Recognizing the right of access to search warrant papers by the target of a search and the press, the state sought impoundment of the records for a brief time until indictment, and this was reasonable under the circumstances. [The case also contains a summary of the law on access to materials.] New England Internet Café v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County, 462 Mass. 76, 966 N.E.2d 797 (2012):

In sum, we do not agree with the plaintiffs that the Fourth Amendment requires that the target of government searches be given access to the materials supporting them prior to indictment or that an analysis separate from our recognized “good cause” analysis is required whenever a Fourth Amendment interest is asserted. On the other hand, we do not agree with the Commonwealth that the privacy and property interests protected by the Fourth Amendment’s constraint on unreasonable searches are irrelevant to a judge’s balancing of the interests of the parties in the circumstances presented here.

With this in mind, we turn to the manner in which the judge balanced the respective interests of the parties before us. After reviewing both the warrant affidavits and the assistant attorney general’s affidavit on good cause, the judge concluded that “the contents of the affidavits are unexceptional.” As he explained, and we so conclude after our own review of the impounded materials, the affidavits portray a generic gaming experience at a public place of business; they are innocuous and do not expose any secretive investigative techniques or clandestine operations. In light of the judge’s findings, and the opportunity he properly extended to the Commonwealth to suggest the redaction of information that it believed was particularly sensitive, the Commonwealth’s interest in preserving the secrecy of its ongoing investigation as described in the affidavits, while ordinarily compelling, was considerably diminished. See In re Search Warrants Issued August 29, 1994, 889 F. Supp. 296, 302 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“redaction of the original affidavit is feasible and would meet the government’s concerns regarding any ongoing criminal investigation”). Contrary to the Commonwealth’s contention that the judge overlooked critical information pertinent to the good cause analysis, his acknowledgment of potentially sensitive information worthy of redaction reflects an appreciation of the Commonwealth’s purported needs, as well as his conclusion that the Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate good cause to shield the documents in their entirety.

On the other side of the scale, the judge properly considered the extent of the materials seized from the plaintiffs, the closure of the plaintiffs’ businesses, and the fact that, nearly two and one-half months after the searches had been executed, the plaintiffs had not yet been charged with a crime. There was no abuse of discretion. The judge’s order allowing the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to modify or terminate the impoundment order is affirmed.

Being ordered out of one’s car to sign a traffic ticket is not unreasonable. United States v. Monroe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119542 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 2012):

[T]he Supreme Court has held that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, a police officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Francis, 140 F.App’x. 184, 186 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333 (1977)). Accordingly, the fact that Defendant was required to exit the vehicle in order to sign the citation did not violate Defendant’s Constitutional rights.

Returning papers and saying “You’re free to go” and handing back papers is an intervening act showing voluntariness. United States v. Ansourian, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17879 (5th Cir. August 23, 2012).*

The warrant was issued with probable cause. Even if not, it was supported by good faith [in one sentence with utterly no discussion]. United States v. Townsend, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119581 (E.D. Mo. July 6, 2012).*

Defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the car searched. Without knowing more, the defendant had standing, and the government didn’t challenge standing. Without a government challenge, possession is enough. United States v. Angulo-Fernandez, 53 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1995). Impounding defendant’s car and inventorying it because of a Mexican driver’s license was unreasonable. United States v. Garcia-Medina, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80620 (D. Utah June 8, 2012):

But Trooper Sheets had no legitimate basis for concluding that the Mexican license was invalid and so he had no basis for impounding the car. He was not an expert on Mexican driver’s licenses. He had approximately two days of training on the validity of driver’s licenses in general, and that training focused on licenses issued by states in the United States of America with a smattering amount of information on Canadian and Mexican licenses. He also admitted that he had no way of knowing whether states within Mexico vary in their rules about glowing holograms on licenses. Apart from the black light test (and the record is not clear whether the test was conducted before or after the search), Trooper Sheets did not articulate a specific reason why he believed the license was counterfeit. After he determined that the license plate, insurance, and registration were valid, he had no legitimate basis to detain Mr. Garcia-Medina or impound the car, much less to search the car. The Government does not cite to any law in Utah that prohibits a person from driving a car in the State of Utah with only a valid Mexican driver’s license.

As officers approached defendant’s property with a search warrant, he saw them and fled out of the back of the house into the yard and through a jacket over the fence. The jacket was properly seized and could have qualified as abandoned property. Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy where he threw it. The government bears the burden of showing that the scope of search under a search warrant is reasonable. United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005). The government satisfies its burden here. There was also probable cause for the warrant. United States v. Washington, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119203 (E.D. Cal. August 22, 2012).*

CI called the officer from a cell phone thereby giving the number, so the CI was not truly anonymous. The CI’s information related to defendant’s drug possession in his home, and the defendant was on parole, and the information was reasonable suspicion for a parole search. “Although the general rule in Samson is easily discernible, its application is somewhat more difficult.” Broad searches only possible if state law permits it. This was permitted under Knights. United States v. Dillard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119124 (D. Kan. August 23, 2012).*

The 2255 hearing established that defendant knew pleading guilty was a waiver of appeal of the suppression issue, and he can’t show that he was harmed by it. Martin v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119416 (S.D. W.Va. August 23, 2012).*

Officer following a DUI suspect home watched defendant pull into his garage. As the garage door was closing, she stuck her foot in to stop the door from closing. This was an unreasonable entry of the home without a warrant or exigent circumstances. The police had probable cause, but all the state’s claimed exigent circumstances were considered and rejected. State v. Dugan, 47 Kan. App. 2d 582, 276 P.3d 819 (2012):

The United States Constitution draws a line at the threshold of a person’s home over which law enforcement officers may not step without a warrant from a judge or exigent circumstances so compelling as to override that fundamental right. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches of dwellings or seizures of their occupants reflects a tenet the founders considered essential to the ordered liberty they fought a war to achieve and then cherished as this nation matured. That prohibition is no less significant nearly two and a half centuries into this country’s maturation. The comparatively mundane facts of this case belie the magnitude of the constitutional right and the significance of the constitutional issue—when government agents may claim exigency to override Fourth Amendment protections of citizens in their own homes.

I. Factual and Procedural History

The Douglas County District Court denied a motion to suppress evidence a Lawrence police officer obtained after she stuck her foot in a garage door to keep it from closing and then entered a private home to search and seize Defendant Troy E. Dugan based on a reported misdemeanor traffic offense. The district court found the officer’s actions did not offend the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although the question might be closer than some, we do not share the district court’s tolerance for the governmental breach of a private residence and, therefore, reverse that ruling with directions the motion be granted.

. . .

The courts have generally recognized four types of exigent circumstances that may obviate the warrant requirement: (1) preventing harm to law enforcement officers or others by capturing a dangerous suspect, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); (2) securing evidence in the face of its imminent loss, see King, 131 S. Ct. at 1853-54; (3) hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976) ; and (4) thwarting escape of a suspect, see Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990) (noting those exigent circumstances); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 743 (9th Cir. 2010) (cataloging exigent circumstances). Those categories of exigency are not exclusive, and the facts of a given case might support some different imperative rendering a search or seizure constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant. Struckman, 603 F.3d 743 (“no immutable list of exigent circumstances”); United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655, 663 (6th Cir. 2005). Likewise, the factual scenario in a given case might implicate multiple exigencies, suggesting a greater likelihood of reasonableness. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 (While hot pursuit “was sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Santana’s house,” the narcotics officers also had “a realistic expectation” that Santana would try to dispose of illegal drugs on the premises.).

The courts have recognized an allied exception when a warrantless entry reasonably appears necessary to assist persons who are seriously injured or face imminent injury. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (recognizing emergency assistance doctrine as warrant exception); State v. Geraghty, 38 Kan. App. 2d 114, 123-24, 163 P.3d 350 (2007). The emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement stands on a somewhat different legal footing than the “exigent circumstances.” The exigent circumstances all entail conventional law enforcement functions related to taking individuals into custody or securing evidence. As stated, they require the officers have probable cause. The emergency assistance exception neither implicates that kind of law enforcement action nor requires probable cause. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; Geraghty, 38 Kan. App. 2d at 122. The emergency assistance exception applies when a government agent enters a dwelling or other private place for the purpose of rendering emergency aid to a person in serious peril. The agent must have a reasonable factual basis to believe an emergency threatening life or property is imminent or ongoing and to believe the place entered is associated with that threat. The agent may not use the emergency as a subterfuge to effect a search for evidence or a seizure of a criminal suspect. 38 Kan. App. 2d at 123-24. This case does not implicate the emergency assistance doctrine.

III. State’s Claimed Exigencies Insufficient

In this case, the State argues hot pursuit and preservation of evidence justified entering Dugan’s home without first getting a warrant. We consider each of those bases in turn and find insufficient grounds to support a constitutional entry, a seizure of Dugan, or a search of him or the premises without a warrant. The United States Supreme Court has noted “the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.” Welch, 466 U.S. at 750.

Officer saw a vehicle pull off a well-traveled road, stop, and the driver opened the hood. The officer stopped to see if the driver needed assistance and asked for the driver’s identifying information. This led to the officer finding that defendant’s DL was revoked. The fact that the officer asked for defendant’s identifying information did not necessitate a conclusion that he was conducting a criminal investigation. Further, the officer’s asking for defendant’s identifying information had the safety benefit of allowing the officer to know whom he was dealing with, should defendant attempt to harm one of the officers or flee. People v. Mains, 969 N.E.2d 926, 2012 IL App (2d) 110262 (2012).

Officers had a warrant for defendant’s arrest, and his mother was found to have consented to an entry into her apartment. She said he wasn’t home and she’d call him. A cell phone rang in the back of the house, and the police went to look finding defendant going out the window. In plain view were drugs and a handgun. The entry into the apartment was valid as was looking for defendant because he was expected to be armed. State v. Craft, 425 N.J. Super. 546, 42 A.3d 222 (2012).*

Plaintiff overcame qualified immunity in his claim that he was standing in a tree showing his hands when officers were trying to arrest him, having thrown down his rifle. They gave him conflicting orders, and Tasered him and he fell from the tree. Their claim that he could have jumped on them from the tree to grab the gun was dubious at best. Harper v. Perkins, 459 Fed. Appx. 822 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s racial motivation for a stop failed here because, after the stop ended and he was told he was free to leave, he continued to talk to the officer and ultimately consented. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*

Plaintiff in this FTCA case was caught stealing from the mail, and a body search was conducted with his consent to locate fluorescent powder markings from the mail he tampered with. Thus, his consent and failure to object denies him a claim for this. Pinero v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D. P.R. 2012).*

The video showed defendant crossing the centerline repeatedly. There was probable cause for his stop, despite his contention that state law was not violated. “Additionally, as noted by the officer and demonstrated by the video, the defendant’s driving pattern indicated that he might be impaired, also warranting an investigatory stop.” United States v. Benitez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62913 (N.D. Ala. April 4, 2012).*

Defendant probationer consented to a search of his cell phone and pictures of him holding guns were revealed, and that justified a probation search of where he lived. United States v. Peila, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036 (D. Nev. April 3, 2012).*

Defendant filed a general motion to suppress which was heard before trial, but only statements made at the time of arrest were discussed. A gun was also seized in Tennessee, and it was never mentioned. At trial, the gun was not objected to. On appeal, the issue of the seizure of the gun was waived. Rockholt v. State, 291 Ga. 85, 727 S.E.2d 492 (2012).*

Drug officers stopped defendants based on a request to stop him so used the fact that one of three taillights was out. But, Arizona law just says that “a stop light” needs to work, and this is a mistake of law because defendants otherwise were committing no traffic violation. The subsequent consent derived from the illegal stop, and it’s all suppressed. United States v. Manzo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63058 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2012).*

The use of “electronic devices” and “electronic memory devices” in the search warrant was not overbroad because it had to be interpreted in terms of the last limiting phrase, to locate an alleged missing person. Child pornography was found. United States v. Triplett, 684 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2012):

Triplett lists some of the wide variety of devices with electronic memories. He argues that the warrant description was overbroad. We find limiting guidance for the officers in the warrant. It stated that the objects were relevant “to locate Kaila Morris,” informing the officers that the proper electronic memory devices were those on which information on her location could be preserved. The arguably vague terms were among a list of other items to be seized described in greater detail. The warrant called for the seizure of “all articles of clothing of Kaila Morris, bed sheets, electronic devices, electronic memory devices, cell phone, DNA, hand digging and cutting tools, vehicles, and utility vehicles.” See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(d), at 628 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that a general reference “at the end of a list of specific items may be upheld on the theory that the language of a warrant is to be construed in light of an illustrative list of seizable items” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The list was of evidence likely in Triplett’s possession and relevant to his interactions with Kaila Morris, who had just been reported missing. See United States v. Hibbard, 963 F.2d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding enough particularity when warrant “limited the search to locating Shelly Ramsey or any evidence relating to her”).

The trial court held that defendant was unlawfully stopped when he refused to stop for the officer’s flashing lights. There was no stop until defendant stopped, so the case is remanded for further fact finding. State v. Holohan, 2012 WY 23, 270 P.3d 693 (2012).

The state showed probable cause for the search warrant for defendant’s car and house in a shooting case. [Not a great amount of evidence, but enough for probable cause: matching car color, matching gun.] Robinson v. State, 368 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App. – Austin 2012)*:

In particular, with regard to Robinson’s home and SUV, the affidavits state the following: (1) “a neighbor saw a black SUV drive away very fast” after the shooting; (2) Robinson’s girlfriend “owns a small, black, SUV”; (3) an officer previously noted that Robinson kept a .38 caliber revolver in his home; (4) the bullets that were recovered from the crime scene were consistent with that of a .38 or .357 caliber revolver; and (5) the affiant’s experience in criminal investigations leads him to “believe that items capable of collecting saturated blood [and other evidence], including but not limited to clothing, vehicle upholstery, carpet, [and] floor mats are located” in Robinson’s home and SUV.

The affidavit showed nexus to defendant’s house. “Such a routine of leaving from and returning to a residence demonstrated a pattern of drug dealing consistent with a drug delivery service, and it was reasonable to infer that the delivery service was based out of the residence. See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 60 (2007), and cases cited.” Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 951 N.E.2d 989 (2011).*

Same as the previous case, but two controlled buys in March where defendant left the house to go to the sale, and then another right before the warrant was issued in May. Commonwealth v. Colon, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 951 N.E.2d 1005 (2011).*

The video of defendant’s driving, narrated as made by the officer, does not conclusively show anything one way or the other, so the court credited the officer, and that is sufficient for appeal. State v. Patterson, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 657 (August 22, 2011).*

911 call about an armed suspect at a motel was justification for defendant’s patdown. State v. Williamson, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (August 19, 2011),* revd State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468 (Tenn. 2012), posted here.

A police show of force at an “armed party” where several officers converged and at least one had a gun drawn on the group was a seizure. Under Florida v. J.L. there is no firearms exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement. Here, there was none on this anonymous report. Without articulable reasonable suspicion, the court would be sanctioning general searches on the street. State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468 (Tenn. 2012), revg State v. Williamson, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (August 19, 2011):

Since the Court’s decision in J.L., its principles have been applied in a variety of cases on both the federal and state levels. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the denial of a motion to suppress under facts similar to those before this Court today. In United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011), police received an anonymous phone call alleging that eight shots had been fired in “a high-crime area.” Id. at 482-83. As in this case, there was no description of the suspect. Id. at 483. One of the officers who responded to the call saw four young black men walking a few blocks from where the shots were allegedly fired. Id. … The district court upheld the propriety of the stop and frisk …. The Fourth Circuit reversed, first emphasizing that in order to justify a frisk, “the Constitution requires ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'” Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009)). The court found “precious little” to demonstrate that the officer “had reasonable, particularized suspicion … such that a non[-]consensual frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment,” holding that the anonymous tip neither provided any predictive information about the suspect nor tested the knowledge or credibility of the informant. Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 486-87. In addition, the court found that the tip’s reliability was undermined because it did not include a “physical description of the perpetrators or any other outward identifying features,” meaning that “the only link between the tip and Massenburg’s group was [their] rough proximity to the alleged site of the gunfire.” Id. at 487. Finally, the court observed that the location of the incident in a high-crime area failed to bolster the credibility or reliability of the anonymous tip. Id. at 488. “To hold otherwise,” the court ruled,

would be to authorize general searches of persons on the street not unlike those conducted of old by the crown against the colonists. Allowing officers to stop and frisk any individuals in the neighborhood after even the most generic of anonymous tips would be tantamount to permitting a regime of general searches of virtually any individual residing in or found in high-crime neighborhoods, where complaints of random gunfire in the night are all too usual[].

Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

. . .

Based upon our review of J.L., and the numerous cases with comparable facts, we conclude that the anonymous tip to the Covington police was insufficient to support the stop and frisk of the Defendant. The unidentified 911 caller, whose complaint was relayed to the various officers by dispatch, contained only an allegation that an armed individual was outside a particular room at the Baxter Motel. The content of the tip provided even less support for a stop and frisk than that in J.L., as there was no description of the suspect, much less “predictive information,” which would allow police “to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.” 529 U.S. at 271; … Because of the lack of descriptive information, as in Massenburg, “the only link between the tip” and the Defendant was his proximity to Room 21. 654 F.3d at 486-87.9 In Gomes, the tip at issue was substantially more detailed than the one before this Court, including a description of the suspect’s appearance, the make and color of his car, in addition to the allegation that he was “holding a gun in the air” in a high-crime area, 937 N.E.2d at 14, yet the court determined that it was insufficient. In comparison, the tip in this case falls far short of providing sufficiently probative information.

Defense counsel was ineffective for misapprehending the standard for motel operator consent to search a room in not filing a motion to suppress. But, defendant was not prejudiced because he couldn’t show here that he wouldn’t have gone through with it anyway and not pled guilty. Goins v. State, 397 S.C. 568, 726 S.E.2d 1 (2012):

Although the PCR court found that the police were in Goins’ room to serve a warrant on the distribution charges, there is no evidence to support this finding in the record. Absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the law is clear that a motel owner cannot lawfully consent to a search of a guest’s room. However, in his PCR testimony as to why he advised against proceeding with the suppression hearing, counsel stated: “I told him in the suppression hearing that the law favored the landlord or basically that the proprietor of the motel being able to consent – – excuse me. Being able to unlock the door and let someone in.” This unqualified statement is clearly inaccurate considering the search and seizure jurisprudence that specifically recognizes a landlord or motel owner does not enjoy an unfettered right to grant entry into the rented guest rooms of his establishment. We therefore agree with Goins that counsel informing him he could not have prevailed in the suppression hearing was erroneous and does not reflect “reasonable professional judgment. ”

. . .

Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Goins on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Goins has failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice. We therefore affirm the circuit court order denying Goins’ PCR application.

The stop was justified and the questioning not so prolonged that the stop was unreasonably extended. The officers were not acting pursuant to SB 1070 or the part enjoined in United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011). United States v. Paramo-Villasana, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31075 (D. Ariz. March 8, 2012).*

Defendant’s broad attack on a long affidavit based on wiretaps and investigation for lack of a substantial basis for finding probable cause failed. There was such a basis and it was not stale. United States v. Bussell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153965 (E.D. Tenn. December 16, 2011).*

Plaintiffs’ complaint that the police could not come to their house after they called for the police after a prowler call and then attempted to terminate the encounter didn’t state a claim. Plaintiff was ordered to produce his gun because he was a felon. That, too, didn’t state a claim. Plaintiffs were also sanctioned attorney’s fees but didn’t properly appeal that order. Smith v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Chaves, 468 Fed. Appx. 843 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Inability to answer basic questions about travel plans and lying about criminal history was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2012):

Riley’s case is distinguishable from Jones and Beck when one considers the combination of Riley’s nervous condition, his difficulty in answering basic questions about his itinerary, and his failure to be forthright about his criminal history relating to drugs. In Jones, we noted that an inconsistent answer as to a traveler’s destination and purpose “casts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy of the activity being investigated.” 269 F.3d at 928. Likewise, in Beck we recognized that reasonable suspicion could derive from “unusual or suspicious travel plans.” 140 F.3d at 1139 … Unlike the suspects in Jones and Beck, who stated their purpose and destination without difficulty, Riley was hesitant and gave conflicting answers to basic questions about his itinerary. … Furthermore, Riley’s misrepresentation about his criminal history was different from the suspect in Jones because Riley’s history involved drugs, which reasonably added to Trooper Rutledge’s suspicions that Riley was trying to hide drug-related activity. See Jones, 269 F.3d at 928; United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (weighing in favor of reasonable suspicion the fact that defendants had prior arrests for drugs and weapons but “[n]either of the defendants answered questions about their criminal records forthrightly”).

Officers approaching defendant’s vehicle with guns out but pointing down was not an arrest or unreasonable. United States v. Silva, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118880 (D. Haw. August 21, 2012).*

Defendant’s IAC claim in his child pornography case does not identify any issue his lawyers were deficient in, and the warrants were presumptively valid and subject to the good faith exception. With this high burden, he fails. Hinkley v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118676 (D. Me. July 26, 2012).*

Defendant’s crossing the centerline was reason for a stop. State v. Osterhoudt, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1022 (August 21, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped and volunteered he had drugs in the car, and handed them to the police. He was arrested and his car was locked up. When the police came back to the car to impound it, a gun was seen sticking out from under the seat. The automobile exception permitted the search despite the delay. [Not to mention plain view.] People v Thomas, 94 A.D.3d 914, 941 N.Y.S.2d 524, 2012 NY Slip Op 2714 (2d Dept. 2012).

Defendant’s stop for driving too slow was justified where his car impeded other vehicles. Marijuana in plain view justified a search under the automobile exception. Shell v. State, 727 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. App. 2012).*

Alabama follows Diaz and others and rejects Smith in holding that a cell phone’s text messages are subject to a search incident. Gracie v. State, 2011 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 123 (December 16, 2011)* [Note: It’s always easier to let some other court do your thinking for you. Alabama has a subscription only website for state opinions that I won’t pay for since its opinions are so shallow.]

Defendant was stopped for driving too slow in the left lane and impeding traffic. The video showed trucks slowing and passing on the right. Shell v. State, 727 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. App. 2012).*

911 caller said that the police stopped the wrong man, so officers looked at the two men nearest. Finding a gun on one did not dissipate the reasonable suspicion as to the other because the officer did not have to consider the stop over. United States v. Woods, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51607 (W.D. Mo. April 6, 2012).*

Entry by warrant or consent is not required for a valid protective sweep under Buie. All that is required is the officer lawfully be on the premises. United States v. Crisolis-Gonzalez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2568 (W.D. Mo. January 10, 2012).*

Defendant’s consent argument was off the mark: “Crawford, largely ignoring the well-established vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, insists that the law enforcement officers were required to obtain his consent to search the vehicle. Crawford’s motion to suppress fails for three reasons: 1) probable cause to search the vehicle; 2) consent of the lien holder; and 3) independent knowledge.” United States v. Crawford, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2336 (N.D. Ohio January 9, 2012).*

Since the search incident in this case was four years before Gant, Gant doesn’t even apply. United States v. Schuttpelz, 467 Fed. Appx. 349, 2012 FED App. 0023N (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant was fired from his job and the manager consented to a search of the desk he used that was shared with others. There was no lock on the desk. Kelly v. State, 77 So. 3d 818 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2012).

Defendant did not show that his stop was unreasonably prolonged for consent. Sims v. State, 313 Ga. App. 544, 722 S.E.2d 145 (2012)* [Note: This opinion is badly written and comes dangerously close to putting the burden on the defendant to show a warrantless detention was unreasonable.]

The search of defendant’s car was shown to be by consent, and the court does not accept that the atmosphere was generally coercive. Berry v. State, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 13 (January 12, 2012).*

At least in the Sixth Circuit, municipal ordinances are subject to judicial notice, and the government didn’t have to prove it as cause for a stop. There was cause to believe defendant violated a municipal ordinance for his stop. United States v. Alexander, 467 Fed. Appx. 355, 2012 FED App. 0025N (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*