Threat to arrest occupants if drugs were found and the officers were forced to get a search warrant was not unlawful coercion to consent because it was conditional. State v. Martin, 996 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 5th Cir. October 28, 2008).*

911 call about blood in a house where the caller wanted assistance getting her kids out of the house justified police entry because there was obviously an injured person likely in need of aid. Defendant’s bloody palm print was thus validly seized. State v. Simmons, 996 So. 2d 1177 (La. App. 5th Cir. October 28, 2008).*

Plaintiff’s call to the fire department for assistance is consent to their entry, and a plain view after that was valid. Rose v. Julliano, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101094 (E.D. N.Y. December 8, 2008).*

Stop of vehicle was justified based on report of a domestic distrubance in it. State v. Clark, 2008 MT 419, 347 Mont. 354, 198 P.3d 809 (December 16, 2008)*; State v. Lewis, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (December 9, 2008).*

The defendant was seen with a group of men by a bike cop who headed toward them in what the officer described was a “high crime area.” The defendant walked 15′ to his town house. This was not “headlong flight” as in Wardlow. The defendant had a right to walk away from the officer. Jones v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 171, 670 S.E.2d 31 (December 23, 2008):

The facts of the instant case can hardly be equated to those of Wardlow. Unlike the facts in Wardlow, the officers in the instant case were on a routine patrol, not targeting participants in a drug transaction at a specific location where drug transactions were known to frequently occur. Furthermore, Jones carried no item, such as the opaque bag in Wardlow, which together with the other circumstances, would objectively indicate his involvement in criminal activity. Jones’ “brisk” walk of some fifteen feet to a nearby townhouse upon seeing the officers can hardly be equated to the “headlong flight” of Wardlow. The Commonwealth also points to Jones’ “[n]ervous, evasive behavior” to support its contention that the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion. Specifically, that Jones refused to heed the officer’s requests to stop. However, citizens who are not under arrest or otherwise detained have every right to refuse or ignore requests from law enforcement officers. “[W]hen an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.” Id. at 125 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)). Moreover, a “‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.'” Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991)). That was precisely what occurred here. Under these circumstances, Jones’ failure to obey the officer’s instructions cannot serve as the justification for his seizure.

(Comment: The state’s argument here proved too much. It wants to be able to say that a person had a right to refuse a purely consensual encounter with the officer, but then require the defendant to not walk away.)

Dog sniff outside the home on the curtilage did not violate the Fourth Amendment. All it revealed was a bag outside the house. United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. December 24, 2008), aff’g United States v. Hayes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98101 (D. Vt. May 5, 2006) (posted on Lexis 1/1/09):

We reject Hayes’s arguments and his reliance on Thomas and hold that the police canine’s act of sniffing for narcotics here did not violate Hayes’s “legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. Thomas is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. The contents of the black bag that Kilo [the dog] smelled were not located inside Hayes’s dwelling or residence but in brush outside the house, approximately 65 feet from the back door of the residence and bordering an adjoining property. A critical consideration in Thomas, one not present here, was that the canine there smelled the presence of narcotics located inside the defendant’s home.

. . .

The sanctuary of the home simply does not extend to the front yard of Hayes’s property, where the initial sniff occurred. See United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a homeowner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a patch of front lawn visible from the road and leading up to the front porch); see also United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance …. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be.”); accord Esmont v. City of New York, 371 F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Unobstructed, open areas in front of a residence are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”).

Nexus between drugs and defendant’s home was shown from defendant’s engaging in significant drug transactions. It was logical they would be in his house. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. January 8, 2009):

As discussed above, the affidavit contains evidence that Gunter was engaged in repeated purchases of cocaine in the one to four kilogram range. Because the quantity of drugs and the repeated nature of the transactions make it reasonable to conclude that Gunter was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking, it was reasonable to infer that evidence of illegal activity would be found at Gunter’s residence. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1998) (probable cause to search residence existed where defendant engaged in two recorded transactions outside of his residence because “[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the drug dealers live”).

The issuing magistrate does not have to personally view child porn to issue a search warrant for it. United States v. Wellman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 833 (S.D. W.Va. January 7, 2009).

Defendant conceded facts in his motion to suppress that showed that reasonable suspicion existed, so a suppression hearing was not required. United States v. Pasillas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106221 (W.D. La. December 12, 2008).*

Defendant driving a stolen vehicle had no standing to contest its search. United States v. Pickar, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106240 (D. Minn. November 18, 2008).*

Defendant’s tight control over the movement of the drugs and the money prevented an anticipatory search warrant and created exigency itself. Therefore, the police were justified in entry on a Buie protective sweep and the plain view that resulted was lawful. United States v. Flores, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707 (M.D. Fla. January 7, 2009) (the court also chided the lawyers for not citing Grubbs):

As Grubbs stated, an anticipatory search warrant cannot issue until the officers have probable cause that the triggering condition will occur. The triggering condition in this case was the confidential source seeing the crystal meth; as the officers correctly recognized, given the multiple occasions when this group of suspects had promised drugs but failed to deliver, nothing short of seeing the drugs was sufficient. The confidential source reported at 6:30 or 6:38 p.m. (the time was variously stated in the testimony) that he had seen the crystal meth. Given the factual background with these particular suspects, there was not probable cause to believe that the drugs would be there prior to that time. Under the terms of the agreement with the suspects, $23,000 was to be brought by a female money courier immediately thereafter, and the courier was to have been within minutes of the house. Given the suspects’ history of caution in the transaction and their stated desire to do the transaction quickly, there was simply not sufficient time to obtain an anticipatory search warrant, even by telephone or electronic media. This is not based upon speculation, but upon the reasonable inferences of the facts known to the officers at the time.

A NYC livery cab encroaching on a sidewalk was sufficient cause for a stop. The driver’s furtive movements after the stop gave RS. United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. January 8, 2009), rev’g United States v. Stewart, 491 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D. N.Y. 2007).*

Fire scene search by deputy sheriff after fire was extinguished was a criminal search unrelated to the fire, and it was suppressed. People v. Christianson, 2008 NY Slip Op 10269, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10026 (4th Dept. December 31, 2008):

At the time the Sheriff’s Deputy arrived at defendant’s home, the fire officials had extinguished the blaze, ventilated the home, and determined the origin of the fire. Moreover, the Fire Chief testified at the suppression hearing that he called for the Sheriff’s Deputy to investigate other safety concerns, such as the locked interior door and boarded-up windows. Those concerns, however, did not pose an immediate threat to defendant and thus do not fall within the purview of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement (see generally People v Molnar, 98 NY2d 328, 332; People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-178, cert denied 426 U.S. 953).

The issue was really just one of consent, not fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Melton, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 1296 (December 31, 2008):

In Bergmann our supreme court held that even if an initial pat-down search were illegal, marijuana discovered as a result of a subsequent search based on probable cause and exigent circumstances was not subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree because there was no link between the pat-down and the subsequent search. Id. at 333, 338. The only incriminating evidence seized from Melton was marijuana found not during the pat-down search, but instead found during a later search to which Melton consented. Melton does not question the nature or character of that consent, or claim that it was involuntary.

Finding of one joint was not the entire basis of a search warrant for defendant’s house. Other things she said contributed to it. State v. Gdovin, 2008 ME 195, 961 A.2d 1099 (December 30, 2008).*

“[B]inocular surveillance was legal under the plain view doctrine”. United States v. Sledge, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95062 (N.D. Fla. November 21, 2008).*

Tinted window stop led to window rolling down and overwhelming smell of air fresheners coming out. That coupled with excessive nervousness was reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Kemp, 2008 PA Super 274, 961 A.2d 1247 (November 26, 2008).*

The validity of a 911 caller’s tip was assessed when the officer met the caller. That provided reasonable suspicion for defendant’s later stop. United States v. Bland, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76992 (D. Del. September 30, 2008).*

General consent to search a room includes moving a towel that revealed drugs. United States v. Gordon, 294 Fed. Appx. 579 (11th Cir. September 26, 2008) (unpublished).*

Defendant consented to continue to talk to the officer after the stop was technically complete. Suppression order reversed. State v. Ford, 992 So. 2d 360 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 2008).*

No Fourth Amendment claim for a broken door from pursuing a fleeing man otherwise reasonably under the Fourth Amendment. Heckenswiler v. K. McLaughlin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76771 (E.D. Pa. September 29, 2008).*

Defendant’s hand to hand drug deal from his car five days earlier was reasonable suspicion to detain the car for a dog sniff. United States v. Ferrell, 293 Fed. Appx. 934 (3d Cir. September 29, 2008) (unpublished).

Defendant’s live in girlfriend obviously had authority to consent to a search of their shared property. United States v. Nichols, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76549 (W.D. Ark. August 26, 2008).*

Defense counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion was not ineffective assistance where the motion was groundless. Hillary v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 294 Fed. Appx. 569 (11th Cir. September 26, 2008) (unpublished).*

Plaintiff’s civil search claim here necessarily attacked the underlying basis for his conviction, so it was barred under Heck. Weaver v. Geiger, 294 Fed. Appx. 529 (11th Cir. September 24, 2008) (unpublished).*

District court erred in granting the government’s motion to dismiss under the FTCA for plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution action. He got a judgment of $1.8M from a jury. Nguyen v. United States, 545 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008), on reconsideration Nguyen v. United States, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2127 (11th Cir. February 4, 2009) (Comment: This case is compelling reading, as the court intended. Dr. Nguyen is a North Vietmanese born doctor who fled Vietnam after having been imprisoned repeatedly there. Here, he was targetted by the DEA and state officers for wrongfully prescribing valium and hydrocodone, his case made the headlines, his patients defected, and then the case evaporated and was nolle prossed in a mere 55 days.).

Factual dispute as to the underlying constitutional claim over decedent’s death in custody precluded qualified immunity. Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008) (2-1).*

“It is well-established that ‘the Fourth Amendment is not implicated simply because an individual violates state law.’ Armstead v. Township of Upper Dublin, 347 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (discussing an arrest outside the officer’s jurisdiction in apparent violation of the MPJA). See also, Baker v. McCollan, 442 U.S. 137, 144 (1979). McDonald v. Darby Borough, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77774 (E.D. Pa. October 2, 2008).*

Evidence supported the conclusion that the consenter had apparent authority to consent. United States v. Torres, 294 Fed. Appx. 940 (5th Cir. October 2, 2008) (unpublished).*

In ruling on all motions pending in a case, the defendant filed a motion to suppress a warrantless search, but the government contended it was with a warrant and provided it, and no further explanation was filed. So, the motion is denied. United States v. Glover, 583 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. D.C. October 3, 2008).*

The evidence justified the district court’s conclusion that defendant consented to a search as shown by his hand gestures. United States v. Patterson, 295 Fed. Appx. 100 (8th Cir. September 23, 2008) (unpublished).*

Maps of border towns on the front seat inconsistent with defendant’s travel plans, coupled with everything else, was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sierra, 294 Fed. Appx. 884 (5th Cir. September 30, 2008) (unpublished) (“We agree that the presence of maps of popular drug trafficking border towns not included in a driver’s expressed itinerary coupled with nervousness creates reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Accordingly, based on the collective knowledge of Deputy Womack and TFA Newman, we conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to continue Sierra’s detention and that Sierra’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.”).

Defendant was not stopped, and the encounter was consensual. He did not have to be told he was free to leave. United States v. White, 295 Fed. Appx. 186 (9th Cir. September 29, 2008) (unpublished):

Here, the encounter between White and the officer was not a seizure, but rather a consensual encounter, wherein the officer merely asked questions and White was free to leave the encounter at any time. The officer approached White alone and in an non-threatening manner. Additionally, the encounter occurred in the open public space of a motel parking lot. Although the police officer did not explicitly tell White that White was free to leave, the officer’s failure to do so does not render the encounter a seizure. See Orman, 486 F.3d at 1176. Further, there was no evidence that White attempted to terminate the encounter but was unable to do so. See United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).

Informant’s information was specific and corroborated. It showed that he had inside information. United States v. Schmidt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77482 (D. Kan. September 29, 2008).*

Good faith exception could not be applied to the officer’s good faith belief that the drug dog was well trained without proof that the dog was. Also, one officer’s mistake applies to all of them, and an officer cannot rely on the mistakes of another to invoke the good faith exception [not to mention it was a warrantless search and why should Leon apply to a warrantless search?]. United States v. Clarkson, 551 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. January 6, 2009):

In declining to extend the Leon good-faith exception to mistakes made by law enforcement personnel, this court has relied on the Leon Court’s statement that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Herrera, 444 F.3d at 1249-51. That “[t]he Supreme Court has never extended Leon’s good-faith exception beyond circumstances where an officer has relied in good faith on a mistake made by someone other than the police” provides additional support for this court’s continued reliance on the Leon Court’s stated purpose of the exclusionary rule and continued refusal to extend the good-faith exception to mistakes by law enforcement. Id. (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995), further reinforces confinement of the good-faith exception. There, in determining whether to apply the good faith exception to an illegal search, the Court explicitly distinguished court employees from law enforcement personnel for purposes of the Leon good-faith exception. Id. at 14-15. The Court again recognized “that the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct.” Id. at 14. The Court went on to explain that excluding evidence based on a court employee’s clerical error would not deter improper conduct, since unlike police officers, “court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 15 (citation omitted). The Court then created an exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees and remanded the case for a determination of whether a court clerk or a member of law enforcement had made the mistake in question. See id. at 16. Thus, the Court was willing to apply the good-faith exception only where a neutral third party, not a law enforcement member, was responsible for the error leading to the Fourth Amendment violation. See also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (extending Leon’s good-faith exception where officers conducting a search relied in good faith on a statute’s regulatory scheme permitting warrantless administrative searches, when the statutory regulatory scheme was later declared unconstitutional).

Here, any mistake on which Officer Sutera relied was made by a fellow officer. Were the good faith exception to apply in this circumstance, the improper police conduct of conducting a search with an untrained or unreliable dog would not be effectively deterred. Such a rule would minimize motivation for police officers to ensure a dog is actually trained or reliable before deploying it. Allowing the good-faith exception to apply in this situation would therefore contravene the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (“[The exclusionary rule is the] principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. Without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere form of words.” (alteration and quotation omitted)). The district court thus erred in concluding Officer Sutera’s reasonable reliance on Oso’s [the dog’] reliability warranted a finding of probable cause and declining to rule on whether Oso was qualified. On remand, the district court should determine whether Oso was trained or otherwise reliable. While successful completion of a training course and a current certification would be satisfactory, we do not exclude the possibility that reliability can be established by other evidence.

Delaware finally adopts community caretaking exception, in an interesting opinion with an overview of the entire exception. Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210 (Del. December 2, 2008):

In order to balance this caretaking function with the fundamental protections guaranteed by the Delaware and United States Constitutions, we must ascertain that the encounter was part of the police officer’s community caretaker function; that the officer’s actions during it remained within the caretaking function; and that once the caretaking function had ceased, either the encounter was terminated, or some other justification existed for its continuance. We find that the test promulgated by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Lovegren, properly balances these concerns. Following an in-depth analysis of various concerns informing the community caretaker doctrine, the Supreme Court of Montana adopted the following three-part test to ensure its proper application:

First, as long as there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in peril, then that officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen is in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure implicating … the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, but more importantly, those greater guarantees afforded under [state law].

We adopt this test to ensure that investigations conducted in Delaware under the community caretaker doctrine are reasonable.

Strip searches must be conducted at the minimum on reasonable suspicion. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7923 (D. N.J. February 4, 2009):

Several other Courts in this District have since held the same. See, e.g., DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F. Supp. 610, 622 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that a visual strip search and subsequent viewing of plaintiff urinating was not reasonable “on the basis of mere suspicion that a car in which the detainee was a passenger was stolen.”); Ernst v. Borough of Fort Lee, 739 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D.N.J. 1990) (“The mere fact that an arrestee will be incarcerated … does not render a strip search reasonable. Stated somewhat differently, arrest itself, standing alone, is simply not enough.”); O’Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that strip/body cavity searches of plaintiffs arrested for petty disorderly offenses were unconstitutional and “senseless”); cf. Wilkes v. Borough of Clayton, 696 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding borough’s blanket policy of visual observation of arrestees using bathroom facilities “no less destructive of arrestees’ rights than the visual strip searches” previously held unconstitutional).

With respect to the Circuit Courts of Appeal, eight circuits presently agree that reasonable suspicion must be present before a strip search is conducted in this context. See Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 539 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Rhode Island., 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. County of Lubbock, 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982). This consensus is buttressed by valid concerns for privacy, dignity, and the preservation of self-worth. See, e.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 (considering strip searches an “extreme intrusion” on personal privacy and “an offense to the dignity of the individual”) (citation omitted); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.3d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1993) (“It is axiomatic that a strip search represents a serious intrusion upon personal rights.”); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (considering strip searches “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, embarrassing and repulsive”); see also, O’Brien, 679 F. Supp. at 434 (D.N.J. 1988) (describing strip/body cavity searches of plaintiffs for disorderly offenses as humiliat[ing] and degrad[ing]”). In short, a clear consensus demonstrates that these searches are undignified and unconstitutional.

Officer who was generally aware of a search warrant’s terms but did not have it in hand complied with the Fourth Amendment under Groh. United States v. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7777 (E.D. N.Y. February 3, 2009):

Beyond merely complying with the four core warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the undisputed credible facts establish that the execution of the warrant substantially complied with the procedural restrictions contained in the body of the warrant itself: the warrant was executed in the daytime, within ten days of its issuance, by officers of the NYPD. Although the warrant authorized the officers to enter Apartment 2A without previously announcing their authority (a “no-knock” warrant), Captain McGinn was unaware of this term. He adopted the more conservative approach to gaining entry to Apartment 2A by directing ESU officers to knock at the door and announce the NYPD’s presence. This decision underscores the reasonableness of Captain McGinn’s conduct in a situation in which he knew of the search warrant for crack cocaine inside Apartment 2A, but did not actually possess the warrant and thus did not know whether a no-knock entry was permitted.

Applying an objective standard in determining whether Captain McGinn’s search of Apartment 2A was “pursuant to” the warrant, the court finds that because the warrant authorized the search of Apartment 2A by “any police officer in the City of New York” (Gov. Ex. 1), it is of no moment that the PSA-3 team did not obtain the search warrant for Apartment 2A, or that they did not intend to execute that warrant when they went to 125 Nostrand Avenue on January 9, 2007. Captain McGinn’s knowledge of the contents of the search warrant and his reasonable reliance that the warrant was facially valid were sufficient.

Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, Captain McGinn did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he directed the NYPD ESU and PSA-3 officers to enter Apartment 2A and search inside for crack cocaine, because the search of Brown’s apartment was conducted “pursuant to” a valid search warrant. Accordingly, the court denies Brown’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered inside his apartment as a result of the search.

Search warrant for a grow operation in a vineyard was executed, but the defendants lacked standing because the vineyard qualified as an open field. United States v. Alejandres-Santa Cruz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7975 (W.D. Wash. January 23, 2009).*

State court determination of third party consent bound § 1983 action over the same issue. Ingram v. Lupas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7791 (M.D. Pa. February 3, 2009).*

On NYTimes.com today: To Nudge, Shift or Shove the Supreme Court Left.

Today’s NYTimes.com, by Adam Liptak, Justices Step Closer to Repeal of Evidence Ruling on the potential demise of the exclusionary rule.