CA7: Pre-announced dorm room search was valid by contractual consent or special needs

A preannounced dormitory room health and safety inspection was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment under the student handbook both by pre-granted contractual consent and special needs. 89g of marijuana were found by the RA’s conducting the inspection and they called the police. “([Medlock’s] failure to use the abundant warning time to clean up his act is one of the mysteries of this case.)” By accepting the student handbook, he consented to the inspection in advance. If there had been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and there wasn’t, it wouldn’t bar the evidence in a student disciplinary proceeding. Ultimately 89g were found, and the Dean of Students testified it was the largest possession case they had, and he found it not indicative of being a minor possession charge. Medlock v. Trustees of Indiana University, 738 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2013):

This is an eye-opening case, but not because of any legal profundities or political reverberations – rather because of the glimpse it affords into contemporary student and administrative cultures of American universities.

. . .

So the marijuana and drug paraphernalia seized from Medlock’s room were admissible in the suspension proceeding (which was of course noncriminal)—and for the additional reason that Medlock didn’t object to their admission in that proceeding. The seized items provided compelling evidence of serious violations of the code of conduct. His giant marijuana plant (a small tree, really) was providing him with dealer-quantity marijuana. And while the criminal charges against him were dropped, this could not have been for lack of evidence. The university’s provost testified that the quantity of marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia found in Medlock’s room made her suspect that he was distributing marijuana to other students. As the dean of students testified, “the quantity that we had here present was such that it was hard to believe it was for personal use” only. He added that “in [his] 17 years as being Senior Student Affairs Officer this ranks maybe first or second in terms of the amount of marijuana that I’ve seen at any one time taken from a room.” And this was said when the dean thought that only 50 grams of marijuana had been found in Medlock’s room. When told it had been 89 grams he remarked: “that placed it certainly number one.”

Although as we noted earlier the fruits of the search were admissible for disciplinary purposes even if obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the violation of the amendment (if there was a violation) would entitle him to damages. … But there was no violation. Medlock had consented in advance, as a condition of being allowed to live in the dormitory, to have his room searched for contraband and other evidence of violation of the health and safety code. He could have lived off campus and thus have avoided being governed by the code. He chose to trade some privacy for a dorm room. His expulsion amounted to holding him to his contract.

Even without explicit consent, and even if the student inspectors had been public officers, their search of Medlock’s dorm room would have been a lawful regulatory search. Indiana University’s student-housing code is the equivalent of a local housing code, and “it is difficult to enforce such a code without occasional inspections” and “impossible to rely on a system of inspections to enforce the code without making them compulsory, since violators will refuse to consent to being inspected. In these circumstances the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that all search warrants be supported by ‘probable cause’ can be satisfied by demonstrating the reasonableness of the regulatory package that includes compulsory inspections.” Platteville Area Apartment Association v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-38 (1967). Those cases involved warrants, but warrants are not required when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). Special needs are found in the school setting, Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-30 (2002); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53, 664-65 (1995), a setting in which requiring a search warrant “would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); cf. Osteen v. Henley, supra, 13 F.3d at 225-26.

The search that officer King conducted before he obtained a warrant stands on a somewhat different footing. He was not a student inspector whom Medlock by deciding to live in the dorm had authorized to search his room. The A to Z Guide—the university’s student-housing handbook—states that “authorized university personnel performing safety inspections may enter a room or apartment to ensure that health, fire, and safety regulations [*13] are being maintained” but that “no provision in the housing contract gives residence hall officials the authority to consent to a search of a resident’s room or apartment by police or other government officials” and “any law enforcement agency having jurisdiction may, in performing its statutory duties, conduct a search [only] in accordance with legally defined procedures governing search and seizure.”

But King’s entry and search were superfluous events so far as harm to Medlock was concerned. …

My wife is a college professor, and she’s not surprised that Medlock didn’t pay attention to the warning of the search because: (1) college students generally don’t pay attention to anything , and (2) even if they try to, colleges inundate the students and staff with e-mails to the point they treat it like spam and don’t read it or remember it.