Yesterday’s NYT: Computers That See You and Keep Watch Over You by Steve Lohr. The story is about “computer-vision” where computers analyze facial and body patterns, looking for helpful information. The story starts in with a prison training exercise where the computer is analyzing inmates’ actions for signs of trouble.

A computer-vision system can watch a hospital room and remind doctors and nurses to wash their hands, or warn of restless patients who are in danger of falling out of bed. It can, through a computer-equipped mirror, read a man’s face to detect his heart rate and other vital signs. It can analyze a woman’s expressions as she watches a movie trailer or shops online, and help marketers tailor their offerings accordingly. Computer vision can also be used at shopping malls, schoolyards, subway platforms, office complexes and stadiums.

All of which could be helpful — or alarming.

“Machines will definitely be able to observe us and understand us better,” said Hartmut Neven, a computer scientist and vision expert at Google. “Where that leads is uncertain.”

. . .

Despite such qualms, computer vision is moving into the mainstream. With this technological evolution, scientists predict, people will increasingly be surrounded by machines that can not only see but also reason about what they are seeing, in their own limited way.

The uses, noted Frances Scott, an expert in surveillance technologies at the National Institute of Justice, the Justice Department’s research agency, could allow the authorities to spot a terrorist, identify a lost child or locate an Alzheimer’s patient who has wandered off.

The future of law enforcement, national security and military operations will most likely rely on observant machines. A few months ago, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Pentagon’s research arm, awarded the first round of grants in a five-year research program called the Mind’s Eye. Its goal is to develop machines that can recognize, analyze and communicate what they see. Mounted on small robots or drones, these smart machines could replace human scouts. “These things, in a sense, could be team members,” said James Donlon, the program’s manager.

Abolish Drunk Driving Laws / If lawmakers are serious about saving lives, they should focus on impairment, not alcohol by Radley Balko in Reason Magazine:

Austin Police Chief Art Acevedo wants to create a new criminal offense: “driving while ability impaired.” The problem with the current Texas law prohibiting “driving while intoxicated” (DWI), Acevedo explained to the Austin-American Statesman in October, is that it doesn’t allow him to arrest a driver whose blood-alcohol content (BAC) is below 0.08 percent unless there’s additional evidence of impairment.

. . .

These constitutionally dubious checkpoints have become little more than revenue generators for local governments. When local newspapers inquire about specific roadblocks after the fact, they inevitably find lots of fines for minor infractions but few drunk drivers. In 2009, according to a story at the investigative journalism site California Watch and data from the University of California at Berkeley, 1,600 sobriety checkpoints in California generated $40 million in fines, $30 million in overtime pay for cops, 24,000 vehicle confiscations, and just 3,200 arrests for drunk driving. A typical nightly checkpoint would divert 20 or more cops from other tasks while yielding a dozen or more vehicle confiscations but only about three drunk driving arrests.

In addition to the Fourth Amendment issues raised by roadblocks, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has been turned upside down by state laws that instantly suspend the licenses of drivers who refuse to take roadside breath tests. Most manufacturers of breath test machines have refused to turn over their source code, meaning DWI defendants can’t assess the machines’ margin of error—a significant factor in a case where the difference between 0.80 and 0.79 for a first offense can mean $1,000 or more in fines, mandatory alcohol awareness classes, and loss of driving privileges for up to a year.

Blood tests are far more accurate, but by the time a driver is pulled over, questioned, taken to the nearest hospital, and had his blood drawn, his BAC may be significantly different from what it was when he was driving. Perversely, the time lapse can have the effect of protecting guiltier motorists.
…

Guns and handcuffs on a defendant are not necessarily unreasonable. The officers have to show that they reasonably feared violence. United States v. Pontoo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136962 (D. Me. June 14, 2010)*:

While, in this case, there was no report that Austin was armed, the record bears out that Maillet and Michaud did actually fear for their safety, and that their fear was objectively reasonable. That Maillet and Michaud subjectively feared for their safety is evident from their actions: both Maillet and Michaud drew their weapons, Maillet parked his cruiser in such a manner as to afford himself cover, and Maillet immediately ordered the defendant into a felony-prone position, handcuffed, and pat-frisked him. That fear, in turn, was objectively reasonable in the circumstances: the individual whom they sought had harassed his ex-girlfriend throughout the night, previously appeared agitated, and now reported at 3:30 in the morning that he had committed murder at the location of her address. Officers were permitted to draw a reasonable inference that he might be carrying a deadly weapon and to take the precautions actually taken. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 346, 379 U.S. App. D.C. 114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) …; United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004) …; United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir. 1994) ….

Defendant’s casting off drugs while he’s running away from the police was a lack of standing to challenge their seizure. United States v. Pearce, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136961 (D. Me. June 15, 2010).*

Since going to this format, and I don’t remember when it was, there have been 5,000 posts to this website, and a few million page views. I haven’t even looked at the exact statistics in over a year, but it would be about 3-4M page views since February ’03, almost eight years. According to DomainsOutlook, this website is ranked 2,022,352 in the world. Nowhere to go but up. WE’RE NUMBER 1. WE’RE NUMBER 1.

I’m thinking about changing the software, but I can’t abandon 5,000 searchable posts. So, maybe 7,000 posts in the current and former format… The former format was not searchable.

Airport strips in protest to TSA? See UPI’s Airport ‘strip act’ leads to arrest. See also Man stripped down for TSA; had Fourth Amendment scrawled on chest.

The consenter here did not have apparent authority to consent to a search of a school bus parked on joint property where she did not know what was in the bus, never been in it, and there was a chained guard dog guarding it. Suppression affirmed. State v. Kerestessy, 44 Kan. App. 2d 127, 233 P.3d 305 (2010):

The State’s argument is flawed. The test is not whether the officers thought Konen had the apparent authority to consent. Rather, the test is whether a person of reasonable caution, having the same facts that the officers had, would believe Konen had mutual use of the school bus or any legal interest in the school bus, which would have given rise to apparent authority to consent to a search of the bus. In other words, would the officer have had a valid consent to search if the facts were as he or she reasonably believed them to be? See Porting, 281 Kan. at 328 (Officer was not mistaken about the facts, but reached an erroneous legal conclusion based on the facts.).

The trial court made findings of fact that Konen did not have the apparent authority to consent to a search of the bus. Therefore, this court will review the trial court’s findings to determine if they are supported by substantial competent evidence as required by our standard of appellate review. See Thompson, 284 Kan. at 776.

Defendant could not be compelled to give a DNA sample where the government showed no connection to the investigation. Order granting it vacated. United States v. Flanders, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96752 (D. V.I. September 15, 2010).

“[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, because that information is also conveyed to and, indeed, from third parties, including ISPs. ‘IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party equipment, but rather are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party’s servers.’” United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. September 15, 2010).* [Yeah, like anyone knows any of this, that IP addresses are “voluntarily turned over.” Voluntary means you know what is being turned over. Pure fiction.]

As the facts developed during the questions asked of the two men in the car with their children, reasonable suspicion was developing to justify holding them there longer. United States v. Jayawardana, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96599 (W.D. Tex. September 15, 2010).*

Defendant’s coming and going from his place immediately before and after drug sales was nexus to search it. United States v. McCloud, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110633 (M.D. Fla. September 26, 2010).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the valid third party consent here. Quibbling of a slight time difference in the reports did not show that it was a winning issue. Even if it was a plausible issue, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [This case has an interesting first issue in overcoming procedural default because of unclear state rules.] Johnson v. Thurmer, 624 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2010).*

Marijuana found in plain view in a car is probable cause to arrest everybody in the car under Pringle. United States v. Pertillo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110232 (S.D. W.Va. October 13, 2010).*

Defendant was accused of beating a woman with a tree limb, and the police responded. He was in his house showering, and they were able to determine where he was. They were admitted by a co-occupant and had audio of the consent which showed it was voluntary. Evidence of the beating was found inside. Brown v. State, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 844 (November 8, 2010).*

The defendant’s shop in an outbuilding was not specifically named in the search warrant, but it was included within the warrant because it was a regularly used part of the household. Mere ministerial defects in the return did not invalidate the execution of the warrant. United States v. Wilkerson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117964 (M.D. Ala. August 18, 2010).*

Defendant was tasered by the officer after he refused to submit to arrest and fled from the stop with an assault rifle in hand. Considering the circumstances, tasering him during the arrest was reasonable, and the arrest was with probable cause. United States v. Harris, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119015 (W.D. Pa. November 9, 2010).*

Use of force in a jail against an immigration detainee is governed by the due process clause, not the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress was too general to advise the state of the grounds defendant was raising, so the motion was ineffective. State v. Whitt, 2010 Ohio 5291, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4438 (2d Dist. October 29, 2010):

[*P40] Based on the wording of Whitt’s motion to suppress and the accompanying memorandum, including the cases to which he cited to support [his argument part] II, we agree with the State that the motion to suppress failed to inform the State that Whitt was challenging his warrantless arrest for the reasons stated in Jones. Accordingly, Whitt has waived any challenge based on the officer’s failure to obtain an arrest warrant.

The police responded to a domestic disturbance, and the officer was permitted in and out of the house by both. The officer asked the defendant for permission to search the garage and defendant gave it. Chiszar v. State, 936 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Defendant was in custody, but he validly consented to a search. State v. Rox, 2010 Ohio 5238, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4417 (8th Dist. October 28, 2010).*

Minnesota Tenants Challenge Nosy Housing Inspectors in Reason Magazine:

Last week the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed to hear a case in which the Institute for Justice is challenging a local ordinance that lets housing inspectors roam people’s apartments to make sure they’re up to code. Red Wing, Minnesota, began requiring the inspections in 2006 as a condition of granting rental licenses to landlords. If a landlord or occupant does not agree to an inspection, the city can ask a judge for a warrant. But because the visits are classified as “administrative inspections,” the city does not have to show there is any reason to suspect that a particular building is substandard. Armed with administrative warrants, inspectors can poke their noses into tenants’ bedrooms, bathrooms, closets, and even, until a recent revision of the law, refrigerators and medicine cabinets. Although they are ostensibly looking for hazards that need to be corrected, they are expected to report evidence of certain crimes—including methamphetamine production, child abuse, elder abuse, and pet abuse—to the police. Inspectors thus can serve as proxies for the police, who would not be allowed to search people’s homes without probable cause to support a criminal search warrant.

Random searches of prison employees’ vehicles in prison parking lots because of community custody inmates allegedly having access to cars was not subject to summary judgment for the state in an employee’s Fourth Amendment claim. There are fact disputes on the reasonableness of the search. True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 2010):

The location of a parking lot and the circumstances of inmate access are relevant to the “interests of the correctional institution in maintaining security”; a lot outside the confines of the prison has greater potential to be a source of contraband when prisoners have unsupervised access to it. Randomly searching such a lot may be an efficient means of preventing the smuggling of contraband. Therefore, balancing a prison employee’s privacy interests against “the substantial government interests in the efficient and proper operation of the workplace,” specifically, the interests of the correctional institution in maintaining security, it is reasonable under all the circumstances to search, by “systematic random selection,” employee vehicles in prison parking lots to which inmates have unsupervised access. [McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1987), an O’Connor-like analysis]

The Muskogee Creek Nation sued Oklahoma, inter alia, over enforcement by its tax collectors against Nation vehicles transporting cigarettes in the Nation which were stopped and searched. The Fourth Amendment claim is too generalized for injunctive relief and also subsumed within the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the state. Muskogee Creek Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant was arrested for DWI by a non-commissioned officer dispatched by the local police department to investigate defendant’s accident. While the officer lacked statutory authority to arrest, the arrest was still valid a citizen’s arrest and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Slayton, 2009 NMSC 54, 147 N.M. 340, 223 P.3d 337 (2009).

The search warrant for defendant’s house was issued for “mere evidence” (Warden v. Hayden), his green card, to show that he was not always in possession of it, and it was lawful under Rule 41(c)(1). (“A warrant may be issued for any of the following: [¶] (1) evidence of a crime; [¶] (2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; ….”). United States v. Doueihi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118693 (S.D. N.Y. December 16, 2009).*

Defendant’s gratuitously participating in the search was evidence of his consent. United States v. Savage, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118696 (S.D. N.Y. December 16, 2009).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue every conceivable inconsistency in the police statements because they were not material and the outcome would not change. United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119064 (D. Colo. September 4, 2009)*:

Additionally, the fact that defendant’s erstwhile counsel did not challenge every possible alleged inconsistency between the version of events offered by the police and that understood by defendant is inconsequential. Almost all of the alleged inconsistencies to which the defendant pervicaciously clings involved collateral or imponderous matters. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel had presented the evidence found most relevant by defendant, the result ineluctably would have been the same ….

Defendant was pepper sprayed before he tried to run, and he got a few steps and dropped drugs. His pepperspraying was a seizure, and it continued into his flight, so Hodari D. is distinguished. State v. Garcia, 2009 NMSC 46, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (2009):

[*22] First, we cannot agree that under the Fourth Amendment Defendant’s seizure ended the moment the officer stopped spraying him with mace. The Hodari D. Court’s hypothetical example of a discontinued seizure seems to contemplate something more than the limited motion that Defendant took away from the officer in the present case. 499 U.S. at 625. For example, in describing the type of action by a suspect that would discontinue his or her seizure, the Court used the terms “escape,” “period of fugitivity,” and “br[eak] away.” Id. These words connote a complete, even extended, separation between the suspect and the officer that is lacking in the facts before us. After being pepper sprayed, Defendant only took several strides before he dropped the cocaine and was tackled. During this time, Defendant continued to be under the effects of the pepper spray as evidenced by the fact that he later had to be allowed to decontaminate. It seems irrational to us that the Fourth Amendment would parse into multiple seizures the separate moments of physical contact making up an officer’s brief, forceful submission of a suspect. This being said, we must acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court has not explained what constitutes having “broken away” from an officer, and as such we cannot be certain that under the Fourth Amendment, Defendant was seized at the moment he disclosed the cocaine.

. . .

[*24] In the case at bar, where only several strides on Defendant’s part intervened between the officer’s pepper spraying of Defendant and the dropping of the cocaine, we do not believe the link to the illegal seizure was attenuated, if indeed that seizure had ended at all. Further, because the exclusionary rule is designed to deter unlawful police conduct, such as the unconstitutional application of physical force resulting in the discovery of evidence, we believe the policies of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine weigh heavily in favor of suppression. We note that other courts confronting similar situations have excluded evidence on this basis. See e.g., United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 127 (4th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Hodari D. and suppressing cocaine dropped by the defendant while fleeing from an unlawful seizure because the dropping occurred after the illegal seizure and was the “direct result” of the illegal seizure); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that marijuana that fell out of a truck as the defendants fled an illegal seizure was not abandoned because “[e]verything was triggered by the original illegal intrusion”); State v. Ingram, 1998 NMCA 177, PP 16-17, 126 N.M. 426, 970 P.2d 1151 (suppressing evidence abandoned while the defendant was fleeing from an illegal search because it was “a direct result” of the illegal search). Again, however, we must acknowledge that the statements in Hodari D. seem to be in conflict with our interpretation of Fourth Amendment case law.

FL Constitution has to be interpreted the same as the Fourth Amendment, and defendant loses. State v. Moreno-Gonzalez, State v. Moreno-Gonzalez (Fla. App. 3d DCA September 30, 2009):

Thus, prior to passage of the 1982 revisions to Article I, Section 12, Florida courts “were free to provide its citizens with a higher standard of protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the federal constitution.” State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983). With this amendment, however, Florida courts became bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with relation to the Fourth Amendment, and provide no greater protection than those interpretations. See State v. Butler, 655 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1995) (“This Court is bound, on search and seizure issues, to follow the opinions of the United States Supreme Court regardless of whether the claim of an illegal arrest or search is predicated upon the provisions of the Florida or United States Constitutions.”) (citations omitted); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 992 (Fla. 1988). Indeed, an exclusionary rule that was once constitutionally mandated in Florida can now be eliminated by judicial decision of the United States Supreme Court. Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 990-91. We note that our Supreme Court has not addressed the post-1982 interplay of the above-quoted sentences in Article I, Section 12, where a search warrant was procured upon probable cause shown by an officer who swore to the allegations in the affidavit under oath before the judge, initialed each of the pages of the affidavit, and also initialed each of the three pages of the search warrant but did not sign the affidavit.

Mall security guards are state actors not subject to the Fourth Amendment. They detained and handcuffed the defendant and held him for police. State v. Santiago, 2009 NMSC 45, 147 N.M. 76, 217 P.3d 89 (2009).*

The passenger in a car had no standing to challenge a search of the car, and the finding of drugs in the car was not a fruit of the seizure of the passenger. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2010).

On the totality, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant in his rental car based on: inconsistent stories about their travel plans, the overwhelming smell of air freshener, cologne, or perfume coming from the inside of the car, and the increase in people transporting prescription drugs from Detroit to Kentucky. The USMJ credited three additional factors which the USDJ does not. Still, there was reasonable suspicion. The drug dog was not shown to be unreliable. United States v. Chapple, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71526 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2010),* R&R 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78616 (E.D. Mich. March 1, 2010).*

Defendant’s probation officer had authority to search defendant’s car for drugs based on reasonable suspicion of his possession of Percocet. United States v. Woodson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71542 (D. Del. July 14, 2010).*

Questions during a routine traffic stop are not subject to Miranda. Those questions led to reasonable suspicion. A “disclaimer,” like a crucifix, in isolation may be meaningless, but with other things can be reasonable suspicion. The subsequent search of the car was justified. United States v. Mendoza-Sorzano, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71681 (D. Utah May 3, 2010).*

A probationer being at a place where a search warrant was being executed for drug sales was sufficient cause for a probation search. State v. Brusuelas, 2009 NMCA 111, 147 N.M. 233, 219 P.3d 1 (2009), Certiorari Denied, No. 31,701, September 2, 2009, Released for Publication October 20, 2009, cert. denied 224 P.3d 648 (N.M., 2009)*:

[*15] Applying the above principles to the circumstances of Defendant’s case, we conclude that Paragraph 9 was consistent with our prior cases and constitutionally permissible. First, as discussed below, the presence of Defendant at a home being searched for evidence of drug sales met the standard of reasonable suspicion. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121; Baca, 2004 NMCA 49, P 41, 135 N.M. 490, 90 P.3d 509. Second, Defendant agreed to the condition of probation in Paragraph 9 that required her to submit to warrantless searches by any law enforcement officer. See Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 699, 675 P.2d at 431 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a choice between a consent-to-search provision and going to prison was not really a choice and thus consent was not voluntary). Third, Paragraph 9 appears to be reasonably related to Defendant’s rehabilitation. The record indicates that the offense for which Defendant was on probation was child abuse (negligently caused, no great bodily harm). The warrantless search condition appears to indirectly further the goal of preventing another incident of child abuse. We observe that the judgment and sentence in which Paragraph 9 appears contains indications that alcohol was involved, as another condition of probation required Defendant to complete a two-year inpatient program and to avoid alcohol. Requiring Defendant to submit to searches would tend to advance her rehabilitation by ensuring that she did not possess alcohol. In addition, though the probationary strictures emphasize alcohol use, they are not limited to alcohol. The requirement under Paragraph 5 that Defendant “submit to substance abuse screening and any recommendations from that screening” are broader and could cover methamphetamine or other drug use. Fourth, because the agents were aware that Defendant was on probation at the time of the searches, in the circumstances–the agents were executing a search warrant at an alleged drug home–the search was reasonably related to “[t]he general purposes of probation, under federal or New Mexico law, [of] rehabilitation and deterrence for community safety.” Baca, 2004 NMCA 49, P 36, 135 N.M. 490, 90 P.3d 509. Fifth, there is no indication that the agents knew beforehand that Defendant would be present at the home, and thus the search cannot be considered “a subterfuge for criminal investigation[].” Gardner, 95 N.M. at 175 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The presence of these factors distinguishes the circumstances of this search from those where reasonableness is questionable or absent, such as one where a police officer stops a probationer on the street with no indication that anything criminal is afoot. We conclude that Paragraph 9 was properly applied.

Defendant waived any search claim by his guilty plea. Bailey v. State, 19 So. 3d 828 (Miss. App. 2009).*

Court’s [mild and virtually meaningless] admonition to jury in a death penalty case to disregard prosecutor’s opening statement comment that defendant refused to consent to a search that opening statements are not evidence was sufficient to cure any error. People v. Tate, 49 Cal. 4th 635, 234 P.3d 428, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156 (2010)*:

Assuming, as defendant contends, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by commenting on defendant’s exercise of his Fourth Amendment right to refuse consent to a search and by arguing evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, the court’s response was sufficient to resolve the problem. The court immediately “asked” – i.e., politely admonished – the jury to disregard the argument, and later instructed the jury that “[s]tatements made by attorneys during the trial are not evidence.”

So lame.

Defendant was stopped [in a classic Terry stop] casing a check cashing store to rob it. An outstanding warrant was found. The search of the backpack was not justified by the search incident doctrine, but it was justified as an inventory under a lawful arrest. Motion to suppress denied. United States v. Matthews, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66925 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2010).*

The Key West PD got a phone call about a drug dealer in a car. Defendant was approached by four officers in the dark in a manner that indicated an investigatory stop was taking place. One officer drove his patrol car the wrong way on a one-way street and parked the car directly in front of defendant, pointing the car’s spotlight on him and the woman he was with. Another officer approached defendant on foot in a manner that indicated a sense of urgency. That method of approach and show of authority were akin to the threatening presence of several officers, and this was a Fourth Amendment seizure. Hill v. State, 39 So. 3d 437 (Fla. App. 3d DCA June 30, 2010).*

Defendant’s speeding stop led to reasonable suspicion of DUI. State v. Prescott, 280 Neb. 96, 784 N.W.2d 873 (2010).*

The search warrant here was issued with probable cause on the totality of circumstances. United States v. Lopez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64823 (D. Minn. June 11, 2010).*

Despite the wording of the police inventory policy that police shall give passengers in a car to be towed the opportunity to remove valuables before hand, they are not required to do so. United States v. Battle, 370 Fed. Appx. 426 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

Battle argues that Officer Campbell deviated from the RPD policy because he failed to afford either himself or Laron an opportunity to remove any valuables from the vehicle before conducting an inventory search. For support that the RPD policy requires officers to allow passengers to remove valuables before towing, Battle points to Section III.B.2.b of the RPD policy, which provides that, “Prior to towing, the officer shall … Ask the owner or operator of the vehicle to remove, if possible, all valuables from the vehicle prior to impoundment …” J.A. 26-27. Even if we credit Battle’s reading of the policy, Officer Campbell was not required to follow the RPD procedures word-for-word. Items seized during a legal inventory search may be admissible as evidence because “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added); see also Banks, 482 F.3d at 739 (“[s]tandardized search procedures must be ‘administered in good faith‘ for their attendant searches to satisfy the Fourth Amendment”) (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376). The Fourth Amendment is satisfied so long as Officer Campbell conducted the inventory search and followed the procedures in good faith.

[Another warrantless good faith exception.]