Plaintiff’s wearing a giant pink rabbit suit around a bank gave police justification to encounter him and pat him down. The officers were awarded summary judgment because his outfit was reasonably perceived as a potential disguise for a bank robber. Bowie v. City of Livonia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51460 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2007):

Here, having received a phone call from a bank complaining of a man in a giant pink rabbit costume, and reasonably believing that bank robbers may wear a disguise to avoid identification, it was reasonable for Pertunnen to be suspicious that criminal activity was afoot. Considering that Plaintiff was dressed in a giant pink rabbit costume in a residential neighborhood, during the Fall when such a fashion statement is not quite in vogue, it was also reasonable for [Officer] Parinello to suspect that Plaintiff was intoxicated, perhaps even armed, and posed a threat to himself and the public. [Officer] Pertunnen’s detainment, questioning, and pat-down of Plaintiff was a constitutional Terry stop as a matter of law. Amway Distributors, 323 F.3d at 390.

Tasering plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances and not excessive force because he was holed up in his house for two hours and officers were unsure of his cooperation as he finally came out and made like he was going back in. Biggers v. Lowe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51650 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2007):

Defendant Stephens’ actions, under the circumstances described above, were not so unreasonable as to amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The uncontroverted facts establish that plaintiff had refused to come out of the house for more than two hours, conduct on plaintiff’s part that certainly qualifies as resisting arrest. Stephens had been informed that plaintiff was intoxicated and armed and that plaintiff had made threatening statements to other officers at the scene. Although plaintiff had finally emerged from the house, he appeared to reenter the house. Defendant Stephens’ action in firing the taser was reasonable under the circumstances and therefore did not amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiffs survive summary judgment for being left handcuffed and nude for 8-20 minutes. Plaintiffs’ suit was not barred by res judicata because he “took issue” with the search, but did not litigate it. There was an arrest warrant and that justified the entry. Depaolo v. Brunswick Hills Police Dep’t, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51649 (N.D. Ohio July 17, 2007):

Courts that have examined this issue have found forcing a person to remain unclothed during a search may be a violation of that person’s Fourth Amendment rights, depending on the circumstances. Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring an individual to remain naked for twenty to thirty minutes while exposed to cold January air violates individual’s clearly established constitutional rights.) The plaintiff in that case also claimed that he was only offered a woman’s dress and that the officers made derogatory remarks about his nudity. Id. at 1153. Armstead v. Township of Upper Dublin, No. Civ. A 03-CV-3608, unreported 2004 WL 2743451 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2004) (using excessively tight handcuffs and removing arrestee from home without allowing him to cover his nakedness violated arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights and was clearly established in 2003). Spencer v. Moreno, No. 4:02CV3049, unreported 2003 WL 1043318, (D. Neb. March 11, 2003), citing Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Fourth Amendment is violated when a female arrestee is allowed to remain naked and exposed to male guards for a substantial period of time after the threat to security and safety posed by the arrestee has passed.”).

Arrest warrant permitted the police to approach defendant’s house from the front and back. United States v. Jordan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51574 (E.D. Tenn. July 16, 2007):

It is well-settled that “‘for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.'” U.S. v. Wickizer, 633 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). Thus, Judge Guyton’s determination that the posting of officers in the defendant’s backyard in order to execute a valid arrest warrant was reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment was not in error.

DL roadblock was valid. Defendant’s license having been revoked, he was subject to arrest. United States v. Nixon, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105889 (W.D. N.C. December 18, 2008):

Although Nixon does not challenge the validity of the initial stop, this Court notes as a preliminary matter that the driver’s license checkpoint was permissible. Vehicle checkpoints are permissible where all drivers on a certain road are stopped as they pass, or where all cars at specific intervals (e.g., every fifth car) are stopped, so long as the intrusion on the drivers’ privacy and time is minimal, the procedure is uniform, and the stop satisfies a purpose other than normal law enforcement. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-55 (1990). Here, all drivers were stopped and asked to produce their licenses before they could proceed on their way. The intrusion was minimal and uniformly imposed. The purpose of the stop was roadway safety, a purpose approved by the Supreme Court as distinct from normal law enforcement. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38. Of especial relevance to the present case, the Supreme Court in Edmond suggested in dicta that a “roadblock with the purpose of verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible.” Id. at 37-38. Thus, the initial seizure of Nixon at the checkpoint for the purpose of checking his driver’s license was reasonable and comports with Supreme Court precedent on the issue.

Customs had an outgoing package interdiction program at the Fed Ex Oakland overseas shipping hub looking for cash in outgoing packages, and the search here was authorized by

31 U.S.C. § 5317(b), which provides: “For purposes of ensuring compliance with the requirements of section 5316, a customs officer may stop and search, at the border and without a search warrant, any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other conveyance, any envelope or other container, and any person entering or departing from the United States.” Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 643 (9th Cir.1992).

The package search here revealed a letter and a sexual relationship with an 8 year old girl in the Phillipines. He challenged the reading of the letter.

Seljan argues that the search, regardless of its authorization, was unreasonably intrusive in its scope because it entailed reading his personal correspondence. Seljan further objects to the search because he contends that it should have been clear to the customs agent, without having to read the letter, that the FedEx package contained no undeclared currency or other contraband.

The concerns identified by the Supreme Court are not present here. The search did not involve the destruction of property, it was not conducted in a “particularly offensive manner,” and it was not a “highly intrusive search[] of the person.” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, 154 n.2, 155-56 (internal quotation marks omitted). There was no destruction of property. The first FedEx package, the target of Seljan’s motion to suppress, was returned to FedEx for delivery and presumably reached its destination in good order. Nor was the search conducted in a manner that could be categorized as “particularly offensive.” See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13. Ramsey suggested that a border search might be unreasonable “because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out,” citing as examples searches that were held unreasonable in Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 77 S. Ct. 828, 1 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1957) (officers, without a search warrant, seized the entire contents of a cabin and took the items 200 miles away to be examined), and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931) (Officer falsely claimed to have a search warrant and then “made a general and apparently unlimited search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases, and other parts of the office. It was a lawless invasion of the premises and a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence of crime might be found.”). There was nothing like that here.

The concern in this case is simply with how far the search went–whether it was too intrusive in scope. We agree with Seljan that there was intrusion into his privacy, but the degree of intrusion must be viewed in perspective. Seljan voluntarily gave the package containing the letter to FedEx for delivery to someone in the Philippines, with knowledge that it would have to cross the border and clear customs. The reasonable expectation of privacy for that package was necessarily tempered. When the Supreme Court spoke of “highly intrusive searches” in Flores-Montano, it expressly referred to “highly intrusive searches of the person” which raised concern based on the “dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched,” and made the point that this concern was not triggered by a search of the person’s vehicle. 541 U.S. at 152. The reference in Flores-Montano to “highly intrusive searches of the person” followed a discussion of Montoya de Hernandez, which involved an actual physical intrusion into a person’s body to search the alimentary canal. In the latter case, the Court illustrated its reference to “nonroutine border searches” by citing “searches such as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.” 473 U.S. at 541 n.4. The search of Seljan’s FedEx package was substantially less intrusive than these examples.

. . .

Seljan also argues that the customs inspectors were required to stop their examination without reading the letter. Even if the inspectors were authorized to open the FedEx package and the sealed envelopes within the package, he contends that it should have been apparent to the customs agent that the letter was not currency or another monetary instrument, such that no reading was justified or permitted.

. . .

Moreover, the customs inspector’s task here was not so simple. Although the bills turned out to be of small denominations, both of the sealed envelopes within the first FedEx parcel did in fact contain currency, so there was reason for the inspector to pause and look more carefully. In addition, many documents in addition to currency may qualify as “monetary instruments,” as the definition reprinted above, at 15, demonstrates, and thus are subject to the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5316. A simple sheet of paper could, for example, turn out to be a negotiable instrument, such as a promissory note in bearer form. The inspector could not determine that the folded paper found inside the envelope was not a monetary instrument without actually looking at what was printed there.

IV. Conclusion

We hold that customs officials acting under authority of 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) may, at the functional equivalent of the border, search a package or container being shipped via FedEx across the border, without a warrant. The inspection may include smaller envelopes or other wrapped or sealed objects contained within the package. The search does not violate the Fourth Amendment simply because it may entail scanning of personal correspondence, or because the evidence of contraband or other criminal activity that is detected may not relate to the interdiction of undeclared currency. To unreasonably constrain customs inspectors from searching and seizing obviously incriminating materials would be imprudent and inconsistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Reading it, he scanned the letter and quickly discerned its contents. Seljan was 87 years old and sentenced to 20 years for attempted travel to have sex with a minor. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’g United States v. Seljan, 497 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), posted Aug. 15, 2007 here: FedEx’s Oakland hub is functional equivalent of border for overseas shipments.

CI who just made a buy from the defendant and related the details to the police showed probable cause. State v. Allen, 994 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 2008).*

District Court credited that defendant consented to a search and not that she was in some kind of spell when she did. United States v. McCurdy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92437 (D. Maine November 13, 2008).*

Tow company entered on open fields to tow plaintiff’s car at the request of the police, so the entry was not unlawful. Hardy v. County of El Dorado, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92229 (E.D. Cal. November 13, 2008).*

Defendant’s stop was based on running a stop light, and that was justified. Events thereafter developed into more. United States v. Coppedge, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92428 (D. Del. November 10, 2008).*

In a warrantless blood draw where there was no probable cause to believe the driver was impaired but the driver was involved in a serious accident, the special needs exception cannot be relied upon to admit the result of the blood draw in a criminal case. State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 178 P.3d 1190 (2008).*

Apparent hand to hand transaction is not alone reasonable suspicion. “But when, as in the current case, an officer observes items changing hands, when the transaction takes place in a specific location known for drug-related activity, and when it takes place late at night, an officer’s otherwise unparticularized suspicions may be elevated to the level of reasonable suspicion.” State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 179 P.3d 954 (2008).*

The “four corners” rule of an affidavit for a search warrant does not apply to a citation for arrest. The contents of the citation are relevant, but not even determinative under the totality of circumstances. Smith v. State, 182 Md. App. 444, 957 A.2d 1139 (2008).*

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s arrest based on his description and the fact witnesses saw his car at the scene of the crime and then it was seen at his house. Jordan v. State, 995 So. 2d 94 (Miss. 2008).*

There was probable cause and the good faith exception should not be applied. State v. Cobb, 2008 Ohio 5210, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4389 (12th Dist. October 6, 2008).* Of more significance is this radical comment: “[*P23] However, the exclusionary rule need not be employed when police properly execute a legal warrant issued by a detached magistrate which is supported by probable cause. State v. George (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325.” So, the exclusionary rule will not be applied if there is probable cause? I’m dumbfounded. How will we cope?

Asking the defendant to step out of a motel room so he could be questioned about a crime was not a seizure. United States v. Parker, 549 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2008):

The closest precedent in our circuit is United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 69-70 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 979, 125 S. Ct. 484, 160 L. Ed. 2d 357 (2004), vacated on other grounds sub. nom. Champagne v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102, 125 S. Ct. 1025, 160 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2005). In Beaudoin, we held (albeit by a divided vote) that no warrant was required for a reasonable police request that the suspect step out of his hotel room. We deemed the intrusion on privacy of such a direction to be real but modest, especially when weighed against the risk to police officers, and stressed the analogy to the Terry stop cases allowing investigative stops on the street.

Here, as in Beaudoin, the men inside the room were reasonably suspected of involvement in a felony (the threatening of Davis) and of possessing a gun. Indeed, although the crime at issue was less serious than in Beaudoin, the evidence pointing to Parker’s involvement in it and the likelihood of his having a weapon were much stronger, as in Beaudoin police were acting merely on an anonymous tip. Id. at 62. Summoning Parker and the other men to step outside the hotel room was thus justified as a means of protecting the police while they pursued the investigation and of securing the weapon and other possible evidence when they decided to seek a warrant.

Having the men outside the room, the police could perhaps have arrested them on the spot. Davis’ statement provided probable cause, not mere suspicion, to arrest the men who had threatened her; and the tracing of the truck to the motel and the desk clerk’s identification point to the men in Room 419 as the culprits. But absent exigent circumstances, Samboy, 433 F.3d at 158, or consent, Luciano, 329 F.3d at 7, the police still needed a warrant to search the room for physical evidence. So, reasonably enough they awaited the warrant and the confirmation provided by the gun, drugs and money before making formal arrests.

Defendant’s consent to search his apartment in a stalking investigation was general. “Furthermore, the form referred generally to ‘letters, papers, or other property.’ This boilerplate language, unmodified, indicates an intention to go well beyond a mere computer search.” He contended that he thought they were looking for letters to the stalking victim. Cash in a briefcase and desk drawer and business records showing defendant sold used computer equipment under a pseudonym was used to prosecute him for tax evasion, and they were within the scope of consent. United States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2008).* (Comment: There was a significant claim of waiver that the defendant changed the argument from the District Court and the Court of Appeals. The court here dealt with the issue on the merits.)

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and have him lie on the ground for a patdown when he was seen fleeing the scene of an unannounced visit of a defendant on home detention. United States v. Carlisle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98075 (N.D. Ind. December 3, 2008).*

Baseless plaintiff’s motion to remand in a civil rights case removed to federal court that was clearly barred by Heck results in show cause order for Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff. King v. Farris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98044 (M.D. Ga. December 3, 2008).*

Plaintiff’s motion to suppress had been granted by the state trial court, and he sued under § 1983. He lost on summary judgment because there was PC for the stop and he failed to show that it was based on racial profiling. Ballard v. Heineman, 548 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2008).*

Car was suspicious in high crime area where it was parked with lights off and engine running, people inside, license plate that was bogus, and it moved as police car approached. United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 2008 FED App. 0434P (6th Cir. 2008).*

Officers responding to a 911 call about threats to kill people had probable cause to believe that the person inside was the person who made the threats. Glenn v. City of Columbus, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97458 (M.D. Ga. December 2, 2008).*

Probable cause was lacking, but not so lacking that the search was invalid under the good faith exception. Defendant was handcuffed and removed to a police station, and this was an arrest despite the officer’s not believing it was. The fact the search incident was two hours later did not void the search. United States v. Smith, 549 F.3d 355, 2008 FED App. 0435P (6th Cir. 2008).*

Defendant’s stop was valid under Terry for two apparent traffic violations. He consented after that. United States v. Ferrying, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97694 (N.D. Okla. December 2, 2008).*

Plaintiff’s civil case was barred by Heck. “Wilson’s version of the incident necessarily implies that her convictions were unlawful. In essence, Wilson claims that she was not behaving in any manner that would justify the use of force by either officer.” Wilson v. Gilbert, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97777 (S.D. Ind. December 2, 2008).*

Detention of the defendant, lawful during a protective sweep, ostensibly for officer safety, unjustifiably continued thereafter, and defendant’s consent during that unlawful detention was invalid. State v. Hitchcock, 224 Ore. App. 77, 197 P.3d 33 (2008):

Applying those principles here, the detention of Winters continued after the protective sweep and Henson’s arrest and after dissipation of concerns for officer safety. The police continued the questioning of the occupants and asked them for identification. Hitchcock remained handcuffed. Winters was asked if the interrogation could continue in her bedroom. She was not expressly or implicitly advised that she was free to go or that she could refuse to answer any questions. The continued questioning of Winters, both in the living room and in her bedroom, prolonged her detention.

“The threshold question we must answer is whether Officer Lappe had probable cause to stop Stroud’s car. During the eight-month investigation, the officers made observations and compiled 106 recorded conversations and numerous surveillance videos.” (You figure it out.) People v. Stroud, 2008 Ill. App. LEXIS 1134 (November 19, 2008).*

Defendant consented to a search when he was told, when there was reasonable suspicion, that a drug dog would be coming and would arrive in 15-20 minutes. United States v. Thao, 291 Fed. Appx. 129 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Defendant lacked standing to contest the search of a camper on the road that he stored drugs in. Even if he did, the police activity was based on a CI corroborated by surveillance, and it was an independent source. United States v. Cabaniss, 286 Fed. Appx. 196 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s Miranda waiver was voluntary on the totality, including the fact that he was familiar with criminal law. United States v. Doody, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60382 (D. Me. August 6, 2008).*

Defendant’s getting upset when being questioned about what was found during a consent search is not a withdrawal of consent. Boone v. State, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (September 23, 2008).*

Landlord could not consent to a search of a trailer rented to a person the police were looking for. The arrest warrant was used as a search warrant. Looney v. State, 293 Ga. App. 639, 667 S.E.2d 893 (2008).*

Handcuffed suspect could consent to a search of his car. Here, it was within 15 seconds. Maloy v. State, 667 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. App. 2008).*

Motel employees conducted a valid search of the defendant’s vacated room where he was arrested on a warrant while police were investigating drugs and he would not be back before the room rental expired, and his own guest had, at the motel’s request, vacated the premises. The manager went back into the room and checked it completely a second time finding meth hidden in a tissue box. United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2008).*

Reasonable suspicion was evident for defendant’s stop by police where the vehicle was already stopped at a rest area within one mile of the Mexican border and the desert off-road vehicles were off-loaded from the defendant’s vehicle. United States v. Macias-Encinas, 291 Fed. Appx. 59 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Fact that some defendants might have been involved in money laundering did not lead to the conclusion that evidence would be found in the homes of other defendants. United States v. Orozco, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2008):

While such evidence might suggest that 11538 Nucla was purchased with drug trafficking proceeds that had been laundered through various bank accounts, or that Defendants Evaristo, Martha, and Cynthia Orosco had engaged in money laundering, I find it would not “lead a prudent person to believe there is a fair probability contraband or evidence of a crime would be found” at this address. Eidson, 515 F.3d at 1146; see also Gonzales, 399 F.3d at 1228 (requiring a nexus between the contraband to be seized or the suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched). With respect to potential evidence of drug trafficking, no evidence suggests that Defendants Evaristo, Martha, or Cynthia Orosco were involved in such activities, and no evidence suggests that 11538 Nucla was used for such purposes. No evidence links Defendant Samuel Orozco’s Mercedes Benz CL 600 to such trafficking, and the affidavit merely indicates that this vehicle had been purchased with drug trafficking proceeds.

Officer saw cocaine on the console when defendant got out of the vehicle, and that is a classic plain view. United States v. Gill, 290 Fed. Appx. 965 (8th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

While a search warrant is considered within the four corners of the affidavit, the protective sweep conducted here obviously is not. United States v. Lawson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67124 (D. Kan. August 15, 2008).*

An order for saliva, hair, and blood samples has to be based on a sworn affidavit, and merely presenting an order to a judge for signature is insufficient. Thus, it must be suppressed. Here, however, the error was harmless in light of all the evidence in the case. State v. Woods, 376 S.C. 125, 654 S.E.2d 867 (2007):

On June 6, 2003, Officer Creech approached Judge Cooper in chambers for an order to take samples of Woods’ hair, blood, and saliva. Two other judges were present in chambers when Officer Creech requested the order. Although Judge Cooper found probable cause to issue the order based on his conversation with Officer Creech, there was no affidavit from Officer Creech to support the court order, and Officer Creech failed to make a statement under oath as required by section 17-13-140. The State conceded the order was defective on its face. We find the court order failed to comply with statutory guidelines. Consequently, the hair, blood, and saliva samples should have been suppressed.

Defendant waived the argument he makes on appeal now in the trial court, so it is barred. State v. McDaniel, 104 Conn. App. 627, 934 A.2d 847 (2007).*

Defendant’s wife had the authority to consent to a search of their hotel room. State v. Toney, 187 N.C. App. 465, 653 S.E.2d 187 (2007).*

State’s failure to show how close the defendant was to his car at the time of the arrest is a failure of proof on proximity for search incident. State v. Webb, 146 Wn. App. 1067 (2008):

¶16 Here, unlike in Adams, the trial court’s findings do not address Webb’s physical proximity to either the passenger compartment or his vehicle at the time of his arrest, a critical fact. In the absence of such a finding, the State has not borne its burden to show that the search of Webb’s vehicle incident to his lawful arrest falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.

¶17 At the CrR 3.6 hearing, Officer Shipman testified that when he and Officer Reiner asked Webb to exit the vehicle, Webb staggered from his car to the sidewalk. The record does not show the distance between Webb’s car and the sidewalk. Shortly thereafter, Officer Wheeler administered field sobriety tests to Webb in the driveway of a bank. Officer Wheeler parked his patrol car in the adjacent bank parking lot about 15 feet away from where he administered the field sobriety test. During the test, Webb’s car remained parked in the right curb lane of the street. When Webb failed the tests, Officer Wheeler arrested him, placed him in handcuffs, and moved him to the patrol car. Nowhere in this record is there a showing of Webb’s proximity to his car at the time of his arrest. This is a fatal flaw.

Officer confronting citizen on the street expects citizen to be detained, but a knock and talk can be refused. State v. Jarrell, 994 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2008):

There is a clear distinction between the police detaining a suspect on the street as authorized by Article 215.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the police knocking on a suspect’s door. When stopped on the street, a suspect has no choice but to submit to the authority of the police. When the door is opened in response to a knock, it is the consent of the occupant to confront the caller. There is no compulsion, force or coercion involved in the latter situation. State v. Sanders, 374 So.2d 1186, 1188 (La. 1979). HN4A search conducted pursuant to consent is an exception to the requirements of both warrant and probable cause. State v. Johnson, 98-0264, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/98), 728 So.2d 885, 887.

Officer’s mistake as to what type of weapon did not make unreasonable looking for the weapon. Whether it was brass knuckles or a gun was not material. United States v. Murph, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69324 (D. Neb. August 26, 2008):

Moreover, even taking into account Officer Gordon’s mistake in believing that the object was brass knuckles rather than a gun, officers had reasonable suspicion for the searches under Terry. United States v. Bailey, 417 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 2005) (a mistaken belief suffices, if officers do not know that it is mistaken and act reasonably). Officer Gordon testified that he believed he saw a weapon, and his mistake related to the type of weapon. No case law has been cited indicating that this type of mistake cannot support an otherwise legal Terry stop or search.

“The reliability of the informant’s tip did not need to be established before the officers knocked on the door [with their search warrant]. Once the door was opened and the officers were inside, Detective Zemlik observed contraband in plain view.” State v. Johnson, 994 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2008).*

Officer was talking with defendant who was a bystander to an investigation in a house and asked defendant’s name, getting a false name. Under Oregon law, it was not a crime to give a false name because the defendant was under investigation for nothing at the time, but that led to finding a warrant on the defendant. The question of independent basis for the search incident to that arrest was not determined below, so the case is remanded. State v. Allen, 191 P.3d 762 (Ore. App. 2008).*

Defendant fled a traffic stop, and officers outside his house could hear a domestic quarrel, but not likely violence. This did not justify a warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine. State v. Salisbury, 223 Ore. App. 516, 196 P.3d 1017 (2008):

The officers were also aware that defendant was not an intruder in the apartment and that he resided there. The only offense that they were aware he had committed was a traffic offense. Significantly, the police did not testify that they heard any sounds of a physical struggle or an indication that an act of violence had occurred inside the apartment. Moreover, no occupant of the apartment requested assistance from the police, even though the police made their presence known over a significant time period. It is correct, as the state argues, that it could be inferred that, because the lights were turned off and there were no longer any sounds coming from the apartment, the screaming woman inside the apartment was unable to respond to their inquiries due to injury or restraint; however, that inference is counterbalanced by the inference that what the police heard was evidence of a domestic quarrel that did not require their intervention.

Defendant’s car broke down on a convenience store parking lot, and officers asked if he needed help. They asked for his ID [Why?], which he said that he did not have, but he gave his name and DOB. That produced a warrant, and that led to a search incident, which produced evidence of identity theft. The search was valid. State v. Langston, 223 Ore. App. 590 (2008).*