The collective knowledge doctrine does not apply to information not communicated. Here, there was information in a computer of other investigating officers who had not communicated with the searching officers, and defendant’s argument takes the collective knowledge doctrine too far. Here, that doctrine is used against the defendant arguing it. United States v. Cribbs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112559 (W.D. Tenn. September 29, 2011):

In the present case, the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office had knowledge of Defendant’s order of protection as evidenced by the entry of the order into the office’s information systems. Defendant contends that the office’s knowledge of the order should be imputed to the Dyer County Sheriff investigators who conducted the search of 473 Cribbs Road. Defendant seeks to extend the imputed knowledge theory too far. Unlike the cases above in which the collective knowledge of the investigating officers was imputed to individual officers, Defendant asks the Court to impute knowledge of information contained in a law enforcement database to officers conducting an investigation in the field. Defendant has not provided any case law that supports such an application of the imputed knowledge doctrine, nor has the Court found any.

On de novo review, the appellate court read the transcript of the suppression hearing and finds probable cause for his arrest. United States v. Trappier, 447 Fed. Appx. 463 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant was convulsing in a motel room, and the other person asked whether he should call 911. He said “Yes, I don’t want to die.” EMTs and a police officer arrived, and the police officer was looking around for what could have caused defendant’s condition. He looked in a backpack and found an unlabeled pill bottle with a powder in it. After defendant was taken to the hospital, police came back with a warrant. The warrant was lawfully issued because the search of the backpack was reasonable as an emergency search to attempt to find the cause of defendant’s condition. Owens v. State, 2012 WY 14, 269 P.3d 1093 (2012).

Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped by the police. He removed a package of drugs from his backpack and put it on the seat. He lacked standing to challenge the finding of the drugs he took out. United States v. Love, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16245 (E.D. Mo. February 9, 2012)*:

As a passenger in the Altima, Defendant had no expectation of privacy. US v. Green, 442 F.3d 677, 680. While Defendant argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his backpack, Defendant completely ignores the fact that the package of heroin was no longer protected by contours of privacy he may have had in his backpack by his acts of removing the package from the backpack and placing it in the seat compartment.

Massachusetts decriminalized small marijuana possession cases. Where the officers only had knowledge of smoking of marijuana and not delivery, a full search of the person and cell phone was unjustified, and the motion to suppress was properly granted. Defendants were rousted by the police after a parent called to complain they wouldn’t stop smoking. Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 961 N.E.2d 1083 (2012):

An intent to distribute “is a matter of fact, which may not be susceptible of proof by direct evidence. In that event resort must be had … by inference from all the facts and circumstances ….” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 648, 682 N.E.2d 636 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 356 Mass. 574, 578-579, 254 N.E.2d 408 (1970). In this case, while Officer Finnerty had been informed by another about recent marijuana use by the defendant, Officer Finnerty, prior to searching the defendant, did not observe any illegal or suspicious activity on the part of the defendant indicative of an intent to distribute marijuana and there was no information relayed to him concerning any actions by the defendant to support probable cause that the defendant intended to distribute any marijuana. Although Officer Finnerty permissibly could take into account his knowledge of the defendant’s prior criminal record, see Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 442, 750 N.E.2d 897 (2001), without additional facts specifically concerning an intent to distribute, Officer Finnerty’s knowledge of the defendant’s prior criminal record by itself could not justify police intrusion, see Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 709, 690 N.E.2d 436 (1998). In these circumstances, we conclude that probable cause was not met. See Commonwealth v. Levy, 459 Mass. 1010, 1011, 947 N.E.2d 542 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Kennedy, supra at 711 (rejecting per se rule that officer must see object exchanged to have probable cause to arrest for possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute, but noting that such observation is important piece of evidence supporting probable cause and its absence weakens prosecution’s probable cause showing).

Because Officer Finnerty lacked probable cause to search the defendant, his search of the defendant was unlawful and the evidence obtained therefrom, namely, the marijuana, cash, and cellular telephone, must be suppressed. Further, because all text messages recovered from the defendant’s cellular telephone and information derived therefrom was the direct product of the unlawful search, such evidence also must be suppressed under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine set forth in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). See Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 410 Mass. 611, 616, 574 N.E.2d 990 (1991). The motion to suppress was properly allowed.

Police got a tip that defendant had a civil arrest warrant for him for child support, and he was arrested and his bag was searched incident to arrest. Since he was a known gang member, a search of his bag for a weapon was permissible. People v. Cregan, 961 N.E.2d 926, 2011 IL App (4th) 100477 (2011)*:

[**P27] Defendant next contends officers were limited to a brief search for weapons as they could not expect to find any evidence of defendant’s failure to pay child support in the luggage. We conclude the scope of the search was not limited in any way by the absence of evidence of failure to pay child support as a justification for the search. The court in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35, made it clear a search for weapons is just as important and thorough as a search for evidence. The mere fact an officer cannot expect to uncover evidence of the crime charged during a search in no way limits the scope or intensity of the search. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (narrower Terry standards do not limit a search merely because officers do not expect to uncover evidence of the particular crime for which the defendant was arrested during the search).

[**P28] Officers admitted they were not searching for evidence of the crime of failure to pay child support. This did not limit the search to a more restrictive sweep for weapons. Defendant’s argument the officers’ search should have been confined to a quick weapons check fails. The situation afforded officers wide latitude to conduct a thorough search of defendant’s luggage, including the container of hair gel located inside.

Probable cause for a false arrest case is determined at the time of the arrest, and factors after the arrest that might show no probable cause are irrelevant. Miami-Dade County v. Asad, 78 So. 3d 660, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D 234 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2012)* (on rehearing and under submission for nearly three years; Rehearing denied by Miami Dade County v. Asad, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 3761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist., Mar. 6, 2012)).

Post-conviction petitioner’s failure to show how defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress would have been granted was insufficient. Watson v. State, 2012 Ark. 27, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 38 (January 26, 2012).*

There was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and his identification by a victim as being a robber was probable cause. United States v. Anderson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152284 (W.D. Tenn. July 27, 2011).*

SFGate.org: Why cell-phone tracking should require a warrant by James Temple:

The American Civil Liberties Union released a troubling report this past weekend demonstrating that law enforcement agencies around the nation routinely track personal cell phones, often without warrants. Conspicuously absent from the survey was information about the tactics of Northern California police departments.

That’s because, among the roughly 20 local agencies that received open records requests, only a handful provided substantive responses, said Linda Lye, staff attorney at the ACLU of Northern California. The rest declined to shed light on their practices, she said.

The “inherent social pressure to cooperate with police” does not make questioning inherently under a seizure. Here, the officer had the defendant’s ID, but the record did not show that he was not free to leave [which makes no sense; possession of the ID is not free to leave]. State v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 951 (La. 2011), revg State v. Martin, 54 So. 3d 111 (La.App. 3d Cir. 2010):

We note “police-citizen encounters do not become ‘seizures’ simply because citizens may feel an inherent social pressure to cooperate with police.” Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 425, citing People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 72 (Colo. 1998). Yet, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1762. Courts must pay attention to the facts of each encounter, while keeping in mind the realities of every day life and the importance of an individual’s identification. As noted by the Florida Supreme Court,

[c]ertainly, the dangers posed by crimes such as identity theft and the ever-present threats to our national security makes the act of identifying oneself through presentation of valid, government-issued identification a necessary part of a panoply of human endeavors, from cashing a check to boarding an airplane.

Golphin v. State, 945 So.2d 1174, 1189-1190 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 810, 128 S.Ct. 40, 169 L.Ed.2d 11 (2007). In examining the totality of the circumstances, a court must look to “numerous factors, including the time, place and purpose of the encounter, the words used by the officer, the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor, the officer’s statements to others present during the encounter, the threatening presence of several officers, the potential display of a weapon by an officer, and the physical touching by the police of the citizen.” United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 847, 123 S.Ct. 186, [Pg 11] 154 L.Ed.2d 75 (2002).

. . .

Here, there was no abuse of the district court’s discretion in its denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. The record fails to support a finding that there was an unmistakable show of official authority in the police/citizen encounter at issue which would have indicated to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave. We find, as did the dissenting appellate judge, that Martin voluntarily complied with the officer’s request for identification and voluntarily offered a response to the officer’s potentially incriminating question. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the officer’s brief retention of Martin’s identification under these facts did not change the nature of this essentially consensual encounter and the officer lawfully retrieved the Soma pills from the defendant’s pocket.

[If any can find this on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s website, good luck. It is the worst court website I’ve seen: Everything but the cases.]

Update: A reader, an ADA in another state, no less, was able to find the opinion link for me. Thank you so much. I spent about 10 minutes looking for the link and gave up. I don’t have all day….

Use of defendant’s husband’s probation status to conduct a “probation search” led by the police was unreasonable and violated Griffin and Knights. Hensley v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. App. 2012):

This evidence reveals that the search was not conducted as a probation search, nor was it truly conducted for probation reasons. Instead, the police were pursuing their own agenda and conducted an investigatory search under the guise that it was a probationary search. The search was prompted by the police officers, not by the probation officer. Stuckey agreed that the police could join her in the search, as officers often do for the reason of safety. Instead of acting as Stuckey’s backup, however, the police entered the home and left Stuckey alone with Hensley, without conducting a safety sweep of the home that purportedly contained a firearm. The police did not ask Hensley about the ownership of the home and failed to follow the lead of Stuckey, from whom they could have learned that Robert slept in the living room and not the bedroom. This search did not meet the guidelines for a valid search under Griffin.

. . .

To qualify as a constitutional search under Knights, the police would have needed to have reasonable suspicion that Robert had engaged in criminal activity. In the State’s response to Hensley’s motion to suppress, the State makes no mention of the reasoning in Knights, nor does it contend that these unsubstantiated tips provided “reasonable suspicion” to believe that Robert was engaging in criminal activity. Furthermore, the evidence found in Hensley’s home was discovered under her bed and in her dresser drawer. Hensley was not on probation nor was she the person suspected of criminal activity. The search by Officer Tharp, which uncovered the marijuana and generic Xanax violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure under Knights.

Flight of apparent shooter into a house with a shotgun was reasonable, particularly in light of the apparent lie about who was in the house. United States v. Parrott, 450 Fed. Appx. 228 (3d Cir. 2011):

Here, the officers had probable cause and an objectively reasonable basis for believing that exigent circumstances existed at the time that they searched the house. The officers’ belief was based on a number of facts, including: the missing shotgun that had been taken into the house; the report of shots being fired and the reasonable inference that the person who ran into the house with a gun was the shooter; Mrs. Parrott’s false statements regarding the number of people in the house; and the officers’ reasonable belief that if somebody remained inside the house, that person might attempt to hide, destroy or remove the shotgun, or use it against the officers.

Officers listening to a wire on the CI realized that the CI’s target did not have the sought-after drugs on him, but when a vehicle showed up, and the target went to the car, that was probable cause to search the car. Jones v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 683, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 724 (November 9, 2011).*

RollingStone: Mike Bloomberg’s New York: Cops in Your Hallways by Matt Taibbi:

An amazing lawsuit was filed in New York last week. It seems Mike Bloomberg’s notorious “stop-and-frisk” policy – known colloquially in these parts by silently-cheering white voters as the “Let’s have cops feel up any nonwhite person caught walking in the wrong neighborhood” policy – isn’t even the most repressive search policy in the NYPD arsenal.

Bloomberg, that great crossover Republican, has long been celebrated by the Upper West Side bourgeoisie for his enlightened views on gay rights and the environment, but also targeted for criticism by civil rights activists because of stop-and-frisk, a program that led to a record 684,330 street searches just last year.

Now he’s under fire for a program he inherited, which goes by the darkly Bushian name of the “Clean Halls program.” In effect since 1991, it allows police to execute so-called “vertical patrols” by going up into private buildings and conducting stop-and-frisk searches in hallways – with the landlord’s permission.

. . .

If you live in a Clean Halls building, you can’t even go out to take out the trash without carrying an ID – and even that might not be enough. If you go out for any reason, there may be police in the hallways, demanding that you explain yourself, and insisting, in brazenly illegal and unconstitutional fashion, on searches of your person.

Police officers went on neighbor’s land to be able to smell the grow operation in defendant’s home. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy beyond her own property line, and the neighbor’s property was not their curtilage. State v. Smith, 163 N.H. 169, 37 A.3d 409 (2012):

We agree with the trial court that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area from which the police officers observed her house and smelled an odor of marijuana emanating from its air vent. First, although Sergeant Prince and Detective James may have had no independent right or invitation to cross onto the defendant’s property, they made an effort to ascertain its boundary line and stay on the neighbor’s side of it. Cf. Orde, 161 N.H. at 266 (“[A]n officer has no greater right to intrude onto a person’s property than any other stranger would have.” (quotation and brackets omitted)). Moreover, crossing over the defendant’s property line is not equivalent to crossing into her home’s curtilage. See Hanson, 113 N.H. at 691 (holding, on federal grounds, that “there was no unconstitutional search even though the officers may have been trespassing”). Further, whether the police had a right to be where they were must be considered in context of the “open fields” doctrine, which recognizes implicitly that a trespass alone does not necessarily invade a property owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304 (“[T]here is no constitutional difference between police observations conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open fields.”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.11 (1984) (“[T]he term ‘open fields’ may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. An open field need be neither ‘open’ nor a ‘field’ as those terms are used in common speech. For example, … a thickly wooded area nonetheless may be an open field as that term is used in construing the Fourth Amendment.”).

Inquiry into the character of the area searched establishes that the woods behind the defendant’s home fall outside her curtilage. While the officers conducted their search within approximately fifty to seventy feet of the defendant’s home, proximity alone is not dispositive because there is no fixed distance at which curtilage begins or ends. …

A school policy to search students for contraband who left assigned areas during the day was without reasonable suspicion under the N.H. Constitution. Also, he was leaving school for the day, and they ordered him back and told him he was going to be searched when he produced marijuana. In re Anthony F., 163 N.H. 163, 37 A.3d 429 (2012).

An officer at an immigration checkpoint does not need reasonable suspicion to refer a person stopped for secondary inspection. Defendant consented to a search of the car and handed keys to the trunk to the officer. A dog had alerted to the car. Defendant couldn’t answer fundamental questions about where they were coming from. United States v. Wilson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4609 (D. Ariz. January 12, 2012),* R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151532 (D. Ariz. November 18, 2011).*

The trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence in a drug case, where the initial encounter between the defendant and law enforcement personnel was entirely consensual. The officer had a reasonable articulable basis sufficient to detain him while attempting to gather information to dispel or confirm his suspicions. The consensual search of defendant’s person and his vehicle were not, therefore, fruits of an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. “Begley’s request to see his driver’s license was no more than a request, and Branham’s compliance was voluntary and not coerced.” Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 720 S.E.2d 74 (2012)* [Note: These guys really think that an officer’s request for a driver’s license can be refused?]

Officers had a search warrant for guns, and they searched defendant’s bedroom and found bag of marijuana behind a dresser, defendant’s I.D. on the dresser, and a marijuana pipe and bong on a shelf in the closet. Those items were found in places the officers would have legally searched while looking for guns and ammunition pursuant to the warrant. State v. Shank, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 114 (February 15, 2012).*

The record here was insufficient to decide whether the defendant was not prejudiced by lack of evidence that defense counsel did not introduce. Moreover, “[g]iven the deficiencies in the factual record, we cannot uphold the court’s denial of appellant’s § 23-110 motion on the alternative ground urged by the government (i.e., that the motion to suppress that his trial counsel failed to file would not have resulted in the exclusion of evidence).” Remanded; the court does not think that the government abandoned its position on developing the record. Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251 (D.C. 2012).*

Defendant was not seized when he dropped a gun while fleeing, so defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising it. People v. Henderson, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 102, 2012 IL App (1st) 101494 (February 15, 2012).*

Report of a gunshot from inside a house that about four people then bailed out of through doors and windows justified a protective sweep for the shooter or any one injured by the gunfire. United States v. Goodrich, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107044 (W.D. Mo. September 21, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107338 (W.D. Mo. August 31, 2011).*

On the video of the stop, defendant told the officer she had just bought the car from the person named on the title, and that was sufficient to give her standing. However, her lack of paperwork associated with the purchase was a factor in reasonable suspicion since they were stopped on a drug corridor and unusual travel plans. [One factor was that the car was bought with an income tax refund but the defendant was unemployed at the time, like that makes complete sense.] United States v. Hageman, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107188 (D. Utah September 21, 2011).*

Extreme nervousness with shaking hands and unfamiliarity with how the glove compartment opened and registration and insurance in a different person’s name was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Lopez, 817 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Miss. 2011).*

Officers had [what appears to be kind of thin] exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment for drug dealing with a weapon. The circumstances were sufficiently like Buie to justify a protective sweep. United States v. Richardson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 151 (W.D. N.Y. May 24, 2010),* affirmed United States v. Lucas, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3221 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2012):

In this case, the Court concludes by a preponderance of evidence that exigent circumstances existed justifying the officers’ warrantless entry into 1955 E. Main Street Apartment A-1. At the point they entered, Klein and the other officers, as discussed above, had probable cause to believe that the occupants of the apartment were engaged in drug trafficking and possessed a firearm in furtherance of their drug trafficking activities. When the apartment door opened the second time, Klein was able to see Richardson and Lucas, but not the shotgun. Finally, Richardson and Lucas refused the direction of Klein, a uniformed police officer, to come out of the apartment. Clearly, there was an urgent need for the police to take action.

A named complainant called the police to say that two men were sitting in a car in front of her house with a gun. Officers arrived and everything matched the details of the report except for the gun. There was a sufficient basis for a protective sweep of the car for the gun, and it was found. United States v. Harris, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51847 (D. Minn. April 21, 2010)*:

Thompson properly conducted a Terry stop when he asked first Smith and then Harris to exit the vehicle. Moreover, as Harris was standing near the vehicle, and was not arrested or in handcuffs, he could have broken free from police control and retrieved a weapon from the front passenger area of the car. Therefore, it was proper for Thompson to conduct a protective search of the vehicle to ensure officer safety.

DUI arrest justifies a search incident of the passenger compartment under Gant because there is reason to believe that evidence of the crime may be found there, and such a search is not limited to a paper bag found in there. United States v. Grote, 408 Fed. Appx. 90 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3373 (U.S., May 2, 2011).

While Samson v. California permits suspicionless searches of parolees, the Ninth Circuit has not determined whether it applies to probationers, and it probably won’t. Because there was reasonable suspicion anyway, the issue does not have to be decided. United States v. King, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1725 (N.D. Cal. January 3, 2011).*

There was probable cause for issuance of the search warrants in this case, and, even if not, the good faith exception made the search good. United States v. Van Bui, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139208 (D. Minn. December 27, 2010).*

Defendant’s consent after being Mirandized was valid. The seizure of his cell phone in plain view was valid [the court does not indicate whether the phone was searched, too; presumably it was or it wouldn’t be talking about it]. United States v. Molina, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139298 (S.D. Fla. December 20, 2010).*

The search warrant in this case was based solely on information from the complainant to the state securities department, and the product of the administrative subpoena did not make it into the search warrant application. The case is remanded to the trial court, however, because the trial court did not make a finding on the motivation prong of Murray, the case is remanded. State v. Miles, 159 Wn. App. 282, 244 P.3d 1030 (2011).*

I get most cases from my stored Lexis search about 5:30 a.m., seven days a week. Some I get from Google alerts and list servs. I have no idea how Lexis gets its cases from the federal courts or any other court. Some are obvious because they’re publicly posted, but sometimes Lexis has cases that aren’t on court websites. Sure, they’re on Pacer, but I can’t afford to get them all, save them, and make a link, and with all those cases pending, does Lexis get alerts of all filings?

Today, a 2003 case came through for some reason, and it was about 28,200. 2011 cases were over 150,000. Somewhere in there I quit reporting on civil cases in the district court level because of the number.

NYTimes Editorial: Stop and Frisk, Continued:

The Bloomberg administration and its police commissioner, Raymond Kelly, have been disturbingly dismissive of complaints about the city’s program of stops, frisks and arrests that is ensnaring hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers each year.

Volokh: New Draft Article, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment” by Orin Kerr

I have just posted a new draft article, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, which is forthcoming in the Michigan Law Review. Here’s the abstract:

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision on GPS monitoring, United States v. Jones (2012), five Justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions have always evaluated each step of an investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search.

This Article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. It explores the choices and dilemmas that a mosaic theory would raise, and it analyzes the ways in which the mosaic theory departs from prior understandings of the Fourth Amendment. It makes three major points. First, the mosaic theory offers a dramatic departure from existing law. Second, implementing the theory requires courts to answer a long list of novel and challenging questions. Third, the benefits of the mosaic theory are likely to be modest, and its challenges are likely to be great. Courts should approach the mosaic theory with caution, and may be wise to reject it entirely.

CrimProf Blog: Murphy on Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions:

Erin Murphy (New York University School of Law) has posted The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions (Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

When criminal justice scholars think of privacy, they think of the Fourth Amendment. But lately its domain has become far less absolute. The United States federal code currently contains over twenty separate statutes that restrict both acquisition and release of covered information. Largely enacted in the latter part of the twentieth century, these statutes address matters vital to modern existence. They control police access to drivers’ licenses, education records, health histories, telephone calls, e-mail messages, and even video rentals. They conform to no common template, but rather enlist a variety of procedural tools to serve as safeguards – ranging from warrants and court orders to subpoenas and demand letters. But across this remarkable diversity, there is one feature that all of the statutes share in common: each contains a provision exempting law enforcement from its general terms.