Defendant was handling his rifle and accidentally shot himself. He called 911, and paramedics and the police arrived. The police officer could seize the rifle in plain view when the officer was in the house. United States v. Taylor, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4950 (E.D. Mich. January 17, 2012). [Note: As a general rule, a call to 911 is a waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy for all who might show up: police, EMS, firemen. If you want to protect your privacy, either don’t call 911 or go outside and wait. The number of cases arising from the simple fact the police were called is astounding. How dumb can some people be? My favorite is having a burglar alarm and then complaining because the police showed up, checked the premises, and stumbled upon evidence of crime.]

Under the “four corners” of the affidavit, United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2008), it shows probable cause for issuance of the search warrant for defendant’s house. Even if it didn’t, there was enough for the good faith exception. United States v. Mariano, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151528 (D. Minn. November 22, 2011), R&R United States v. Mariano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4346 (D. Minn. January 13, 2012).*

Defendant’s post-conviction motion that he should have search warrant materials was moot because he got them before the trial. United States v. Reynolds, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151546 (E.D. Tenn. June 8, 2011).*

HuffPo: Man Hides Gun In Rectum: Michael Leon Ward Smuggled 10-Inch Weapon, Cops Say:

There are some places you should definitely not hide a gun.

Police in North Carolina believe that despite multiple searches after a traffic violation , a suspect managed to sneak a 10-inch gun into a prison last Monday by concealing the weapon in his rectum.

One day later, officers confiscated the .38 revolver from the jail cell of Michael Leon Ward, arrested Jan. 9, a statement from the Onslow County Sheriff’s Office explains. They’d performed a strip search on Ward and even required that he “squat and cough” to see if he held any contraband, but nothing turned up, according to MSNBC.

My question is: How did he get it in there? Seems improbable.

The Sheriff’s press release is here from another internet source.

Update: I heard from a law enforcement agency, and they say “Butt first.”

Reuters: TSA: Agents erred in search of elderly passengers:

The Transportation Security Administration said its agents violated procedures by inspecting an elderly woman’s colostomy bag screening another’s back brace but denied claims the women were strip searched.

The women, Ruth Sherman, 88, of Sunrise, Florida, and Lenore Zimmerman, 85, of Long Beach, New York, complained they were strip searched by agents at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport during the busy Thanksgiving travel holiday.

Gizmodo: The NYPD Wants Mobile Weapon Scanners for Drive-By Patdowns:

The NYPD is in hot water with civil rights groups over its controversial Stop-and-Frisk policy. But, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly has a solution—handheld weapons scanners that see guns under clothing! Fourth Amendment? What’s that?

As Kelly told a State of the NYPD breakfast Tuesday, the department is developing a mobile, infrared scanner mechanism that would allow officers to detect concealed weapons similar to the way that full-body scanners at airports work. The Department of Defense is also working with the NYPD to develop the technology, though details are still rather scarce.

Currently the technology only has a range of three to four feet, requiring the officers to still actually interact with the citizenry presumed criminals. The NYPD hopes to eventually extend the range to 25 meters (80 feet) and mount it atop a police van. This would allow the cops to simply cruise down a street and scan everybody on the sidewalk without having to let them know they’ve just been searched. [NY Post – Gothamist via DVice]

Officers had a search warrant for a gun, and, as soon as they entered, they found a gun in plain view. They did not have to believe that gun was one sought, and they could keep looking in hiding places. In the course of searching for more guns, they validly found drugs. United States v. Lasyone, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2576 (M.D. La. January 10, 2012)*:

Moreover, in addition to the Court’s finding that the narcotics were lawfully seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine, the Court also finds that the narcotics were lawfully seized in the course of the officers’ execution of the search warrant. As mentioned supra, the Court heard testimony from Officer Morris, the commander of the operation, who testified that he has over twenty years of experience in his field, and, as part of his training and experience, knows that firearms and other contraband are oftentimes intentionally hidden from the naked eye. He further testified that, although there were several firearms that were in plain view on the counter top (including the one later determined to have been the firearm described in the search warrant), the search warrant did not include a serial number for the firearm at issue, and, therefore, the officers conducting the search did not know with absolute certainty that the firearm they retrieved was the same one described in the search warrant. … [¶] The Court agrees and finds that the officer’s act of opening of the garbage bag and the lunch box during their search for the firearm described in the warrant was within the scope of the warrant, and, thus, constitutional.

Officers seized defendant’s luggage out of his hotel room but didn’t open it until a search warrant was produced. Another officer left to get the warrant before the entry occurred. Nothing in the warrant application mentioned the entry, and the independent source doctrine of Murray makes it admissible. United States v. Manuel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2704 (S.D. W.Va. January 10, 2012)*:

Assuming that is when the officers reentered the room and began the search, it had absolutely no role in Corporal Hunter applying for and receiving the warrant. The warrant he obtained was completely and genuinely independent of anything produced by illegal search conducted by the officers at the scene after he left. Thus, any evidence seized prior to the time Corporal Hunter phoned to tell officers at the scene that he had the warrant, including the luggage and its contents, would have been inevitably discovered when officers searched pursuant to the warrant. Although the Court is not pleased with the manner in which this search may have occurred and cautions officers that in future cases the independent source doctrine may not be so clear cut, the Court finds the facts of this case fall within the doctrine and the evidence ultimately would have been discovered after the warrant was issued. Therefore, the Court finds the evidence taken from the hotel room is admissible.

Daily Herald: Man wants a job with FBI, instead gets 80 months in jail by Harry Hitzeman. He admits to having child pornography on his computer after the polygraph and then consents to a search of his computer.

YouTube: MELTDOWN! Cop Flips Out When Told He Can’t Search Car Without Warrant:

Cop: Everything came back OK on your driver’s license. I did notice you got arrest there about six months ago for minor in possession of marijuana

Man in car: I [took it] for somebody else, my buddy, my buddy [inaudible].

Cop: I gothca. I’ll tell you what. I’m not going to write you a ticket for speeding. I’m going to cut you free on that. Before you take off, you mine if I take a look through your car for any narcotics or anything like that?

Man in car: Not without a warrant, man

Cop: Pardon?

Man in car: Not without a warrant.

Cop: You’re not going to let me look in your car without a warrant.

Man in car: No, not without a warrant.

Cop. [Sighs] Well OK. I guess that’s OK. I guess that’s just fine actually. That’ll be fine. That’ll just be fucking fine buddy! You don’t like you, you take your shit and get back to fucking Charleston! You don’t fucking come back here, you understand? You understand me, motherfucker? Fuck you! [Walks away, turns and flips the bird:] Fuck you! [Gets in car]

Man in car: What the fuck did you say? [Asked about license, too]

Cop: [Gets out of car] Get your fucking license and get out of here motherfucker! Fuck you! [Gets back to car and PA is on:] Cocksucker! [Inaudible] Goddamn motherfucker!

I would think that most people would think they’d get the same response for refusing a consent search of their car. You can almost hear the cop going through a mental checklist trying to figure out it he can search the car without a warrant. A better is question is: how did this video get from the police department to YouTube? It was posted January 10th by a marijuana legalization group and has a quarter of a million hits today.

I’ve since been told this is a spoof by two cops.

NPR: Drones: Coming Soon to a Sky Near You? On the Media:

The Federal Aviation Administration is preparing to announce new regulations for small camera-equipped drones, versions of which you can already buy at your local mall. Lots of people are eager to hear the FAA’s decision, from energy execs and environmentalists to police and protesters. Brooke talks to Matt Waite, founder of U. Nebraska’s Drone Journalism Lab, about some of the ‘cool’ and ‘creepy’ ramifications of drone technology. Also, check out this blog post for some cool examples of journalistic drones in action.

I’m on a Tea Party list serv that had drones and posse comitatus as its weekly outrage that selling police military style drones violated the law. They chose to put their head in the sand about raw capitalism making drones available to anybody. See posts here, here, and here about drones.

Las Vegas ATF received information from The Gun Store [the one that advertizes it has a machine gun range on taxicabs] that defendant had bought a bunch of assault rifles with cash on a Sunday, and that the store tried to call ATF about the purchase as a “suspicious transaction” on Sunday but couldn’t raise anybody. They gave their surveillance video and paperwork on defendant. A couple of days later, they had a call that defendant was inquiring at another store about buying a 50 caliber Special Forces-type sniper rifle for $10,000 in cash. The purchase didn’t happen, but defendant was on the phone with somebody while looking at the gun, a fact indicative of a straw purchase. Then he showed at another store which called ATF about a suspicious transaction in the offing, and they stalled him until ATF arrived, and defendant was stopped in the parking lot. Defendant was detained on suspicion of being a straw purchaser to ship guns to Mexican drug cartels. He consented to a search of his car. That a reasonable explanation might exist does not negate reasonable suspicion. United States v. Carranza, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100951 (D. Nev. August 5, 2011),* motion granted on remand from district judge United States v. Carranza, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151259 (D. Nev. October 28, 2011) (no reasonable suspicion for a stop under Nevada law and presence in a high crime area alone not reasonable suspicion). Posted originally here.

Las Vegas ATF received information from The Gun Store [the one that advertizes it has a machine gun range on taxicabs] that defendant had bought a bunch of assault rifles with cash on a Sunday, and that the store tried to call ATF about the purchase as a “suspicious transaction” on Sunday but couldn’t raise anybody. They gave their surveillance video and paperwork on defendant. A couple of days later, they had a call that defendant was inquiring at another store about buying a 50 caliber Special Forces-type sniper rifle for $10,000 in cash. The purchase didn’t happen, but defendant was on the phone with somebody while looking at the gun, a fact indicative of a straw purchase. Then he showed at another store which called ATF about a suspicious transaction in the offing, and they stalled him until ATF arrived, and defendant was stopped in the parking lot. Defendant was detained on suspicion of being a straw purchaser to ship guns to Mexican drug cartels. He consented to a search of his car. That a reasonable explanation might exist does not negate reasonable suspicion. United States v. Carranza, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100951 (D. Nev. August 5, 2011),* motion granted on remand from district judge United States v. Carranza, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151259 (D. Nev. October 28, 2011) (no reasonable suspicion for a stop under Nevada law and presence in a high crime area alone not reasonable suspicion).

The government argued lack of standing because defendant did not live, pay rent, or seemingly ever spend the night at the residence searched; however, his car was in the garage and his driver’s license was found in a shoe in the residence. This would indicate standing. Nevertheless, the searches were valid so standing does not have to be decided. The officers had a warrant for defendant, and they were told he was inside. United States v. Griffin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101180 (E.D. Tex. August 5, 2011).*

Defendant approached a closed gate of Wright Patterson Air Force Base and started to make a U-turn when he was stopped by air base security officers. After the stop, they learned he was driving on a suspended license (for which he was cited and released). Nevertheless, the motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Adams, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048 (S.D. Ohio January 12, 2012)*:

Although this Court fully understands Sedon’s sincere testimony regarding his duty as a law enforcement officer to keep WPAFB safe, there was no testimony elicited at the suppression hearing to indicate Sedon believed the vehicle being driven by Adams was being operated in an unsafe manner. Sedon never testified that he witnessed the vehicle swerve or otherwise move erratically, impede traffic in any way, or that he believed the driver may be having a medical emergency, falling asleep, or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In fact, Sedon very clearly testified that he did not witness any traffic violations committed by Adams before initiating the traffic stop.

In addition, while it is understandable that a heightened level of security may exist around a military base, the vehicle’s movements, as well as the actions of its occupants, did not provide a reasonable basis for Sedon to believe Adams or his passenger were, or were about to be, engaged in any sort of criminal activity. For example, Sedon did not testify the vehicle attempted to evade him, was previously witnessed in the area, or had otherwise appeared to be taking photographs of the base or involved in some type of surveillance. Sedon also did not testify that any intelligence or other reason existed to believe the type of vehicle, or the occupants therein, posed a specific security threat or concern to WPAFB. In addition, when the vehicle pulled up to Gate 1A, which closed at 6 p.m., none of the occupants emerged from the vehicle, nor did the vehicle stay there for any longer than would have been necessary to switch gears and complete a u-turn. Likewise, because the gate was closed and no guards were present, it is clear that Adams did not make the u-turn in front of the gate as a way to avoid the need to identify himself to, or otherwise have contact with, law enforcement personnel.

While defendant had permission to use an open field by a relative, that did not give him a reasonable expectation of privacy in what was nothing more than an abandoned refrigerator containing some drugs. United States v. Douglas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673 (D. Minn. January 11, 2012)*:

As [U.S.M.] Judge Brisbois recognized, the most closely analogous precedent in the Eighth Circuit is United States v. Stallings, 28 F.3d 58 (8th Cir. 1994). In Stallings, the Eighth Circuit found that the defendant (Stallings) did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in a tote bag that he had left in the underbrush of a field belonging to his neighbor. Stallings, 28 F.3d at 59-61. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that the tote bag “bore no indicia of ownership indicating it belonged to Stallings,” id. at 61 n.4, and, moreover, that Stallings had “put on no evidence of his possession or control of the bag, his historical use of the tote bag, or his ability or attempts to regulate access to it.” Id. at 60-61. The Eighth Circuit further observed that, even if Stallings had a subjective expectation of privacy, it would not have been a reasonable expectation because Stallings, by leaving the bag in an open field unattended, had no means of restricting access to the bag. Id. at 61 (“[A]ny expectation of privacy Stallings had is not objectively reasonable … because ‘animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public’ had access to the tote bag.”) (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).

Police received a suspicious vehicle report from a McDonald’s near an interstate that had been robbed before. They found two people asleep who gave nonsensical explanations and the license of the vehicle did not exist. It all added up to reasonable suspicion. The request for consent and giving it was valid. United States v. Espinal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151179 (N.D. Ga. August 29, 2011).*

A knock and talk does not require reasonable suspicion. United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006). Entry by a way open to the public was authorized. United States v. Shuck, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2521 (N.D. Okla. January 9, 2012).*

911 call that there was a fight outside at a boys club sent officers who found apparently it across the street. When defendant tried to drive off after he was told to stop officers had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Hightower, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3334 (W.D. Ark. January 11, 2012)*:

The officers in this case were initially dispatched to the Boys’ Club based on a call that officers were needed there. The officers determined that there was no disturbance at the Boys’ Club and made the reasonable assumption that the hang-up call was made concerning a group of people who appeared to be arguing across the street. Since hang-up calls are treated as emergency calls by the Paris Police Department, the officers made the reasonable decision to cross the street to the apartment complex and investigate what was happening. Both Officer Haney and Chief O’Brien testified that people in the group were posturing as if they were about to, or had already been, fighting. O’Brien also testified that he heard raised voices and unsavory language. Both officers testified that the Paris Police Department had often received calls regarding fights or other criminal activity from that apartment complex on prior occasions. As the officers approached the group, the Group dispersed. The officers stopped several people for questioning, including Defendant, who attempted to drive off in his car. From the officers’ perspective, Defendant ignored repeated orders to stop, and continued to attempt to flee.

Isn’t this cart before the horse? The court doesn’t come right out and say that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop before the defendant tried to leave, but trying to leave was an act supporting reasonable suspicion. Therefore, there had to be reasonable suspicion before the stop, but the court doesn’t quite articulate it.

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy when sitting on one’s porch with a visible gun. United States v. Locklear, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3295 (E.D. N.C. January 11, 2012)*:

Here, the court finds that Locklear did not manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy when he visibly possessed a gun while sitting on the front porch of his house. It appears that the front yard of Locklear’s residence is not surrounded by any physical barriers, such as fences, nor are there signs such as “No Trespassing” or “Private Property” which would indicate some reasonable expectation of privacy. The front porch was also not enclosed with any impediments that would either block its view nor would preclude the casual visitor from entering the area. In fact, a visitor would have to enter the front porch to even arrive at the front entrance of Locklear’s home. Ultimately, the front yard and the front porch was as open to the police officer as to any delivery person, guest, other members of the neighborhood, or the general public and no evidence has been provided to contrary. As Locklear was in an area that was open and exposed to public view, it appears that he lacked the requisite reasonable expectation of privacy to trigger the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court finds that the police officer’s action of entering Locklear’s front yard and front porch did not amount to a “search” as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.

Removing the back cover from a cell phone to get its FCC ID number was reasonable where the telephone was in defendant’s property at the jail. He also did not have standing in the search of the car because he was a mere passenger and nothing of his was searched. His duffle bag was moved, but not searched [as in Bond]. United States v. Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3157 (D. Minn. January 10, 2012)*:

Following Rodriguez’s arrest on January 29, 2011, police took and inventoried his property, including the phone. Two days later, following the search of Daniel Rodriguez’s car, a law enforcement agent retrieved Justin Rodriguez’s cell phone from the jail and removed the back cover to obtain the FCC ID number. Because the cell phone was held by police in connection with an undisputedly lawful arrest, Rodriguez had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone. See Lester, 647 F.2d at 874-75 (noting Supreme Court’s approval of warrantless search of an accused’s effects at the stationhouse well after the time of the arrest). The inspection of his phone was therefore proper. See id.

Rodriguez’s objection that removal of the cover from the phone is akin to a closed container search requiring a warrant, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1977) (discussing closed containers), would be relevant if the phone were not already in police custody pursuant to a lawful arrest. It is true that the constitutional protection against unlawful searches and seizures applies regardless of how brief the unlawful intrusion: that the removal of the battery was “brief” would not render an otherwise unlawful search lawful. But the duration of the search is irrelevant here because Rodriguez’s property was already subject to search by virtue of its being held pursuant to a lawful arrest. See Lester, 647 F.2d at 874-75. Because the Court finds the inspection of Rodriguez’s phone to be proper, it follows that the inspection offers no basis on which to invalidate the later-obtained search warrant.

WaPo: CES 2012: Smart appliances can cause privacy concerns (3:30):

Privacy expert Jules Polonetsky and The Washington Post’s Cecilia Kang discuss the myriad privacy issues that come with the new trend of smart and connected appliances.

NPR: “I Know Who You Are and I Saw What You Did: Social Networks and the Death of Privacy” (Diane Rehm Show, one hour):

Social networks have empowered us and connected us to people around the world. In the last year, they have even been credited with fostering democracies. But they have also eroded our personal privacy and made us more vulnerable. Data aggregator services use our on line activity to compile an astonishing amount of information on us and sell it to others. Potential employers and colleges judge candidates in part by their social network pages. The law has not yet caught up with the technology. Diane and her guests discuss protecting our privacy in the digital age.

Just being the driver of a vehicle doesn’t automatically give one standing to challenge its search–more is required to be shown. United States v. Almeida, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2415 (D. Me. January 9, 2012)*:

At hearing, Almeida’s counsel argued that his client had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Silverado because, when Drouin first stopped the vehicle, Almeida was driving it and, as a result, was in exclusive control of it. However, “First Circuit precedent reflects that, in general, ‘standing’ does not exist to challenge a search of a vehicle when the defendant neither owns nor is in possession of the vehicle in question.” United States v. Paquette, No. CRIM 04-10BW, 2005 WL 850847, at *2 (D. Me. Apr. 12, 2005) (rec. dec., aff’d May 2, 2005) (footnote and citation omitted). As counsel for the government suggested at hearing, the mere fact that Almeida was driving the vehicle during the initial traffic stop is insufficient to confer “standing” to challenge its search, particularly in circumstances in which Martin was found driving it a short time later. See, e.g., id. at *2-*3 (defendant lacked standing to challenge search of vehicle’s trunk when he was neither the owner nor the individual in exclusive possession of the vehicle; conceivably, he might have been able to establish both “historical use” of the vehicle and that he was able to “regulate access” to it given that vehicle had served as his conveyance for a period of weeks, but on record before court, he lacked “standing” to challenge the constitutionality of search of vehicle) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant lawyered up in the police station, but the officer kept on pressing for a DNA sample, which defendant voluntarily provided. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2377 (S.D. Fla. January 9, 2012), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150909 (S.D. Fla. September 30, 2011):

The Court finds that despite the officers’ continued questioning and requests for a DNA sample after Davis invoked his right to an attorney, the totality of the circumstances outlined above – including the Magistrate Judge’s credibility determinations regarding the testimony of Davis and the forensic psychologist and the lack of any threats by law enforcement – show that Davis voluntarily provided his consent to the search.

When officers knocked at the screen door, defendant’s father told them to come in, and that was consent to enter. It doesn’t matter that the officer opened the screen door. Once inside, he consented to a “quick search” of the premises. United States v. Downwind, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150963 (D. Minn. October 24, 2011).*

The Independent: LAPD’s sci-fi solution to real crime: Predicting where felons might strike is being made easier with a computer calculation by Guy Adams:

Sergeant John Gomperz slows his black-and-white patrol vehicle to a crawl as he enters the parking lot of one of the shopping malls that litter the Los Angeles northern suburbs. For the next 15 minutes, he drives up and down, past McDonald’s, Taco Bell, and a row of fast-food outlets. Then he pauses at the entrance of the electronics store Best Buy, and scans the horizon.

We’re looking for people he considers “suspicious”. These include lone, predatory males; youths cruising around on bicycles; and anyone who happens to be sporting gangland tattoos. “I’m trying to be highly visible,” he explains. “Just because we don’t see them doesn’t mean they can’t see us.”

Eventually, after smiling at a few shoppers, waving to a casual acquaintance, and making a final lap of the car-park, Gomperz looks at his watch, winds up the window, and drives off. Job done, he announces.

To a casual observer, it might seem a waste of a quarter of an hour of valuable police time. But the way the sergeant sees things, the long, slow tour of a seemingly normal parking lot is one of the most important things he’s done all day.

That’s how things roll in the brave new world of computerised “predictive policing”, a hi-tech crime-busting technique which Gomperz is helping to pioneer and which, has the potential to revolutionise modern law enforcement.

. . .

It also has legal complications. Under the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, police officers are forbidden from stopping a suspect without “reasonable suspicion” that they are committing a crime. No one yet knows whether simply being in a geographic box identified by a computer programme represents reasonable suspicion.

“What happens if officers turn up at a 500ft x 500ft area, on the look out for burglaries, see a guy with a black bag, search him and find it contains stolen goods?” wonders Andrew Ferguson, an assistant professor of Law at the University of the District of Colombia. “If that case goes to court, there will be the question of whether it was reasonable for the officer to suspect he was committing a crime.”

It is quite settled that being in a high-crime area is not reasonable sucision. Is Mr. Ferguson suggesting that a computer algorithm takes the place of the police officer’s objective observations and can show reasonable suspicion from presence alone? I don’t think so.