SB 1070, the Arizona “papers please” law held constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part and the court was concerned with lengthening detentions based on suspected illegal status without only a hunch. Arizona v. United States, first from the syllabus:

(c) By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of certain aliens suspected of being removable, §6 too creates an obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue a warrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute. If no federal warrant has been issued, these officers have more limited authority. They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with even greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government. This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform an immigration officer’s functions. This includes instances where the Attorney General has granted that authority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See, e.g., §1357(g)(1). Although federal law permits state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” §1357(g)(10)(B), this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain authorized by §6. Pp. 15–19.

Then from 22-23 of the opinion:

Some who support the challenge to §2(B) argue that, in practice, state officers will be required to delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. See, e.g., Brief for Former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard et al. as Amici Curiae 37, n. 49. Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission”). And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. Cf. Part IV–C, supra (concluding that Arizona may not authorize warrantless arrests on the basis of removability). The program put in place by Congress does not allow state or local officers to adopt this enforcement mechanism.

But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. To take one example, a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be unable to produce identification. The first sentence of §2(B) instructs officers to make a “reasonable” attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE if there is reasonable suspicion that his presence in the United States is unlawful. The state courts may conclude that, unless the person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong the stop for the immigration inquiry. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 12, n. 4 (“[Section 2(B)] does not require the verification be completed during the stop or detention if that is not reasonable or practicable”); cf. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101 (2005) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where questioning about immigration status did not prolong a stop).

To take another example, a person might be held pending release on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. As this goes beyond a mere stop, the arrestee (unlike the jaywalker) would appear to be subject to the categorical requirement in the second sentence of §2(B) that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before [he] is released.” State courts may read this as an instruction to initiate a status check every time someone is arrested, or in some subset of those cases, rather than as a command to hold the person until the check is complete no matter the circumstances. Even if the law is read as an instruction to complete a check while the person is in custody, moreover, it is not clear at this stage and on this record that the verification process would result in prolonged detention.

However the law is interpreted, if §2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 589 (1948) (authority of state officers to make arrests for federal crimes is, absent federal statutory instruction, a matter of state law); …

Defendant’s stop was justified for following too close as corroborated somewhat by the video. A dog was immediately called in and conducted a sniff while the warning ticket was being filled out. The dog alerted within five minutes of the stop, so the stop was not prolonged. The officer’s testimony on the “well trained” dog was that the dog had 800 alerts with no false positives, so there was probable cause. United States v. Trejo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86740 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2012).*

Defendant school teacher ordered a search of people in a room based on the smell of marijuana, but included plaintiff who she was aware arrived after the smell. The defendants were on notice that such a search was illegal under T.L.O. Plaintiff also stated a claim that the search was racially motivated against two African-American students who arrived after the smell. Doe v. Champaign Cmty. Unit 4 Sch. Dist., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86857 (C.D. Ill. February 24, 2012).*

There is no differing standard of justification for a seizure v. a search. The officers’ entry here was without exigent circumstances, and their findings made it into the search warrant affidavit, so the search was suppressed. United States v. Estrada, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86592 (D. Utah June 21, 2012):

2. Seizure vs. search

The government argues that, as the officer’s intent was merely to secure the hotel room, remove any occupants, and obtain a search warrant, “their activity in entering the room should be considered a more limited intrusion than would be a warrantless search, and therefore subject to a different degree of scrutiny.” In support of this contention, the government cites to the plurality opinion in United States v. Segura, which states:

[A] seizure affects only possessory interests, not privacy interests. Therefore, the heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue. We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents.

However, this language comes from a section of the Segura opinion that was joined by only two justices. Furthermore, even if the language cited by the government garnered majority support, the same section of the opinion states that the justices did not believe that the holding would increase the possibility of illegal entries by police officers because: 1) “an entry in the absence of exigent circumstances is illegal;” 2) “officers who have probable cause and who are in the process of obtaining a warrant have no reason to enter the premises before the warrant issues, absent exigent circumstances which, of course, would justify the entry;” and 3) “officers who enter illegally will recognize that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry may be suppressed.”

In the case at hand, the officers did not enter the premises “while a search warrant [was] being sought;” instead, they entered the premises before seeking the warrant, and included substantial evidence found in the apartment in the subsequently-prepared warrant affidavit.

Under the Segura plurality, an entry in the absence of exigent circumstances is illegal and evidence discovered from such a search may be suppressed. Therefore, the question before the Court remains the same: whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’ warrantless entry.

Under the Fourth Amendment, why would there be because both are provided for by its plain language.

Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 110 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2012), on SSRN. Abstract:

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision on GPS surveillance, United States v. Jones (2012), five Justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions have always evaluated each step of an investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search.

This article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. It explores the choices and puzzles that a mosaic theory would raise, and it analyzes the merits of the proposed new method of Fourth Amendment analysis. The article makes three major points. First, the mosaic theory represents a dramatic departure from the basic building block of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Second, adopting the mosaic theory would require courts to answer a long list of novel and challenging questions. Third, courts should reject the theory and retain the traditional sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. The mosaic approach reflects legitimate concerns, but implementing it would be exceedingly difficult in light of rapid technological change. Courts can better respond to the concerns animating the mosaic theory within the traditional parameters of the sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.

The seizure of defendant’s cell phone was with probable cause because he was a suspect in a murder. The police did not search it until they obtained a warrant consistent with Smith. The seizure of the telephone was not inconsistent with Smith. Under Segura, a seizure and search protect different interests, but they both have to be justified. This was. State v. Cunningham, 2012 Ohio 2794, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2443 (2d Dist. June 22, 2012):

[*P28] The police did not search the contents of Defendant’s cell phone at issue until after a search warrant was obtained to search those contents. Defendant does not challenge the validity of the search warrant but instead argues that the seizure of the cell phone itself without a warrant required the trial court to exclude all evidence derived from the cell phone after the search warrant was issued pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith. We do not agree.

[*P29] The police had identified Defendant as a key suspect in a double homicide that occurred only hours before Defendant was sitting in the interview room. (Motion to Suppress Tr., p. 7-10.) Defendant was at police headquarters for purposes of an interview concerning those crimes and used the phone while waiting to be interviewed. Defendant’s phone was confiscated by police out of a concern that relevant information memorialized on the phone would be deleted or lost. At no point between the time that Detective Baader seized Defendant’s cellular phone and the time when the search warrant was issued did the police search the records stored inside Defendant’s phone. (Id. at 15, 25, 39, 42, 46, 50.)

[*P30] The police had probable cause to seize Defendant’s cellular phone until a search warrant could be obtained. As the Supreme Court recognized in Smith, the police had an “immediate interest in collecting and preserving evidence and can take preventive steps to ensure that the data found on the phone are neither lost nor erased.” Smith, ¶ 23. The confiscation of Defendant’s phone did just that.

Sun-Sentinel: State seeks to expand secret tracking program that uses cellphones, GPS by Alexia Campbell:

Florida wants to expand a secret surveillance program that uses GPS cellphone tracking and other new tracking technology to help police solve violent crimes.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Electronic Surveillance Support Teams have operated under the radar since the first one launched in the Orlando area in 2007. The teams have since spread to South Florida and all across the state, records show, and rising police requests for surveillance have led the department to push for $1.7 million to expand the program.

Although little is known about how agents on these teams use the high-tech surveillance equipment to help police, state records show that locating criminal suspects with GPS locators on smartphones is a common practice.

Oregon’s warrantless eavesdropping requirement to record a CI and his target requires exigency and probable cause. State v. Miskell, 351 Ore. 680, 277 P.3d 522 (2012),* revg 239 Or. App. 629, 246 P.3d 755 (2010):

Another aspect of the provision’s wording supports defendant’s contention that the legislature had in mind the well-known constitutional doctrine of exigent circumstances that obviate the need for a warrant. Law enforcement officers who wish to proceed without a court order under ORS 133.726(7)(b) must be able not only to point to “circumstances of such exigency that it would be unreasonable to obtain a court order,” but also must have “probable cause to believe that [the person whose communication is to be intercepted] has committed, is engaged in committing or is about to commit” a felony. The phrase “probable cause” inescapably alludes to a specialized legal concept associated with the constitutional prohibition (in both the Oregon and United States constitutions) against unreasonable searches and seizures, and its use in ORS 133.726(7)(b) appears to confirm that the entire provision, including the “exigency” wording, was intended as a reference to the familiar “probable cause plus exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177, 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (warrantless search permitted if police could show probable cause and exigent circumstances).

Washington rejects the Thornton “exception” to Gant on scope of search incident under state constitution. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) (dissent here):

In the consolidated cases before us, the issue we must decide is whether an equivalent to Gant’s second exception, referred to here as Thornton 1 exception, applies under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. We conclude that no such exception is permissible under article I, section 7. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals in both cases, reverse the defendants’ convictions, and remand these cases for further proceedings consistent with our decision herein.

. . .

The specific issue raised in the present consolidated cases is whether the Thornton form of the exception will apply under article I, section 7. We conclude that it does not.

First, the underpinnings of the Thornton version of the exception do not justify its existence under article I, section 7. The Court in Gant adopted the Thornton exception given “circumstances unique to the vehicle context.”

. . .

However, although the automobile exception is recognized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it is not recognized under article I, section 7. See Patton, 167 Wn.2d at 386 n.4; State v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364, 369, 236 P.2d 885 (2010) (in context of automobile search where suspect was not arrested; probable cause to search did not justify search of vehicle–“the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search”); Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 700-01. Although the Thornton exception is consistent with the rationale underlying the federal automobile exception under the Fourth Amendment, it lacks similar support under article I, section 7.

. . .

We also reject the State’s proposal made at oral argument that a modified form of the Thornton exception, so to speak, be applied. The State proposed a vehicle search incident to arrest exception that would permit a warrantless search based on probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, rather than a reasonable belief as stated in Gant. As we said in Buelna Valdez, “when a search can be delayed to obtain a warrant without running afoul of” concerns for the safety of the officer or to preserve evidence of the crime of arrest from concealment or destruction by the arrestee “(and does not fall within another applicable exception), the warrant must be obtained. A warrantless search of an automobile is permissible under the search incident to arrest exception when that search is necessary to preserve officer safety or prevent destruction or concealment of evidence of the crime of arrest.” Id. (emphasis added). We emphasized that “time is of the essence” because in “some circumstances, a delay to obtain a search warrant might be shown to provide the opportunity for the arrestee to procure a weapon or destroy evidence of the crime.” Buelna Valdez, 167 Wn.2d at 773 (emphasis added).

In an arrest for DUI, a search incident that included opening a dollar bill that was folded in a way to indicate it held cocaine, which defendant then admitted, was reasonable. The officers did know all that defendant was under the influence of. State v. Armendariz-Nunez, 2012 NMCA 41, 276 P.3d 963 (2012):

[*13] We disagree with Defendant’s argument that the cocaine was not evidence of the DWI crime for which he had been arrested. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(B) (2008) (amended 2010); State v. Aleman, 2008 NMCA 137, 145 N.M. 79, 194 P.3d 110 (affirming the defendant’s conviction for driving while under the influence of cocaine). While the deputy observed that Defendant smelled of alcohol, there was no indication that other substances could not have contributed to his intoxicated state. As the State points out, both alcohol and marijuana emit a distinct odor, while cocaine and many other controlled substances do not. The discovery of a particular drug on a suspect’s person could be relevant evidence that the suspect may be under the influence of that drug and, therefore, may be appropriately seized.

Police responded to a domestic abuse call and were inside defendant’s house. He was arrested and removed from the house and warrants were obtained. Drugs were found on him when he was booked into the jail. Even if the entry was unconstitutional, which does not have to be decided) the finding of the drugs was sufficiently attenuated from that, and suppression was properly denied. Echavarry v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 177, 725 S.E.2d 151 (2012).*

Defendant Airman first consented to a UA but withdrew his consent before the testing was done. This was potentially binding under M.R.E. 314(e)(3), which had to be considered. Also, his UA could not be considered an abandonment. United States v. Dease, 71 M.J. 116 (C.A. A.F. 2012):

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that Appellant had a privacy interest in his urine sample and could withdraw consent prior to the search. Further, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the urinalysis evidence and evidence derived from that urinalysis would not have been subject to inevitable discovery. Seizure and search are not necessarily coterminous, particularly in the context of a urinalysis case. M.R.E. 314(e)(3) states that “[c]onsent may be limited in any way by the person granting consent, including limitations in terms of time, place, or property and may be withdrawn at any time.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the lower court erred in determining that Appellant’s privacy interest in his urinalysis sample was extinguished by his voluntary surrender of his urine to the Government, without addressing M.R.E. 314(e)(3).

Defendant was illegally arrested and searched, and then an unMirandized statement was taken from him, and then he was Mirandized for a second, official, statement where the product of the illegal search and his dissembling during the first statement were used in the second statement, and that required the second statement be suppressed. United States v. Cordova, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2011):

There is a fundamental difference, however, between an illegal arrest and an illegal search and seizure of evidence. An arrest is not evidence of a crime; illegally seized evidence of a crime, on the other hand, can be (and in this case, was) used to convince a defendant that the government can convict him without a statement and to lead to a common-sense belief that confessing and cooperating are the only option. Were this Court to hold otherwise it would be left with the anomalous result that evidence obtained during an illegal search would be suppressed but then the existence and discovery of the evidence would be introduced by the statements of the Defendant obtained only as a result of the illegal search and seizure.

Defendant was “asked” to come into a store with the officer saying “we need to talk.” Two officers talked to him and several others were in the store investigating a crime. The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that his consent was voluntary. United States v. Guevara, 448 Fed. Appx. 453 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant consented to a search of his hotel room for anything illegal, and officers seized two computers, thumb drives, and other storage electronic devices for a later search believing them connected to a crime, and this was not unreasonable. A search of the electronic devices on the premises was not possible. United States v. Chappell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127588 (N.D. Ga. November 3, 2011).*

It was reasonable to arrest plaintiff with probable cause on a controlled delivery because he signed for the package with a fictitious first name for him. This was more than mere acceptance of the package known by the police to carry drugs. He left the house with the package and got into a car with the package, and that gave probable cause to search the car [citing search incident cases, which was wrong; automobile exception applied]. Johnson v. United States, 40 A.3d 1 (D.C. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a seat belt violation, and reasonable suspicion developed from numerous factors, one of which was that defendant was a known drug trafficker who made a five hour trip to a store and didn’t buy anything. State v. Fisher, 725 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. App. 2012).*

Fourth Amendment issue raised on direct appeal and rejected was not a proper subject of a 2255. Martinez v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36781 (D. S.D. March 19, 2012).*

“A stop at a permanent immigration checkpoint, like the San Clemente checkpoint, is constitutional as long as the detention is limited to a few brief questions about immigration and the production of immigration documents. United States v. Preciado-Robles, 964 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976)). Whether or not the Border Patrol agent in this case impermissibly extended the immigration stop, the search of Ortiz-Flores’s backpack and the search of his person must be justified by consent or probable cause. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566-67.” Here there was neither, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. United States v. Ortiz-Flores, 462 Fed. Appx. 759 (9th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s claim in his § 2255 that the DVD of his traffic stop was edited to remove exculpatory evidence fails for lack of any factual support. Even so it fails on the merits. Thomas v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147971 (M.D. Tenn. December 23, 2011).*

“Mr. Dutton, a military veteran, has been preparing for the economic collapse of the world.” He freely talked with his ex-wife’s boyfriend about manufacturing explosives and arming grenades when their daughter was exchanged for visitation. His information to the police was enough for probable cause for manufacturing a destructive device. United States v. Dutton, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147928 (D. Kan. December 23, 2011).*

Eight factors of reasonable suspicion cited by the government were individually quite weak but collectively were reasonable suspicion. United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2012).*

“While the totality of the circumstances may include innocent activity, the innocent factors must collectively eliminate ‘a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied,’ as Defendant’s actions do. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).” United States v. Stacks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67422 (W.D. N.C. May 14, 2012).*

There was [clearly] probable cause for a search warrant for defendant’s house when the police were able to credibly link him to a bank robbery. United States v. Allen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68902 (W.D. Mo. April 24, 2012).*

41(g) motion for return of property is denied because the government doesn’t have the property. Also, the claimant has an adequate remedy under state law for the same thing. Bennett v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68298 (N.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925 (N.D. W.Va. May 16, 2012).*

The district court granted defendant’s motion to suppress for failure to have a reasonable basis for a protective sweep. In the district court, the government failed to develop the record. [Because they couldn’t, because they didn’t think they had to, why?] United States v. Fann, 462 Fed. Appx. 128 (2d Cir. 2012):

In part because the Government did not submit any affidavits or other evidence before the district court to develop the record, the Government fails to identify specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that the officers who conducted the search of the residence reasonably believed that an individual was present at the time of Fann’s arrest and that such individual posed a danger to them. Because the officers lacked this reasonable belief, their warrantless search of the residence violated Fann’s Fourth Amendment rights. The evidence obtained through the search was properly suppressed.

Compare this Texas case from four days ago where the state prosecutor did the same thing. What were they thinking? We’re from the government and we can lose?

They indicted. Did they have no confidence in the case? Roll over and play dead if the defendant happens to file a motion to suppress? What’s going on here? If the search was that bad they shouldn’t have indicted in the first place. Or were they so obtuse they didn’t think of that before going to the grand jury?

Remember Calandra from 1974 holding that the defendant can’t litigate the quality of the search before the grand jury because it unnecessarily screws with the grand jury’s function and we have to trust the AUSA to do the right thing? In the run of the mill case (98% of them) with close questions of fact and law, I get that. This case, however, is real proof that Calandra might have been wrong when the government is just incapable of recognizing that the officers did it really wrong and the search will fail in court. Nevertheless, there is at least some remedy after indictment. Maybe there is an ethical complaint here for the prosecutor proceeding without justification. See Rule 3.8(a) which is not clear on this. More to the point is Rule 4.4(a) on burdens on others.

There was probable cause from a controlled delivery of a shipping container with 505 lbs of marijuana. The district court found that the officers did not tell the defendant that they would “seal” his house and exclude him while they got a warrant if he didn’t consent. Even if they did say that, they could have easily gotten a warrant, so that was not an unreasonable “threat.” United States v. Neely, 462 Fed. Appx. 632 (7th Cir. 2012).*

Narcs set up a drug deal with a lady and arranged a meeting. She arrived in a car driven by defendant. She gave him up when arrested. That was probable cause to arrest the defendant as the source of her drugs. United States v. Canales, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21403 (W.D. Tex. February 21, 2012).*

Claimant’s taking the Fifth in a forfeiture action cost him his standing claim and resulted in summary judgment against him. United States v. $133,420.00 in United States Currency, 672 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2012) (not on court’s website).

Defendant came to a Pennsylvania police station with his cell phone complaining of threatening text messages from a person in Ohio. He handed the cell phone to the officer sitting at the duty desk who was pushing buttons trying to make the text messages come up when the officer saw child pornography on the phone. By handing the phone over for the officer to look at it and try to open the text messages, defendant waived his expectation of privacy in the phone. He might have retained it if he opened the text messages and showed them instead. United States v. Coates, 462 Fed. Appx. 199 (3d Cir. 2012):

[I]t is abundantly clear that Coates did not possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone. “Regarding the subjective prong, ‘we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy,'” … , and an individual cannot claim a subjective expectation of privacy in an object voluntarily turned over to third parties. … Nor is such an expectation, if one exists, considered reasonable. …

Coates walked into the Bloomsburg Police Department and voluntarily handed his cell phone over to a police officer. Although he stated that he wanted to show the officer a text message, he did not hold the phone to show the message to the police officer, nor did he navigate to the text message before handing it to the officer, as we would expect of an individual expecting to maintain privacy. And even though the cell phone was in a closed position, Coates did not instruct Officer Persing how to navigate to the text message from the start screen, nor did he say anything during the period that Officer Persing was attempting to access the message. Coates freely and knowingly exposed the contents of his cell phone to law enforcement, without manifesting any expectation of privacy therein, and “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public … is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted); …

A commercial vehicle safety stop was valid, and defendant’s lack of knowledge about his load, where he got it, and exactly where he was going was reasonable suspicion to detain him for a dog sniff. The USMJ concluded that the trailer was unlawfully searched but a drug dog alert after that was inevitable discovery because that was probable cause. United States v. Rendon, 462 Fed. Appx. 923 (11th Cir. 2012).*

The testimony of consent was conflicting, but the credibility determination of the trial court is binding on appeal. State v. Reglus, 2012 Ohio 1174, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1033 (9th Dist. March 21, 2012)* (sustaining consent); State v. Durden, 2012 Ohio 1194, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1048 (8th Dist. March 22, 2012) (finding consent involuntary).

The trial court concluded that the officer’s car blocked defendant’s car and was a stop, but it was with reasonable suspicion. State v. Spradlin, 2012 Ohio 1211, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1071 (5th Dist. March 12, 2012).*

The trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress erroneously put the burden of proof on the defendant to show that a warrantless search was unreasonable. Briggs v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 226, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 341 (April 4, 2012):

In so holding, the trial court erred as a matter of law by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof. See Danner v. Discover Bank, 99 Ark. App. 71, 257 S.W.3d 113 (2007). The grounds asserted by appellant, i.e., lack of consent, were presumptively true because all warrantless searches are presumed illegal, and the burden of showing that a search was made pursuant to unequivocal and specific consent rests entirely on the State. State v. Brown, supra. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct such further proceedings as are necessary for it to make findings of fact in a manner consistent with this opinion. Because the new findings may differ from those made pursuant to the inverted burden of proof employed in the present case, appellant’s constitutional arguments are not ripe for decision, and we therefore do not address them.

Report to the police that a vehicle was stolen was reason to stop it. At the hearing, it was shown that the victim didn’t intend to affect defendant, but the report was relied on in good faith at the time. State v. Mundy, 87 So. 3d 300 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2012).*

Defendant lacked standing to challenge the stop of a vehicle that he was two blocks away from at the time of the stop and did not argue that he had an expectation of privacy. Art. III standing does not apply. [Like this court had any choice?] United States v. Ruiz-Zarate, 678 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2012):

Ruiz does not argue that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Morales’s truck at the time of the stop. Rather, he contends that he has “standing” to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge because he suffered an injury-in-fact “that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). Our court has previously rejected Ruiz’s argument, concluding that this “concept of ‘standing’ has not had any place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence … since the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), indicated that matters of standing in the context of searches and seizures actually involved substantive Fourth Amendment law.” United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 698 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). “Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted.” United States v. Randolph, 628 F.3d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, to challenge a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, “the defendant must show that (1) he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched or the items seized, and (2) society is prepared to accept the expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable.” United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 842 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, Ruiz-Zarate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in Morales’s vehicle, which he neither owned nor was near at the time of the traffic stop. Consequently, Ruiz-Zarate cannot raise a Fourth Amendment claim.