Defendant consented to a search but then locked the door. The officers had reason to believe that he had drug evidence inside. Then he closed the curtain. At that point, the officers could conclude that he was destroying evidence and exigent circumstances arose. United States v. Almonte, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67237 (D. N.J. June 23, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a lane change violation, and the passenger fled from the car, and he matched the description of a wanted bank robber. That gave reasonable suspicion to detain the driver a while. United States v. Hastings, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66792 (D. Minn. May 23, 2011).*

Child pornography here was found in a private search and turned over to the police through a lawyer. There was no evidence that the private searcher was an agent of the police. United States v. Jeremias, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66794 (W.D. N.C. April 28, 2011).*

Defendant’s wife had apparent authority to consent to a search of their house. United States v. Dooley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67186 (N.D. Fla. January 24, 2011).*

Thirteen policemen arrived with arrest warrants, and the person who answered the door had apparent authority to consent to a protective sweep. United States v. Barnes, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (N.D. Ga. 2010).*

No one has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with an informant who was parked in a driveway talking to the defendant and recording him. United States v. Scott, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62401 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2011)*:

The recording of the conversation between the Defendant and Reynolds in the driveway of the Defendant’s Heritage Drive residence on August 19, 2009, was not obtained pursuant to a warrant or the Defendant’s consent. The Defendant and the Government have stipulated that the Defendant would testify that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his conversation with Reynolds in the driveway of his Heritage Drive residence on August 19, 2009, that Reynolds was not told of the recording device in the informant’s vehicle, and that the Defendant would testify that he did not know of the recording device in the informant’s vehicle. Consequently, the key question is whether the Defendant had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his oral communication with Reynolds on August 19, 2009. The Court finds that he did not.

The officer here allegedly stopped and engaged the defendant in conversation and got confusing answers. She asked for his ID, and then asked for a warrant check. A warrant came up, but she was going to let him go until he became belligerent. Then she arrested him. The warrant’s existence was an intervening circumstance. State v. Hummons, 227 Ariz. 78, 253 P.3d 275 (2011).*

Officer responding to an attempted suicide call did not act unreasonably nor violate the Fourth Amendment and thus had qualified immunity in entering a door and staying there to ascertain the mental state of the person, particularly after she blew up on him. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2011).*

In a motion to suppress, without proof, there is a presumption that the judge acted within his authority. The warrant here was also sufficiently particular and with probable cause for evidence of sexual assault. Proctor v. State, 356 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App. — Eastland 2011).*

The search warrant was sufficiently particular for evidence of clothing worn during a bank robbery. United States v. Anderson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117159 (E.D. Tenn. October 11, 2011)*; R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120094 (E.D. Tenn. June 23, 2011).*

During a consent and probation search, the officer did not act unreasonably in reopening a bedroom door closed in front of him for officer safety. State v. Enriquez, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 1030 (April 27, 2011).*

Defendants were suspected of serious credit card fraud by loss prevention at a Wal-Mart, and they were seen in the store again the next day. The store had even determined which car they came in from reviewing the video. The police were called, and they saw the same car in parking lot, and the officer approached. Defendant appeared not to understand English and the officer got him out of the car for a patdown. By plain feel, the officer found what he suspected was large pack of credit card in his pocket, which he could remove and seize. United States v. Chen, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (M.D. N.C. 2011):

Under the “plain view” or “plain feel” doctrine, courts have found probable cause to seize seemingly innocuous items when determined to be contraband in the context of the crime being investigated. In United States v. Bruce, 109 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1997), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that shotgun ammunition, while not contraband in and of itself, “assume[d] an incriminating nature in connection with the search for items such as assault rifles.” Id. at 328-29 (upholding denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the ammunition under plain view doctrine). Similarly, in United States v. Cervantes, 19 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit held that “although a wad of cash is not in itself a suspicious object,” when the police have good reason to believe the cash on a defendant’s person was just obtained in exchange for illegal drugs, it is “suspicious.” Id. at 1153 (finding that the police had probable cause to seize the wad of cash under the “plain view” doctrine). Accord State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 396 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Wis. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 475 N.W.2d 148 (Wis. 1991) (finding that during a Terry stop police officers lawfully seized wristwatches from the occupant of a vehicle implicated in a jewelry store burglary where the wristwatches were known to have been stolen from the store); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(d) n.251 (4th ed. 2004) (collecting cases).

In the present case, Sgt. Davis had probable cause to believe that the bundle of cards in Chen’s pocket was contraband. Although Chen rightly points out that gift cards are not suspicious in themselves, the large bundle of cards in his pocket gave rise to probable cause to believe they were contraband in the context of the ongoing credit-card fraud inside the immediately adjacent Wal-Mart. …

From Landline Magazine: Court enjoins Minnesota State Patrol from violating truckers’ rights by Jami Jones and Sandi Soendker:

Truckers’ Constitutional rights came out the big winner in the judge’s final order in the OOIDA lawsuit against the Minnesota State Patrol and its so-called fatigue enforcement program.

U.S. District Court Judge Donovan W. Frank issued his final order for declaratory relief, injunction and entry of judgment in favor of the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and its member plaintiff Stephen K. House on Wednesday, Sept. 21.

OOIDA and its member plaintiff Stephen K. House filed the lawsuit against the Minnesota State Patrol and individual officers on May 13, 2009, on behalf of truck drivers placed out of service after members of the patrol consulted a checklist and arrived at the conclusion the drivers were “fatigued.”

Judge Frank ruled on Jan. 28 in favor of truckers’ Fourth Amendment Rights and ruled that the OOIDA and House were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.

That meant the plaintiffs were entitled to an order of the court instructing the defendants how they must change their practices in the future in order to not repeat their violations of the U.S. Constitution. But instead of immediately issuing such an injunction, the court ordered the parties to enter mediation to try to agree upon the appropriate injunction.

Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n v. Dunaski, 812 F. Supp. 2d 994 (D. Minn. 2011).

Defendant got off a Greyhound bus and was somehow noticed by drug interdiction police who started to walk up to him and show a badge to talk to him. He fled and was taken down after an “extended chase.” This was just a Terry stop. United States v. Wallace, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. W.Va. 2011):

Following the extended chase, Det. Carper and Lt. Napier forced defendant to the ground. At this precise point, defendant was unquestionably seized within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. Compare United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.”); Brown, 401 F.3d at 594 (noting “[A] seizure ‘requires either physical force … or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.’”) (citation omitted).

The court does not deem the stop, at least at this point, to have constituted an arrest. It is best treated as a Terry stop. The question thus arises whether a Terry stop was justified under the circumstances. The Supreme Court has articulated factors to be weighed in considering the totality of the circumstances that might support the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a Terry stop. These factors include: (1) whether a high crime area is involved, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972), (2) whether an individual exhibits evasive behavior, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975), and (3) whether there is unprovoked flight, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (“Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”).

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his ex-lover’s apartment after she kicked him out. When he came back, he was a trespasser. United States v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2011):

Here, although Battle may have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in Fonseca’s apartment, that expectation was objectively unreasonable because Battle did not have permission to be present. The district court found that on August 21, 2004, after the armed encounter with Rosa, Fonseca told Battle to leave her apartment and not come back. On September 2, 2004, when Battle called Fonseca and told her that the police were in her apartment, she asked Battle what he was doing at her house since he did not have permission to be there. On the day of the search, Battle was no longer a welcomed guest in Fonseca’s apartment, but instead was a trespasser who stayed beyond his permitted visit. As such, he no longer had a legally sufficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amendment challenge.

911 report of a man carrying a handgun in Texas was not sufficient for reasonable suspicion without more. Here, the officer encountered the man and saw nothing that corroborated the informant because the man was carrying only a white water bottle. When the officer saw the defendant, he ordered the defendant to the ground. United States v. Wali, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Tex. 2011)*:

Before delving into its analysis, the court believes that it must first draw a distinction between reported activity that is per se illegal and reported activity that is potentially illegal. Reported activity that is per se illegal contemplates reported conduct that is, by itself, absolutely against the law, such as the possession of narcotics. See United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1993). Reported activity that is potentially illegal contemplates reported conduct that is against the law only if one or more additional elements are also present. See id. In the latter instance, when there is no indication that those other necessary elements are present, there cannot be reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arising out of the potentially illegal conduct. See id. Accordingly, the 911-caller’s complaint described activity that was potentially illegal instead of per se illegal. The court therefore determines that the 911-caller’s complaint, without more than just the bare bones assertion that the person was carrying a handgun, did not constitute a report of criminal activity. See id. Unless the tip was accompanied by sufficient indicia of reliability, further investigation was required before a forcible stop of the suspect could be authorized. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.

NH faces conflict of laws question in application of exclusionary rule, which it briefly discusses, but decides it doesn’t have to decide. State v. Ruggiero, 163 N.H. 129, 35 A.3d 616 (2011):

The question presented is whether telephonic evidence that is legally obtained in a sister state by a citizen thereof is admissible in a New Hampshire court proceeding where such evidence would not be admissible if it had been obtained in New Hampshire. This question is one of first impression in New Hampshire, which we review de novo. …

Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have generally employed two approaches — the exclusionary rule approach and the conflicts-of-law approach. See State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the conflicts-of-law approaches used by other states in deciding evidentiary issues); People v. Capolongo, 85 N.Y.2d 151, 647 N.E.2d 1286, 1293, 623 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing the split in jurisdictions between the exclusionary rule approach and the conflicts-of-law approach); see also 1 W. R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.5(c), at 183-86 (4th ed. 2004). Jurisdictions following the exclusionary rule approach “adhere to the Federal view that the overriding purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful governmental conduct, and that one State’s laws have no deterrent effect on conduct of governmental agents of another jurisdiction.” Capolongo, 647 N.E.2d at 1293. Alternatively, jurisdictions that conduct a conflicts-of-law analysis typically weigh the interests of the forum state against those of the sister state and assess which state has the greater interest in the process by which the evidence was obtained. See State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 736-37 (Minn. 1985).

Defendant did not argue that the sobriety checkpoint was illegally set up, instead challenging his consent to search, which was found voluntary. In any event, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by the consent search when he took the stand and said he was addicted to cocaine and had it in his possession. Wilson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 96, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 195 (February 1, 2012). [Note: Probably no harm here because the trial court’s findings of consent would likely be sustained on appeal, anyway.]

A sobriety checkpoint was not exactly where the press release said it would be, and that was not enough to suppress a stop there. It was still done according to a predetermined plan. Commonwealth v. Aivano, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 247, 961 N.E.2d 613 (2012).*

The USMJ’s findings that the stop of defendant was invalid, based on the credibility of the officer’s testimony, was supported by the evidence. The government’s objections did not overcome the findings. United States v. Northington, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12941 (E.D. N.C. January 31, 2012).*

Officers were let into an apartment building by tenants and the manager, and they did a dog sniff outside defendant’s apartment door. That was support for a search warrant. [This issue is pending in SCOTUS in Florida v. Jardines, 11-564 granted Jan. 6 (ScotusBlog), not yet calendared for argument, so not this Term.] United States v. Sample, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29278 (E.D. Mich. March 6, 2012).

Co-occupant of hotel room who occupied it, had clothes there, and told police he had counterfeiting tools there had standing, and therefore could consent, despite the fact he didn’t sleep there the night before. United States v. Yates, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29028 (D. R.I. March 6, 2012).

2255 ground that defense counsel didn’t file a motion to suppress was wrong; one was filed and heard. Schmitz v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29274 (N.D. Ala. January 19, 2012).*

2255 is not a method to relitigate the search and seizure already denied on direct appeal. Kapordelis v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153854 (N.D. Ga. December 12, 2011).*

A San Francisco apartment building was rendered uninhabitable from a fire, and occupants were locked out while clean up was going on. Defendant approached a construction worker and asked him to retrieve a gun from the motor compartment of a refrigerator, and that was reported to the police. The fire rendered the building de facto and de jure abandoned by operation of law, and the landlord could consent to the police entry. At the time, all personal belongings appeared to have been moved out of the apartment except for large pieces of furniture. United States v. Allen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28790 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2012):

The first is that under California law, either party to a lease may terminate the lease if the premises are destroyed. Cal. Civ. Code § 1932(2) (“The hirer of a thing may terminate the hiring before the end of the term agreed upon: … (2) When the greater part of the thing hired, or that part which was and which the letter had at the time of the hiring reason to believe was the material inducement to the hirer to enter into the contract, perishes from any other cause than the want of ordinary care of the hirer.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1933(4) (“The hiring of a thing terminates: … (4) By the destruction of the thing hired.”). Based on this principle of California landlord-tenant law, coupled with the representations the property manager made to the SFPD dispatcher about the apartment being vacant, see Scafani Decl. ¶ 3, it was objectively reasonable for Officer Scafani to believe that Ms. Wilson’s lease had been terminated as a result of the fire and, thus, that the property manager had the authority to consent to a search of Ms. Wilson’s apartment. This belief was an objectively reasonable mistake of fact, not law, and if the mistaken fact were true, it would have conferred authority to consent on the property manager.

The second reason it was objectively reasonable for Officer Scafani to believe the property manager had authority to consent to a search is the condition of Ms. Wilson’s apartment and the building as a whole at the time of the search. There is no definitive list of facts that may lead to a reasonable belief of abandonment, but in Sledge the Ninth Circuit found apparent authority where the tenants had given their landlord thirty days notice of their intent to vacate, had removed all personal belongings from the apartment, and the apartment was “empty of furnishings not belonging to the landlord” at the time that the landlord consented to the police search. 650 F.2d at 1076, 1082. Similarly, in determining whether eviction had actually taken place, the Ninth Circuit in Young considered whether the defendant’s personal belongings had been removed from his hotel room and placed into storage and whether his room key worked. 573 F.3d at 717.

Here, as in Sledge, it was objectively reasonable to believe that the apartment had been vacated. Most of the personal belongings inside had been removed from the apartment and placed into storage. …

Warrant was vague as to a search for “further analysis” of the digital media, so the subsequent searches were suppressed. The first searches are enough for the case to proceed. United States v. Salceda, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28211 (C.D. Cal. February 27, 2012):

The government conducted searches of defendant’s digital media in September and October 2011 based on the following language of the original search warrant:

If, after conducting such an initial search [within 60 days from the date of the execution of the search warrant], the case agents determine that a digital device is an item to be seized or contains any data falling within the list of items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government will retain the digital device for further analysis; otherwise, the government will return the digital device.

. . .

The Court finds that any evidence discovered during the September and October 2011 forensic searches is inadmissible. The original warrant’s “further analysis” language is ambiguous as to whether it permits the government to analyze defendant’s digital devices for additional evidence of contraband, or whether it merely permits additional analysis of previously discovered contraband. Given this ambiguity, suppression of the evidence is appropriate. See Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d at 1228 (construing ambiguities in plea agreements in favor of a defendant because the government, as drafter of the agreement, bears the “responsibility for any lack of clarity”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 463 (finding fourth amendment violation because officer “recognized the warrant as ambiguous before the execution of the warrant, but failed to immediately stop execution and seek the necessary clarification of a warrant in order to make certain the warrant particularly described the place to be searched. …”). The Court’s decision is informed by the fact that the government sought—and was denied—a new warrant from Judge Zarefsky, and thereafter sought ex parte relief from this Court before conducting the subsequent searches. At the very least, the government’s conduct demonstrates its acknowledgment that the “further analysis” language is ambiguous. In denying the government’s ex parte application, the Court directed the government to seek clarification from the issuing judge to cure any ambiguities. Because the government chose to proceed with the searches without clarification or without securing a new search warrant, that evidence must be suppressed. See Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 463.

Gizmodo: Police Drone Crashes into Police:

The Montgomery County (Texas) Sheriff’s Office had a big day planned. After becoming the first department in the country with its own aerial drone ($300,000!), they were ready for a nice photo op. And then the drone crashed into a SWAT team.

. . .

Not only did the drone fail [at 18′ altitude], and not only did it crash, it literally crashed into the police. It’s no wonder we’re not able to find a video of this spectacular publicity failure. Luckily, the SWAT boys were safe in their Bearcat.

This would be a fine one-off blooper story if it weren’t for some upsetting implications. This is exactly why we have reason to raise multiple eyebrows at Congress, which wants to allow hundreds of similar drones to fly over US airspace. These drones are still a relatively young technology, relatively unproven, and relatively crash-prone. The odds of being hit by one are low, of course, but should a Texas-style UAV plummet ever happen in, say, a dense urban area, nobody would be laughing. Not all of us are driving around in Bearcats. [Examiner]

Volokh: Are Historical Cell-Site Data Protected Under the Fourth Amendment After United States v. Jones? by Orin Kerr:

No, concludes Judge Bennett in United States v. Graham (District of Maryland, March 1, 2012). Judge Bennett concludes that historical cell-site records are not protected because they fall under the third-party doctrine: …

[posted here, too].

Defendant was stopped for having a headlight out and was given a warning. Immediately after he was told he was free to leave, the officer went into asking whether he had any drugs, firearms or knives on him. In the meantime, a second officer showed up to observe. The consent to search his person was a mere submission to authority at that point. State v. Dieckhoner, 2012 Ohio 805, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 699 (8th Dist. March 1, 2012):

[*P22] We find no legal distinction between Robinette and the case before this court. Just as the Ohio Supreme Court was in Robinette, we are also troubled by the timing of Comerford’s immediate transition from giving Dieckhoner the warning for the improperly working headlight to questioning him about contraband and then requesting to search his person.

[*P23] Comerford gave Dieckhoner a verbal warning for the improperly working headlight and told Dieckhoner that “he was all set and to have a good night.” As Dieckhoner turned to walk toward his car, Comerford then asked, “[b]y the way, do you have anything illegal; guns, knives, bombs, anything[?]” Unlike the facts in Robinette, there was no departmental or “drug interdiction policy” that required Comerford to question Dieckhoner about weapons or drugs. With the second officer standing five feet away, Dieckhoner denied having any contraband. Comerford immediately asked for consent to search him and Dieckhoner agreed.

[*P24] Comerford testified that he asks everyone he stops if they have any weapons, drugs, or guns on their person, and that he had no particular reason for asking Dieckhoner to search his person. In fact, Comerford testified that Dieckhoner was not acting suspicious in any way and that Dieckhoner was free to leave.

[*P25] Although Detective Leanza testified that Dieckhoner stated he consented to the search because he did not think Comerford would find the drugs in his pocket, the test for whether consent was voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances at the time consent was given. Dieckhoner’s reasoning for consenting to the search given after being arrested and to another law enforcement officer while in police custody does not withstand the State’s burden of clearly demonstrating that Dieckhoner’s consent was voluntary.

[*P26] After considering the totality of circumstances in the instant case, including Comerford’s testimony that Dieckhoner appeared calm, the seamless transition between the detention and the request for consent, the fact that Comerford had no reasonable suspicion that Dieckhoner was involved or engaging in criminal activity, and the presence of another uniformed police officer, this court finds there was a sufficient show of authority such that Dieckhoner would not believe at the time that he was free to get in his car and drive away. Under these circumstances, any reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to the officer’s search, rather than consenting as a voluntary act of free will. See Robinette at 244-245.

Officers had developed information that there was a grow house, and they staked it out. From the fenced backyard came a truck and trailer, which they stopped with reasonable suspicion. A drug dog alerted, and 900 lbs of marijuana was found. A search warrant for the premises was based on probable cause and was not based in part on stale information, not to mention the truck just stopped. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010).*

The search of defendant’s car was valid under the inventory policy the government put into evidence. The court could not conclude that the search was a pretext for a criminal search. United States v. Astorga, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102421 (D. Utah September 28, 2010).*

Officers had qualified immunity for executing a facially valid arrest warrant, despite plaintiff’s truthful assertions that the warrant had been quashed in court the previous day. The information just had not made it to the computer yet. Ochser v. Funk, 225 Ariz. 484, 240 P.3d 1246 (App. 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for his license plate being out near his house, and a bag of marijuana was in plain view between his feet. Defendant asked if he could put his dog in the house, and the officer let him, and the officer could see a small quantity of marijuana and a grinder in the living room. There was no reason to believe anyone else was inside, and the entry for a protective sweep was unreasonable. State v. Alihassan, 2012 Ohio 825, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 718 (10th Dist. March 1, 2012):

[*P22] We disagree with the state’s contentions. There was no evidence presented that the marijuana and grinder were in danger of destruction or removal. Although Leighty testified he knew there had been prior disturbance calls to the apartment regarding appellant and his girlfriend, he never said that he believed appellant’s girlfriend lived at the apartment, and he admitted that people can have domestic disturbances when they do not live together. Leighty also admitted he heard no voices coming from inside the apartment, the television was not on, and there were no indications that a person was in the apartment. Although Leighty first testified that he heard no noises coming from inside the apartment, he later said he heard “noises” inside, and the noises were from an aquarium. Importantly, Leighty never testified that he believed the noises were made by people inside the apartment.

[*P23] With no evidence of any third parties present in the apartment, there was no risk of destruction of the evidence. Although, conceivably, the dog could have ingested the small amount of marijuana on the table, the grinder would not have been easily destroyed. …

[I resisted the temptation.]

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop in a high crime area, but the officer then saw that the license for the vehicle was expired. When defendant was stopped, he made furtive movements under the dashboard, and that justified the officer handcuffing him when defendant was removed from the vehicle. This was still not an arrest. State v. Walker, 2012 Ohio 847, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 739 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012):

{¶ 25} Considering the totality of the circumstances, the detective’s actions of drawing his gun and handcuffing Walker did not constitute an arrest. Given Walker’s frantic movements below the dashboard upon being stopped by the police, his failure to comply when ordered to show his hands, and their location in a high crime area, House took reasonable actions to ensure his safety while initiating an investigatory detention.

Officers responded to a shooting call at defendant’s premises, and a cursory review of the premises revealed bags of marijuana. Even opening a closet door was not unreasonable. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 845, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 737 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

2255 petitioner’s claim that his defense lawyer failed to fully investigate the apparent authority of the consenter to consent would have added nothing and the motion to suppress still would have been denied. United States v. Livingston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25558 (W.D. Okla. February 28, 2012).

Even if the curtilage were entered (it wasn’t), purging that information from the affidavit for the search warrant would not nullify the probable cause. Defendant carries the burden on the GFE, and he fails. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25615 (D. Me. February 28, 2012).*

2255 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was time barred, and he couldn’t get in the back door via a writ of error coram nobis. Also, WECN is only available if the petitioner is not in custody, and he was. Johnson v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26522 (E.D. Mo. February 28, 2012).*

Officer’s queries with “please” and normal tone of voice, all recorded during the stop of defendant at the El Paso interstate bus terminal, showed defendant’s consent to a search of his person for drugs strapped to him was voluntary. The court concludes it was not an order. United States v. Trujillo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26580 (W.D. Tex. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s conduct was suspicious around a car and indicated either theft, drug dealing, or a car jacking. When the officer stopped with lights, defendant attempted to back away. All this was more than a hunch of criminal activity. United States v. Bady, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26265 (S.D. Ill. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel failed to raise a racial motivation issue based on something the officer said during the stop is belied by the DVD of the stop. Defendant’s plea deal to a five year max was a huge benefit, considering where he would have fallen on the guidelines if the government pursued his priors. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*