While the officer had reasonable suspicion, she questioned defendant four times about whether he had drugs in his vehicle during a traffic stop where no ticket was written, and the entire event was pursuing a drug investigation and seemed to have nothing to do with a bona fide traffic stop. Defendant consented to a search after repeated requests and being told he was being held while a drug dog was coming. He was held in the patrol car and told he couldn’t have his cigarettes: “Chill.” This all was unreasonable. State v. Troutman, 2012 Ohio 407, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 370 (3d Dist. February 6, 2012)*:

[*P40] While Trooper Long may very well have had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify the continuation of the traffic stop, the more important question is whether Trooper Long diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel her suspicions quickly and whether she acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue an alternative means. Id.; see also, Batchili, supra, at ¶ 12.

[*P41] Unquestionably, Trooper Long was given permission by Troutman to search his vehicle. He was locked in the back of her patrol car, yet she chose, for reasons not articulated in the record, to not search it and wait for the canine. Even after a back-up officer arrived and Troutman gave her permission to search his vehicle once again, Trooper Long did not search his vehicle or have the other officer do so. Further, during the four minutes that she had Troutman’s permission to search, Trooper Long chose not to search the vehicle and to keep Troutman locked in the patrol car and then repeatedly questioned him about what was in his vehicle.

[*P42] Not only did Trooper Long fail to diligently pursue a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel her suspicions quickly, i.e. searching the vehicle once Troutman consented, she acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue this avenue. Indeed, the recording of this stop reveals that this was not a swiftly developing situation that required on-the-spot decisions. To the contrary, Trooper Long discussed the situation with the back-up officer, chatted with that officer about other matters, and opened the door to the patrol car to ask the same questions of Troutman and receive the same answers time and time again, which clearly elevated Troutman’s argumentative attitude towards her each time she repeated her questions.

Officers finally arrested defendant for violating the “no alcohol” provision of his parole because they could smell it on his breath. He got them to leave the car parked where it was–in the driveway of a friend. Nevertheless, the car was mobile enough for the automobile exception to apply because somebody else wanted access to it, ostensibly to drive off. State v. Wiggins, 245 Ore. App. 119, 260 P.3d 826 (2011), on rehearing State v. Wiggins, 247 Ore. App. 490, 2011 Ore. App. LEXIS 1798 (December 29, 2011) (reaching same result):

Here, there is no dispute that the police had probable cause that defendant’s car contained evidence of a crime—a gun—at the time of the search. The only remaining question, then, is whether defendant’s vehicle was “mobile” at the time the officers first encountered it. Compare State v. Coleman, 167 Ore. App. 86, 94, 2 P3d 399 (2000) (“The inquiry is centered on the circumstances surrounding the moment when the police first notice or focus their attention on an automobile.” (Emphasis added.)), with Meharry, 342 Ore. at 178 (“[A] vehicle is mobile for the purposes of the automobile exception because it was moving when the officer stopped it and nothing demonstrated that the vehicle would not be mobile once the officer relinquished control over it.” (Emphasis added.)). We conclude that defendant’s car was mobile, whether we define the initial point of the encounter as the moment when Brewster first observed defendant’s car in the parking lot of the convenience store or the moment when Brewster subsequently stopped defendant’s moving vehicle. In either case, the car was occupied and operable, and nothing subsequent to the stop rendered the car incapable of mobility.

We reject defendant’s argument that the vehicle was stripped of its mobility because the officers broke contact with it. …

On reconsideration:

Similarly, here, defendant’s car was mobile at the time it was stopped. That exigency persisted at the time of the search despite the intervening break in contact with the vehicle and the lapse of time. See, e.g., Meharry, 342 Ore. at 180 (“[T]he exigency that permits the police to conduct a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle arises from the fact that the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)). As we noted in our prior opinion, defendant’s car continued to be the subject of the officers’ ongoing investigation, and “[n]othing occurred between the moment of the initial encounter and the time the officers searched defendant’s car that rendered the vehicle immobile. The car had not been impounded, the car was not functionally disabled, and nothing prevented the car from being driven away once the officers relinquished control over it.” Wiggins, 245 Ore. App. at 127. That conclusion is consistent with Meharry.

We need not go further and decide when a “mobile” vehicle ceases to be mobile by virtue of police delay. The Supreme Court has made clear that the automobile exception has only two requirements: (1) the vehicle must be mobile at the time that it is first encountered by police and (2) probable cause must exist for the search of the vehicle. Kurokawa II, 351 Ore. at 187. Under the facts in this case, those requirements are met. Thus, defendant’s motion to suppress should have been denied.

[Note: First posted 8/20/11, and reposted]

ZDnet.com: Woman who pleaded Fifth in password case now citing Fourth by John Fontana:

A woman who pleaded the Fifth Amendment before being ordered by a federal court to provide a password to decrypt a computer hard drive is appealing the order and now citing the Fourth Amendment.

The case drew national attention when the accused, Ramona Fricosu, argued that surrendering a password was a violation of her Fifth Amendment rights, which protect against self-incrimination.

Fricosu, and her now ex-husband, were arrested in 2010 on bank-fraud charges as part of a mortgage scam.

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals [sic; District Court] in Denver ruled on Jan. 23 that the Fifth Amendment had nothing to do with the case and gave Fricosu until Feb.21 to provide the password.

Prior post here.

Where the owner of the vehicle was present and able to drive it off after the defendant’s arrest, it was unreasonable to impound the vehicle. United States v. Moreno-Nanez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15710 (E.D. Cal. February 7, 2012):

Although the “reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means,” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983), the court agrees that under the circumstances of this case impounding a vehicle under the community caretaker doctrine to remove it from an unsafe location would be unreasonable if the owner of the vehicle was present at the time of the stop and legally able to immediately drive the vehicle away from the scene. In concluding that the decision to impound a vehicle was unreasonable in Miranda, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the owner of the vehicle, who was also a passenger at the time of the stop, was licensed to drive the car. Miranda [Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2005)], 429 F.3d at 866. In discussion, the court explained that “[t]he policy of impounding the car without regard to whether the defendant can provide for its removal is patently unreasonable if the ostensible purpose for impoundment is for the ‘caretaking’ of the streets.” Id. at 865 (quoting United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, when concluding that the impoundment of a vehicle did not come within the community caretaker function in United States v. Maddox, 614 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, “because [the defendant] offered to have his friend move the vehicle, the officer did not sufficiently consider alternatives before impounding [the] truck.” Id. at 1050.

In the Treatise, I wrote in 1999 about “Why not electronic warrants?” Finally in Kansas: With iPads, judges in touch any time, any place:

Douglas County District Judge Robert Fairchild during his 16 years on the bench estimates he’s signed search warrants at nearly every restaurant in town.

Douglas County District Judge Robert Fairchild demonstrates the use of an iPad for receiving and signing warrants from his chambers last week at the Douglas County Judicial and Law Enforcement Center. The iPad is among several pieces of technology that Fairchild says is speeding up the judicial process.

Once while serving as duty judge on a weekend, Fairchild drove back from the Kansas City area and pulled over at a Eudora convenience store off of Kansas Highway 10 to sign one for an officer.

But those days are now over for the county’s six judges.

Fairchild sits at his desk holding a white Apple iPad. He touches his finger to the screen and begins moving it to scroll down to the bottom of a PDF version of a probable cause affidavit form.

Anywhere else? Surely there are. If not, why not?

The Fourth Amendment favors warrants. Anything that leads to a search warrant and judicial review (except by a rubberstamp judge) can’t be bad at all.

HuffPo.com: Adam Greene Settles Police Beating Suit For $300,000: Nevada Officers Kicked Man In Diabetic Shock:

A diabetic who was suffering from insulin shock when Nevada police officers mistook him for a drunk driver and physically assaulted him will receive a settlement of nearly $300,000.

Adam Greene, 38, settled his lawsuit against the city of Henderson and the state of Nevada on Tuesday night. Under the settlement, Greene will receive $158,000 from the city and $35,000 from the state. His wife will receive an additional $99,000 from the city.

The payout settles a federal civil rights lawsuit that Greene filed against Henderson city police and the Nevada Highway Patrol, accusing them of battery, assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

And it was all on video. Why would these cowboys be, first, so untrained to not recognize diabetic shock as a possibility, and, second, not just show basic human respect to a man being arrested instead of treating him like a dirtbag?

Democracy Now: Ramarley Graham: NYPD Slays Unarmed Black Teen as Outrage Over Targeting of People of Color Grows:

The New York City Police Department is under mounting criticism after police shoot dead an unarmed teenager inside his own home. Eighteen-year-old Ramarley Graham was shot at close range in his parents’ apartment in the Bronx after being chased into the house by narcotics detectives. Police said they found marijuana in the home and think Graham may have been trying to flush some down the toilet. The NYPD is coming under criticism not only for shooting Graham, but also for its broader “stop-and-frisk” policy, which critics say disproportionately targets people of color. On Monday, about 500 protesters rallied in the Bronx to condemn the police treatment of black youth. We speak to Jamel Mims, an organizer with the Stop Mass Incarceration Network, which is working to end the practice of stop-and-frisk; and Nicholas Peart, who is serving as a witness in a federal class action lawsuit challenging “stop-and frisk” as racist and unconstitutional.

HuffPo.com: Ramarley Graham, Unarmed Teen, Illegally Killed By New York Police, Lawyer Says:

A week after police shot to death an unarmed 18-year-old in his grandmother’s Bronx apartment, questions continue to swirl around the aggressive police tactics that led to the fatal confrontation.

Ramarley Graham died last Thursday after Richard Haste, 30, a New York police officer, kicked down the door of his grandmother’s apartment and shot Graham in the chest while he attempted to flush a bag of marijuana down the toilet. Graham was unarmed and police did not have a warrant to enter the home.

. . .

Jeffrey Emdin, an attorney representing Graham’s mother, also called the police tactics unlawful. “They illegally entered the home,” Emdin said. “They had no right to be inside. They had no right to use force.”

Many linked the shooting to the NYPD’s aggressive street policing program, called “stop-and-frisk,” which predominantly targets low-income minority neighborhoods. In 2011, the program stopped and searched more than 500,000 New Yorkers, 85 percent of them black or Latino. The searches contributed to a record number of misdemeanor marijuana arrests last year.

. . .

John Wesley Hall, a criminal defense attorney in Little Rock, Ark. who has argued cases involving police searches before the Supreme Court, said a police suspicion that Graham might be carrying an illegal handgun was insufficient justification for breaking down his door.

“If they thought he had a gun, they should have stopped him on the street and not waited for him to go inside,” Hall said. “Any reasonable officer would have known that they needed a warrant to get into the house.”

IdahoReporter.com: Senate amends Occupy Boise bill to avoid Fourth Amendment concerns:

The bill to prevent camping on state property was amended by the Idaho Senate Wednesday to quell concerns that it might violate Fourth Amendment search and seizure protection rights.

There were three amendments up in the Senate’s amending process Wednesday, including one to remove an emergency clause from the measure. …

The bill comes as a result of the Occupy Boise group setting up camp across the street from the Idaho Capitol on the old Ada County courthouse lawn.

The sole adopted amendment, backed by Senate Pro Tem Brent Hill, R-Rexburg, and Senate Majority Leader Bart Davis, R-Idaho Falls, would ease how the state handles property after evictions. The measure would allow protestors’ property to be stored by the state for up to 90 days, though a reasonable fee could be charged.

The bill, as originally passed by the House, would have allowed the state to take protestors’ property and dispose of it immediately.

What about bill of attainder, too?

Where only vehicle around was the police officer in front of defendant, defendant’s failure to use a signal might have affected that vehicle, so it justified a stop. The undisputed evidence was that the police car was the only car around. Mitchell v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 128 (February 8, 2012).* [I find this laughable. The court is straining so hard it loses its credibility as an institution.]

Defendant’s trash search was valid, and that led to a search warrant with probable cause. United States v. Rodgers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13865 (E.D. N.C. February 06, 2012).*

Defendant ran a stop sign, recorded by the dashcam, and fled when the officer tried to stop him. When finally stopped, the officer validly saw drugs in the car in plain view. Defendant’s pro se motion to suppress denied. United States v. Scott, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053 (W.D. Mo. January 6, 2012).*

Defendant’s roommate consented to an entry by officer to look around for the defendant who was alleged to be an unregistered sex offender. The officer looked in a grey bag that was suppressed. As to a shelf, however, the court declines to find getting a stepladder to look on the shelf was an unreasonable search. Add to that the roommate’s getting the stepladder. The box of ammunition proclaimed its contents, and it was validly seized under plain view. United States v. Tolbert, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14287 (E.D. Wis. February 7, 2012):

It is true that, ordinarily, the police must obtain a warrant before opening a closed container because, by concealing the contents from plain view, the possessor creates a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 2008). “However, like objects that sit out in the open, the contents of some containers are treated similarly to objects in plain view.” Id. Courts have held that containers which permit one to infer their contents based on their outward appearance are not entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (“Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.”), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)); United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (collecting cases holding that containers which betray their contents are treated as being in plain view); United States v. Miller, 929 F.2d 364, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that no warrant was required to search a bag whose size and shape suggested it contained a gun). Individuals possess a lesser expectation of privacy in the contents of such containers when the container is observed from a lawful vantage point. Banks, 514 F.3d at 774.

In the present case, the boxes Decker saw proclaimed their contents — Remington ammunition. While it might be theoretically possible that the boxes contained something else, there is certainly a reasonable likelihood that they contained bullets. Because ammunition, possessed by a felon, is evidence of a crime, Decker lawfully seized these boxes. See Banks, 514 F.3d at 775-76.

. . .

Second, even if Decker used a stool to observe and photograph the ammunition, I cannot conclude that this exceeded the scope of Warren’s consent. While a person’s failure to object should not be construed as expanding the scope of consent, the court may properly consider silence in understanding what it is she allowed the police to do. Thus, while I agree with the magistrate judge that Warren’s acquiescence to Decker’s looking through the gray bag cannot bring that search within the ambit of her consent, her apparent agreement in Decker’s use of a stool to photograph the bedroom is something else. Indeed, it appears that Warren may have fetched the stool for Decker, which suggests that she did not see this as outside the scope of what she agreed he could do.

Bank robbery tracking devices are sufficiently reliable to alone establish probable cause, even of a person who does not exactly match the description of the robber. Here, the tracking device pointed to defendant walking alone ten minutes away from the robbery. That alone was probable cause for his stop. United States v. Revels, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138844 (W.D. Wash. December 2, 2011).

Prior suits against officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment is not proof of a failure to train claim under § 1983. Courtney v. City of Chicago, 439 Fed. Appx. 557 (7th Cir. 2011).*

Plaintiff was arrested for disorderly conduct. While holding a repent as a sinner for Jesus sign during the Mobile Mardi Gras parade, plaintiff was arrested for unprovokedly telling a 13 year old girl she was a “whore” and a “slut” and would rot in hell. The parents’ report to the police led to the arrest which was with probable cause, and the officer has qualified immunity even from a free speech claim. Bethel v. City of Mobile, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24042 (11th Cir. December 2, 2011) (unpublished).*

Consent to search a house includes outbuildings because a search warrant for a house includes outbuildings. State v. Hagin, 203 N.C. App. 561, 691 S.E.2d 429 (2010):

When a search is conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, “[t]he premises of a dwelling house include, for search and seizure purposes, the area within the curtilage.” State v. Courtright, 60 N.C. App. 247, 249, 298 S.E.2d 740, 742, …. The search of an outbuilding within the curtilage of the home does not exceed the scope of a warrant permitting the search of a suspect’s property. See State v. Travatello, 24 N.C. App. 511, 513, 211 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1975) (holding that “[t]he search of the defendant’s premises did not exceed the scope of the warrant by including a tool shed as well as the house itself.”); …. Searches within proscribed limits, but conducted in areas different than those described in a warrant, do not exceed the scope of a search. …

We hold that these principles used to define the scope of a search warrant are equally applicable to our analysis of the scope of a search conducted pursuant to consent. Defendant expressly consented to a search of all of the personal or real property at 19 Doc Wyatt Road. He does not contest that the outbuilding was located within the curtilage of his residence. The search of the outbuilding was within the scope of consent given in this case.

Reasonable mistake of fact may support a traffic stop. State v. Hopper, 692 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. App. 2010).*

Defendant was arrested by an FBI task force where he looked like the person they wanted. That person was not at the house they went to, but a black man with facial hair was seen on the street, so he was stopped at gun point. Drugs were found on defendant’s person. The stop was unreasonable because: (1) his location was not related to criminal activity; (2) a task force member admitted that the identifying information was sometimes unreliable; and (3) the description of a “black man with facial hair” was too general. State v. Johnson, 293 Kan. 1, 259 P.3d 719 (2011).*

A stop for a civil traffic offense permits running wants or warrants and conducting a dog sniff within a reasonable time. Ward v. Commonwealth, 345 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. App. 2011)*:

In fact, Officer Mahan could ask the driver for his license and registration; request that the driver and passenger exit the vehicle; request that the occupants sit in the police cruiser; ask the driver about the purpose and destination of his travel; and run a computer check to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants for the vehicle’s occupants or whether the vehicle had been reported stolen. … The officer could even conduct a dog sniff of the exterior of the vehicle during the traffic stop, as “dog sniffs are not considered searches that would implicate an Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights,” provided “the detention itself was otherwise [] reasonable.” …

Snow covered license plate justified a stop on reasonable suspicion to see if the vehicle was lawfully registered. United States v. Head, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77963 (D. Minn. May 9, 2011).*

Defendant acknowledged that he was smoking marijuana, and that gave probable cause for a search incident of the person. [This happened in San Francisco.] But, that led to finding a gun. United States v. Johnsonmarin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78570 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011).*

Defendant consented to a search after a knock-and-talk. United States v. Ponce-Duarte, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77191 (W.D. N.C. July 14, 2011).*

The appellate court concludes that the evidence supports the conclusion that defendant’s bus ticket was handed back to him before consent was given. United States v. Chavez, 429 Fed. Appx. 807 (10th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s probation search condition was complete, and that permitted the search of his premises. United States v. Graham, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78145 (S.D. Ga. May 11, 2011).*

Defendant sought federal habeas to challenge a state search warrant pretrial. His petition for writ of mandamus to grant the petition is obviously outside the jurisdiction of the federal court. In re Wallace, 438 Fed. Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a CI recording a conversation with him was hardly an IAC claim. United States v. Reynolds, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79030 (N.D. Ind. July 20, 2011).*

Defendant was charged with destruction of evidence for destroying the hard drive of his computer when he learned federal investigators wanted to look at it in a child pornography investigation. His prosecution was not a Fourth Amendment violation for interference with his property rights since he had no property rights in child pornography as contraband. United States v. Hicks, 438 Fed. Appx. 216 (4th Cir. 2011)*:

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers and effects. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992). The seizure of personal property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 204 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). We hold that there was no meaningful interference with Hicks’s possessory interests because he did not have a property right in the images of child pornography. See Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the district court did not err in convicting Hicks under § 1519.

Retaliatory prosecution alleged to be in violation of First Amendment is not governed by the arguable probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment: “Accordingly, we address this argument on its merits and conclude that arguable probable cause does not apply to a First Amendment retaliatory inducement to prosecution case because probable cause is not an element of the First Amendment right allegedly violated.” Moore v. Hartman, 396 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 644 F.3d 415 (2011).*

Entry into a screened-in lanai with a swimming pool that was not visible from the street was curtilage and required announcement. United States v. Hill, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (USMJ R&R):

In the instant case, the screened enclosure included a swimming pool and lanai, and had two closed doors. The screen was attached to the house and part of the lanai was under roof which was also part of the house. The screened enclosure had furniture and a swimming pool which was for use by the residents of the home. The screened enclosure was in the back of the house and there was no testimony that it could be seen by people passing by the house. The screened enclosure was either a part of the house or included in the curtilage of the house, and the Defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in this area. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protections extended to the lanai and the screened enclosure.

. . .

In the instant case, the Government provided no testimony, evidence or argument that the officers approached the front door of the residence to attempt to “knock and talk.” An officer may enter private land to “knock and announce” as a private citizen would, but in this case, the private citizen would go to the front door. Further, the Government failed to provide any evidence as to where the officers did knock at the residence. The only testimony was from Deputy Waid who stated that the K-9 officers knocked on a door of the residence, but he failed to indicate which door or if, perhaps, the door was located on the lanai and in the screened enclosure. The Government failed to meet its burden of showing that the officers took reasonable steps to contact the Defendant. The Government has failed to meet its burden of showing the lawfulness of the warrantless entry into the screened enclosure by the officers.

Adopted by USDJ: United States v. Hill, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2011):

The screened-in lanai area in the back of the house was either a part of the house itself or included in the curtilage of the house, and in either case was within the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. Despite these protections, however, a law enforcement officer in carrying out his or her duties is free to go where the public would be expected to go without violating the Fourth Amendment. Coffin v. Brandau, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11353, 2011 WL 2162997 (11th Cir. June 3, 2011)(citations omitted). This includes knocking on the front door, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011), and in some circumstances a back door. (See Report and Recommendation, Doc. #40, p. 18)(citing cases). Nothing in this case indicates that the public would be expected to go to the lanai at the rear of the house. Therefore, since none of the exigent circumstances recognized by the Supreme Court, King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856-57, were present, the officer’s initial entry into the lanai was unlawful. The Court adopts this portion of the Report and Recommendation and overrules the government’s objection.

Defendant was on a 4-wheeler that officers followed suspecting it was stolen. He fled into the woods and finally came out. In the path where he passed was a digital camera, which he denied was his as soon as an officer noticed it and before it was asked about. All three officers testified to defendant’s volunteered statement, and this was his clear abandonment of the camera on which there was child pornography. When he was searched incident to his arrest, a memory card for a camera was found, and he had an expectation of privacy in the memory card which could not be viewed without a warrant. United States v. Jenkins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96296 (N.D. W.Va. August 26, 2011), adopting 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96335 (N.D. W.Va. June 28, 2011).*

Officers pulled guns on defendant and told him to raise his hands, but he did not comply, so he was not seized. He finally complied. His movements toward his waist corroborated that he had a gun. Plummer v. United States, 2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 753 (November 12, 2009)* [yes, almost two years old and just on Lexis].

A well-known CI provided corroborated information and that justified defendants’ stop. United States v. Chandler, 437 Fed. Appx. 420 (6th Cir. 2011)*:

In the present case, we agree with the district court that the initial stop of Profitt’s vehicle fell well within the acceptable parameters of a lawful Terry stop based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Indeed, the officers received detailed information from Hamilton, a known informant who had direct knowledge of Chandler’s drug-related activities. Hamilton was able to predict when Chandler would leave his residence, the manner of travel, the location of the alleged narcotics transaction, and the general appearance of the supplier’s vehicle. All of these predictions were thereafter confirmed by law-enforcement surveillance. In addition, the observed behavior of Chandler in quickly entering and exiting the black sedan, and the discovery of a large amount of currency in Ciers’s pocket, provided further support for the brief stop of Profitt’s vehicle.

“Consent once removed” applies only to entries, not reentries. Plaintiff also stated a due process claim for animal control officers entering the property to take animals, plant microchips in them, and then require plaintiff to pay $1,000 to get the dogs back. A Fourth Amendment claim for the reentry. O’Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, 662 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2011):

Akinsanya and Diaz, however, do not stand for the general proposition that achieving “one consensual entry” permits “law enforcement agents [to] thereafter enter and exit a home at will.” Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459. Both were drug cases in which the purpose of the undercover agent’s or informant’s exit was to immediately summon officers to help effectuate an arrest. See Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 855-56; Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459. Those circumstances distinguish Akinsanya and Diaz from this case, where the backup LMAS officers did not—after the undercover officers exited—rush in to help effectuate an arrest. They instead knocked on the O’Neills’ door to request proof of a “breeder’s license,” carried on a discussion with the O’Neills about the need for such a license, and entered only after the O’Neills specifically objected to their coming into the residence.

. . .

Applying the consent-once-removed doctrine to the LMAS officers’ second entry, where no arrest was intended, would go well beyond the confines of this limited doctrine, which has yet to be adopted by the Supreme Court. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-44, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (declining to rule on whether the consent-once-removed doctrine is constitutional by instead resolving the issue of qualified immunity on the basis that no clearly established law was violated). We therefore conclude that the O’Neills have sufficiently pleaded a Fourth Amendment violation based on the second warrantless entry.

Law.com: Dog owners have their day at 6th Circuit.

In a Bivens action against the DEA in Puerto Rico for entering a house of another looking for a person named in a warrant, knowledge that the person named in the warrant drove the car of the other person and had access to his garage inferred access to the house, and that was enough to enter under Steagald. Solis-Alarcón v. United States, 662 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2011):

In a nutshell, the DEA agents had evidence that Díaz-Suazo was twice seen using a vehicle registered to Solis-Alarcón and parked at the latter’s house; that Díaz-Suazo had access to the garage and presumably the house; and that Díaz-Suazo did not live at the address set out in his driver’s license. Perhaps, too, they could place weight on the judgment of the local officers that Díaz-Suazo lived at #17 Alondra St. And, if he did live there, it would be reasonable to believe him in residence early in the morning.

The judgment that he did live there would perhaps be a close call if the issue before us were whether evidence seized in the search should be suppressed. In many like search cases, the police had more potent evidence of residence, such as statements of the subject himself, extensive records linking the person to the address, or a combination of a reliable tip, a recent police report, and a contemporaneous witness identification. See also Werra, 638 F.3d at 337 (“doubt[ing]” that an informant’s tip could support a reasonable belief that suspect lived in a rooming house).