A traffic stop, even with PC to believe that a traffic offense occurred, is governed by Terry. People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 898 N.E.2d 603325 Ill. Dec. 556 (2008):

Nonetheless, this court and many other courts have analyzed traffic stops under Terry principles, regardless of whether the initial stop was supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260, 273 Ill. Dec. 360 (2003) (and cases cited therein); People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 277 Ill. Dec. 658 (2003).

In Gonzalez, this court applied Terry principles to a traffic stop during which a police officer requested identification from the defendant, who was a passenger in the stopped vehicle. Citing Berkemer, we noted that, because the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop than to a formal arrest, a fourth amendment challenge to the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228-29. We concluded that the officers’ stop of the vehicle was supported by probable cause. Thereafter, we set forth an analytical framework to use in determining whether police questioning during a traffic stop violates the fourth amendment. First, with respect to Terry‘s scope requirement, a court must determine whether the questioning is related to the initial justification for the stop. If the questioning is so related, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the questioning is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, the court must determine whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the questioning. If so, there is no fourth amendment violation. In the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the court must consider whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the questioning impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.

The California Supreme Court has Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007), on remand in People v. Brendlin, 45 Cal. 4th 262, 195 P.3d 1074, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (2008), and holds that, given the unlawfulness of the stop, the finding of the outstanding warrant on defendant was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful stop to support the search of his person incident to the arrest under Brown v. Texas.

Defendant contends that suppression is necessary to deter the police from randomly stopping citizens for the purpose of running warrant checks, but we are not persuaded. Where the seizure is flagrantly or knowingly unconstitutional or is otherwise undertaken as a fishing expedition, the third Brown factor will make it unlikely that the People would be able to demonstrate an attenuation of the taint of the initial unlawful seizure. (People v. Mitchell, supra, 824 N.E.2d at p. 650 [suppressing the evidence where “the sole apparent purpose of the detention is to check for a warrant”].) But “a chance discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant” in the course of a seizure that is later determined to be invalid is an intervening circumstance that does not trigger the same concerns. (Myers v. State, supra, 909 A.2d at p. 1067; accord, Jacobs v. State, supra, 128 P.3d at pp. 1088–1089; Fletcher v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 419, 421.) “It is only in the unusual case where the police, after a questionable stop, discover that an occupant is wanted on an arrest warrant that the intervening circumstances exception will apply.” (U.S. v. Green, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 523.) Those are precisely the facts here.

Thus, despite the unlawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the facts of this encounter demonstrate that the drug paraphernalia found on defendant’s person and in the car was not the fruit of the unlawful seizure. The police searched defendant’s person and the vehicle only after they discovered a valid outstanding warrant for his arrest. In connection with that arrest, the police were authorized to conduct a search incident to it. Under these circumstances, the outstanding warrant sufficiently attenuated the connection between the unlawful traffic stop and the subsequent discovery of the drug paraphernalia.

Younger absention applies to a § 1983 case filed while plaintiff’s criminal case is pending. Skidmore v. Henley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82180 (E.D. Ky. October 15, 2008).*

Officer saw a man on the street leaning against a car run from him as he approached. He knocked on the door of the house ran into. The trial court’s findings of consent were supported by the evidence. State v. Woolridge, 996 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2008).*

Officers investigating a shooting who arrested defendant could conduct a protective sweep of an adjacent building where the officers had facts that justified the conclusion that somebody could be there to “launch an attack” as in Buie. United States v. Dutchie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66823 (D. Utah September 2, 2008).*

Class certification denied for an Iowa strip search lawsuit because, inter alia, the questions do not sufficiently predominate to resolve the action. Rattray v. Woodbury County, 253 F.R.D. 444 (N.D. Iowa 2008).*

Defendant should have filed his motion to suppress before trial because the material he needed to file the motions was present then, not later as contended. Also, the fact the trial court ruled on the motion does not obviate the waiver question. United States v. Musick, 291 Fed. Appx. 706, 2008 FED App. 0536N (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Tasering plaintiff after he was repeatedly warned was justified because plaintiff was not cooperating in his arrest. Buckley v. Haddock, 292 Fed. Appx. 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)*:

In the light of the undisputed facts established in the record, we conclude that Defendant’s use of force in this particular situation was not outside the range of reasonable conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Of particular importance are three facts. First, the incident occurred at night on the side of a highway with considerable passing traffic. Second, the deputy could not complete the arrest–that is, truly control Plaintiff–because Plaintiff was resisting. Third, the deputy resorted to using the taser only after trying to persuade Plaintiff to cease resisting, after attempting to lift Plaintiff, and after repeatedly and plainly warning Plaintiff that a taser would be used and then giving Plaintiff some time to comply.

Good faith exception saved a search warrant that lacked probable cause for documents [at least the court decided probable cause] because there were no factual inaccuracies and the officer reasonably relied on it. United States v. Rodriguez, 291 Fed. Appx. 989 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)*:

Though the warrant used to search Contreras’s residence was not supported by probable cause, the evidence seized from the residence is still admissible under the Leon good faith exception, since the officers acted in reasonable reliance upon the warrant. Contreras does not allege any of the information in the warrant affidavit was factually inaccurate, and there is no evidence that the affiant officer was reckless or dishonest in preparing the affidavit. While the affidavit may have lacked the specificity needed to establish a connection between Contreras’s residence and evidence of the alleged crimes committed by Patino and Baird, it did establish that Patino and Baird owned Contreras’s residence and illegal aliens were residing in at least some of the residences on their property. Officers executing the warrant could have reasonably believed the presence of illegal aliens at nearby residences owned by Patino and Baird was sufficient to establish probable cause to search Contreras’s residence. Because the affidavit contained at least some information suggesting evidence might be found at Contreras’s residence, the executing officers could have reasonably believed the warrant was supported by probable cause. Thus, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence found during the search of Contreras’s residence.

Agent accessed defendant’s computer with peer-to-peer software looking for child pornography that was available for sharing. There was no expectation of privacy in the computer files. United States v. Borowy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68936 (D. Nev. August 28, 2008).*

Search warrant for a boat on a trailer permitted seizure of finger and palm prints in plain view even though they were not mentioned in the warrant. They was probable cause to believe it was evidence of a crime. United States v. Zaldivar, 292 Fed. Appx. 868 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Dog sniff during a traffic stop was valid under Caballes. United States v. Auris, 293 Fed. Appx. 188 (4th Cir. September 15, 2008) (unpublished).*

Officer had probable cause to stop defendant for robbery because the car he was driving matched the description of the one involved in the robbery. United States v. Tyree, 292 Fed. Appx. 207 (3d Cir. September 16, 2008) (unpublished).*

Relationships can create a reasonable belief in apparent authority to consent. United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir. 2008):

In the same vein, certain relationships between the occupants may give rise to the presumption that one has authority to consent to search of the other’s property. For instance, in United States v. Wright, 564 F.2d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 1977), where the defendant was an adult living with his mother, the mother had authority to consent to the search of his dresser. In United States v. Clark, 409 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2005), police reasonably relied on a wife’s permission to search a closet in which the wife reported that the defendant often hid things; nothing in the circumstances showed that the defendant had exclusive access to the closet. The Seventh Circuit has held that “a spouse presumptively has authority to consent to a search of all areas of the homestead; the nonconsenting spouse may rebut this presumption only by showing that the consenting spouse was denied access to the particular area searched.” United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 1992). It would be more accurate to say that the nonconsenting spouse must show that police had reason to know the area or container was off-limits to the consenting spouse.

In this case, the testimony of Raggs supported the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Maria Juarez gave permission to enter the bedrooms. It was reasonable for Ortiz to rely on the words and gesture of Maria Juarez, the proprietress of the house and the wife of Porfirio, to conclude that he was authorized to push the doors open and step in the rooms in order to communicate with the people inside. The district court’s legal conclusions in denying the suppression motion were sound.

Search incident can go to the defendant’s buttocks when there was concern he still had drugs on him, which would have meant the drugs would come into the jail. Court refuses to adopt the minority rule that the defendant cannot complain on appeal of an alleged illegal search unless he also testified at trial. Hendricks v. State, 897 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. App. December 12, 2008).*

Bell v. Wolfish factors applies to all jail searches and not just strip searches. Powell v. State, 898 N.E.2d 328 (Ind. App. 2008).

Disorderly conduct arrest supports search incident. State v. Hansen, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 1251 (December 17, 2008).*

Directing a motorist to move away from a vehicle and over to the police vehicle in such a way as to express a requirement of compliance is a seizure. Strange v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 847 (Ky. 2008).*

Defendant proved that he was a guest and had standing to contest a search of the apartment he was visiting. He had spent two or three nights there, had a key, and had stuff there when the entry occurred. His cocaine conviction is reversed, but his assault of the officers is not. State v. Keith, 2008 Ohio 6122, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5115 (10th Dist. November 25, 2008).*

Officers who had a 911 report that the decedent was mentally ill and was a danger to himself or others, verified at the scene, had qualified immunity from suit for their entry and re-entry into the premises, establishing a perimeter around the premises (not itself a seizure), and seizure of the premises. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24217 (1st Cir. November 26, 2008).*

From Yahoo! Tech and AP: AP IMPACT: SWAT teams deployed in 911 fraud. Scammers are using internet-based phone services to call 911 and report that they are high on drugs and shot their sister. The SWAT team responds and breaks in.

Doug Bates and his wife, Stacey, were in bed around 10 p.m., their 2-year-old daughters asleep in a nearby room. Suddenly they were shaken awake by the wail of police sirens and the rumble of a helicopter above their suburban Southern California home. A criminal must be on the loose, they thought.

Doug Bates got up to lock the doors and grabbed a knife. A beam from a flashlight hit him. He peeked into the backyard. A swarm of police, assault rifles drawn, ordered him out of the house. Bates emerged, frightened and with the knife in his hand, as his wife frantically dialed 911. They were handcuffed and ordered to the ground while officers stormed the house.

The scene of mayhem and carnage the officers expected was nowhere to be found. Neither the Bateses nor the officers knew that they were pawns in a dangerous game being played 1,200 miles away by a teenager bent on terrifying a random family of strangers.

. . .

While Doug and Stacey Bates were cuffed on the ground that night in March 2007, 18-year-old Randal Ellis, living with his parents in Mukilteo, Wash., was nearly finished with the 27-minute yarn about a drug-fueled murder that brought the Orange County Sheriff’s Department SWAT team to the Bateses’ home.

In a grisly sounding call to 911, Ellis was putting an Internet-based phone service for the hearing-impaired to nefarious use. By entering bogus information about his location, Ellis was able to make it seem to the 911 operator as if he was calling from inside the Bateses’ home. He said he was high on drugs and had just shot his sister.

According to prosecutors, Ellis picked the Bates family at random, as he did with all of the 185 calls investigators say he made to 911 operators around the country.

At what point are the police on notice that these types of calls could be bogus? Should the police wait to find out or go in? Under Herring, is just being on notice of a risk enough to sue the police? I know that Herring is a criminal case, but we all know it will soon be applied to civil cases.

Sole ownership of a corporation does not confer standing on the owner. United States v. Okun, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7402 (E.D. Va. February 2, 2009):

While the Fourth Circuit has not directly ruled on the issue, the weight of precedent in this area clearly indicates that the possessory interest attendant to sole ownership of a corporation is not, in and of itself, sufficient to confer upon the owner Fourth Amendment standing as to all corporate property. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1403 (6th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Kunze, 806 F.2d 594, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 600-601 (1st Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds by Carter v. United States, 476 U.S. 1138, 106 S. Ct. 2241, 90 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1986); U.S. v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Dall, 608 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1976). Indeed, as the Eighth Circuit stated in Kelly, a case relied upon by Okun for the purpose of attempting to establish his standing: “a bare assertion of a property interest, without a supporting expectation of privacy, will not give rise to a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim.” 529 F.2d at 1369. Therefore, while Okun’s ownership of the corporations against which the search was conducted is surely a relevant and important consideration, that consideration is but one factor in deciding whether Okun possessed the required “reasonable expectation of privacy” necessary to have standing to challenge the search. See Rusher, 966 F.2d at 874-75.

See the SDI case posted Jan. 28.

Dog sniff during traffic stop that did not extend the stop was reasonable. United States v. Pierce, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7207 (D. Del. February 2, 2009):

In this case, Cpl. Brietzke verbally engaged Defendant during the traffic stop and detained Defendant for follow-up questioning. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that Cole’s sniff of the exterior of Defendant’s vehicle during the stop and questioning, including Cole’s sniff at the open front-passenger window, was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Private security working in conjunction with local off-duty sheriffs deputies were not acting as agents of government in this case. Here, they held defendant so he could be removed by the sheriffs from the property, and there was no detention in the arrest sense. United States v. Craig, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049 (D. Vt. February 4, 2009):

Similarly, there is no evidence that the Rutland Sheriffs offered or gave GMC Security any kind of reward for detaining Craig. These facts resemble those in United States v. Abney, where an off-duty police officer working as a private security guard questioned a person suspected of using counterfeit money and asked him to empty his pockets. The private security guard was not wearing a police uniform, identified himself as a security guard, and did not arrest, pat down, or physically restrain the suspect. The private security guard also testified that he acted to further the security interests of the private store in not receiving counterfeit notes. In those circumstances, the court determined that the private security guard was not acting as an agent or instrument of the government. United States v. Abney, No. 03 CR 60(JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15055, 2003 WL 22047842 at *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003).

Like the security guard in Abney, GMC Security officers testified that they were acting to protect the interests of their employer, the Concert promoter, by avoiding any problems or confrontations at the Concert. The evidence here falls short of establishing that GMC Security acted as an instrument or agent of the government. Since the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private party action, there is no constitutional violation.

A clearing away from a house and not within an enclosure near the house was open fields. United States v. Armstrong, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8296 (D. V.I. February 4, 2009):

The clearing in which the Officer observed the marijuana plant was not near a home, nor was it included within any enclosure surrounding a home. The clearing was not used for any residential purposes; no one lived there. That there may have been a fence surrounding the entire property and a chain across the access road, is not sufficient for the area to be considered one in which society would reasonably expect the same privacy as within a home. The clearing was not within the curtilage, but rather was an open field. Thus, the Officer needed neither a reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to search.

Defendant’s live-in girlfriend consented to a search of the premises while defendant was in the bedroom asleep. Randolph has no application, and the trial court erred in applying it trying to give the defendant veto power when he was unavailable to consent. People v. Parker, 325 Ill. Dec. 768, 898 N.E.2d 1047 (2007):

Here, we find that the warrantless search of defendant’s home was reasonable and did not violate his fourth amendment rights where police had secured a voluntary consent to search the premises from the co-tenant in defendant’s absence. Similar to the defendant in Rodriguez, defendant in this case was sleeping in the bedroom when Grisham, his live-in girlfriend, gave police her consent to enter and search the home that they shared. Although defendant was present nearby, he was not present at the threshold colloquy where Grisham gave her voluntary consent. Due to his absence at that point, defendant could not object when police entered his home and began their search. Following the reasoning of the Randolph court, defendant “lost out” on his opportunity to do so. We further note that the record contains no evidence that defendant ever expressly voiced an objection to the search, even after being confronted by police in the bedroom.

In addition, we reject defendant’s argument that the search was unreasonable because he was deprived of his opportunity to object. In order for defendant to override Grisham’s consent, it was necessary for him to be present “at the door” and expressly object to the search when police entered his home. There is no evidence in the record that the police removed him from the “entrance” to avoid his possible objection. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.

In New Mexico, Randolph came down while defendant’s case was pending, and the defense put the state on notice of the case. The state, however, apparently never read the case, and it failed to preserve its argument for appellate review when the defense won his motion to suppress under Randolph. State v. Janzen, 2007 NMCA 134, 142 N.M. 638, 168 P.3d 768 (2007):

[*14] Moreover, we disagree with the State’s claim that because Randolph was relatively new at the time of the hearing and because the prosecutor did not fully understand the basis of Defendants’ argument, the State’s failure to properly preserve the issue is somehow excused. We observe that Defendants filed their motion to suppress some three months before the suppression hearing. The motion made clear that Defendants would rely heavily on Randolph in arguing that the evidence should be suppressed. Defendants provided sufficient notice of their arguments, and the State certainly had adequate time to review Randolph and develop an argument in response. We therefore disagree with the State’s assertion that we should somehow relax our preservation rules in the present case due to prosecutorial ignorance. Thus, we decline to address the State’s argument that the search was valid as to Defendant Janzen.

Police had already searched defendant’s attic and determined that they may have missed something. They procured a warrant to go back, and an informant gave them information that they likely missed something in the attic. It was not a Franks violation that the police did not disclose that they previously searched the attic and found nothing since they had an independent belief there was still something there, which there was. United States v. Fletcher, 295 Fed. Appx. 749 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Quarles public safety exception does not apply where the police were looking for a gun and it was inside a house that nobody could get to. United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 2008).*

WV parole agreements are governed by Samson, so defendant agreed to the parole search ahead of time. United States v. Pickens, 295 Fed. Appx. 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)* (“Pickens signed a copy of the rules and regulations which included the provisions requiring him to permit his parole officer to visit his residence without obstruction and to submit to a warrantless search of his person and home for supervision purposes at any time.”).

Defendant in jail did not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in a document he had in his jail cell. It was otherwise relevant. State v. Kalican, 2008 Conn. App.LEXIS 477 (October 7, 2008).*

When two men enter a restroom stall together, here to do drugs, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy, and officers could look over the partition. State v. Powers, 991 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2008):

Clearly, a person in a closed stall in a public restroom is entitled to be free from unwarranted intrusion. E.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). However, this expectation gives way where two persons enter a stall together under circumstances reasonably indicating that they are doing drugs. See State v. Orta, 2003 WI App 93, 264 Wis. 2d 765, 663 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Tanner, 42 Ohio App. 3d 196, 537 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Manning v. State, 957 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Lee v. State, 868 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

Defendant’s supervised release condition under Adam Walsh Act of 2006 for searches on reasonable suspicion was, of course, constitutional. United States v. Rosenthal, 295 Fed. Appx. 985 (11th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).

Defendant abandoned a satchel while fleeing, and in it was a gun. United States v. Johnson, 295 Fed. Appx. 342 (11th Cir. October 3, 2008)* (unpublished).

Issuing magistrate was not shown to have abandoned judicial role merely because he did not inquire further into the reliability of the informant. State v. Dubose, 2008 Ohio 5933, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4974 (12th Dist. November 17, 2008).*

In making a credibility determination after granting a motion to reopen a suppression hearing after having denied the motion, United States v. McCurdy, 480 F. Supp. 2d 380 (D. Me. 2007), the court makes the following observations about assessing credibility, United States v. McCurdy, 585 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Me. 2008):

The Court finds that the Government has proven it is more likely than not Ms. Sawtelle consented to the search of the attic and the seizure of the military harness and rifle case. The Court bases its finding on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, including Deputy Rolfe and Mr. Huckins. The Court readily concedes that Mr. Huckins’ motivations and recollections remain a mystery, and there are some indicia of reliability. But, these indicia are outweighed by unexplained contradictions with other evidence and a striking implausibility when Mr. Huckins’ testimony is held up against the broader context of the domestic violence complaint, the sequence of events, and common sense police procedure.

Consenter lacked common authority, but the officer’s reliance on what appeared to be common authority validated the search. United States v. Meador, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92728 (E.D. Mo. January 7, 2008).*

Search incident could extend to defendant’s shoes under United States v. Edwards. State v. Pinkelton, 2008 Ohio 980, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 837 (6th Dist. March 7, 2008).

Feeling 17 bags of crack in defendant’s pocket was not justified under plain feel. Defendant was lawfully stopped because he matched the description of a robbery suspect and was found in the area. The initial patdown was valid, but the plain feel was not. State v. Tucker, 2008 Ohio 963, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 820 (8th Dist. March 6, 2008)*:

[*P17] However, in order to justify the seizure of the drugs, the State had to present some evidence that its incriminating nature was “immediately apparent” to the searching officer. There is no such evidence. The officer simply testified that “as we were searching [defendant] we found 17 bags of rock crack cocaine, and we found a bundle of plastic baggies in his right rear pocket.” This is insufficient to satisfy the plain feel exception. See State v. Bey, Cuyahoga App. No. 86234, 2005 Ohio 5842. Contrary to the State’s assertion, the record reflects that defendant was not under arrest at the time the officers conducted the patdown search for weapons. Accordingly, the seizure cannot be justified as being a search incident to a lawful arrest. The second assignment of error is sustained.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress that was [so frivilous that it was] bound to fail because of lack of standing. Defendant was on the property to make drugs, and that was his only connection. Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 180 P.3d 511 (App. 2008).*

A religious symbol on one’s dash, allegedly there to forestall stops of drug couriers, cannot constitutionally be a basis for a stop. United States v. Magana, 544 F. Supp. 2d 560 (W.D. Tex. 2008):

This routine traffic stop case implicates the First and Fourth Amendments. It involves an officer who initiated a traffic stop after observing what he believed to be a defective tire. After verifying the tire was not in fact defective, the officer detained the driver, because among other things, the driver had a religious statue on his dashboard. The officer stated that in his experience and opinion, religious symbols are used to dispel suspicion of wrongdoing and are usually indicative of drug activity. The Court finds that religious symbols cannot be used to generate reasonable suspicion of drug dealing or criminality. To do so, violates religious rights secured by the First Amendment and consequently, the Fourth Amendment. After removing the impermissible element of the religious symbol from the officer’s reasonable suspicion calculation, the Court finds the remaining factors do not rise to the level of warranting extending the detention. Because reasonable suspicion did not exist to extend the stop, once the officer realized a violation had not been committed, the purpose of the stop was fulfilled, and anything thereafter controverted Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.

Questioning a probationer during a traffic stop about drug offenses, that he was already suspected of, was not overly intrusive. State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 181 P.3d 1249 (App. 2008)*:

In light of the foregoing authorities, particularly Muehler, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that the Fourth Amendment was violated when, during the stop for a traffic infraction, officers asked intrusive, disconcerting questions and informed Stewart that he was under investigation for drug offenses. The district court specifically found that the duration of the stop was reasonable and was not extended by the questioning. Muehler compels a conclusion that the officers’ informing Stewart that he was the subject of a narcotics investigation and questioning him about the no-contact order did not infringe a Fourth Amendment interest.

Defendant was approached by three police cars, two having their blue lights on. There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop, despite his claim of coercion. United States v. Neal, 271 Fed. Appx. 233 (3d Cir. 2008).*