Officers responded to a domestic violence call and defendant told them about it in her house. The police left to find her boyfriend. They did, and he had scratches and a puncture wound he said came from her stabbing him with scissors. The police went back to the house to talk to her, and she refused entry into the home. Then they lied to her about needing to sign a protective order to gain access. Inside, one thing led to another and she was charged with resisting arrest. Because the entry into the house was unlawful, she couldn’t be convicted of resisting. Harper v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1080 (Ind. App. 2014):

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Officer’s observation during traffic stop that defendant possessed a nunchuck was justification for the officer opening the door and removing defendant from the car. It turned out to be a bullwhip, but the officer’s safety concerns were exacerbated by defendant reaching for his right hip. Commonwealth v. Rosado, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 995 N.E.2d 95 (2013).*

Questions about the driver picking up a passenger from the bus station were reasonable, as was the fifteen minutes the stop took until consent was granted. The passenger said he came in from Toledo and threw away the ticket at the restaurant, and another officer retrieved the ticket at the restaurant saying he came from Detroit “piquing the officer’s interest” and justifying extending the stop. United States v. Locklear, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124234 (E.D. Ky. August 30, 2013).*

Post-conviction claim that officer lied during suppression hearing was barred because it was resolved in the direct appeal. Jackson v. State, 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (August 30, 2013).* (Alabama is still the only court in North America that charges for it’s opinions. Why is that?)

Frisk for weapons was justified, but the search of defendant’s pockets for drugs was not justified by “plain feel” because the state did not justify the justification. State v. Carter, 131 So. 3d 479 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2013):

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The presence of a plastic bag in the groin area, where drug dealers commonly keep it, is more susceptible to plain feel. Pockets are where people carry things; drug dealers use their groin. State v. Vessel, 131 So. 3d 523 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2014).

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NPR: Not-So-Private Metadata, On The Media:

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NYT: Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies by Claire Cain Miller:

America’s cloud computing industry could lose billions of dollars in business because of the government’s surveillance program.

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AP: Police phone-tracking contracts often kept secret by Jack Gillum:

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A passenger in a stolen car has no standing. “His argument is that he has standing because he did not realize the vehicle had been stolen or embezzled. He cites no authority for the proposition that a lack of knowledge regarding whether a vehicle is stolen or embezzled is sufficient to confer standing for purposes of challenging the search of the vehicle. His lack of knowledge simply underscores the finding that he had no demonstrated right to control or possess the vehicle.” United States v. Stubbs, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36722 (D. Nev. February 27, 2014).

“Defendant makes no specific argument to support his generalized challenge to the legality of the search warrant; rather, he simply requested a four-corner review and a determination by the Court as to whether the warrant was supported by requisite probable cause. [¶] SA Drengson’s affidavit articulates an ample basis upon which to conclude that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant. …” United States v. Edderhoff, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36835 (D. Minn. March 10, 2014).* [Some courts would have denied the motion for failure to make an argument. And, that request doesn’t warrant a hearing.]

The CI information here was a month old, but it detailed an ongoing marijuana operation, and there was probable cause and good faith reliance. United States v. Giesy, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36481 (D. Kan. March 7, 2014).*

Police entered the house with an arrest warrant, which is permitted by Payton. Once inside they performed a protective sweep and found a cell phone clearly related to the defendant, and they had plenty of reason to believe evidence would be on the phone, so its evidentiary value was immediately apparent. Therefore, it was subject to seizure because it was in “plain view” at the time of the valid protective sweep. [But, the court says not a word about searching the phone.] United States v. Delva, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36845 (S.D. N.Y. March 11, 2014):

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NSA case: Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 59 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 825 (D. D.C. December 16, 2013), stay granted by Klayman v. Obama, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177169 (D.D.C., Dec. 16, 2013), finding the third party doctrine inapplicable:

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Probable cause can be on information from others. The officer had information that defendant had the IP address where the child pornography was coming, and that was probable cause. Gardner v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2957 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) March 18, 2014).

The government agrees not to use statements made by defendant during the execution of the search warrant here in the face of a motion to suppress that the statements were influenced by the agents saying that he might not be prosecuted if he cooperated. [Probably because the government thinks it can win its case without it, so why clutter the record?] United States v. Gibson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34831 (S.D. Iowa March 18, 2014).*

Defendant’s 2255’s Fourth Amendment claim was not couched as an IAC claim, so it was waived by his guilty plea. United States v. Labrosse, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35101 (E.D. La. March 18, 2014).*

The officer knew that defendant was armed because, on patrol, he could see the gun in defendant’s pocket. He stopped the car and approached without his own gun drawn because he could see defendant’s hands and didn’t feel threatened. In talking to defendant, defendant finally lied about being armed, and then the situation escalated into the frisk, and it was valid. Mackey v. State, 124 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 2013).

There was probable cause from defendant’s actions and denials of what the officers already knew. United States v. Cavazos, 542 Fed. Appx. 263 (4th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant filed his brief alleging the search was invalid, and the government responded claiming consent to the search. For the first time, then, he challenged the search as without consent in the reply brief. Getting to the merits anyway, the search was by consent. Once the officer discovered cocaine, the automobile exception applied. United States v. Correa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149366 (N.D. Ill. October 17, 2013).*

The video is not conclusive that the parked highway patrol officer could not see defendant’s not signaling his lane change at a toll plaza. Therefore, the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Turrentine, 542 Fed. Appx. 714 (10th Cir. 2013).*

Substantially similar is United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149779 (M.D. Ga. October 18, 2013), where the video seemed to contradict the officer on the lane change violation, but the court agreed with the officer’s testimony.

Remanded to the trial court to make findings on whether state mandated procedures on a DUI roadblock were complied with. Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 990 N.E.2d 528 (2013).*

Use of a flash bang device is governed by the Fourth Amendment. Its use by the police cuts both ways: It creates noise and smoke and a bright light, and it disables the citizen briefly, but it also disables the police. Are they reckless when they shoot into the smoke not fully knowing what’s going on? A jury will decide in this case. Jones v. Sandusky County, 541 Fed. Appx. 653 (6th Cir. 2013):

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Lexis has the treatise on sale for 20% off through March 31. They sent this email yesterday:

Get 20%* off at the LexisNexis® Store using code JCM165570.
Offer expires March 31.

WaPo: Morning Links: Durham PD offers ‘conviction bonuses’ to informants by Radley Balko:

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WaPo: ‘If the facts alleged … are true, this … incident [was] more like home raids by Red Guards during China’s Cultural Revolution than like what we should expect in the United States’ by Eugene Volokh:

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Defendant’s pro se additional appellate grounds that a safe seized from his house in a murder case with a search warrant needed a separate search warrant to open it is rejected without comment. State v. Walker, 178 Wn. App. 478, 315 P.3d 562 (2013).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to suppress a consent search of a car after defendant and his co-defendant were stopped and the car was full of stuff and the police suspected they were involved in a burglary. State v. Weimer, 2013-Ohio-5651, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5916 (11th Dist. December 23, 2013).*

Defendant lived with his grandmother and she validly consented to a search of the living room, a common area as to the two of them. United States v. Dunn, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26653 (6th Cir. December 15, 2011)* (yes, just came in, and it’s not on court’s website yet).

Email search warrant following government’s standard format is a general search. It has to be narrowed, and the email provider should perform the screening function before the government gets it. In re Search of Information Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35323 (D. D.C. March 7, 2014) (relying heavily on the court’s own “Facebook Opinion”):

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The officers could open the door to secure a weapon that they saw in defendant’s hand. The trial court’s holding they couldn’t was wrong. State v. Snead, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 178 (March 19, 2014).*

Defendant committed resisting by fleeing. The dissent says that there was no reasonable suspicion of anything so he couldn’t possibly be guilty of fleeing. Murdock v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 106 (March 18, 2014).*

“The issue of probable cause need not be addressed because I find that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here.” [Then the court proceeds to state every thing but that there was probable cause anyway.] United States v. Conant, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34542 (W.D. Mo. February 10, 2014).*