Police entry onto the curtilage, defendants’ carport, violated the Fourth Amendment because, while it could be seen, it was still a trespass under Jones. United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012):

This confusion has persisted for decades. For example, in United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1975), we stated that “‘a reasonable expectation of privacy,’ and not common-law property distinctions, now controls the scope of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1170-71 (citing Katz). Relying on Magana, we repeated this error in a recent opinion that the government cited to the district court. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533, 182 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2012). In Pineda-Moreno, despite the government’s admission that agents had, without a warrant, entered the curtilage of the defendant’s home to place a mobile tracking device on his car in his driveway, our court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Pineda-Moreno had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage. Id. at 1215. The Supreme Court recently and emphatically repudiated this reasoning, explaining that “as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.

After determining that the carport was part of the curtilage to the home, the district court erroneously concluded that the agents did not violate Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights when they occupied the carport without a warrant. The Supreme Court has explained that the role of reasonable expectation analysis in evaluating the constitutionality of searches of the curtilage is only in determining the scope of the curtilage, and not the propriety of the intrusion. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (“[T]he extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.”). The district court circularly reasoned that because the agents were able to freely enter the carport, Perea-Rey had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport. Yet, because it was curtilage, it was a constitutionally protected area, and the warrantless entry, search and seizure by the agents violated Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”). No further showing was required of Perea-Rey.

The district court also conflated the ability to observe inside the curtilage with the right to enter the curtilage without a warrant. Although a warrant is not required to observe readily visible items within the curtilage, and “officers [need not] shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986), a warrant is required to enter the home. In Ciraolo, the Supreme Court held that warrantless aerial observation of the curtilage of a home was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that such observations could form the basis for probable cause to support a warrant to search the curtilage. Id. at 213-14. Only after obtaining a warrant based on the observations did officers actually enter Ciraolo’s curtilage. The ability to observe part of the curtilage or the interior of a home does not authorize law enforcement, without a warrant, to then enter those areas to conduct searches or seizures. See Struckman, 603 F.3d at 747 (“[P]olice officers must either obtain a warrant or consent to enter before arresting a person inside a home or its curtilage or make a reasonable attempt to ascertain that he is actually a trespasser before making the arrest.”). The agents here could observe the curtilage from the sidewalk and use those observations, as in Ciraolo, as the basis for a warrant application. But, the ability to see into the curtilage or the home does not, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement, authorize a warrantless entry by the government. Therefore, the district court erred by admitting the evidence simply because the officers could view the inside of the carport from the street.

A child pornography victim described a silver Apple computer as where defendant’s photographs of her were stored. The police procured a search warrant and, when executing it, they found no silver Apple, but they did find a silver Dell computer. The warrant included “devices,” and the officer testified that he included “devices” because they didn’t know all that they would find, like the cameras and other computers. The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress of the Dell computer because it could be seized under the warrant. State v. Chiquet, 82 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).*

Defendant validly consented. She had been Mirandized and advised of her right to refuse consent. She was upset, but many people arrested are. State v. Brown, 129 Conn. App. 552, 2011 Conn. App. LEXIS 339 (June 21, 2011).*

Defendant was believed to have burglarized his neighbor’s house, stolen his computer, and then accessed the internet through the victim’s wireless router. The police obtained IP information to aid in the investigation. Defendant’s state constitutional claim was unavailing because there was no reason to depart from the Fourth Amendment cases here. State v. Simmons, 2011 VT 69, 190 Vt. 141, 27 A.2d 1065 (2011).*

Defendant’s stepdaughter who was at best an overnight guest at defendant’s house just passing through on a trip was not able to legally consent to a search of the house. When the police got there looking for a gun, they only knew defendant lived there, and they were looking around for a bystander who knew more. Then they found out about her, but they made no effort to determine her status in relation to the house. [Guest status here wouldn’t be enough, but the court doesn’t have to go that far. However, the constitutional violation was harmless based on all the evidence.] State v. Pike, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (May 16, 2012).

A judge in one county could not issue a search warrant to be executed in another county under Texas law. Sanchez v. State, 365 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). [Note: This is a state law issue because the Fourth Amendment doesn’t care about county lines.]

The officer’s testimony that the defendant failed to stop for a crosswalk was not unsupported by the record, so the stop of the vehicle was justified. McMahan v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3912 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) May 17, 2012) (on rehearing).

Defendant was on the receiving end of a drug courier’s delivery. The courier had already been arrested and agreed to continue on the trip for the government. After the delivery, there was reasonable suspicion as to defendant. United States v. Torres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96036 (S.D. N.Y. July 3, 2012).*

The corroboration of the CI’s really detailed information down to the lump hidden in the groin during a patdown as the hiding place of drugs all was probable cause. United States v. Williams, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95992 (D. Vt. July 10, 2012).*

Officers were investigating a check cashing scheme. The independent source doctrine supports the seizure of brass knuckles found in the car. United States v. Maxwell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96375 (D. Minn. July 11, 2012).*

Defendant’s stop was with probable cause, and the following search was incident to the arrest, so the patdown is moot. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268 (11th Cir. July 12, 2012).*

Failing to file a futile motion to suppress is not IAC. United States v. Lohrman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95474 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing that a trash search was unreasonable considering Greenwood. Defense counsel did argue that the search of a cell phone was unreasonable, but it was held harmless on the direct appeal if error at all. Therefore, no prejudice. United States v. Roberts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95306 (D. Nev. July 9, 2012).*

Defendant’s version of the facts amounts to an abandonment; the government’s version of the facts is a plain view of a firearm in a car visible to anyone. United States v. Contreras-Espinal, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95577 (D. P.R. May 18, 2012).*

Aside from pre-Jones placement of a GPS device on defendant’s vehicle to track it for six days, there was probable cause for stop and search of the vehicle, so the motion to suppress is denied. A cell phone “dump” by the DEA and returning the phone was an unreasonable search. The fact a cell phone is a tool of the trade of drug traffickers was not enough. United States v. Lujan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95804 (N.D. Miss. July 10, 2012):

The Government has not, at either the hearing or through briefing, established that Lujan’s cell phone contained evidence of a crime, or that there was probable cause to believe such evidence existed on his cell phone. The Government asserts that cell phones have been recognized as tools of the narcotics trade, and that is enough to justify its warrantless search. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “cell phones contain a wealth of private information, including emails, text messages, call histories, address books, and subscriber numbers.” United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008). Indeed, a cell phone is “similar to a personal computer that is carried on one’s person. Id. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. Id. Because cell phones contain such a wealth of private information, in this situation, where no probable cause has been established as to Lujan’s cell phone, the evidence must be suppressed. Indeed, requiring the government to secure a warrant prior to searching the contents of a properly seized cell phone is typically not overly burdensome in light of the privacy interests at stake. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting the “vast amounts of diverse personal information” contained in electronic devices).

Police saw defendant acting furtively in a high crime area, and he avoided contact with the police while they tried to apprehend him. He was not seized until the police got him on a porch, and that was with reasonable suspicion by the time it happened. His actions avoiding the police further added to the reasonable suspicion. United States v. Denson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14143 (10th Cir. July 11, 2012).*

Police received a 911 call from defendant’s girlfriend who was moving out, and she showed them a firearm and ammunition of defendant who was a convicted felon. Her consent was voluntary. The findings supported a later search warrant. United States v. Franco, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95569 (D. Mass. July 10, 2012).*

Defendant agreed with defense counsel that the best course was to forego a motion to suppress that was a loser and negotiate a better deal. Defense counsel was not ineffective. Villareal v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2012).*

The CI’s information for the search warrant was not given a time frame, but there was a confirming trash pull within 72 hours of the search warrant, and that mooted the time problem. Also, there is no higher constitutional right in trash in Ohio. An “all persons” warrant was valid. State v. Quinn, 2012 Ohio 3123, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2751 (12th Dist. July 9, 2012).*

Validity of consent to search a backpack in a vehicle was moot where there was probable cause for search of the whole vehicle. State v. Young, 2012 Ohio 3131, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2752 (12th Dist. July 9, 2012).*

Where the IRS was on the premises with a warrant and they found syringes while looking for flashdrives, state officials did not need a separate warrant to come in and take what the IRS was not taking. State v. Lorenzo, 2012 Ohio 3145, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2774 (9th Dist. July 5, 2012).*

Defendant hiding in a house failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it where it was attempted to be proved by one sentence in a police report and he did not testify. United Sates v. Manson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95799 (N.D. Ga. July 11, 2012)*:

Defendant would have no reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection unless he could show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular quarters of the house where he stayed over night and that those specific rooms were subject to the challenged search. In the absence of such a showing, the Defendant would not have standing to challenge the search and seizure. United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1984). The Defendant’s showing here relied on a slim reed of evidence – his own statement to one of the officers, as reflected in a police report, made after he was caught hiding out in the house. No affirmative evidence was presented as to how long the Defendant purportedly had stayed in the house or in what room(s) he stayed. Ms. Caja’s statements to the police lend no support for the Defendant’s assertion. Under these circumstances, the Court finds insufficient credible, specific evidence to sustain Plaintiff’s contention that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in some portion of the house where the search was conducted and where contraband was discovered.

To detain a person who appears to be a danger to himself or others because of mental difficulties, there must be probable cause. State v. Standifer, 2012 Ohio 3132, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2758 (12th Dist. July 9, 2012):

[*P17] We find that based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s language in Miller and the constitutional requirements regarding criminal arrests and exigent circumstances, police officers must possess probable cause that a person “represents a substantial risk of physical harm to [her]self as manifested by evidence of threats of, attempts at, suicide or serious self-inflicted bodily harm” to seize that person pursuant to R.C. 5122.10. Probable cause exists when the officer has sufficient information, derived from his own knowledge or a trustworthy source, which would lead a prudent person to believe the person did certain acts. State v. Cearley, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-08-213, 2004 Ohio 4837, ¶ 8. When determining whether probable cause exists, a court reviews the totality of facts and circumstances. State v. Gargaris, 12th Dist. No. CA2007-06-142, 2008 Ohio 5418, ¶ 13.

HuffP.com: Is The U.S. Government Planning To Implement Secret Scanners That Can Detect Anything? by Allie Compton:

The debate over the government’s use of technology that may infringe on privacy is about to be blown out of the water.

Gizmodo has published a report from an anonymous contributor alleging that the government plans on implementing laser-based molecular scanners as soon as 2013. These scanners have the ability to detect even trace amounts of substances.

“From specks of gunpowder to your adrenaline levels to a sugar-sized grain of cannabis to what you had for breakfast,” said the report.

The Picosecond Programmable Laser scanners — developed by Genia Photonics and In-Q-Tel — have a reach of 50 meters (164 feet). The machine fires a laser in picoseconds (trillionths of a second), detecting the tiniest traces of substances in an instant, according to the report.

Omission of information from an officer-created affidavit for a search warrant does not mean that the officer was trying to mislead for Franks purposes. It is expected that some details will be left out, and that’s normal. United States v. Marion, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94931 (E.D. N.C. June 5, 2012):

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that an affidavit drafted by non-lawyers submitted in support of a search warrant application “cannot be expected to include … every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation.” Tate, 524 F.3d at 455 (quoting Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300). Moreover, “because every piece of information cannot be expected to be included, the very process of selecting facts to include for the demonstration of probable cause must also be a deliberate process of omitting pieces of information. Certainly, such intentional omissions do not satisfy the requirement of Franks.” fd. at 455; Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300-01 (a showing of intentional omission is not enough to merit a Franks hearing; rather, a defendant must show the omission was designed to mislead or was made with reckless disregard whether it had a misleading effect); see Clenney, 631 F.3d at 664 (merely identifying factual omissions from warrant affidavit not sufficient). Likewise, the information omitted from the warrant affidavit must be material. See Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301 (“[T]o be material under Franks, an omission must do more than potentially affect the probable cause determination; it must be ‘necessary to the finding of probable cause”‘) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156). “Omitted information that is potentially relevant but not dispositive [of probable cause] is not enough to warrant a Franks hearing.” Id.

Investigator’s use of E-Phex (“undercover investigative software”) to enter defendant’s computer when it was available for peer-to-peer file sharing was not an unreasonable search. United States v. Hill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94505 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94506 (W.D. Mo. July 9, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped based on a CI’s report, but the officers also ran defendant’s name and found he had a revoked license, and that justified the stop. United States v. Irons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93935 (N.D. W.Va. July 9, 2012).*

CI’s information was corroborated by the officers as to how they were dressed and where they were located, and the officer immediately recognized one of the men as a convicted felon. The officers made a “soft approach” without lights and did not order them to stop. They got out of their car and asked to talk to them. “None of the traditional factors used to assess the presence of police coercion were present, and there was no objective indication that Shaw and Teixeira were not free to disregard Detective Almeida’s request and leave the area. Such an encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny until and “unless it loses its consensual nature.” United States v. Shaw, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144672 (D. Mass. April 7, 2010).*

TSA search of defendant’s bag at Oakland airport was not for explosives or other threat to airline security, and the motion to suppress is granted. The TSA officer’s report said that he concluded the dark mass on the screen was not an explosive before the search; he just didn’t know what it was. To be a valid administrative search, it has to be consistent with TSA’s mission; otherwise, it’s just a general search. United States v. Fulgham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93909 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012):

In McCarty, the Ninth Circuit recently explained the scope of a lawful airport administrative search. “[U]nder federal law, TSA agents could legally search [Defendant’s] entire bag for explosives or other safety hazards.” 648 F.3d at 831 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44901; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111(c)). “However, because warrantless, suspicionless administrative searches remain subject to the Fourth Amendment, a particular search is constitutionally reasonable only where it is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives and where it is confined in good faith to that purpose.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1995) (“lawful airline security searches of carry-on luggage may not be enlarged or tailored systemically to detect contraband (e.g., narcotics) unrelated to airline security”).

“In other words, an airport search remains a valid administrative search only so long as the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; ‘once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale.'” McCarty, 648 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Thus, because TSA screeners are limited to the single administrative goal of searching for possible safety threats related to explosives, the constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual screener’s actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft.” Id. at 831 (citing $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1245). However, the mere fact that an airport screening procedure reveals contraband other than weapons or explosives does not automatically “‘alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening process … or render the searches unconstitutional.'” United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).

HuffPo: ACLU Police App Lets People Police The Police (VIDEO) by David Moye:

Smartphones allow people to check email, Facebook and Twitter accounts, and now keep an eye on the police — at least in New Jersey.

The New Jersey chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU-NJ) has just released “Police Tape,” an Android phone app that allows people to securely and discreetly record and store their interactions with police, as well as provide legal information about citizens’ rights when interacting with law officers.

The story points out that there is only such a constitutional right recognized in NJ. Elsewhere too. No case has held that a person does not have a constitutional right to record the police. Assertions to the contrary are just police paranoia, like arrests for the undefinable crime of videorecording the police under any statute they can come up with, like harassment.

NYTimes.com: More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance by Eric Lichtblau

In the first public accounting of its kind, cellphone carriers reported that they responded to a startling 1.3 million demands for subscriber information last year from law enforcement agencies seeking text messages, caller locations and other information in the course of investigations.

The cellphone carriers’ reports, which come in response to a Congressional inquiry, document an explosion in cellphone surveillance in the last five years, with the companies turning over records thousands of times a day in response to police emergencies, court orders, law enforcement subpoenas and other requests.

Like a general motion to suppress, an appeal brief that only generally stated the certified search and seizure question for appeal was insufficient to bring the question up for appeal. State v. Simmons, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (June 26, 2012):

Here, we conclude that the certified question presented by Simmons fails to precisely identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). In attempting to reserve the question of “[w]hether the cocaine and oxycodone should have been suppressed by the Circuit Court for an illegal stop and search of Andre Jon Simmons,” he asks this court to conduct a complete overview of search and seizure law as applied to the facts of this case. This court has repeatedly declined to engage in or conduct such an overview. See Nicholas J. Johnson, 2001 WL 1356369, at *2; State v. Randal L. Cheek, No. M2000-00203-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1838584, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 14, 2000) (dismissing appeal because certified question, “whether there was a lawful or unlawful search of [the defendant’s] residence by police officers,” was overly broad question in violation of Preston), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sigifredo Ruiz, No. M2000-03221-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1246397, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 17, 2001).

Simmons’s certified question is overly broad for several reasons. First, the certified question does not adequately set forth the legal basis for Simmons’s claim. It is unclear whether the police action is allegedly illegal under the United States Constitution, the Tennessee Constitution, or both. Additionally, assuming he alleges a constitutional violation, he fails to mention any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement that potentially apply. See State v. Tobias Toby Horton, No. W2008-01170-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486173, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 13, 2009) (“In light of the facts of this case and the trial court’s ruling at the suppression hearing, the failure to mention the exigency exception to the warrant requirement in the certified question of law is fatal to this appeal.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). In particular, the question does not mention reasonable suspicion, probable cause, search incident to arrest, or the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. All of these concepts would presumably be central to Simmons’s claim. As framed, the question is patently non-specific because it fails to identify the scope and limits of the legal issue raised and the reasons relied upon by Simmons at the suppression hearing. Moreover, the broad terms of the certified question are not cured by Simmons’s narrower assertions in his appellate brief. See id.; Kale J. Sandusky, 2009 WL 537526, at *3. Because Simmons has failed to properly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

You can’t expect an appeals court to do your work for you if you can’t do it yourself.

[One would hope that the appellate court at least read the record enough to tell that the case would have been affirmed on the merits so as to know at least that a post-conviction petition would fail for lack of prejudice. Whether or not it did, the court’s finding is law of the case on the performance prong of ineffectiveness under Strickland.]

The justification for defendant’s stop was break-ins in the area, but there was no call of a break-in that day, no description of a suspect or a vehicle involved. The stop was without reasonable suspicion. State v. Lindsey, 2012 Ohio 3105, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2731 (2d Dist. July 6, 2012).*

Defendant’s stop was justified by excessive noise from revving his engine in a parking lot. He was found under the influence, and the stop was valid. His complaint of a frisk is moot because nothing was found to be suppressed. State v. Brown, 2012 Ohio 3099, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2726 (2d Dist. July 6, 2012).*

Heck didn’t bar a § 1983 action where the criminal defendant was fined and had no habeas review. Embassy Realty Invs. v. City of Cleveland, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93053 (N.D. Ohio July 5, 2012).*

Defendant was not stopped by the police, but he was certainly seized when he was ordered out of the car at gunpoint. Since the officers lacked a sufficient basis for the seizure, suppression should have been granted. State v. Harwood, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 812 (July 3, 2012):

As the trial court found in denying Defendant’s suppression motion, the investigating officers, after following Defendant’s vehicle, parked their vehicle directly behind Defendant’s vehicle, drew their firearms, and ordered Defendant and his passenger to exit Defendant’s vehicle. After Defendant got out of his vehicle, Agent McAbee placed Defendant on the ground and handcuffed him, thereby restraining Defendant’s freedom of movement “‘by means of physical force [and] … authority'” and creating a situation in which a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254, 127 S. Ct. at 2405, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 138 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct. at 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398). Thus, although the officers did not, in fact, initiate a traffic stop, Defendant was “seized” by the agents. As a result, “in order [for the agents] to conduct [such] a warrantless, investigatory stop [of Defendant, they] must have [had] a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 206-07, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000) (citation omitted).

Defendant was a passenger and lacked standing to challenge the search of the car he was in, but he still prevails. He can only challenge the stop. Here, the stop was not consensual, and the driver was not free to leave when a police car pulled in front of it and the officer walked back. While the fellow officer rule allows one officer to credit another’s informant, the informant’s tale still has to have indicia of reliability or trustworthiness, and here it didn’t. United States v. Oliver, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92988 (W.D. Ky. July 5, 2012):

Even though the suspicion level necessary for an investigative stop is minimal, the Government has not shown there was reasonable suspicion to believe Oliver and Woodson were engaged in criminal activity. The Government failed to offer any background on the informant. The tip lacked verifiable information for the officers. No specifics were offered on Oliver’s connection to the apartment. The Government did not elicit statements from Pearson explaining what he knew about Oliver’s criminal record before the detention. Taken in the aggregate, the Government failed to carry its burden and prove the police acted with reasonable suspicion.

. . .

Despite its best efforts, the Court cannot conceive of a scenario whereby the police would have gathered this inculpatory evidence through the inevitable-discovery doctrine or the independent-source rule. See id. As the Government bears the burden to prove the appropriateness of these doctrines, its silence forecloses their application. See United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 992 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2012). Judging from the clear implications of the evidence, the pistol and Oliver’s statement are unaffected by either of these legal rules.