IN: Ruse to get into defendant’s house to arrest her for DV voided her conviction for resisting

Officers responded to a domestic violence call and defendant told them about it in her house. The police left to find her boyfriend. They did, and he had scratches and a puncture wound he said came from her stabbing him with scissors. The police went back to the house to talk to her, and she refused entry into the home. Then they lied to her about needing to sign a protective order to gain access. Inside, one thing led to another and she was charged with resisting arrest. Because the entry into the house was unlawful, she couldn’t be convicted of resisting. Harper v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1080 (Ind. App. 2014):

In this case, Harper came to the door of her residence in response to the officer’s knock. After Officer Gillespie asked to come inside, Harper expressly denied the officers entry to her residence and told them they had no reason to be inside her home. Therefore, to induce Harper to open her screen door to the officers, Officer Gillespie lied to Harper and told her that he needed her to sign protective order documents against her husband. Harper opened her screen door to take the documents from Officer Gillespie, and the officers entered her residence.

Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). “[T]he physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Id. at 585; see also Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (stating “it is the policy of this state to recognize the unique character of a citizen’s home and to ensure that a citizen feels secure in his or her own home against unlawful intrusion by another individual or a public servant”). “‘The warrantless arrest of a person in his or her home requires both probable cause and ‘exigent circumstances … that make it impracticable to obtain a warrant first.”” Paul v. State, 971 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Sapen v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (quoting Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000))).

Although Officer Gillespie’s purpose for entering Harper’s home was to arrest her, he was still required to obtain an arrest warrant before entering her private residence. This was not a situation of hot pursuit or a crime committed in the presence of the officer. The State does not argue any other exigent circumstances, or any reason at all, that would have made it impracticable for Officer Gillespie to obtain an arrest warrant.

Despite these facts and circumstances, the State posits that Officers Gillespie and Hartman lawfully entered Harper’s residence because they “arrested [her] at the threshold of her residence after Harper had voluntarily opened the door[.]” Appellee’s Br. at 7. In support of that argument, the State relies on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976). In that case, officers investigating illegal drug buys observed Santana standing in the doorway of her house with a brown paper bag in her hand. When the officers were within fifteen feet of Santana, they got out of their van, shouted “police,” and displayed their identification. As the officers approached, Santana retreated into the vestibule of her house. The Supreme Court observed that because Santana was at the threshold of her dwelling, she was in a public place and did not have an expectation of privacy. “She was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house.” 427 U.S. at 42.

The State’s “threshold” argument and citation to Santana are unavailing because the facts and circumstances before us are markedly different. Harper’s citation to Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) is more persuasive. …