); Paul, 692 F. Supp. at 193 (“While it is reasonable to infer that an individual like [the defendant] would keep bank statements, safe deposit box information or keys and other financial records or instruments in his house over an extended period of time, it is not reasonable to infer that he would keep the $5000 cash proceeds of his illegal extortionate behavior for over five months in one place.”).

Under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, Agent Mercurio was justified in searching Rivera-Rodriguez’s vehicle if he had probable cause to believe it contained evidence of criminal activity. Gant, 556 U.S. at 347. Agent Mercurio had probable cause to believe that the Sienna had been used in a robbery and an attempted robbery, and evidence of the vehicle’s ownership, which would link the Sienna to the defendant, would be evidence that could be used in the prosecution of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1258 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[P]robable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.”); United States v. Giampa, No. 92 Cr. 437, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266, 1992 WL 249885, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1992) (finding that probable cause existed where the evidence sought served to connect the defendant with a suspected criminal enterprise).

Agent Mercurio would have been reasonable in concluding that such documents are usually kept in cars, and that it was therefore probable that relevant evidence in this case would be found in the Sienna. Because this sort of document is unlikely to be removed from a car at any point when the car is still in use, the passage of a few months between the criminal activity in question and the warrantless search at issue here is irrelevant. Accordingly, the basis for the car search was not stale, and the search was therefore valid under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.