Officers had a search warrant for a vehicle and an occupant, and defendant was there too. They developed enough information to detain her as well, and she consented to a search of her person, but officers elected to have a female officer do that, and they waited a reasonable time for one to show up. In the meantime, she incriminated herself. United States v. Baptiste, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95755 (D. Vt. August 25, 2011).*

Defendant was driving through a supermarket parking lot with his lights off and stopped for two minutes, and the driver and passenger switched. This was suspicious enough that criminal activity was afoot to make a stop. When the officer questioned the former passenger now driver, he found that her license was suspended, and that justified a longer detention. State v. Little, 2011 Ohio 4175, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3482 (12th Dist. August 22, 2011).*

In a valid traffic stop, the officer smelled intoxicants, but rejected the driver as the source. He moved to the passenger who admitted to having an open container, and that gave probable cause to search for the open container. The defendant was told to “come clean,” and he admitted to marijuana possession as well, and that was further probable cause. Harper v. State, 349 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App. — Amarillo 2011).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress raised a knock-and-announce issue that was not fully decided by the trial court. Remanded for findings. State v. Dillon, 163 Wn. App. 101, 257 P.3d 678 (2011).*

A person who was not invited, who was even not wanted there, came into the house searched. When the police searched the house, he had no standing under Olson. It isn’t even close. [Essentially he was a trespasser.] United States v. Pettiway, 429 Fed. Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2011).*

In a police shooting case, there was a classic jury question on the reasonableness of the shooting, so qualified immunity is denied. Bletz v. Gribble, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10683, 2011 FED App. 0148P (6th Cir. May 27, 2011).*

The district court’s findings of fact for the basis for the stop are not clearly erroneous, so the stop was justified. United States v. Figueroa, 647 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

An officer went to defendant’s house to do a knock and talk. Instead of going to the door, he went into the open garage to check out defendant’s car. This violated curtilage and was unreasonable, analyzing a bunch of curtilage cases from around the county. The court found “instructive” United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1975), where a heroin deal went down in a garage, and that was a waiver of privacy. State v. Blakley, 226 Ariz. 25, 595 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4, 243 P.3d 628 (2010):

P17 Here, instead of approaching the front door to make contact with any occupants of the residence, Silva walked past the pathway that led directly to the front door and continued walking down the driveway into an area ordinarily not used by visitors. And at the suppression hearing, Silva acknowledged that his original intent when he entered the property was to “knock and talk” to an occupant of the residence, but instead, he decided to investigate the vehicle. Applying Magana’s reasonableness test to the facts of this case, we conclude that in exceeding the boundaries of the area commonly accessed by visitors, with no intent to locate an occupant but, rather, for the purpose of conducting an investigation, Silva’s actions in approaching the vehicle violated Blakley’s reasonable expectation of privacy in that area of his property. Silva’s presence near the vehicle on Blakley’s driveway therefore was unlawful. And, in the absence of a warrant, or an exception to that requirement, the search of the garage that followed also was unlawful.

Defendant was stopped and arrested shortly after threatening to shoot up a bank. His car had been stopped, and a gun case was visible. This was a valid plain view. State v. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 602, 243 P.3d 165 (2010).*

A police went to defendant’s house on a claim that a missing teenager was there. When there was no answer at the front gate intercom, the officer stepped over it, and entered, and that was a warrantless search of the curtilage. The facts did not support this emergency entry. State v. Ryder, 301 Conn. 810, 23 A.3d 694 (2011). From the syllabus:

a. [Officer] K conducted a warrantless search of the defendant’s property when he stepped over the defendant’s gate and onto the defendant’s curtilage, the area between the defendant’s gate and front door, that was protected by the fourth amendment, the defendant having taken measures to bar the public from his interior driveway, front yard and front door and having had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area.

b. The emergency exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the warrantless search of the defendant’s curtilage and the subsequent warrantless search of the defendant’s home because a reasonable police officer would not have believed that an emergency existed: it was not objectively reasonable for K to believe that A was in immediate need of help, despite the father’s telephone calls to the police about A, the presence of the car and the couch in the driveway and the lack of an answer at the intercom and the front door, those facts not having provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed; furthermore, the father never suggested to the police that A was in danger or likely would be harmed in any way, the father’s telephone call to the police did not rise to the level of a reliable report of a missing person, and the presence of the car parked in the driveway and the couch was not suspect, but, rather, given the totality of the circumstances, should have led to the reasonable belief that no one was home at the time K was at the defendant’s house, rather than to the belief that an emergency existed.

Odor of raw marijuana coming from defendant’s car justified search of both the car and his person. Meek v. State, 950 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. App. 2011).*

Odor of burnt marijuana coming from defendant’s car and his breath justified search of the car. Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. App. 2011).*

Defendant alleged false statements of the police in getting a search warrant for his house after they smelled the strong odor of raw marijuana coming from the house when they tried to enter but were denied entry. Some marijuana was found. Defendant admitted that he entered the house from the rear while the police were waiting for the warrant. The statement was not necessarily false, and a ready explanation would be that the defendant flushed marijuana after he sneaked into the house. United States v. Kittrell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76513 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2011).*

“I love the smell of [marijuana] in the morning. … Smelled like … [sniffing, pondering] victory. Someday this war’s gonna end…”

An airline passenger had a computer stolen from her bags in transit from Houston to Orlando. The computer has LoJack software on it, and she had the computer traced. The software company notified the police where the computer was, and the police used that to get a search warrant for defendant’s property. Defendant’s claim that obtaining the location information somehow violated Florida Security of Communications Act, chapter 934, specifically § 934.23, was unavailing since it was done at the request of the victim. Defendant was a baggage handler at the Orlando airport. State v. Oliveras, 65 So. 3d 1162, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D 1573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) [And, it seems incredibly unlikely that he would have “standing” to contest gathering that information at all since it was about a stolen computer he had in his possession.]

Defendant had a parole condition limiting his access to computers. The PO received information that defendant was viewing adult porn on his computer. The PO had an objectively reasonable basis for a search and seizure of the computers. State v. Plastow, 2011 Ohio 3557, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3004 (5th Dist. July 18, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for not having his child in child’s carseat. His grabbing the officer’s arm during the stop was a separate crime that led to his valid search incident. O’Neal v. State, 311 Ga. App. 102, 714 S.E.2d 744 (2011).*

Defendant failed to show that his lawyer was ineffective for not challenging his search as being by consent. Throughout the proceedings, the defendant agreed that the search was by consent and that he cooperated throughout. The first anybody heard of the claim of no consent was after he was in prison. Koons v. United States, 639 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 2011):

Despite numerous opportunities, Koons not once informed the court that the officer who approached Koons at work on April 19 falsely claimed to have a warrant, brandished a weapon, and required Koons to accompany him to Koons’s home and let him in. Rather, Koons repeatedly acknowledged that he voluntarily consented. We treat sworn statements made in open court most seriously and demand that parties tell the truth.

While a suspicionless search of a motel register is a “private affair” under the Washington Constitution, here the officers had reasonable suspicion, so the state constitution was not violated. In re Pers. Restraint of Nichols, 171 Wn. 2d 370, 256 P.3d 1131 (2011).*

The search warrant was issued on the statement of a CI who said that he recently saw child pornography on defendant’s computer. That showed his basis of knowledge. When the search warrant was issued, there were some false statements by the affiant, but there still was probable cause. The police failure to leave a copy of the warrant at the time was not a sufficient failure to justify suppression of the search. State v. Ollivier, 161 Wn. App. 307, 254 P.3d 883 (2011).*

While the defendant was not obligated to tell the officer his name, he gave two names in short order, and succeeded in giving the officer reasonable suspicion. The false names itself was a crime. He was not detained until he was told to sit on the curb. The dashboard camera video shows it to be consensual. United States v. Gatamba, 419 Fed. Appx. 529 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

In a CI arranged drug deal, officers had probable cause for defendant’s stop and search based on the fact the person arranging the deal made a call and she showed up, the person went to her car and retrieved cocaine. State v. Chesney, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (March 24, 2011).*

Defendant sued the company providing pretrial release drug testing for a court in Kentucky. He did not challenge the condition; he conceded it was reasonable. He challenged the method of “direct observation” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6881, 2011 FED App. 0085P (6th Cir. April 6, 2011).*

Officers could rely on the report from an apartment complex security officer who they knew and had a duty to protect the apartment complex when he saw things and reported them. Defendant’s furtive, evasive, and defiant conduct in relation to the security guard was relevant to the reasonable suspicion calculus. United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s external computer hard drive was searchable at the border. But, defendant also consented. United States v. McAuley, 420 Fed. Appx. 400 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Factual disputes precluded summary judgment on an unreasonable search and excessive force claim where officers entered with a battering ram without knocking and used flash bang devices. As to the latter, the officers get qualified immunity because no case at the time of the search held flash bang devices unreasonable. [And, this court isn’t going to even decide that question (so there never will be a case in point).] Marmelshtein v. City of Southfield, 421 Fed. Appx. 596, 2011 FED App. 0283N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant was arrested as an “internet traveler” who showed up for sex with a minor. Because the chat sessions talked about his bringing condoms and candy, the officers could search the vehicle under the automobile exception. United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011).*

The court of appeals failed to grant deference to the trial judge’s findings of fact, where the facts were in dispute. Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (with dissent).

The search warrant referred to Attachment 1, and it was clear from the evidentiary hearing that Attachment 1 was present at the scene of the search for particularity purposes. The fact that the defendant’s copy was missing Attachment 1 is not material. United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011):

The district court determined a clear incorporation of Attachment 1, including a full list of items subject to seizure, and the presence of Attachment 1 with the search warrant at the search scene satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. That the copy of Attachment 1 was not provided to Riesselman after the search concluded was of no consequence because a complete copy of the search warrant was present at the time of the search, limiting the items the officers could seize. Based on the facts, we agree the search warrant was sufficiently particular for several reasons.

Defendant’s stop for a traffic offense was valid. When the officer saw defendant’s DL, he recognized the defendant as somebody known to carry weapons. Coupled with some of defendant’s unusual activity, the officer had reason for a patdown. The vehicle was uninsured, and that was cause for impoundment on the city code. United States v. Preston, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79824 (D. Minn. June 8, 2011).*

Under Payton, it was reasonable to believe that defendant would be home outside of normal working hours, so they could enter to arrest. Also, defendant was known to not be working anyway, so she could be home anytime. United States v. Blevins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78995 (W.D. La. May 31, 2011).*

Police investigating a missing persons case went to defendant’s house and walked up to the garage where they could smell raw marijuana. They retreated and obtained the electrical usage records with a county attorney subpoena. Then they got a thermal imaging warrant. Defendant’s claim of a state privacy interest in the power usage records was rejected under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2011) (aff’g United States v. McIntyre, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Neb. 2010)):

As the district court explained, McIntyre’s “argument that § 70-101 provides an expectation of privacy by restricting the dissemination to the county attorney of utility subscriber information is deficient because that statute relates only to identifying information and not to usage records.” United States v. McIntyre, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1026 (D. Neb. 2010) (emphasis added). Therefore, we conclude that McIntyre’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by law enforcement’s use of the subpoena, and a search warrant was unnecessary to obtain the usage records.

We also reject McIntyre’s argument that the subpoena was deficient because it was not served in compliance with § 25-1273 or Nebraska Rule of Civil Discovery 34A. As the district court explained, “[regardless of these issues, the county attorney has subpoena power, under the circumstances present here, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-2,112.” Id. at 1033. Section 86-2,112 states that “any county attorney may … require the production of records … which constitute or contain evidence relevant or material to the investigation or enforcement of the laws of this state when it reasonably appears that such action is necessary and proper.”

And, even if state law was violated, “state law violations do not necessarily offend the Federal Constitution.” United States v. Burtton, 599 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted). “Thus, when a federal court must decide whether to exclude evidence obtained through an arrest, search, or seizure by state officers, the appropriate inquiry is whether the arrest, search, or seizure violated the Federal Constitution, not whether the arrest, search, or seizure violated state law.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). For the reasons set forth supra in Part A.1, we hold that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

An outbound border search is also governed by the border search exception, and there is no requirement the officer state the statute, regulation, or reason for the stop to make it reasonable. United States v. Rivas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57428 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2011).

In a murder case, the defendant claimed that the warrant was invalid for a Franks violation because of a statement that somebody forged a signature to a car title. Removing that information from affidavit still left “overwhelming” probable cause for the search warrant. A search warrant is for collection of evidence, and it is not the place for the officer to make his or her case for arrest of the defendant. State v. St. Louis, 128 Conn. App. 703, 18 A.3d 648 (2011).*

The exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412 (2011), rev’g Thackston v. State, 303 Ga. App. 718, 694 S.E.2d 136 (2010).*

Fact car rental agreement showed that the car was overdue did not alone provide police justification for detaining the defendant. The officer at least had to inquire of the rental company. [After all, a telephone call by the renter can extend the agreement, and the contract in the car would still show it overdue.] State v. Coleman, 257 P.3d 320 (Kan. 2011):

In addition, Coleman was driving a rental car with an expired rental agreement. Although Tatro should have attempted to verify Coleman’s explanation that he had renewed the agreement by telephone, the expired agreement may have provided another legitimate basis for a temporary detention. Courts in other jurisdictions have examined this question; most have concluded that an expired rental agreement provides at least some grounds for further detention and search, while a few have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Masterson, No. 2:08-CR-138, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65941, 2009 WL 2365334 (D. Vt. 2009) (unpublished opinion); Burks v. State, 362 Ark. 558, 561-62, 210 S.W.3d 62 (2005); Tanner v. State, 281 Ga. App. 101, 635 S.E.2d 388 (2006); Crenshaw v. State, 248 Ga. App. 505, 510, 546 S.E.2d 890 (2001) (fact that driver was driving a car with an expired rental agreement sufficient in itself to establish an objective reason for believing the driver may have engaged in criminal conduct, justifying detention for canine search); State v. Kruip, No. 07-1675, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 515, 2008 WL 2902149 (Iowa App. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (driver’s peculiar travel itinerary combined with an expired car rental agreement created reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; expired agreement created reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving without consent of rental company and may have illegally converted car to her own use); State v. Lewis, 980 So. 2d 251, 260 (La. App. 2008); Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sutton v. State, 2009 WY 148, 220 P.3d 784 (Wyo. 2009); Garvin v. State, 2007 WY 190, 172 P.3d 725 (Wyo. 2007). But see United States v. $93,120.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 8:09-CV-374, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34664, 2011 WL 1002766 (D. Neb. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (expired rental car agreement, which driver said he had renewed over the phone, along with travel itinerary including travel from drug-source area to a drug-destination area, and a small amount of visible luggage combined with larger carrier on the top of vehicle and trash about the vehicle did not give police reasonable suspicion for detention and seizure); United States v. Billups, 442 F. Supp. 2d 697, 710-11 (D. Minn. 2006) (detention not justified despite expired rental agreement and request from rental agency that officer impound car; car not reported stolen and officer had already concluded expired agreement was not grounds for detaining driver); Enriquez v. State, 97 Ark. App. 62, 66-67, 244 S.W.3d 696 (2006) (arresting officer gave little weight to expired agreement at time of stop and there were no reports the car was stolen).

We have no difficulty in agreeing with the district court and the Court of Appeals that the expired rental agreement, in combination with Coleman’s parolee status and the reports that it was likely that Coleman was engaged in drug transportation, provided Tatro with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying a temporary detention and allowing further investigation.

Consent to search given to armed officers arresting the defendant at his house at 6 am after surrounding it was not shown to be voluntary. United States v. Real Property and Premises Known as 90-23 201st Street, Hollis, New York, 775 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D. N.Y. 2011)*:

Here, the court finds that the government has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Young voluntarily consented to the police entry into his home. On the morning of October 13, 2005, seven armed agents went to Young’s residence at 6 a.m. to arrest him. The number of armed agents who went to Young’s residence, coupled with the very early morning hour at which they approached, created an environment that was implicitly coercive. When the agents surrounded the home upon arrival and began “knocking” and “pounding” on all the doors and the windows, they intensified that coercion. Young’s failure to answer the door for several minutes in response to agents “pounding” and “knocking” constituted a refusal to admit the agents. The agents persisted for fifteen minutes in the face of Young’s refusal. Under such circumstances, he could reasonably have concluded that the agents would not leave unless the door was opened. After opening the door, Young was faced with three armed agents at his front door demanding entry into his home, at which point he “grudgingly” allowed them to enter, even though he was “annoyed” and “unhappy” about their presence. Given these circumstances, a reasonable person would understand Young’s consent to entry to be submission to authority, not a voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. Thus, the court finds Young’s consent invalid.

Striving to find a “bright line” rule, driving on the line dividing lanes is not a lane violation in N.M. but weaving within a lane is at least reasonable suspicion of being “fatigued or impaired.” Handing a warning ticket and saying “have a nice day” and to “be safe,” is permission to leave. Defendant’s stopping to answer further questions was by consent. [And I have bridge in NYC for sale.] United States v. Bassols, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (D. N.M. 2011)*:

After Officer Lucero gave Bassols a warning citation for violating Section 66-7-317, Officer Lucero told Bassols to have a nice day and to be safe. Bassols then turned and walked back toward his vehicle. Because Bassols began to walk back toward his vehicle after Officer Lucero advised Bassols to “have a nice day” and to “be safe,” the Court concludes that a reasonable person in Bassols’ position would believe that he was free to leave the scene and terminate his encounter with Officer Lucero. While Bassols was walking away, Officer Lucero called out to Bassols and asked if Bassols would answer a few more questions. Officer Lucero did not order Bassols to return to Officer Lucero’s car and he did not order Bassols to answer any questions. Bassols turned around and walked back to Officer Lucero.

Talking with a CI is one way to assess reliability; another is to corroborate him. The fact some information in an affidavit is old does not make it stale. PC is determined from the totality of the information. United States v. Kavalchuk, 2011 DNH 55, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38284 (D. N.H. March 31, 2011).*

The testimony of the officers is credited over the defendant’s “bald denial” that she committed three traffic offenses before she was stopped and then officers found her DL suspended. United States v. Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38483 (N.D. Ohio April 7, 2011).*

Defendant’s claim he used heroin and Xanax the night before he confessed was not enough to show that the consent was not voluntary. United States v. Figueroa, 419 Fed. Appx. 973 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

On traffic stop, the officer is free to run the DL information on the driver; the officer is not limited to just writing a ticket. Questions can also be asked, and here it developed into reasonable suspicion. United States v. Orozco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34378 (D. Kan. March 30, 2011).*

A state search warrant that ends up in federal court is not subject to Rule 41, even where a federal officer was tangentially involved in the case. United States v. Moore, 775 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Va. 2011).*

The emergency aid exception applies to automobiles. This one involved the officer seeing the defendant sitting in his car asleep at 5:40 am in a high crime area with the engine off and lights out. The officer did not attempt to wake up the defendant, instead opening the door to the car seeing crack cocaine on the floor. This was an unreasonable entry into the car. Mundy v. Commonwealth, 342 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. App. 2011):

Accordingly, we hold that the proper test for determining whether a police officer conducted a lawful warrantless search of a motor vehicle pursuant to the emergency aid exception is whether the police officer’s entry into the vehicle was based on an objectively reasonable belief, given the information available at the time of entry, that a person within the vehicle was in need of immediate aid.

. . .

Objectively viewing the circumstances of the instant case, we are unable to conclude that it was reasonable for Officer Bastian to believe that Mundy was in need of immediate aid. Although Officer Bastian specifically testified that he was concerned about Mundy’s well-being, a mere subjective concern is not enough to justify a warrantless entry into Mundy’s vehicle. In contrast to Collins, Officer Bastian did not receive a report of a potentially dangerous or life-threatening situation in the vicinity, nor did he receive a 911 call regarding Mundy’s well-being or safety. Additionally, in Collins, the police officers not only had a reasonable belief that someone might be injured because of the report of shots fired, the police officers also tried to arouse the car’s occupants by yelling repeatedly, and only entered the car after the occupants were unresponsive to the police officers’ shouts. Collins, 321 F.3d at 695.

In the case before us, Officer Bastian failed to take any additional steps to determine if Mundy was actually unresponsive or in need of immediate help prior to opening Mundy’s car door. Officer Bastian did not attempt to wake up Mundy by knocking on the car’s door or any portion of the car, shining his flashlight near Mundy’s face, or yelling or shouting at Mundy. A person sleeping in his vehicle on a summer night, by itself, does not justify a reasonable belief that he is in medical peril necessitating aid. Further, Mundy’s car was not running, its headlights were off and it was legally parked, indicating that Mundy intentionally parked his car at its present location, as opposed to a person becoming ill or experiencing a medical emergency who abruptly pulls over or passes out with the engine running and the headlights activated.

Neither defendant nor the consenter were at the house when the consenter was asked. Nothing in Randolph requires the police to first offer to the defendant to consent before asking somebody else with apparent authority. United States v. Travis, 311 Fed. Appx. 305 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)* (2672 month sentence for bank robbery and armed career criminal).

Defendant’s traffic stop based a turn signal violation and on highly specific information from a CI that defendant was planning a burglary that weekend led to a seizure of evidence. Shortly thereafter, a court order was obtained for installation of a tracking device. The initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion and was not unreasonably extended. The tracking warrant had probable cause. United States v. George, 421 Fed. Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished),* aff’g United States v. George, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33068 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 2007).

CI’s information was detailed and corroborated and that gave reasonable suspicion for the stop. United States v. Holmes, 311 Fed. Appx. 156 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Plaintiff’s truck was properly stopped and detained with reasonable suspicion that it was overloaded and overwidth just by observation by the officer. Reid Mach. Inc. v. Lanzer, 421 Fed. Appx. 497, 2010 FED App. 0719N (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

CI’s information provided probable cause for search of defendant’s car, so Gant did not apply. United States v. Soto, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123213 (E.D. Wis. November 19, 2010).*

As a passenger, defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the vehicle he was in. The officer was credited with the basis for the stop. United States v. Luckey, 402 Fed. Appx. 889 (5th Cir. 2010).*