Search warrant violated the particularity requirement when it failed to specify the crime believed to have occurred to limit the search. It permitted a general exploratory search, and it was so defective that the good faith exception could not be relied upon. United States v. Denton, 487 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D. Ore. 2007):
Here, the search warrant makes no reference to the crime being investigated. Instead, the warrant only lists, in broad terms, the items to be searched for. The government claims that the reference to “controlled substances” adequately limits the scope of the search warrant and identifies what conduct is being investigated. However, without either (1) a more definite and limited statement of what the officers were authorized to search for, or (2) a description of the criminal activity being investigated, the search warrant lacks sufficient particularity. While specific categories of evidence are identified by the search warrant, including items commonly associated with drug-trafficking, other categories are overbroad. For example, under number four, the search warrant includes: “[a]ny and all diaries, notebooks, notes, and any other records and receipts.” Govt’s Ex. B. This category could reasonably include all records and files maintained by any tenant of the residence in question, and without any statement of what crimes are being investigated to narrow the search, leaves the warrant woefully lacking the necessary particularity.
Further, the search warrant includes the disapproved term “including but not limited to” when describing what items are sought. In Bridges, the court found the phrase “including but not limited to” especially offensive to the particularity requirement of warrants because “if the scope of the warrant is ‘not limited to’ the specific records listed on the warrant, it is unclear what is its precise scope or what exactly it is the agents are expected to be looking for during the search.” 344 F.3d at 1017-18.
No crime is stated in the warrant, and the scope of what could be seized by the officers was not restricted to contraband. Indeed, the scope was not limited at all, given the use of the disapproved language “including but not limited to.” See Bridges, 344 F.3d at 1017-18. Based on Kow and Bridges, the warrant was facially invalid and the evidence obtained pursuant to it must be suppressed.
The fact that the affidavit in support of the warrant had additional facts concerning suspected crimes cannot save the warrant.
While defendant was on pretrial release, U.S. Marshals were looking for him to arrest him for a violation or terms of release. His adult child consented to a search but he was not found but drugs were. He arrived later and was arrested. The consent search was valid. United States v. Alama, 486 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2007).*
Border Patrol officers did a knock and talk looking for an illegal alien, and they gained entry into the apartment but the alien was not there. While the officers were there, they did a “security sweep” and kept people separate. In the course of that, defendant admitted that he was an illegal. The officers’ testimony was credited. “Therefore, the court finds that neither the entry into nor the search of Defendant’s apartment constituted a violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, neither asking for identification from Defendant nor requesting Defendant to remain seated during the search constituted an unlawful seizure.” United States v. Maino, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37189 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2007).*
Man with a gun report brought officers to plaintiff’s house where a young man was ordered to the ground at gunpoint. The gun turned out to be a toy gun, and the matter ended. The officers were entitled to summary judgment in a § 1983 case against them because they had reasonable suspicion for the stop and entry onto the driveway of the house. Murray v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37071 (M.D. Tenn. May 21, 2007):
In this case, the totality of the circumstances supports the propriety of the officers conducting a Terry stop. Officers had received a dispatch regarding a “person with a weapon call.” The description of the subject was a 16 or 17-year old black male wearing a gray top, white sweatshirt, and black pants. Upon arrival at the scene, the caller confirmed to the officers that she had seen a 16 or 17-year old black male pointing a gun at his sister. The caller’s daughter stated that she too saw what she thought to be a gun.
With this information, it was reasonable to proceed to the suspect’s house and walk up the driveway with guns drawn. “This Circuit permits the use of force, such as handcuffs and guns, to effect a stop when such a show of force is reasonable under the circumstances of the stop.” United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2001). This is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s statement in Terry that police officers are not “required to take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. “Indeed, police officers may use reasonable means to protect themselves when conducting a Terry stop, including drawing weapons if the officers believe the suspect may be armed.” United States v. Lindsey, 114 Fed.Appx. 718, 721-722 (6th Cir. 2004)(citing, United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986)).
