E.D. N.Y.: Officer did not have to read warrant to be aware of and comply with it

Officer who was generally aware of a search warrant’s terms but did not have it in hand complied with the Fourth Amendment under Groh. United States v. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7777 (E.D. N.Y. February 3, 2009):

Beyond merely complying with the four core warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the undisputed credible facts establish that the execution of the warrant substantially complied with the procedural restrictions contained in the body of the warrant itself: the warrant was executed in the daytime, within ten days of its issuance, by officers of the NYPD. Although the warrant authorized the officers to enter Apartment 2A without previously announcing their authority (a “no-knock” warrant), Captain McGinn was unaware of this term. He adopted the more conservative approach to gaining entry to Apartment 2A by directing ESU officers to knock at the door and announce the NYPD’s presence. This decision underscores the reasonableness of Captain McGinn’s conduct in a situation in which he knew of the search warrant for crack cocaine inside Apartment 2A, but did not actually possess the warrant and thus did not know whether a no-knock entry was permitted.

Applying an objective standard in determining whether Captain McGinn’s search of Apartment 2A was “pursuant to” the warrant, the court finds that because the warrant authorized the search of Apartment 2A by “any police officer in the City of New York” (Gov. Ex. 1), it is of no moment that the PSA-3 team did not obtain the search warrant for Apartment 2A, or that they did not intend to execute that warrant when they went to 125 Nostrand Avenue on January 9, 2007. Captain McGinn’s knowledge of the contents of the search warrant and his reasonable reliance that the warrant was facially valid were sufficient.

Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, Captain McGinn did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he directed the NYPD ESU and PSA-3 officers to enter Apartment 2A and search inside for crack cocaine, because the search of Brown’s apartment was conducted “pursuant to” a valid search warrant. Accordingly, the court denies Brown’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered inside his apartment as a result of the search.

Search warrant for a grow operation in a vineyard was executed, but the defendants lacked standing because the vineyard qualified as an open field. United States v. Alejandres-Santa Cruz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7975 (W.D. Wash. January 23, 2009).*

State court determination of third party consent bound § 1983 action over the same issue. Ingram v. Lupas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7791 (M.D. Pa. February 3, 2009).*

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