M.D.Fla.: Entry into a screened-in lanai was protected by the Fourth Amendment

Entry into a screened-in lanai with a swimming pool that was not visible from the street was curtilage and required announcement. United States v. Hill, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (USMJ R&R):

In the instant case, the screened enclosure included a swimming pool and lanai, and had two closed doors. The screen was attached to the house and part of the lanai was under roof which was also part of the house. The screened enclosure had furniture and a swimming pool which was for use by the residents of the home. The screened enclosure was in the back of the house and there was no testimony that it could be seen by people passing by the house. The screened enclosure was either a part of the house or included in the curtilage of the house, and the Defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in this area. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protections extended to the lanai and the screened enclosure.

. . .

In the instant case, the Government provided no testimony, evidence or argument that the officers approached the front door of the residence to attempt to “knock and talk.” An officer may enter private land to “knock and announce” as a private citizen would, but in this case, the private citizen would go to the front door. Further, the Government failed to provide any evidence as to where the officers did knock at the residence. The only testimony was from Deputy Waid who stated that the K-9 officers knocked on a door of the residence, but he failed to indicate which door or if, perhaps, the door was located on the lanai and in the screened enclosure. The Government failed to meet its burden of showing that the officers took reasonable steps to contact the Defendant. The Government has failed to meet its burden of showing the lawfulness of the warrantless entry into the screened enclosure by the officers.

Adopted by USDJ: United States v. Hill, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2011):

The screened-in lanai area in the back of the house was either a part of the house itself or included in the curtilage of the house, and in either case was within the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. Despite these protections, however, a law enforcement officer in carrying out his or her duties is free to go where the public would be expected to go without violating the Fourth Amendment. Coffin v. Brandau, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11353, 2011 WL 2162997 (11th Cir. June 3, 2011)(citations omitted). This includes knocking on the front door, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011), and in some circumstances a back door. (See Report and Recommendation, Doc. #40, p. 18)(citing cases). Nothing in this case indicates that the public would be expected to go to the lanai at the rear of the house. Therefore, since none of the exigent circumstances recognized by the Supreme Court, King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856-57, were present, the officer’s initial entry into the lanai was unlawful. The Court adopts this portion of the Report and Recommendation and overrules the government’s objection.