CBS Pittsburg: Pilot Program Uses GPS Technology To Track Sex Offenders:

More than 1,100 registered sex offenders live and work in Allegheny County and 43 of them are now wearing monitoring devices as a condition of their parole.

District Attorney Stephen Zappala blames the nature of the crime for the need to better track these offenders.

“Because the psychology of the crime of the criminal actually is, they will re-offend and so we’re looking at persons who are recidivists,” Zappala said.

The offenders are monitored by places like Guardian Protection Service. The system uses GPS technology.

As long as the offenders stay in the inclusion area, they’re OK, but if they travel into an exclusion area, police are notified immediately.

Hat tip to PogoWasRight.org.

Officers on the premises with a search warrant who see things that they determine before they leave are criminal evidence are legally able to seize that evidence. Any further investigation into the nature of those items did not entail an additional and unjustified search of, or unduly prolonged police presence on, the premises, for the seizure of those items, and it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. White v. State, 729 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) is disapproved. State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), revg State v. Dobbs, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1857 (Tex. App.–Dallas March 18, 2009) (unpublished):

The further investigation that the officers undertook in this cause did not involve any search of the premises that was not already authorized by the search warrant. So the appellee’s privacy interest was not compromised. Nor were the golf clubs and shirts actually seized until after the officers, still legitimately on the premises, developed probable cause to believe they were stolen, by conducting further investigation that did not involve an unjustifiedly incremental search of the actual premises. So the appellee’s possessory interest was compromised–but legitimately so, even without an additional warrant. It does not serve the interests of the Fourth Amendment to construe the “immediately apparent” aspect of the plain-view doctrine to prohibit this kind of further investigation because it does not impact either the privacy or the possessory rights of the defendant beyond the encroachment already legitimized by the warrant.

To appreciate the sensibleness of this understanding of the plain-view doctrine, suppose the facts were slightly altered. Suppose that at the instant the officers executing the search warrant had originally come across the golf clubs and shirts, they had thought nothing of it and conducted no further investigation of those items. Then suppose an officer in the burglary division had called one of the searching officers to inform him to be on the lookout for stolen golf clubs and shirts on the premises, describing them with particularity, because of probable cause the burglary division had just developed, independently of the officers executing the warrant, to believe these items were stolen. What was not “immediately” apparent to the searching officers would now be readily apparent, while the officers are still on the premises and legitimately conducting their search. They would now have probable cause to seize the stolen items. Under these circumstances, it makes no more sense to require an additional warrant to justify seizing the items than it would to require a warrant to seize apparent contraband that is found in a public place. Moreover, it should make no difference that the searching officers generated their own probable cause while still on the premises, so long as their investigation did not entail any greater intrusion on the premises (from which the defendant’s privacy interest, after all, derives) than the intrusion already legitimately underway.

Officers waited 20 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence to enter on an arrest warrant, and 20 seconds was a constructive denial. There was no question as to the validity of the arrest warrant or the knowledge defendant was present. Hudson did not have to be applied. United States v. Young, 609 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2010)*:

3 In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006), the Supreme Court held that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations occurring in the execution of search warrants. The government contends that Michigan applies to knock-and-announce violations arising from the execution of arrest warrants, see United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 201 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that Hudson applies in the context of an arrest warrant), while Young argues that there are different considerations present in arrest-warrant cases that counsel against an extension of Hudson. Given our conclusion that the agents complied with the knock-and-announce requirements, we need not consider whether Hudson applies in cases involving the execution of arrest warrants.

Traffic stop was completed when the officer said goodbye to the defendant, but then engaged him in further conversation which was consensual. “Indeed, Sullivan could have declined to answer Trooper Johnson’s questions. He need not even have been informed explicitly that he was free to go, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (holding that a lawfully seized individual need not be informed that he or she is free to go for a consent to search to be recognized as voluntary).” United States v. Walker, 719 F. Supp. 2d 586 (W.D. Pa. 2010).*

Not a Fourth Amendment case, but one with some Fourth Amendment implications:

Officers testified falsely about what happened in defendant’s home during arrest. He was strip searched and assaulted and allegedly made a statement. The District Court suppresses the statement. The government, to its credit, also treated a statement from another officer for the suppression hearing about the search as Giglio material and turned it over. United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Mass. 2010)*:

Because the government has not proven that Gonzalez waived his Fifth Amendment rights knowingly or voluntarily, both his statements and the physical evidence derived from them must be suppressed. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003). The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not qualify this conclusion. Permitting the contents of the shoebox to be used as evidence would significantly weaken the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2006); Rullo, 748 F. Supp. at 40-45. It would also abet police misconduct, which in this case involved not only Smith punitively punching Gonzalez, but Smith testifying falsely about events at Gonzalez’s home as well. See Almeida, 434 F.3d at 28; Rullo, 748 F. Supp. at 40-45.

It is not clear whether the suppression of the gun and crack found in the shoebox will result in Gonzalez escaping conviction because the court may find that the second gun found in a search of Gonzalez’s bedroom after he disclosed the shoebox is admissible. However, even if all of the evidence is suppressed and the case dismissed, the cost to society of condoning the police misconduct in this case would be unacceptable. As Justice Louis D. Brandeis explained, in words that are etched into this courthouse:

Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Defendant’s car was parked, and the police pulled up with blue lights on. “The Illinois Rules of the Road do not permit motorists to disregard police lights or emergency vehicles,” so he was stopped, and it was without reasonable suspicion. United States v. Windom, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114650 (S.D. Ill. October 28, 2010):

When the Tahoe (lights ablaze) zipped up and parked in front of Windom’s car (with the law enforcement vehicle parked at an angle facing Windom’s car on the “wrong side of the street,” partially blocking the street) and two officers hopped out and approached Windom’s vehicle, a reasonable person in Windom’s shoes would not have felt free to ignore the officers, drive off, “decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36; United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002).

The court already upheld the search on consent to enter by apparent authority. On defendant’s motion to reconsider, nothing new was added that changes the outcome. United States v. Newton, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114740 (N.D. Ind. October 28, 2010).*

Because there was no real factual issue with the probable cause for the search warrant of plaintiff’s property, the qualified immunity question does not even have to be addressed. Parkey v. Sample, 623 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 2010).*

Illegal stop that led to a warrant being found on one in the car was subject to the exclusionary rule; otherwise, police would have free reign to stop anybody. The taking of a DNA sample, however, was with a warrant, so it is not suppressed because it is independent. United States v. Gross, 624 F.3d 309, 2010 FED App. 0332P (6th Cir. 2010):

To hold otherwise would result in a rule that creates a new form of police investigation, whereby an officer patrolling a high crime area may, without consequence, illegally stop a group of residents where he has a “police hunch” that the residents may: 1) have outstanding warrants; or 2) be engaged in some activity that does not rise to a level of reasonable suspicion. Despite a lack of reasonable suspicion, a well-established constitutional requirement, the officer may then seize those individuals, ask for their identifying information (which the individuals will feel coerced into giving as they will have been seized and will not feel free to leave or end the encounter), run their names through a warrant database, and then proceed to arrest and search those individuals for whom a warrant appears. Under this scenario, an officer need no longer have reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the very crux of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Williams, 615 F.3d at 670, n.6 (“[A]llowing information obtained from a suspect about an outstanding warrant to purge the taint of an unconstitutional search or seizure would have deleterious effects. It would encourage officers to seize individuals without reasonable suspicion-not merely engage them in consensual encounters-and ask them about outstanding warrants.”); see also Michael Kimberly, Discovering Arrest Warrants: Intervening Police Conduct and Foreseeability, 118 YALE L.J.177 (2008) (commenting that a rule where the discovery of an outstanding warrant constitutes an intervening circumstance has the perverse effect of encouraging law enforcement officials to engage in illegal stops where they have an inarticulatable hunch regarding a person on the street or in a car).

[This case has an excellent discussion of the exclusionary rule in application here.]

In a seizure of business records, the Arizona statute involved required that the magistrate take testimony on whether the documents should be returned when no forfeiture of the seized property is sought. In re Search Warrant, No. 08 SW 1417, 224 Ariz. 505, 233 P.3d 618 (Ariz. App. 2010):

P12 We agree with the essence of Franklin’s interpretation. Section 13-3922 clearly and unambiguously provides that a magistrate “shall proceed to take testimony” unless a forfeiture action relating to the same property interest “is or has been” filed. Thus, if such a forfeiture action is pending, the magistrate is precluded only from taking testimony. Nothing in the statute’s plain language suggests the magistrate also is precluded from deciding the motion on the papers. Despite neither citing supporting authority nor providing any analysis, the state argues this interpretation of the statute is “absurdly tortured.” We disagree. Because the language of § 13-3922 is clear, we need not examine either the statutory scheme as a whole or the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects, consequences, spirit, or purpose. See Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, P 22, 151 P.3d at 1264.

P13 Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Franklin’s motion to controvert. Moreover, we observe that the court may take testimony, if offered, relevant to Franklin’s motion as it relates to the seizure of his business records. Because the state has not sought forfeiture of those records, no “proceeding pursuant to chapter 39 of this title is or has been initiated” with respect to Franklin’s property interest in those records. § 13-3922(A). In light of our ruling, we need not address Franklin’s remaining arguments.

Officers who made three controlled buys from defendant had a search warrant for his home, but did not execute it because he was not home. A fourth controlled buy was done, and then the officers went back to his apartment to conduct a protective sweep on the authority of a prosecutor because defendant left the lights on[!]. After the sweep, another search warrant was sought which was based on the same information as the first and included the fourth controlled buy. “Finally, because we agree with the District Court that the second search of the apartment was justified by the independent search doctrine, we need not decide whether the warrantless protective sweep of the apartment was unlawful or whether the circumstances underlying the first search warrant were suspect.” United States v. Davis, 383 Fed. Appx. 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant was not seized when the officer drew a Taser on him when he refused to show his hands. The officer, however, already had reasonable suspicion at the point the Taser was drawn. United States v. Coleman, 383 Fed. Appx. 180 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s being slow to show his hands during a traffic stop and then keeping one hand down was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Ford, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55566 (D. V.I. June 4, 2010).*

CI passed on two pieces of information about the defendant and both were corroborated, and that made reasonable suspicion. United States v. Hanson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55382 (N.D. Iowa March 19, 2010).*

While comments on defendant’s refusal to consent are general inadmissible, the government can admit evidence of defendant’s refusal to consent to a search if the defendant argues at trial the absence of evidence (matching DNA) that would have been found. United States v. Davis, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59354 (D. V.I. June 15, 2010).

An alleged date discrepancy on an arrest warrant was not sufficient to put the officer on notice that the arrest warrant was invalid for qualified immunity purposes. Pair v. City of Parker FL Police Dep’t, 383 Fed. Appx. 835 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Officer’s entry onto property at 4 a.m. was ostensibly to investigate a burglary and he entered an open door. The court finds that the proffered explanation was pretext for a meth lab investigation. The fact the officers left for 30 minutes and came back shows no exigency. United States v. Wells, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59408 (E.D. Mo. June 14, 2010).*

Denial of medical care to an arrestee can also be determined under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, based on reasonableness. Legg v. Pappas, 383 Fed. Appx. 547 (7th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

Finally, Legg argues that Agee and Hutt violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably denying him medical care. Whether the officers acted reasonably is determined by four factors: the officers’ notice of the arrestee’s medical needs; the seriousness of the medical needs; the scope of the requested treatment; and police interests. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007). All four factors show that Hutt and Agee behaved reasonably. First, there is nothing in the record that suggests that Hutt or Agee had notice that Legg was in need of medical care. By all accounts, it appeared that Legg was just plain drunk. Furthermore, neither he nor his family members said he needed medical care. Indeed, when Legg went to the hospital, he told Dr. Oakley that “there’s nothing wrong with me, I’m just drunk.” The second factor is of no help to Legg because he was not in serious medical need at the time he was transported from his brother’s house. Furthermore, since no one requested treatment, the third factor also shows that Agee and Hutt behaved reasonably. Finally, the police had an interest in taking Legg into custody because he had outstanding warrants. Since none of the factors favor Legg, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

Williams v. Rodriguez:

The severity of the medical condition under this standard need not, on its own, rise to the level of objective seriousness required under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis operates on a sliding scale, balancing the seriousness of the medical need with the third factor–the scope of the requested treatment. In Sides for example, the court noted that the plaintiff was partially responsible for his lengthy detention outdoors, since he insisted that the officers not charge him at all, rather than requesting that the officers take him to the station house or write him a citation immediately. Id. Finally, police interests also factor into the reasonableness determination. This factor is wide-ranging in scope and can include administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns. Sides reflected the latter of these interests, with the court emphasizing the importance of an on-site investigation and noting that the officers did not prolong the plaintiff’s detention once this investigation was completed. Id. Again, we offer no opinion as to whether defendants’ conduct violated Williams’s Fourth Amendment rights under this multi-factor analysis, but for the reasons discussed above, Williams has failed to meet the higher burden of showing that Officer Rodriguez was deliberately indifferent to an objectively serious medical condition.

Defendant, accused of conspiring with bin Laden to bomb embassies in 1998 and awaiting trial in Manhattan, is strip searched whenever he goes to court. He claims PTSD flashbacks from the strip search to CIA interrogation techniques. The court rejects his claim because of the weighty interest in jail and courtroom security. United States v. Ghailani, S10 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK) (S.D. N.Y. June 14, 2010):

In light of the above Beard [v. Banks] analysis, and even assuming the truth of all of Dr. Porterfield’s testimony, which the Court does not now either accept or reject, the defendant is not entitled to relief. He has not “met [his] heavy burden of showing that these officials have exaggerated their response to the genuine security considerations that actuated these restrictions and practices.” The challenged prison regulation – namely, the requirement of visual inspection of defendant’s body cavities as part of a standard visual search performed whenever he travels to or from court – is justified by the legitimate governmental interest in protecting the safety of prison and court personnel and other inmates. The Court’s intervention in this matter would be inappropriate.

See Law.com.

Defendant failed to show under Franks that the arrest affidavit had false information in it. It could have been better, however, “Significantly, during Hyatt’s cross-examination of Farris at the suppression hearing, he failed to ask any questions regarding the veracity of the statements that she made in her affidavit.” There was a private search of defendant’s computer, and the government had nothing to do with it. United States v. Hyatt, 383 Fed. Appx. 900 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

The search of plaintiff doctors’ lockers for stuff allegedly stolen from a hospital was reasonable based on O’Connor v. Ortega. Narotzky v. Natrona County Mem. Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 610 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 2010).

After the state court dismissed criminal charges against plaintiff because of a bad knock and talk, plaintiff sued over the search and arrest. Defendants failed on summary judgment. Sufficient factual disputes remained, and the issue was not appealable. Tubbs v. Harrison, 383 Fed. Appx. 804 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Officers had probable cause based on reasonable inferences that plaintiff was engaged in credit card fraud to justify his arrest. The criminal charge against plaintiff was dismissed in state court. Painter v. City of Albuquerque, 383 Fed. Appx. 795 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s live-in girlfriend complained to the police about him and his drugs, and she signed a consent to search their shared property. When the police arrived at the house, they arrested defendant on an outstanding traffic warrant and searched the house without her present and without telling him what they were doing. This made the search unreasonable under Randolph. Preston v. State, 296 Ga. App. 655, 675 S.E.2d 553 (Ga. App. 2009):

Nevertheless, Randolph provides guidance in applying Fourth Amendment requirements to the facts of this case. The Court held that the “constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases … is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations.” Thus, a basis for the Randolph decision was the Court’s determination that a “co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant.” We believe that similar reasoning applies to the circumstances of the search of Preston’s residence. We know of no widely shared social expectations that support third parties entering a residence without first explaining to the occupant who has opened the door that an absent co-occupant has given them permission to do so.

Officers had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle stopped had recently crossed the border into Idaho. The vehicle was briefly inspected at the border, but the border agent had a “visceral feeling” about the vehicle after looking in the trunk. The word was put out to look for the vehicle, and it was seen shortly thereafter with two extra people in it. The vehicle was stopped, and the odor of marijuana was strong. The stop was justified as an extended border or immigration stop. State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 217 P.3d 1 (2009).

A backpack found at the scene of a search could be searched. State v. Ha, 2009 Ohio 1134, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 967 (9th Dist. March 16, 2009).*

Off the record statement to state court judge to support the PC objectively did not add to the PC already there. Good faith exception would save it anyway. United States v. Pettiford, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20833 (M.D. N.C. March 15, 2009).*

Defendant’s computer was searched for child porn at Customs when he arrived at the Detroit airport. The computer was removed to another location for further analysis, which would be questionable under Place. The removal to another location could only occur with reasonable suspicion. “The defendant’s analogy to the extended border search cases therefore is apt. But that does not mean that the subsequent examination of the Twinhead laptop was invalid. The Court believes instead that the ICE agents had reasonable suspicion to believe that [both] the computers … contained contraband, and the continued detention and examination of those items was reasonable.” United States v. Stewart, 715 F. Supp. 2d 750 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

Officer on patrol heard six gunshots in the early morning hours coming from a high crime area. Being familiar with the area, he looked for vehicles which would flee on certain streets and saw defendant’s car, the only one. There was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Robinson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50848 (E.D. Tenn. May 24, 2010).*

Officer’s reliance on his memory about a warrant list he saw earlier in the week where the warrant turned out to be recalled after that arrested the defendant without probable cause, and the exclusionary rule would be applied. Herring‘s good faith exception was not applied. People v. Arnold, 914 N.E.2d 1143, 333 Ill. Dec. 331 (2009):

In proceeding to the second part of the analysis–whether the facts of the fourth amendment violation at issue support suppression–we conclude that they do. Here, as in Morgan, Officer Dykema’s decision to proceed with handcuffing the defendant, despite the lack of confirmation that there was an active arrest warrant for the defendant, went beyond mere negligence and constituted reckless disregard. Such a decision is the type that can be deterred by suppression of evidence. See Morgan, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 265 (“the officers’ reliance on an up-to-three-day-old warrant list is conduct that can be deterred”). Finally, the benefits of suppression outweigh the costs, in that the need to deter police from handcuffing a citizen without confirming whether there is a valid warrant for his arrest outweighs the costs of hindering the State from prosecuting this particular defendant. Thus, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply here, and the evidence was properly suppressed.

The State also argues that, apart from the warrant, Officer Dykema had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while his driver’s license was revoked. We must reject this argument in light of our holding that the defendant was arrested before the dispatcher provided Officer Dykema with any information, as Officer Dykema conceded that he did not know the status of the defendant’s license at the time he handcuffed the defendant in the store. Accordingly, the defendant’s arrest cannot be justified on the basis that the police had probable cause to believe that his license was revoked.

In sum, the police initiated the arrest before obtaining probable cause to believe either that there was a valid warrant for the defendant or that his license was revoked, and under the Herring suppression analysis the evidence gained from the search incident to arrest was properly suppressed. Even if suppression were not justified based on the invalidity of the arrest, however, we would still affirm the trial court’s suppression order because the search performed by Officer Dykema was not a valid search incident to arrest.

A license plate hanging by one bolt was reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 218 P.3d 10 (Ida. App. 2009).*

Officer’s observation that the defendant passenger was still but nervous was not reasonable suspicion. Nothing in the car added to RS. United States v. Moore, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81547 (E.D. Tenn. September 8, 2009).*

CI’s statements about the defendant’s activities were based on personal observations, and that was probable cause. United States v. Hinton, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81750 (E.D. Mo. August 25, 2009).*

The Lt. Columbo Gambit fails here, and the defendant refused to consent. The stop was over, and he was walking back to his car when the officer called out to him. After he refused consent, and started to walk back to his car, the officer grabbed his arm and detained him, and the officer called for a drug dog. The continuation of the stop was without reasonable suspicion. State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 227 P.3d 868, 579 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 21 (Ariz. App. 2010)*:

P14 In $404,905.00, the Eighth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when an officer conducted a dog sniff of the defendant’s vehicle after the traffic stop was completed but before the defendant’s license had been returned to him. 182 F.3d at 648-49. There, the driver did not object to a sniff of his car’s exterior. The court reasoned that a two-minute delay to complete a dog sniff was a de minimis intrusion on the defendant’s liberty. Id. at 649. In Box, this court held that a brief post-traffic-stop detention to accommodate a dog sniff was de minimis. 205 Ariz. at 499, P 24, 73 P.3d at 630.

P15 We cannot conclude that the post-traffic-stop detention in this case was de minimis. Unlike in $404,905.00 and Box, Officer Craft waited until the arrival of a second officer (whose presence he had not requested until after Appellant declined to consent to a search) before conducting the sniff. Moreover, Officer Craft used physical force to detain Appellant when he grabbed his arm and ordered him to stand in front of the patrol car. And unlike $404,905.00 and Box, there was nothing consensual about the encounter at the time it occurred. Because we conclude that the intrusion was not de minimis, we turn our examination to whether the duration of the detention was reasonable.

Tennessee discusses parole and probation searches at length and concludes this one is valid. It also recognizes that arbitrary searches would not be valid. State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009):

While we agree that these are appropriate factors to consider when reviewing whether a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, we also recognize that a suspicionless search could be characterized as “arbitrary.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 112 (8th ed. 2004) (“1. Depending on individual discretion ….”). A search of this type is not necessarily unreasonable, however. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances surrounding a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee must be examined to determine whether the search is constitutionally unreasonable. For example, a pattern of repetitive searches while the parolee is at work or asleep would be unreasonable. Searches intended to cause the parolee some harm would be unreasonable. A search conducted out of personal animosity would be unreasonable. Indeed, there may be other situations where a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee is unreasonable. A suspicionless search of a parolee subject to a warrantless search condition, and which is conducted out of valid law enforcement concerns, is not unreasonable.

A NY parole officer could look in defendant’s room when he showed up for a parole search and defendant was disheveled and kind of out of it and a lamp was topped over on the floor which created a fire hazard. United States v. Santalucia, 666 F. Supp. 2d 268 (N.D. N.Y. 2009).*

Defense counsel withdrew defendant’s motion to suppress. On this record, the court could not consider an IAC claim. Defendant can do that in a 2255. United States v. Cooper, 346 Fed. Appx. 962 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

In an administrative DL suspension for DUI in Idaho the driver has the burden of showing that the stop was illegal. Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d 761 (App. 2009), Released for Publication January 28, 2010, Review denied by Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 2010 Ida. LEXIS 29 (Idaho, Jan. 26, 2010). (Note: The Fourth Amendment requires the government bear the burden of proof and going forward in a warrantless stop and search. How could they get it so wrong?)

The defendant got in an argument with his girlfriend over his looking at underage nudity on his computer, and he hit her. She called the police, and they came. She told them the reason for the argument, and she consented to a search of the computer. She had apparent authority. He told her to get out of the house, but she hadn’t left yet, and she had unrestricted use of the premises and the computer. Therefore, she could consent to a search of his computer as a user. People v. Bell, 403 Ill. App. 3d 398, 932 N.E.2d 625, 342 Ill. Dec. 498 (2010).

Defendant’s vehicle stop was in an area known for stolen vehicles, and that was the basis for his stop and the car looked suspicious in the area, although it turned out it wasn’t stolen. There was, at least, reasonable suspicion for the stop. People v. Letner, 50 Cal. 4th 99, 235 P.3d 62, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746 (2010).*

The defendant had no expectation of privacy in observations of a car (assuming he even had standing in that car in the first place) parked in a ten unit parking space in an apartment building. State v. Collanzo, 2009 N.H. LEXIS 152 (February 23, 2009).*

Quarterly in-home maintenance of electronic monitoring system and thus checking on registered sex offenders does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Bowditch, 364 N.C. 335, 700 S.E.2d 1 (2010):

Noting the maintenance that must be performed by DCC personnel every ninety days, typically within an offender’s residence, the dissenting opinion argues that the SBM program unnecessarily burdens the Fourth Amendment rights of those convicted felons subject to SBM. However, it is beyond dispute that convicted felons do not enjoy the same measure of constitutional protections, including the expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, as do citizens who have not been convicted of a felony. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that collecting blood samples from felons for registration in a DNA databank does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing a state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S. Ct. 1191, 140 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1998); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Even probationers lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to their right to privacy against searches of their homes pursuant to an established program to ensure rehabilitation and security.” (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977, 113 S. Ct. 472, 121 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1992); Standley, 362 N.C. at 329-33, 661 S.E.2d at 730-32 (holding that a convicted sex offender’s constitutional rights were not violated by a municipal ordinance that prohibited him from access to public parks); Bryant, 359 N.C. at 557-70, 614 S.E.2d at 481-89 (holding that no due process violation occurred when a convicted sex offender who was required to register in South Carolina failed to register in North Carolina, even though he received no actual notice of registration requirement). Here felons convicted of multiple counts of indecent liberties with children are not visited by DCC personnel for random searches, but simply to ensure the SBM system is working properly.

Interestingly, the Wisconsin electronic monitoring system went down recently requiring officers to go looking for their charges. Hat tip to Stockycat, http://stockycat.blogspot.com/, which I discovered only today because the author communicated about something else. Great new blog “focused non-exclusively on the intersection between criminal law and emerging technology. Dedicated to the idea that effective law enforcement is not incompatible with a vigorous interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” More about that later. [Embedding a link isn’t working, and that’s my software.]

When a ruse checkpoint is involved, the checkpoint case law does not apply. The defendant avoided the checkpoint—he wasn’t stopped at it, and reasonable suspicion developed from that. United States v. Carr, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33578 (D. Kan. April 5, 2010).*

A hearing was not required on defendant’s claim that his search incident violated Gant because, even assuming that his version of the facts are true, the search incident was valid. United States v. Mompremier, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33793 (S.D. N.Y. April 5, 2010).*

Defendant’s border search at Calexico was valid, and his complaints about the drug dog are essentially harmless and meaningless. United States v. Calderon-Quinonez, 382 Fed. Appx. 540 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), cert. denied 178 L. Ed. 2d 232, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 7160 (U.S., Oct. 4, 2010).*

Defendant did not respond immediately to an order to remove his hands from his pockets, and the officers pulled guns on him. There was not enough to show reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dorlette, 706 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D. Conn. 2010)*:

The officers’ concern for their safety, however, was unaccompanied by any articulable facts, or inferences drawn from them, that could give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dorlette was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Nor do they assert or provide grounds to conclude that their safety concern was tethered to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Indeed, aside from Edson’s rank speculation that the men had obtained weapons from the Diaz Street apartment and were going out to search for a fight, criminal activity was not a concept that the officers’ testimony suggests in any way drove their stopping Dorlette. Lacking reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Dorlette.