Officer’s entry into defendant’s mobile home was based on exigent circumstances. He found a toddler on the side of a highway near the home, and he was able to ascertain the one by seeing a picture of the child in a pickup truck parked outside. He looked in the vehicle for the registration, and officers were calling around trying to find the parent. Nobody answered at the mobile home, and the officer went to the back door which was ajar and a diaper was on the top step. While there was no sign of blood or foul play, the entry was reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Cline, 205 N.C. App. 676, 696 S.E.2d 554 (2010).

The defendant was talking with an officer and he dropped a folded dollar bill and put his foot over it. He then picked it up and the officer asked for it. The officer asked what it was and defendant said it was “a little bit for play”–cocaine. The admission was suppressible, but the seizure was not because it was with probable cause. State v. Delaoz, 2010 VT 65, 189 Vt. 385, 22 A.3d 388 (2010).*

The entry into the defendant’s apartment was with exigent circumstances that he caused a gas leak after bizarre behavior. People v Leggett, 2010 NY Slip Op 6177, 75 A.D.3d 609, 904 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dept. 2010)*:

The defendant, who had recently been released from prison, was staying in a friend’s apartment, and refused to allow his friend to enter the apartment when she returned from visiting her mother. Despite the efforts of his father and the police, the defendant refused to leave the apartment, instead responding incoherently with threats, profanities, demands for a search warrant, and a request that the police supply him with drugs. When the police heard the defendant moving appliances to block the door, they became concerned about the possibility of a gas leak if the stove was moved. The police therefore forced open the door, which was blocked with a refrigerator, and they arrested the defendant, who was found in possession of three handguns and ammunition.

Grand Junction: DA: Search central in State Trooper’s trial by Paul Shockley:

District Attorney Pete Hautzinger carried the unhinged front door that once stood at the Redlands home — splintered at an end and black shoe prints from police officers’ kicks elsewhere — into a courtroom today as the prosecution told jurors that the Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution was front and center in the trial of Colorado State Patrol trooper Ivan “Gene” Lawyer, who’s charged in the shooting death of 31-year-old Jason Kemp.

He told them to get a search warrant, prosecutors said.

“Jason Kemp died demanding his constitutional rights be honored,” Deputy District Attorney Todd Hildebrandt said during opening statements in Lawyer’s trial. “And the only force he (Kemp) used was trying to prevent them from coming inside his home.”

Kemp would have been justified that day in defending his home with deadly force as allowed under the doctrine of Colorado’s Make My Day law, the prosecutor told jurors.

“That force can be applied against a police officer,” Hildebrandt said.

The court rejects the government’s contention that an arrest warrant for a suspect causes him to not have a standing in hotel room where he was located. At any rate, defendant was arrested in the hallway, but his companion opened the hotel room door to see what was going on outside, and that made a protective sweep reasonable. United States v. Marrero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49494 (S.D. Ind. April 6, 2012).*

The warrant for child pornography was based on an IP address, and probable cause was shown, so the good faith exception need not be reached. [The USMJ seems uncomfortable with the fact that he issued the search warrant, too, but his decision is subject to de novo review. United States v. Nolan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50046 (E.D. Mo. March 6, 2012).*

A knock-and-talk does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and defendant consented to a search. United States v. Major, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49665 (W.D. La. February 16, 2012).*

New law review article: The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones–Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World by Mary Leary on SSRN. Abstract:

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. These protections, therefore, are only triggered when the government engages in a “search” or “seizure.” For decades, the Court defined “search” as a government examination of an area where one has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Such an expectation requires both that the individual demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation is one society finds reasonable. In 1974, Anthony Amsterdam prophesized the unworkability of this test, warning of a day that the government would circumvent it by merely announcing 24 hour surveillance. Similarly, the Court has stated that it would adjust the definition of a search if the government tried to “condition” citizens to have no expectation of privacy.

Today, those concerns have come to bear, but not in the way Amsterdam or the Court predicted, and the Court has failed to respond. Today, private commercial entities, not the government, have utilized technology to “condition” citizens to have no expectation of privacy. They have done so on two particular levels. First, these commercial entities have obtained private data about citizens, i.e. information from their “digital dossier.” They have then revealed the information to others resulting in citizens feeling as though “nothing is private.” Second, when these entities obtain the data, they do not afford the individuals the opportunity to “demonstrate” their subjective expectation of privacy. Since a “search” requires a demonstration of a subjective expectation of privacy, and these commercial entities have used today’s technology to strip citizens of any expectation of privacy or ability to demonstrate one, then little the government examines will constitute a “search” and trigger Fourth Amendment protections.

This article identifies this assault on the expectation of privacy due to “corporate conditioning” of the consumer and proposes a viable legislative solution. It examines the Court’s existing approaches, including a thorough analysis of the recently articulated frameworks announced in the majority and concurring opinions of United States v. Jones, noting their inadequacy for today’s technological challenges. Utilizing the example of satellite imaging technology, it demonstrates the threat to privacy expectations unanticipated by the Court. This article proposes a new legislative framework for respecting privacy protections in response to these corporate induced privacy affronts. This framework, supported by analogous American law and European proposals, calls for an opt-in model. Before a citizen can be assumed to have voluntarily sacrificed his privacy, he must meaningfully opt in to the sharing of his private data. Such an opt-in must not be conditioned upon the service but must be uncoerced.

This approach advocates for addressing this unanticipated problem further upstream than other solutions by focusing on the commercial entities and not the later police action. It is rooted in the concept of ownership of one’s digital footprint and, therefore, the right to control one’s data.

Seizure of defendant’s cell phone at the end of his interrogation was reasonable and based on exigent circumstances. Officers had probable cause to believe that the phone contained evidence and that it should be seized. United States v. Robison, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47092 (D. Minn. March 16, 2012).*

The court finds defendant was free to leave when his papers were handed back to him, but he agreed to stay when the officer asked if he could ask a few questions. Defendant said that consent had to come from the other person which was agreeing to continue the encounter. United States v. Quintero-Felix, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46377 (N.D. Iowa April 3, 2012).*

“Prior to conducting a warrantless probation search, an officer must have probable cause to believe the probationer lives in the residence to be searched.” United States v. Gibson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47138 (N.D. Cal. April 3, 2012).*

Defendant’s IAC claim that it somehow violated the Fourth Amendment for police to continue to keep records lawfully seized for several years was rejected. No case even suggests that was unlawful, so how could defense counsel be ineffective? United States v. Lecroy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47030 (N.D. Ga. March 30, 2012).*

The Puerto Rican coffee importing business is sufficiently regulated that Burger applies. The beans here were seized after an administrative inspection under PR law. United States v. 323 “Quintales” of Green Coffee Beans, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47775 (D. P.R. March 30, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47765 (D. P.R. March 9, 2012):

The Supreme Court stated in Burger that an administrative search qualifies as an exception if: (1) the state has a substantial interest in regulating the industry (2), the inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and (3) the inspection is properly limited in scope and puts the business owner on notice that the search is being made. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-703. The second part of this last requirement is satisfied if the regulatory scheme is “sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.” Id. at 703 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)).

The laws of Puerto Rico contain a comprehensive set of provisions pertaining to the regulation of the coffee industry. P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 5, § 320 et. seq.; Tit. 13, §§ 2201-2205. The laws relating to coffee production express the need to protect the local coffee industry and eradicate plant pests and diseases on coffee plantations. P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 5, §§ 319-319g. The Court agrees with the Magistrate’s determination that these provisions evince a substantial government interest in regulating the coffee industry in order to meet local consumption needs and promote the economic health of the industry.

(Lorenzo J. Palomares-Starbuck appeared for the beans.)

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, but it was quickly learned from the police computer terminal in the patrol car that there was an active warrant for him. The officer never bothered to follow up with the traffic offense, but this was not unreasonable. Defendant’s car would have been left on a busy street, so it was reasonable to tow and inventory it. The fact the search started immediately does not prove that the inventory was pretextual. A printout of the computer readout was admissible in lieu of the warrant because good faith is the only question. State v. Sanders, 2012 Ohio 1540, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1357 (8th Dist. April 5, 2012).*

Defendant agreed to probation with a search at any time provision. The PO showed up at his parents place where he was living, and saw him on the back deck with a friend who hurriedly left. Drugs were validly found in a potted plant. State v. Burns, 2012 Ohio 1529, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1342 (4th Dist. March 29, 2012).*

The officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by knocking on the window of defendant’s car to wake him. When defendant woke up, he was dazed and confused, and that was reasonable suspicion to go further. State v. Jones, 2012 Ohio 1523, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1337 (4th Dist. March 16, 2012).*

Touching the fog line (“as nearly as practicable within” the lane) is not reasonable suspicion for a stop in Indiana. United States v. Peters, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46977 (S.D. Ind. April 3, 2012)*:

To the extent that the Government argues that probable cause existed because, on one occasion, Officer Borgmann might have reasonably believed that the Denali momentarily and slightly touched the fog line, that argument fails as a matter of law. The statute commands only that drivers drive “as nearly as practicable within” the lane. While no Indiana case has addressed whether briefly touching a fog line violates the statute, courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted similarly worded statutes, and have rejected the Government’s argument. See United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases holding that momentarily touching but not crossing a dividing line does not violate a statute requiring that a driver drive as “nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.” (emphasis omitted)). In opposition to those cases, the Government has collected cases of its own. Those cases are, however, irrelevant. They involve fact patterns involving “erratic” driving across one or both fog lines, …; or “partially swerving off the roadway,” …. No such behavior occurred here.

The affidavit for the search warrant here for evidence of a “violation of the [Pennsylvania] UFA” (Uniform Firearms Act) was not based on probable cause to believe that the UFA was violated. Nothing in the affidavit indicated that defendant was a felon who was incapable of possession of a firearm. “The affidavit in this case reveals a complete absence of indicia of probable cause that Defendant violated § 6105. We conclude that the complete omission from the affidavit of any fact upon which a police officer could base a belief that Defendant had violated § 6105 was not a reasonable mistake that would support application of the good faith exception.” United States v. Jones, 818 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Pa. 2011).*

After the trooper stopped defendant’s car, it was apparent that the vehicle with California plates was lawfully registered, so that justification for the stop was complete, and the defendant should have been allowed to go. Questioning him exceeded the justification for the stop. United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2011).*

Person who did not rent car and was not an authorized driver of the rental car on the rental agreement did not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. United States v. Mikelic, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50300 (D. Conn. May 11, 2011).*

In a search warrant for alleged stolen heavy equipment, automatic weapons were not “immediately apparent” for plain view purposes. They usually aren’t, especially without nexus being shown. United States v. Lamb, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49155 (S.D. Ohio April 6, 2012):

The Government has, however, failed the third prong of the plain view analysis because it cannot demonstrate that the illegality of the automatic guns was immediately apparent. “Because the plain view doctrine supplants the need for a particularized warrant, the ‘immediately apparent’ requirement is necessary to prevent officers from using the plain view doctrine as a means to extend a particularized search authorized by the Fourth Amendment principles into an unlawful exploratory search.” Garcia, 496 F.3d at 510.

Under the “immediately apparent” prong, “multiple factors may be taken into account, none of which are necessary, but each of which are instructive.” Carmack, 426 F. App’x. at 382. Courts should consider: (1) the nexus between the seized object and the items particularized in the warrant; (2) whether the intrinsic nature or appearance of the object gives probable cause to believe it is associated with criminal activity; (3) whether the officer, at the time of the discovery of the object and with the facts then available, can determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating nature; and; (4) whether the officer can recognize the incriminating nature of the object as the result of his instantaneous sensory perception, as opposed to further investigation. Id.; Garcia, 496 F.3d at 510. “Probable cause does not require knowledge that the evidence is contraband.” Carmack, 426 F. App’x at 382. Instead, it requires that the available facts would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that it may be contraband. Id.

Here, the first factor weighs in favor of suppression. There was no nexus between the guns seized and the documents or computer accessories authorized in the warrant. Nothing in the warrant or the affidavit suggests guns were used in the alleged theft.3 To the extent the officers were aware of the shooting that occurred on the property earlier that morning, they were likely also aware the shooting involved a handgun, not an automatic machine gun. Furthermore, there was no testimony that the guns were seized in connection with the earlier shooting; they were seized because they were found to be automatic.

3 Some district courts in the Sixth Circuit have found the incriminating nature of a machine gun was immediately apparent for purposes of the plain view exception where the gun had a connection to the alleged crime. See United States v. Jefferson, 717 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (finding incriminating nature of AK-47 immediately apparent where police were investigating a homicide involving a firearm); United States v. Case, No. 2:07-CR-111, 2008 WL 4865967, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (finding that if the plain view exception were applied, the incriminating nature of a machine gun is immediately apparent where there was a nexus between guns and narcotics crimes). Here, there was no nexus between the alleged crime and the guns in this case, and therefore, within the context of the search, the illegal nature of the guns was not immediately apparent.

Under the second factor, neither the intrinsic nature nor the appearance of the guns gave probable cause to believe they were illegal automatic weapons. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held the incriminating nature of certain weapons and accessories, such as sawed-off shotguns and silencers, is immediately apparent. See, e.g., Carmack, 426 F. App’x at 383 (citing cases establishing the immediately apparent incriminating nature of sawed-off shotguns); United States v. Poulos, 895 F.2d 1113, 1122 (6th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Horton, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (“[S]ilencers, like sawed-off shotguns, are not ‘intrinsically innocent’ objects and their possession is a serious crime except under ‘extraordinary circumstances.'”).

There is, however, a distinction between silencers and sawed-off shotguns on the one hand, and automatic weapons on the other. The Sixth Circuit has held that the incriminating nature of automatic weapons is not immediately apparent. United States v. Tatman, 397 F. App’x. 152, 175-77 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding incriminating nature of automatic weapons parts kit not immediately apparent); United States v. Szymkowiak, 727 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1984) (suppressing assault rifle where the officers could not tell by looking at the rifle whether it was automatic); United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding stolen rifles did not fall under the plain view exception). Therefore, the illegality of an automatic gun is not immediately apparent, and factor two also weighs in favor of suppression.

Plaintiff claimed that the Department of Defense stole his intellectual property, and he filed suit alleging, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment claim, which was rejected because there was no search and seizure. “Because there are elaborate remedial systems already set up for wrongful appropriations of intellectual property, a Fourth Amendment constitutional remedy is not available for Plaintiffs’ claims.” Pearlstein v. United States Dept. of Defense, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49235 (D. Ariz. April 9, 2012).

Where the officers have probable cause to believe there are drugs in the car, defendant’s arrest on a felony drug warrant justified a search of the car under the automobile exception, and Gant was inapplicable. United States v. Fox, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48966 (W.D. Mo. February 23, 2012).*

Hot pursuit of fleeing felon from a hand-to-hand drug transaction into an apartment justified entry into the apartment. Also, raising a new argument during the closing argument of the suppression hearing was inadequate to raise the issue because the government didn’t get to respond. United States v. Thompson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49472 (N.D. Tex. April 9, 2012):

The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit recognize that the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon is an exigency justifying a warrantless search and arrest. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (“[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place … by the expedient of escaping to a private place.”); Payne v. City of Olive Branch, 130 Fed. Appx. 656, 662 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“‘Hot pursuit’ of a suspect is recognized as an exigency justifying a warrantless search.”) (citing Santana, 427 U.S. at 41-43 & n.3).

In addition, the warrantless search was justified by the need to preserve evidence. “[T]he need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.” Kentucky v. King, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing cases). As explained above, the officers had background knowledge that drugs were being sold out of apartments located at the Complex. They had just witnessed Thompson engage in what they believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction, and Thompson fled to his apartment and locked the doors after the officers unexpectedly arrived on the scene, observed the transaction as it was occurring, and commanded him to stop when he fled. Thompson was aware that the officers were pursuing him. If he had been selling drugs from his apartment and was still in possession of illegal narcotics, he could have destroyed any evidence of drugs during the time it would have taken the officers to obtain a warrant. …

Attachment of an unsworn police report to a search warrant affidavit can support probable cause. United States v. Schubert, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49270 (E.D. Wis. April 9, 2012):

In State v. Wegrzyn, [751 S.W. 2d 796 (Mo.App. 1988)] the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a deputy sheriff’s notarized application for warrant which was based entirely on document signed by police officer that was not dated, not verified by oath, and not properly notarized was sufficient. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bass, 24 Mass. App. 972, 512 N.E.2d 519 (1987), an affidavit for a search warrant, properly verified, incorporated the contents of attached documents. The attachments were not in affidavit form. They were not sworn to and they contained no jurat. The trial court held that those deficiencies invalidated the warrant. The Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed that holding and upheld the warrant and the search made pursuant to it. The court held that the attached documents were properly incorporated into the affidavit, itself in proper form, and that it was of no moment that the attachments were not sworn to or contained no jurat. See also People v. Campbell, 678 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Colo. App. 1983) (“However, documents attached to and incorporated in an affidavit by reference need not be sworn to separately and may thus fall within the four corners of the affidavit.”).

As a general matter, federal courts, too, have held that attached documents that are properly incorporated into an affidavit can be considered in determining whether probable cause exists and that it is of no moment that the attachments were not sworn to or contained no jurat. See, generally, United States v. McCoy, 781 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Berisford, 750 F.2d 57, 58 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. One Olivetti Electric 10-Key Adding Machine, 406 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir. 1969). But in most cases, the attachment is not the sole source of information needed to establish probable cause, or the affiant is the author of or has direct knowledge of the facts set forth in the attachment. Here, there is no showing that Investigator Johnson had any direct knowledge of the facts set forth in the attached report. Yet, it is not uncommon for law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant based on an affidavit that expressly includes hearsay that is not itself given under oath or affirmation. Police affidavits made in support of search warrant applications generally recount information they obtain from citizen witnesses, other police witnesses, or even unidentified informants. There is no requirement that the affiant have direct knowledge of all of the facts essential to support a finding of probable cause. Nor must the probable cause determination be based only on evidence that would be admissible at trial. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949); see also U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (holding that finding of probable cause may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial).

Bloomberg: Strip-Search Case Reflects Death of American Privacy By Noah Feldman:

The short answer is that Kennedy couldn’t find a violation of dignity for the petitioner because almost everyone committed to a jail or prison gets similar treatment. (Some states have banned the practice after minor arrests.) Every arrest, even for major offenses, is supposed to take place on the basis of suspicion, not proven guilt. Everyone in jail is equally presumed innocent until proven guilty at trial — or until he or she admits guilt in a plea bargain. To find that all of these people are having their most basic rights violated every day would have been too disruptive to the basic practices of American criminal justice.

Salon.com: U.S. filmmaker repeatedly detained at border by Glenn Greenwald:

One of the more extreme government abuses of the post-9/11 era targets U.S. citizens re-entering their own country, and it has received far too little attention. With no oversight or legal framework whatsoever, the Department of Homeland Security routinely singles out individuals who are suspected of no crimes, detains them and questions them at the airport, often for hours, when they return to the U.S. after an international trip, and then copies and even seizes their electronic devices (laptops, cameras, cellphones) and other papers (notebooks, journals, credit card receipts), forever storing their contents in government files. No search warrant is needed for any of this. No oversight exists. And there are no apparent constraints on what the U.S. Government can do with regard to whom it decides to target or why.

JSOnline: Beloit to pay $265,000 to settle strip search lawsuit; Milwaukee investigation may leave taxpayers on the hook by Gina Barton:

The City of Beloit has agreed to pay a teenage boy $265,000 to settle a federal lawsuit claiming police violated his constitutional rights by strip-searching him on the street and slamming his head into a car window.

Asking for consent while waiting for return of information from dispatch was during an “unavoidable lull” in a stop and did not extend it. State v. Hampton, 247 Ore. App. 147, 268 P.3d 711 (2011)*:

Asking for consent to search the car did not extend the stop because it occurred during an unavoidable lull in the traffic stop while defendant was looking for his registration. See State v. Jones, 239 Or App 201, 208, 245 P3d 148 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 230 (2011) (holding that, because the defendant’s consent to search occurred during an unavoidable lull in an ongoing traffic stop, the request for consent to search did not delay the stop).

The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion and findings that the air freshener hanging from defendant’s mirror was a “material obstruction” to the driver’s view. “‘In making its decision on the motion, the trial court’s focus is not on “whether an offense was actually committed but whether an arresting officer reasonably suspected at the time of the stop that criminal activity was taking place or about to take place.”’” People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 110272, 962 N.E.2d 1035 (December 12, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for some unexplained thing that was hanging from his rearview mirror which, in the testimony of the officer allegedly “materially” obstructed the driver’s view. The statute doesn’t prohibit anything hanging from the mirror, just things that materially obstruct view. Without testimony as to what it is, the stop was unjustified. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 609 Pa. 1, 14 A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011):

Finally, we note there are myriad objects which drivers commonly hang from their rearview mirrors. Air fresheners; parking placards; mortarboard tassels; crosses; rosary beads; medallions of St. Christopher, the patron saint of travel; and rabbits’ feet are but a few. It is not illegal for a driver to hang such items from his or her rearview mirror, so long as the items do not materially obstruct the driver’s view. The legislature could have written Section 4524(c) to prohibit a driver from hanging any object from the vehicle’s rearview mirror, or it could have prohibited hanging objects that obstruct a driver’s view to any degree, but it did not; rather, it prohibited only material obstructions. Were this Court to conclude that an officer’s bare testimony that he saw an object hanging from a rearview mirror which obstructed the driver’s view, without any additional testimony or other evidence supporting the officer’s conclusion that the object materially obstructed the driver’s view, was sufficient to demonstrate reasonable suspicion to constitutionally support the intrusion of a vehicle stop, we would obviate the suppression court’s role in ensuring there is an objectively reasonable basis for the vehicle stop, and expose every law-abiding motorist who hangs an object from his or her rearview mirror to a potentially unwarranted intrusion. See Terry.

A defendant told he’s going to be frisked is “seized.” Here, the record is devoid of any factual justification for the frisk based on what “other people” said. If they were informants, there was no showing of basis of knowledge or any reason to be truthful. Commonwealth v. Arias, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 342, 963 N.E.2d 100 (2012)*:

Here, the record reveals nothing about the informants’ basis of knowledge or veracity. Hart and Halloran, the MBTA employees who told the police about the defendant, expressly stated that they were passing on information they had obtained from “other people” but said nothing about who the other people were and provided no information about the other people that would enable anyone to determine either their veracity or basis of knowledge. In that regard, we treat the individuals who gave information to Hart and Halloran as unknown informants even though police knew their identities by the time of the hearing. … Nothing in the record suggests that the police knew who the informants were before they arrested the defendant or that they had any idea how the informants knew of the gun. Moreover, information obtained from known informants receives somewhat greater weight than that received from anonymous informants because known informants expose themselves to “charge[s] of filing a false report or any comparable consequence of providing false information to law enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 397, 923 N.E.2d 1004 (2010). See Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 515-517, 862 N.E.2d 371 (2007). Here, the informants faced no such consequences when they made their disclosures to Hart or Halloran. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that they even knew that Hart or Halloran would relay their information to authorities.

Defendant was stopped for DUI by an off-duty narc. He conducted a search of the car finding MDMA. The stop and search were valid as a private search. In addition, if an on-duty LEO had stopped the car, that officer could have searched the passenger compartment incident to the arrest for the cause of the DUI. State v. Common, 78 So. 3d 237 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

An anonymous CI provided sufficient predictive detail to justify the stop of defendant’s car with reasonable suspicion when defendant showed up in the car described at the time given. State v. Leonard, 80 So. 3d 535 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011)*:

Further, the source correctly predicted the specific place and time, within ten minutes, that the suspect would arrive with contraband. The source was able to describe the vehicle defendant would be driving – a black, four-door vehicle. As the detectives surveyed the situation, they corroborated the source’s information when they observed a man, fitting the description of the suspect, drive up to the expected location in a vehicle that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle within the specified time frame. As such, we find that the trial judge did not err in implicitly finding that the detectives possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.

Officers were in the house of another to conduct a parole arrest, and they encountered the defendant who was there. He was handcuffed for safety reasons and told that and that he was not under arrest. Then defendant admitted to possessing contraband. State v. Jones, 78 So. 3d 274 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*