While there was no traffic violation justifying the stop, the mere presence of a work van driving slow in this rural Vermont area where there was no attractions to a trained border patrol agent strongly supported reasonable suspicion that the van was looking for a place to drop persons or drugs. United States v. Funez-Pineda, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121926 (D. Vt. October 20, 2011)*:

In this case, Agent Hartness did not observe the operator of the vehicle, nor did he see the operator commit any traffic violations. A record check on the license plate did not return any suspicious information. Additionally, Agent Hartness did not observe that the van was carrying excess weight.

On the other hand, the work van’s status as a vehicle associated with smuggling, its out-of-state plates, its presence in a sparsely populated area of Vermont with no local attractions and with no discernable purpose, the early time of day, the van’s prolonged slow speed, and the proximity of Route 114 in Norton to the border all contribute to a reasonable suspicion that the van’s operator may have been engaged in smuggling activity and was looking for a place to pick up or drop off a person or contraband.

In analyzing the relevant facts, the court regards them from the perspective of a trained Border Patrol agent. …

The 22 page affidavit for the search warrant clearly showed probable cause, and it supported search and seizure of electronic devices, here a thumb drive, where nexus was shown. United States v. Mehilove, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121247 (D. Minn. September 15, 2011).*

A recurring issue I’ve had to explain to clients and family members repeatedly lately: A violation of Riverside’s 48 hour rule does not lead to dismissal of charges. And, a state’s violation of Riverside’s 48 hour rule is irrelevant to federal prosecution after feds took case over. A quick summary of the law in United States v. Salinas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121110 (D. Kan. October 19, 2011):

To safeguard an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment requires judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest.8 If a suspect remains incarcerated after 48 hours, the government bears the burden of proving an emergency or other extenuating circumstances that justify the delay.9 The Supreme Court has declined to articulate the appropriate remedy in the event the government violates the Fourth Amendment by exceeding the 48-hour rule.10

8 Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975)); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV.

9 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57.

10 See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 85, 114 S. Ct. 1280, 128 L. Ed. 2d 1 n.* (1994) (“Whether a suppression remedy applies in that setting remains an unresolved question.”).

. . .

Second, the government did not violate Salinas’s Fourth Amendment rights because he appeared before a federal magistrate less than 24 hours after Salina’s arrest by federal officials.23 It is inarguable that Salinas did not receive a judicial determination of probable cause on state charges within 48 hours of his arrest by state officials. But as Salinas acknowledges, no precedent authorizes the dismissal of a federal indictment as a remedy for constitutional violations by the state.24

23 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56. The Supreme Court has noted that hearings held within the 48-hour period may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if the detainee “can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably.” Id. In this case, however, Salinas has not made any allegation that there was unreasonable delay between the time of his arrest by federal officers and his appearance before the magistrate judge.

24 See, e.g., United States v. Headdress, 953 F. Supp. 1272, 1294 (D. Utah, 1996) (noting that 48-hour rule announced in McLaughlin did not take effect with respect to federal charges until the defendant was arrested by federal officers).

The government asserted plain view as justifying the seizure, but it violated plain view in rifling through documents. That was not a plain view. The court earlier in the opinion credited the defendants on who the raid took place since the officers couldn’t get their stories together. United States v. Hu, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120898 (W.D. N.Y. January 21, 2011):

The government argues that “to the extent that [agent Hurwitz] may have been mistaken in his assessment of some of the articles seized, the blanket suppression of all physical evidence obtained in the Hu/Ln apartment is simply too draconian a sanction”. Government’s memorandum [687], pp.16-17.

To characterize Agent Hurwitz’s assessment of the documents seized as “mistaken” is far too charitable. He admitted that he did not even look at all of the documents before seizing them ([481], p.30), and his explanations for seizing many of the documents which he did look at strain credulity. For example, he seized a composition notebook because “people that are engaged in illegal businesses keep their records in notebooks such as this” ([481], p.34), and seized a “bill … from Citibank, which appeared to be financial records. And there’s also papers from a bank. Metlife is an insurance company that insures properties, which could have been properties purchased with the proceeds of counterfeit merchandise”. Id., pp.37-38. When confronted with documents such as an insurance receipt and a pain clinic card which he had seized, he had no idea how they were incriminating. [507], p.121. Finally, he admitted that several of the seized documents were written in Chinese. Id., p.40.

Nor did the manner in which he observed the documents comport with the requirements of a valid plain view search. He testified that there were numerous stacks of paper, and that “[t]he documents on top were viewed; they were then seized. When they were seized, more documents were revealed; they were reviewed and seized . … [T]he stack of paper, if the paper on top appeared to be incriminating, that stack of papers was taken” ([481], p.104). He admitted that some of the papers “were in plain view … only after [he] moved other documents”. Id., p.105.

Reason magazine: Michigan Sheriff: Random Narcotics Checkpoints Are Totally Constitutional by Lucy Steigerwald:

Genesee County, Michigan Sheriff Robert Pickell is not concerned about the constitutionality of his new method of keeping Flint free of illegal drugs. Fourth Amendment fans, medical marijuana patients, and jumpy motorists are less sure.

According to the Detroit Free Press:

At least seven times [in October] motorists have said they have seen a pickup towing a large sign on I-69 or U.S.-23 that depicts the sheriff’s badge and warns: “Sheriff narcotics check point, 1 mile ahead — drug dog in use.”

The checkpoints are part of a broad sweep for drugs that [Pickell] and his self-titled Sheriff’s Posse said are needed, calling Flint a crossroads of drug dealing because nearly a half-dozen major roads and expressways pass in and around the city. Pickell said he decided to try checkpoints when he learned that drug shipments might be passing through Flint in tractor-trailers with false compartments.

Apparently nobody read Edmond. This isn’t even a close call. And there will be no qualified immunity for a damages action since Edmond dates from eleven years ago. See Malley v. Briggs: “As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Or Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead:

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.

Plainly incompetent? Without understanding? Here is Exhibit 1.

Or Johnson:

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.

Metropolitan News-Enterprise: California S.Ct. grants review in People v. Buza (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1424 re DNA testing on arrest.

The California Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether state law requiring the taking of DNA samples from felony suspects following arrest is constitutional.

The justices, at their weekly conference in San Francisco Wednesday, unanimously granted review in People v. Buza (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 1424.

The First District Court of Appeal, Div. Two, ruled Aug. 4 that Proposition 69, the DNA initiative approved by voters in November 2004, violates the Fourth Amendment to the extent it provides for the taking of DNA samples from felony arrestees in the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause.

NewsChannel5.com: Tennessee Becomes First State To Fight Terrorism Statewide By Adam Ghassemi:

PORTLAND, Tenn. -– You’re probably used to seeing TSA’s signature blue uniforms at the airport, but now agents are hitting the interstates to fight terrorism with Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR).

“Where is a terrorist more apt to be found? Not these days on an airplane more likely on the interstate,” said Tennessee Department of Safety & Homeland Security Commissioner Bill Gibbons.

Tuesday Tennessee was first to deploy VIPR simultaneously at five weigh stations and two bus stations across the state.

See ‘Nazi-style’ TSA roadside checkpoint rights abuses in effect by Deborah Dupre.

At the suggestion of the ICE, the RCMP searched defendant’s property and a helicopter in Yale, BC for alleged authorized flights across the border into the US. Defendant alleged that the search violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [§ 8]. The RCMP’s search did not shock the judicial conscience. United States v. Rosenau, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120371 (W.D. Wash. October 18, 2011):

Generally, neither the Fourth Amendment nor the judicially created exclusionary rule applies to searches conducted by foreign authorities in their own countries. See United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit, however, has recognized two very limited exceptions to the general rule that Fourth Amendment protections are inapplicable to actions of foreign agents conducted in foreign countries. The first is “if the circumstances of the foreign search and seizure are so extreme that they shock the judicial conscience.” United States v. LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488, 489 (9th Cir. 1989). The second applies when “United States agents’ participation in the investigation is so substantial that the action is a joint venture between United States and foreign officials.” United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (1987).

First, Defendant’s assertion that the RCMP conducted a warrantless search of his property and his helicopter (Dkt. No. 32), even if true, cannot be said to shock the judicial conscience. This is an exacting standard, where exclusion is not based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but rather on the recognition the Court may employ supervisory powers when “absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.” United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendant offers no facts indicating that his treatment by Canadian officials rises to the level requiring judicial intervention to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Second, the Court need not reach the issue of whether a joint venture existed, because the exclusionary rule applies only if it was objectively unreasonable for U.S. officers to rely on the assurances of their foreign counterparts. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492. In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit directed courts to consider whether American law enforcement officers were in an advantageous position to judge whether the foreign search was lawful, and whether it serves the purpose of deterring unlawful behavior to hold U.S. agents strictly liable for the failings of their foreign associates. Id. Here, Defendant offers no facts indicating that it was objectively unreasonable for U.S. authorities to rely on the assurances of Canadian officers. Therefore, there is no basis for the Court to suppress evidence obtained by the Canadian authorities.

A protective sweep of defendant’s motel room was valid even though he was stopped 20-75′ away from the room. They had reasonable suspicion that others could have been in the room where the door to the room was left ajar. Also, defendant’s citing the state constitution in his federal motion to suppress is pointless. United States v. Loman, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120398 (E.D. Ky. August 16, 2011):

The Court draws guidance from United States v. Biggs, 70 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 1995). The defendant in Biggs was arrested 20-75 feet outside his motel room when he came out into the parking lot, leaving the door ajar. Id. at 915-16. Officers then entered the room to perform a protective sweep, at which time they discovered a gun in plain view. Id. at 915. Although police did not see anyone else enter the room during the two-hour surveillance period that preceded the arrest, the officers had previously received information that someone was going to meet the defendant there, and on two prior arrests, the defendant had been accompanied by someone with a firearm. Id. at 915-916. Those facts were held sufficient to warrant a Buie sweep. Id. at 916; see also United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 911-12 (6th Cir. 2007) (protective sweep justified where police identified car at residence registered to local criminal); Perkins v. United States, 127 F. App’x 830, 835 (6th Cir. 2005) (protective sweep justified where, although two men who officers had observed enter a residence had been arrested, a woman who had answered a phone call had not yet been located); United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 512-14 (6th Cir. 2001) (considering apartment occupant’s “overtly nervous behavior” in approving protective sweep).

The “articulable facts” on which the United States bases its initial search of Loman’s bedroom are that (1) Defendant initially refused to show his hands and step out of the bedroom, Tr. at 11, and he repeatedly looked back into the room; (2) the officers who conducted the sweep of the bedroom had not yet found two of the three men Mrs. Loman said were inside the house; and (3) the Deputy Marshals were aware of Defendant’s criminal history — including convictions, charges, and suspicions. The Court finds that these facts and the rational inferences that arise from them would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing the bedroom may harbor an individual posing a danger. Under these circumstances, like in Biggs, the fact that Basic had already been arrested and removed from the home by the time the protective sweep occurred did not eliminate the safety considerations justifying the search.

Politico.com: Digital data privacy rules turn 25 by Tony Romm:

Congress first penned the rules for how law enforcement may obtain digital data for investigations in 1986, long before most Americans — save academics and the military — had even used the Internet.

And as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act turns 25 this week, members of Congress are hearing it is time to revisit a law that never anticipated the day consumers would use Gmail, Facebook, Twitter, the iPhone and other tech staples of the digital age.

Lawmakers have updated the statute over the years, but disagreements linger in 2011 over how best to revise it again. In addition, the Department of Justice has actively avoided changes to the ECPA that might curtail its broad powers — maligned by privacy hawks and civil libertarians alike — to investigate crimes involving digital evidence.

A search warrant for a body cavity search for heroin and cocaine allegedly secreted in the body permitted an x-ray when a digital search was unavailing. On a balancing of interests, this search was reasonable under Schmerber. Spencer v. Roche, 11-1146 (1st Cir. October 18, 2011):

It is a piece of constitutional bedrock that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their bodies. Thus, a physical intrusion below the skin constitutes a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989). Because individuals possess a strong interest in their bodily integrity, a nonconsensual intrusion into the body requires a particularly robust justification. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 772 (1966).

Withal, not every intrusion into an individual’s bodily integrity offends the Fourth Amendment. An inquiring court must weigh the nature of the particular intrusion against the totality of the circumstances surrounding it to determine the reasonableness of the search. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).

. . .

In general, compelled x-rays have been viewed favorably by courts, given an appropriately supported level of suspicion. For example, courts have approved x-ray searches performed at border crossings when customs officials had reasonable suspicion that drugs were being smuggled internally. …

Similarly, the Second Circuit has upheld an x-ray search of a criminal defendant who had set off a metal detector on his way to hear the jury’s verdict. … And this court has described an x-ray as a “much simpler, less invasive procedure” than surgery. …

We hold today that the x-ray search of the appellant’s anal cavity passed muster under the Fourth Amendment. …

Nostalgia moment: Today is the 38th Anniversary of the “Saturday Night Massacre,” which happened a mere six weeks after I got my law license.

What a night, and it was before the 24/7 news cycle, and the networks covered it all. Richard Nixon then lost nearly all support even from his friends.

A woman wearing baggy clothes but keeping her legs close together was a factor in reasonable suspicion[!]. United States v. Gilmore, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119609 (S.D. Fla. October 4, 2011)*:

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and search the Defendant. Also, the officers had probable cause to arrest and conduct a pat-down search incident to that arrest. The salient objective facts supporting our conclusion are: 1) Officer Cardeso observed an individual pass a marijuana cigar, he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana and observed smoke (reasonable suspicion to investigate); 2) Officer Sosa observed Defendant drop a small bag that looked to contain marijuana (probable cause to arrest); and, 3) because Defendant wore baggy clothes, acted nervously, was fidgety, and kept her legs close together, Officer Gamez was justified to search Defendant for concealed narcotics or a weapon (reasonable suspicion to conduct pat-down search).

Police received a report of a man in a car in a parking lot with a large amount of drugs and they went to investigate. When they got there they found a car matching the description, and defendant was in the car. He wouldn’t respond to police commands to keep his hands where they could see them, and that led to a valid pat down for safety purposes. State v. Carroll, 2011 Ohio 5255, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4331 (8th Dist. October 13, 2011).*

A mere technical error in an arrest warrant does not void the warrant. United States v. Cox, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119737 (D. N.J. October 17, 2011):

Under Third Circuit law, a “mere technical error does not automatically invalidate the warrant.” United States v. Carter, 756 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1985)(holding that inaccuracy in the date of the offense in a criminal complaint is not a material or critical variance). The key inquiry is “whether there has been such a variance as to ‘affect the substantial rights’ of the accused.” Id. at 313, quoting Cromer v. United States, 142 F.2d 697, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 400 (D.C. Cir. 1944). Such affects would occur if: 1) the accused is not informed as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial; and 2) the accused is not protected against another prosecution for the same offense. Cromer, 142 F.2d at 698. When a defendant alleges warrant invalidity, he must prove that “the misstatement was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Carter, 756 F.2d at 313; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).

The “the unrelated questioning” process which led to consent to search the defendant’s vehicle during a legal traffic stop was valid. United States v. Sandreth, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119510 (D. W.Va. October 17, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119505 (N.D. W. Va. September 21, 2011).*

Daily Kos: TSA Arrests Me for Using the Fourth Amendment as a Weapon (Tales from the Edge of a Revolution #2):

Oct. 17, 2011
Albuquerque International Sunport Security Checkpoint:

I pass a camera crew filming the ticket counter. I stop and consider telling them what I am about to do, but decide against it. They probably won’t care. Instead, I wheel my baggage to the security area.

I can feel my heart beat in my chest. I’ve never done anything like this. I’ve always said “Yes sir,” even when I didn’t agree. Even this simple act fills me with conflicting emotions.

New Mexico is far warmer than my native Pacific Northwest. I’m sweating by the time I reach the first inspection of my ID. I’m sure I already look like a terrorist. The TSA agent, perched on his stool, takes no notice. I look enough like my driver’s license and I have a valid airline ticket. He black lights my ID and lets me pass with hardly a glance.

Defendant challenged defense counsel’s performance at this suppression hearing for not adequately challenging the search. Based on what defense counsel did not present and the government’s argument in its appeal brief, the court determines that defendant had standing to challenge the search after all, but he would fail on his Franks challenge. [“Further support for the assertion that Defendant would be entitled to claim some degree of standing is found in the Government’s appellate brief, in which it argues that the search was conducted at a location where Defendant ‘routinely resided’ (doc. 213, att. 1 at 6 (page 7 of the brief, page 6 of the exhibit)).”] United States v. Smith, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119199 (N.D. Fla. September 23, 2011).*

The search of defendant’s safe is found to be by voluntary consent. United States v. Matayoshi, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119048 (M.D. Fla. September 22, 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search warrant for defendant’s computer because defendant had no expectation of privacy from leaving his computer connected to the internet for P2P searches of his hard drive. United States v. Samples, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119040 (N.D. Tex. September 15, 2011).*

Forbes.com: IRS Chides Collector For Going After Tax Cheat’s E-mail Without A Warrant by Kashmir Hill:

A branch of the IRS in Newark wants to collect $250,000 from a scamster who turned tax day into a pay day by improperly claiming loads of tax credits. (His home office must be the size of New Jersey.) The revenue officer on the case figured out that the shady taxpayer (or taxunpayer, rather) had an e-mail alter ego, so the officer contacted that Internet Service Provider (ISP) for the account and asked for all e-mails from the last two years, hoping to figure out where the money had been sent so that it could be retrieved. The officer may be intimately familiar with the tax code, but seems to be uninformed about electronic privacy laws.

After the ISP, which is not identified in an IRS document describing the case, refused to comply with the request, citing a law marking its 25th birthday this week that requires the gov to have a warrant for e-mails from the last 6 months (though not for e-mails older than that), the officer turned to the IRS general counsel for help. As noted by Forbes contributor Peter Reilly, IRS lawyer William Spatz informed the revenue officer that the ISP knew the law, and that the IRS would be limited in what it could get its hands on due to the “the current controversy concerning the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of the SCA [Stored Communications Act].”

While the dog sniff of claimant’s bag was ninety minutes later, and seemed to be unreasonable under United States v. Place, the police were as expeditious as possible, and the delay was reasonable under the totality, and Place is distinguishable. United States v. $60,020.00 United States Currency, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117947 (W.D. N.Y. September 12, 2011):

When viewed in the context of overall reasonableness and not simply the duration of the detention alone, I conclude that the delay of ninety minutes or so to await the arrival of Odie [the dog] was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the facts of Place where the actions of the DEA demonstrated a lack of diligence, the actions of law enforcement here reflected an immediate effort to conduct their investigation of the seized property and determine whether they had a basis to retain it. Within minutes after being summoned to the secondary screening area at the airport, Monroe County Sheriff Deputy Kenneth Carpenter met Luke, assessed the situation regarding the discovery of the two bundled bricks of currency and notified his supervisor Sergeant Mark Jenis. Carpenter briefed Jenis who immediately made the decision to call in additional resources relevant to narcotics investigations-one of whom, Sergeant Vadas, was the handler of Odie. Because of the early hour, Jenis paged Vadas and also left a message on his cell phone. Vadas recalls receiving Jenis’s call at home at approximately 6:00 a.m. After receiving the call, Vadas drove to the airport with Odie. Vadas and Odie arrived at the airport and their search was completed by 6:53 a.m. Thus, less than an hour after being called at home by Jenis, Vadas had driven to the airport and had Odie complete the narcotic detection search.

Unlike Place, the time line here supports a finding that given the particular circumstances they were presented with, “the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. Luke has not argued that a trained canine like Odie could have or should have arrived at the airport earlier. …

The officer testified that the defendant completely crossed over into the other lane, and that justified the stop. The video showed the wheels just barely crossing, and that was not sufficient for a stop under state law. State v. Sanders, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8115 (Tex. App. — San Antonio October 12, 2011).*

Defendant’s host of issues are rejected: “(1) the application for the search warrant contains material misstatements of fact; (2) the Affiant omitted material information from the Affidavit; (3) there was a lack of corroboration on information received; (4) the Affidavit contained excessively stale information; (5) there was no nexus between the items sought and criminal activity associated to those items; (6) the officer used the search for business-related records as a pretext to search for other evidence; and (7) the officers searched beyond the scope of the Search Warrant.” United States v. Murphy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117943 (S.D. Ohio October 12, 2011).*

There was cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle for a traffic offense, and he consented to a search of the vehicle. United States v. Valdez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118328 (D. Neb. September 12, 2011).*

HuffPo: Airport Security Checkpoint Of The Future Unveiled:

A mock-up “checkpoint of the future” could spare air travelers the hassle of TSA liquid checks, shoe removal and pat-downs, while speeding up security for almost all fliers.

Those wishing to see the system, first introduced in June, can now catch a glimpse at an aviation security conference in Amsterdam. The hi-tech set up retains the familiar lane set-up — but the similarities end there reports the Daily Mail.

The new system has passengers walking through one of three 20-foot tunnels, marked “enhanced,” “normal” or “known traveler,” a reference to programs in which fliers submit personal data before flying in exchange for lighter scrutiny at checkpoints. Equipment in each tunnel would scan passengers as they walk through — meaning no more x-ray machines, emptying of pockets or removing of shoes and jackets.

Defendant had no standing to contest the installation of a GPS device on the CI’s car that he got in, even if the court followed Maynard. United States v. Okafor, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117030 (D. Minn. August 18, 2011), adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114563 (D. Minn. October 4, 2011):

Here, there is no indication that Defendant treated his business lot as private. The entire lot can be viewed and used by the public. And the GPS tracking of the CI’s vehicle into the fenced lot adjacent to Defendant’s business did not invade Defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy either. Entrance to both the business parking lot and the adjacent lot across the street is gained from a public street and both lots were visible by officers with their naked eyes from public areas. Although the adjacent lot was surrounded by a chain-linked fence with a locked gate, Defendant himself unlocked the gate to allow the CI access and there was no other indication that the adjacent lot was “private.” In fact, Defendant testified that he used the adjacent property to store customer vehicles for his automotive business because there was not enough room to store them on his business lot. In other words, if there would have been room across the street, presumably he would have stored the vehicles there in the open business lot. Therefore, this Court concludes—similar to the court in Reed—that the adjacent lot was a “semi-private area” but was not an area in which Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Reed, 733 F.2d at 501.