Search of defendant’s person before he was placed in an ambulance at best could be for weapons. Removing a smoking pipe from his pocket was an unreasonable search. People v. Kowalski, 2011 IL App (2nd) 100237, 352 Ill. Dec. 582, 954 N.E.2d 442 (2011):

[P14] The State argues, as the trial court found, that this warrant exception should be extended to a situation where a citizen is to be transported in an ambulance. Even assuming that this exception may be properly extended in such a manner, we believe that the search conducted by Gaw exceeded the scope permitted under this exception. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Terry, a search for weapons without probable cause must, like any other search, be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. Accordingly, if the purpose of searching a citizen prior to providing him with a courtesy transport in a squad car or transporting him in an ambulance is to ensure the safety of the transporting officers or paramedics, then such a search, like the protective pat-down search permitted by Terry, should be limited to “an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer” or paramedic. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. As previously discussed, the State did not present any evidence that indicated that Gaw initially limited his search of defendant to a pat-down search for weapons or that the pipe felt like a weapon or other contraband. Accordingly, the State failed to counter defendant’s prima facie case that the search conducted by Gaw was illegal.

Defendant’s arrest was without probable cause. It isn’t valid just because there is a warrant for his arrest. Otherwise, anybody could be arrested. State v. Echols, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 442 (June 14, 2011):

The trial court found that the appellant’s having an outstanding warrant justified the arrest even though the officers did not know about the warrant. However, if that were true, then a police officer could arrest anyone without probable cause, check the person’s background for an outstanding warrant, and then use the outstanding warrant as justification for the warrantless arrest. We note that the police officers in this case did not even have enough information to check for an outstanding warrant until after they arrested the appellant and learned his last name was Brabson. Therefore, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings, and we conclude that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him for killing the victim.

A radio call of a drive-by with shots coming from a black Lexus with three Asian males justified a stop here of a black Honda with with Asian males. State v. Parker, 71 So. 3d 483 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

A 911 call from a woman at defendant’s house brought the police who shined a flashlight through the front door and saw probable marijuana and crack. If it were daylight, they could have made the same observation. Entry to seize the drugs was reasonable. People v. Glick, 250 P.3d 578 (Colo. 2011).*

Defendant’s car was stopped in a crosswalk, and the officer approached. He was in a rental car that was not rented to him, he was not a designated driver, and he had no DL, which turned out to be suspended. In the car were six air fresheners and a bundle of cash. The officer could reasonably call out a drug dog. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 945 N.E.2d 976 (2011),* Review denied 460 Mass. 1105, 949 N.E.2d 925 (2011)

CI identifying defendant by specific identifiers and clothing that were corroborated gave officers PC when they saw him. He was wanted for assault and talking the victim’s cell phone. State v. Emery, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 860 (April 13, 2011).*

The affidavit for the search warrant was based on CI information that was not clear as to the time being recent. The officer sought to rehabilitate the search warrant in the face of a staleness challenge by testifying at the suppression hearing that he thought he told the issuing magistrate that the information was within the last 24 hours, but he was unclear as to that. Under Ex parte Green, 15 So. 3d 489 (Ala. 2008), the warrant fails. McIntosh v. State, 71 So. 3d 41 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).*

Defendant was driving a Cadillac Escalade in a neighborhood suspiciously, and the officer felt that he was casing houses for burglary. When defendant crossed the centerline, he pulled him over. Defendant seemed under the influence, but not enough to arrest. The officer was going to let him go but asked for consent, which defendant gave. The drug dog was in the patrol car, came out, and alerted. It was all valid. State v. Ellis, 2010 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (October 1, 2010).*

The mistaken delivery and later police search case of Walter v. United States did not apply to a computer brought to Best Buy’s Geek Squad to remove viruses. While working on the computer, viruses would apparently be removed but would reappear, and they were isolated to files which had child pornography in them. When defendant turned the computer over to the Geek Squad for virus repair, he permitted them to do anything to it to fix it. They called the police, as they were supposed to. This is not an expectation of privacy that public is going to find reasonable. Melton v. State, 69 So. 3d 916 (Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 2010),* certiorari denied Ex parte Melton, 69 So. 3d 932 (Ala. 2011).*

Defendant’s request to certify interpretation of the state following too close statute to the state supreme court is denied; the federal courts have already well interpreted it. Based on the officer’s testimony, following too close did not justify the stop here. However, defendant did not show standing to challenge the search of the car, as opposed to the stop, or a factual nexus to his stop and the finding of the drugs. United States v. Ibarra, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135514 (D. Kan. November 23, 2011)*:

The only way defendant may challenge the search, therefore, is to use a derivative evidence theory—to argue that but for his unlawful detention, the officer would not have found the drugs. United States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 2001). In the Tenth Circuit, there must be a “causal link between the violation and the contraband.” Id. at 1134-35. If the evidence ultimately found in the vehicle is the fruit of the defendant’s illegal detention, then the defendant will have standing to seek suppression. United States v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2000). To prevail under this theory, however, the defendant bears a two-pronged burden. He must not only show that his original detention violated the Fourth Amendment, but also that there was a “factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence.” Id. at 1131. If the defendant can show that the evidence would not have been found but for his—and only his—detention, then the burden shifts to the government to show that the evidence is not the fruit of the poisonous tree. DeLuca, 269 F.3d at 1133. Although this framework has been criticized, see, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006), the Tenth Circuit has recognized that courts are bound by precedent to follow it, see United States v. Ladeaux, 454 F.3d 1107, 1111 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006).

Under prevailing Tenth Circuit law, defendant has not met his burden and demonstrated the factual nexus required for suppressing the drugs found in the car. Defendant has provided no evidence of a factual nexus between the violation of his rights and the challenged evidence. As previously mentioned, defendant must show that the evidence would not have been found but for his own unlawful detention. This can be done by showing that had defendant departed the scene, he would have been allowed to leave in the vehicle. See Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d at 1131 (“At the suppression hearing, Nava-Ramirez put on no evidence to demonstrate that had he, at some point after the passenger compartment search was completed but before the trunk search began, requested permission or otherwise attempted to depart the scene, he would have been able to leave in Wald’s car. In the absence of some supportive proof, this court cannot simply speculate that Wald would have given Nava—Ramirez permission to take his car.”). Defendant presented no such evidence. There is no evidence before the court that he had possessory control over the vehicle or that he would have otherwise been allowed to leave the scene in the vehicle. And there is no evidence that the drugs were found as a result of defendant’s detention. The drugs were found because Ms. Rendon-DeMartinez—the person with the owner’s permission to possess the vehicle—consented to a search of the vehicle. Defendant has not established a factual nexus between his detention and the discovery of the drugs, and the court denies his motion to suppress.

In an internet traveler case without travel involving Perverted Justice, a search warrant was issued for defendant’s computer for chat logs and pictures sent to the decoy officer. In the picture folder, the forensic search found child pornography in “plain view” under an otherwise valid warrant. United States v. Wilmes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134757 (W.D. Ky. November 14, 2011)*:

In the instant case, the valid portion of the warrant authorized a search for “chat logs, emails, data files, and any other electronic information stored on the electronic media that may support the allegation of contact between Wilmes and the ‘child.’” Investigator Baker searched for images of Wilmes that may have been transferred to the decoy by navigating directly to the Yahoo! Photo Sharing folder, the folder in which any such images would have been stored. It was reasonable for Investigator Baker to open the Yahoo! Photo Sharing folder to determine if it contained evidence of child enticement. In that folder Investigator Baker encountered images that appeared to involve child pornography along with images of the Defendant. After verifying the nature of the illegal images, Investigator Baker then promptly secured a search warrant to conduct a search specifically looking for additional images of child pornography.

In summary, Investigator Baker discovered what immediately appeared to be evidence of child pornography in plain view during his search and had lawful right of access to those photographs as they were accessed automatically during a search for evidence of child enticement. Accordingly, the child pornography evidence would have been inevitably discovered during the properly authorized forensic search of Wilmes’s computer for evidence of child enticement. As a result, the evidence is admissible and the motion to suppress is DENIED. Accord id.; United States v. Underwood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134092, 2010 WL 5313766 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521-22 (4th Cir. 2010).

Wired.com: 9 Reasons Wired Readers Should Wear Tinfoil Hats by David Kravets on the assault on privacy:

There’s plenty of reason to be concerned Big Brother is watching.

We’re paranoid not because we have grandiose notions of our self-importance, but because the facts speak for themselves.

Here’s our short list of nine reasons that Wired readers ought to wear tinfoil hats, or at least, fight for their rights and consider ways to protect themselves with encryption and defensive digital technologies.

We know the list is incomplete, so if you have better reasons that we list here, put them in the comments and we’ll make a list based off them.

Until then, remember: Don’t suspect a friend; report him.

A thought provoking piece. They are:

• Warrantless Wiretapping
• Warrantless GPS Tracking
• Tracking Devices in Your Pocket
• Fake Cell Phone Towers
• The Border Exception
• The “6 Months and It’s the Government’s” Rule under ECPA
• The Patriot Act
• Government Malware
• Known Unknowns

How long the cell carriers keep stuff:

In an IRS and mail fraud case, the warrants were necessarily broad, but they were not constitutionally overbroad. United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2011):

However, despite the generality of the warrants themselves, the supporting affidavits fill in many of the necessary details. In particular, the affidavits flesh out how the conduct being investigated is related to the statutes listed on the warrants. For example, the affidavits indicate that “[t]he use of the United States mail and commercial interstate carriers to transport Renaissance promotional materials or other matters in furtherance of this scheme or artifice to defraud United States consumers is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which is mail fraud.” … Furthermore, they describe various “mailings [that] contained Renaissance promotional material such as videotapes, brochures, tax forms, and other material containing some false and misleading information,” … and various bank and brokerage accounts held by Mr. Cooper, Renaissance, or associated entities, …. Importantly, the affidavits also include a list of “[i]tems to be seized,” …, which—when read in conjunction with the warrant and the remainder of each affidavit—would “enable[] the [executing officers] to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized,” Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862 (quoting Leary, 846 F.2d at 600). Contrary to Mr. Cooper’s assertions, the warrants and affidavits do much more than “merely recit[e] the mail fraud and money laundering statutes.” ….

Furthermore, as noted above, “[e]ven a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.” Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862 (quoting Leary, 846 F.2d at 600). In other words, whether a search warrant is sufficiently particular depends in part on the nature of the crimes being investigated. Warrants relating to more complex and far-reaching criminal schemes may be deemed legally sufficient even though they are less particular than warrants pertaining to more straightforward criminal matters. See United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e are satisfied that [the warrant] is sufficiently limited and specific, in view of the nature of this extended conspiracy and other crimes for which he was being investigated ….”); … Indeed, the complex and comprehensive nature of the broad scheme of financial criminal activity implicated in this case “makes it difficult to list with great particularity the precise items desired to be seized which evidence such activity.” Janus Indus., 48 F.3d at 1554. In the face of this difficulty, the affiants provided a meaningful and sufficient amount of detail.

Every complex white collar case with a search warrant seems to include a claim that the warrant was overbroad, yet they seldom succeed. The more complicated and paper heavy the crime under investigation, the more is allowed in the breadth of the warrant. Few of these challenges seem to succeed because the government is allowed significant leeway in expressing what needs to be searched for just as a matter of practicality.

Even if defendant could challenge a subpoena for information for subscriber information on a cell phone, he lacks standing because he used a fictitious name to get the phone. United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Ore. 2011):

Following this reasoning, several district courts have held that a defendant lacks standing to challenge cell phone records in which the defendant was not a registered subscriber. See, e.g., United States v. Novas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N. Y. 2009), reversed on other grounds by United States v. Novas, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *6-7 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (“The subscriber name indicates that [the defendant] either was trying to distance himself from the cell phone or had no interest in the cell phone. As such, the use of a fictitious name or names of third party indicates that [the defendant] does not have a privacy interest in the phones.”); United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596, at * 15-17 (E.D. Tenn. May 24, 2007) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone records where the defendant was not the legitimate subscriber to the phone); United States v. Solomon, No. 02: 05cr385, 2007 WL 927960, at *3 (W.D. Pa. March 26,2007). This court agrees with the conclusion reached by these district courts.

When defendant was stopped she reached into her purse for her DL, and the officer could see heroin in plain view. United States v. Jones, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56186 (W.D. Pa. May 25, 2011).*

Defendant didn’t want to consent, but he did, and a marijuana grow operation was found in the basement behind a hidden door, which the officers figured out. The consent was still voluntary. United States v. Butchko, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56274 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011).*

The FBI’s description of the child pornography to be seized could not be better described than it was, and the government did not unreasonably delay in searching defendant’s computer. United States v. Ivers, 430 Fed. Appx. 573 (9th Cir. 2011):

The FBI could not have provided a more specific description of the items sought because, as in prior cases, the government knew that Ivers had received pornographic images “but had no way of knowing where the images were stored.” United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000). The warrant was limited to items related to the crime, and the supporting affidavit explained the necessity of seizing electronic storage devices for later examination. See Hill, 459 F.3d at 976 (noting that officials must explain “why a wholesale seizure is necessary”).

A dog alert was enough to refer a vehicle for secondary inspection at the border. United States v. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45928 (D. Ariz. April 27, 2011).*

On the totality of the circumstances, the Border Patrol officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle on a rural road near the border that was an area of low population and the vehicle didn’t look like it belonged to any of the local residents. United States v. Castro-Rios, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45921 (D. Ariz. March 31, 2011).*

The fair probability of destruction of evidence justified entry without a search warrant, assuming defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Domenech, 430 Fed. Appx. 392 (6th Cir. 2011), reversing United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2010) (posted here) on rehearing:

Even if we were to assume that defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room, the contested search was lawful because the totality of the circumstances known to the officers when they initiated the search of Room 22 gave them probable cause to believe that there was a “fair probability” that “evidence of a crime” would be found in the room. We recognize, of course, that having searched Room 22 without a valid warrant, the government bears the burden of establishing the legality of the search by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Haynes, 301 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2002). Officers must show both that there was probable cause to believe a crime was being committed or evidence of a crime would be found, and that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). Where probable cause exists, officers may enter without a warrant “when evidence of drug crimes is in danger of destruction.” United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 655 (6th Cir. 2002). The officers must reasonably believe that the occupants of the structure are likely to destroy evidence. Id. at 656. Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). That determination is a “commonsense, practical question” based upon the totality of the circumstances Id. at 230-31. Those circumstances, in turn, consist of “objective facts known to the officers at the time of the search.” Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998).

What, precisely, did the officers know when they entered Room 22? First, Officer Crawford testified that the Green Acres motel was known for “a lot of drug activity.” Second, the driver of the Ford Explorer parked in front of Room 22 had behaved evasively earlier that evening. Third, a check of the license plates of the Explorer revealed that its owner had an outstanding arrest warrant. Fourth, the registration associated with Room 22 was filled out incompletely by “Rogelio,” who listed an automobile other than the Ford Explorer parked in front of Room 22. Fifth, Officer Burchell was familiar with the construction of the motel and knew where the toilet for Room 22 would be situated. Sixth, shortly after he heard his colleagues make contact with the occupants, he observed a figure enter the bathroom and bend over the toilet. Based upon his prior experience, he concluded that “this person might be attempting to destroy something or flush something down the toilet.” While none of these considerations, when taken individually, would be sufficient to create a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime would be found in Room 22, they strike us as more than sufficient to establish probable cause and exigent circumstances when viewed through the “totality of the circumstances” prism. Officer Burchell observed a figure rush to the bathroom and appear to bend over the toilet in response to the officers’ appearance at the doorway of Room 22. This gave Officer Burchell probable cause to open the bathroom window to prevent what he concluded was an attempt to destroy evidence. For their part, the officers at the door of the motel room had probable cause to enter as soon as they heard the shouts of their colleague from the back of the room.

In reaching this holding today, we do not intend to downplay the importance of requiring a warrant. …

The Ninth Circuit joins virtually every other jurisdiction and holds that there is a common law right of access to search warrant materials, thus declining to reach the constitutional issues of whether the Fourth Amendment requires it. United States v. The Business of the Custer Battlefield Museum and Store Located at Interstate 90, Exit 514, South of Billings, Montana, 658 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2011):

We also agree with these courts that post-investigation warrant materials fall outside the “narrow range of documents [that are] not subject to the right of public access at all because the[y] have ‘traditionally been kept secret for important policy reasons.’” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219). As we acknowledged in Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213-14, 1218, warrant materials have not historically been accessible to the public during the early stages of criminal proceedings. “Warrant application proceedings are highly secret in nature and have historically been closed to the press and public.” Wells Fargo, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 583; see also Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 64 (“[P]roceedings for search warrants are not open to the public.”); Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573 (“[H]istorically the process of issuing search warrants involves an ex parte application by the government and in camera consideration by the judge or magistrate. Moreover, the very objective of the search warrant process, the seizure of evidence of crime, would be frustrated if conducted openly.”).

[5] Post-investigation, however, warrant materials “have historically been available to the public.” In re N.Y. Times Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d at 88. “Search warrant applications … generally are unsealed at later stages of criminal proceedings, such as upon the return of the execution of the warrant or in connection with post-indictment discovery.” Wells Fargo, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 581. “[A]lthough the process of issuing search warrants has traditionally not been conducted in an open fashion, search warrant applications and receipts are routinely filed with the clerk of court without seal.” Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573 (emphasis added). In the post-investigation context, warrant materials have generally been open to the public.

[6] This tradition of openness “serves as a check on the judiciary because the public can ensure that judges are not merely serving as a rubber stamp for the police.” In re N.Y. Times Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d at 90. Warrant materials are also “often used to adjudicate important constitutional rights such as the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “public access to documents filed in support of search warrants is important to the public’s understanding of the function and operation of the judicial process and the criminal justice system and may operate as a curb on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct.” Gunn, 855 F.3d at 573; see also Wells Fargo, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (stating that access to warrant materials “promotes the legitimate interests of the public and the press in ‘keep[ing] a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995))).

[7] For these reasons, we hold that the public has a qualified common law right of access to warrant materials after an investigation has been terminated. In doing so, we decline to extend Times Mirror to post-investigation access. …

United States v. Krupa, 633 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2011) (posted here), is vacated on rehearing and a new opinion issued: While there arguably was no probable cause based on a later case, at the time of the search (2002) there appeared to be, so the good faith exception would be applied. United States v. Krupa, 658 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2011):

The agent’s affidavit presented to Colonel LaFave first set forth the agent’s qualifications to conduct investigations of computers and recover digital evidence, as well as his experience in investigations related to computer crimes and child pornography. The affidavit then stated that base police, responding to a report of child neglect, determined that “there were several computers at the location and that there was no custodial parents at the house only an individual KRUPA who was not affiliated with the military.” The affidavit stated that Krupa “had care and custody of the residence,” which included the 13 computer towers and two laptops. Reynolds’ affidavit stated that during his initial investigation of the computers, before consent was withdrawn, he located “an image of suspected contraband,” specifically a “photograph [that] appeared to be of a nude 15 to 17 year old female with a web site label of www.nude-teens.com.”

Although a close case, we conclude that Colonel LaFave reasonably concluded that there was probable cause to issue a search warrant. Reynolds’ affidavit set forth his qualifications as a trained investigator of computers for computer crimes and child pornography. Accordingly, the Colonel was entitled to give some deference to the agent’s statement that the photograph constituted an “image of suspected contraband,” even though the affidavit’s description of the photograph did not necessarily support the conclusion that the photograph constituted child pornography. Furthermore, the affidavit indicated that [*9] the police had responded to “a report of child neglect,” that no custodial parents were at the residence, that Krupa, who was not affiliated with the military, had care and custody of the residence, and that the residence contained 15 computers. In sum, the investigator’s assertion that he had found an “image of suspected contraband” — implicitly referring to child pornography — in computers seized from a home for which there had been a report of child neglect, and where there was no custodial parent present, created a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence would be found in the computers. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

“The instant motion to suppress raises the question of whether Defendant Clement Franklin Fuller, III, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the enclosed porch of his leased residence. A police officer passed through the porch to knock on the primary door to the residence. While on the porch, the officer noticed evidence that led to Defendant’s arrest. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion to suppress will be denied because the door to the primary residence was the place that the gentleman’s reasonable expectation of privacy began.” United States v. Fuller, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115913 (E.D. Mich. October 7, 2011).

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging his consent to search on the ground his consent form was forged was legally frivolous. Defense counsel entertained that contention and hired a handwriting expert to compare and the expert determined it was defendant’s signature. United States v. Gallipeau, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116047 (D. S.C. October 5, 2011).*

“Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Johnson, we cannot say that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law.” While the situation was tense and rapidly evolving, it did not appear that plaintiff was any real threat to the officer’s safety. Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2011).*

It is not required that a specific offense be identified for reasonable suspicion to exist. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6188 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (concurrence; dissent), revg Derichsweiler v. State, 301 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, 2009):

… We conclude that the majority below erred to the extent that its opinion may be read for the proposition that facts adduced to give rise to a reasonable suspicion must show that the detainee has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a particular and distinctively identifiable penal offense.

Unlike the case with probable cause to justify an arrest, it is not a sine qua non of reasonable suspicion that a detaining officer be able to pinpoint a particular penal infraction. The reason is simple but fundamental. A brief investigative detention constitutes a significantly lesser intrusion upon the privacy and integrity of the person than a full-blown custodial arrest. For this reason, a warrantless investigative detention may be deemed “reasonable” for Fourth Amendment purposes on the basis of a lesser quantum or quality of information—reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. Likewise, because a detention is less intrusive than an arrest, the specificity with which the articulable information known to the police must demonstrate that a particular penal offense has occurred, is occurring, or soon will occur, is concomitantly less. It is, after all, only an “investigative” detention. So long as the intrusion does not exceed the legitimate scope of such a detention and evolve into the greater intrusiveness inherent in an arrest-sans-probable-cause, the Fourth Amendment will tolerate a certain degree of police proaction. Particularly with respect to information suggesting that a crime is about to occur, the requirement that there be “some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime” does not necessarily mean that the information must lead inexorably to the conclusion that a particular and identifiable penal code offense is imminent. It is enough to satisfy the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion that the information is sufficiently detailed and reliable—i.e., it supports more than an inarticulate hunch or intuition—to suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing.

[It isn’t for PC, so why not for RS?]

Military personnel have a lesser expectation of privacy when they give a urine sample for testing. Here, defendant consented but attempted to withdraw his consent before the testing actually occurred. Once in government control, a member of the military loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Dease, 2011 CCA LEXIS 317 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. September 29, 2011):

… Just as the lapse in exigent circumstances does not revive an expectation of privacy in a blood sample taken by the government, a revocation of consent to seize a urine specimen does not revive an expectation of privacy in a urine sample surrendered to the government.

In finding that a reasonable expectation of privacy in a urine sample continues after it has been provided to the government for testing, the military judge states that one who provides a urine specimen has “a reasonable expectation that the government will properly secure his sample and prevent unauthorized access, tampering, or testing of that sample.” In support of this conclusion the military judge analogizes the privacy interest in a bottle of urine to that in a computer. But we find the analogy incorrect. Unlike a computer hard drive in which one might reasonably retain some possessory and privacy interest after voluntarily providing it to the government for analysis, urine is by definition a waste product which will ultimately be destroyed and in which no continuing reasonable expectation of privacy exists. See Venner, 367 A.2d at 956 (The accused could “not have had an ‘expectation … that society [would be] prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ a property right in human excreta for the simple reason that human experience is to abandon it immediately.”).

While society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the act of urination and the urine excreted under normal circumstances, we find that this reasonable expectation does not survive voluntary surrender of urine waste to government control for analysis. We agree with the military judge that at the time he provided the sample the appellee could reasonably expect his urine sample to be secured against unauthorized access. But this alone is insufficient to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy subject to Fourth Amendment protection: the appellee should also have reasonably expected the sample to be tested at any time, to be incrementally destroyed during testing, and to be ultimately discarded.

Under the circumstances of this case, we find no continuing reasonable expectation of privacy in the sample and, therefore, no continuing Fourth Amendment protection which the appellee’s revocation of consent could reclaim. As stated above, a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches is a subjective expectation of privacy in the item or area to be searched that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. In the case of waste urine provided to the government for testing, we find that this threshold requirement is not met. Like delivering garbage to the curb, the appellee voluntarily abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in his waste urine when he delivered it to the government for analysis. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40; Venner, 367 A.2d at 956.

Computerworld.com: Surrounded by surveillance: Is everything spying on you? by Darlene Storm:

Depending upon who you listen to, GPS tracking shouldn’t be your only concern when you are out and about on the streets. The ACLU hammered license plate scanners as ‘logging our every move,’ a different investigative report concluded your car is spying on you, and some even claim the street lights are out to get you.

ABAJ.com: Big Brother May Not Be Watching You, But Some Shopping Malls Know Where You Are at All Times by Martha Neil:

In an example of how cutting-edge technology apparently may be far ahead of lawmakers, PC Magazine is reporting that at least two U.S. shopping malls, in California and Virginia, will be tracking customers through their cellphones this holiday season.

The Footpath system, which tracks shoppers anonymously, according to those who promote it, is intended to help merchants maximize their real estate by identifying which areas of their stores are drawing the most customers.

The situation isn’t yet a real-life equivalent of the sci-fi scene in Minority Report, in which Tom Cruise enters a shopping center and is immediately identified and bombarded with advertisements. However, the article points out that shoppers may not be aware they are being tracked by the system.

. . .

You can see a brief video demonstration of how the technology works on the company’s site.“)

CNET.com: Police procedures leaked for getting into Facebook, other accounts by Declan McCullagh:

Confidential guidelines telling police how to access Facebook, Microsoft, Blizzard, and AOL user accounts have appeared online this week.

The files, known colloquially as law enforcement guidelines, typically tell police what types of user data are stored, how long they’re retained, and what procedures to use to gain access to them.

A few types of requests–for e-mail less than 180 days old, for instance–tend to require search warrants. In general, basic subscriber information can be disclosed with a subpoena, and a court order is required for more extensive information (whether that’s sufficient is the subject of ongoing litigation in the Twitter-WikiLeaks case).

Here are some highlights from each company’s policies: …

The Hill: Turkey Day provides TSA a chance to test new security procedures by Keith Laing:

The Transportation Security Administration says passengers will likely notice fewer pat-downs of children and other changes at airports over this long weekend, the busiest travel days of the year.

The changes are part of TSA’s move toward a “risk-based” security approach. Most of them have been in place since earlier in the fall, but they will be new to an estimated 3.4 million people who are expected to fly for the holidays.

“When traveling this holiday travel season, passengers may notice new procedures in place at airports, including modified screening for passengers 12 and under and additional privacy protections on more than half of our imaging technology units,” the agency said in a statement provided to The Hill.