Just because the citizen-informant had a prior conviction did not make him part of the “criminal milieu” subject to a higher standard of evaluation. He could still be a citizen informant. Defendant’s arrest without a warrant in his doorway was not a violation of Payton. He resisted and turned back after realizing he was being arrested, but that did not make the arrest violate Payton. Stout v. State, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 657 (August 23, 2012):

We note that, although no evidence was presented about the Petitioner’s exact location in relation to the doorway, the Petitioner has the burden to present facts establishing a violation of Payton. See Keven Scott v. State of Tennessee, No. W2010-02515-CCA-R3-PC, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 22, 2011), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012) (holding that the petitioner bears the burden of proving the alleged prejudice, so it is incumbent on the petitioner to establish an adequate record at his post-conviction hearing upon which this Court could determine the likelihood of success of a motion to suppress). We believe “it unwise to become preoccupied with the exact location of the individual in relation to the doorway. … [T]he crucial issues involve the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the individual came to the doorway voluntarily.” Ducan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 110, 1102 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The Petitioner has failed to present facts establishing that he did not come to the door voluntarily and that he had an expectation of privacy where he was arrested. Rather, the police officers arrested the Petitioner in a public place, and no warrant was required. See e.g., McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding a warrantless arrest was valid when officers knocked on the door and identified themselves; the defendant opened the door; and the officers told him that he was under arrest).

The police officers in this case did not enter the residence until after the Petitioner was seized. The Petitioner slightly resisted the arrest, and the police officers entered the residence to apprehend him. However, “a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is therefore proper under Watson, by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. Therefore, the police officers’ actions in entering the residence to apprehend the Petitioner after he resisted an arrest in a public place did not violate Payton.

While defendant might have been misled concerning the fact he was waiving his suppression issue in a guilty plea, he wouldn’t have won the appeal anyway, so there was no prejudice. Martin v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119416 (S.D. W.Va. August 23, 2012).*

The officers lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in any crime when they stopped him. It was just a generalized suspicion. The gun found on him was suppressed. United States v. Dapolito, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119810 (D. Me. August 21, 2012).*

There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in jail calls, and a wiretap warrant was not required. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120074 (W.D. N.Y. May 29, 2012),* adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119853 (W.D. N.Y. August 23, 2012).*

Reasonable suspicion defendant was armed came from his stopping at a drug house, being nervous, sweating like he was on drugs, being on federal supervised release from a gun charge (which he later admitted), and being a known gang member. United States v. Amaya, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120160 (D. Utah August 23, 2012).*

Where the question of PC was a close call and could have gone either way, the affidavit was “not so lacking” in probable cause that it could not be still relied on in good faith under Leon. Therefore, the product of the search warrant would not be suppressed. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114528 (W.D. N.Y. April 19, 2012)*:

During oral argument, the Government acknowledged that had the same facts been presented to this Court it would be a reasonable judicial response to say “there’s not enough here” to connect the 2978 Upton Road residence to the murders being investigated. That I might agree with the Government is not the litmus test in my analysis. For I also conclude that in the present case there is no evidence that the issuing judge abandoned his independent role as a neutral and detached finder of probable cause or that the judge issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit. Nor do I find that the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in facts amounting to “probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. It would be easy for this Court to second guess whether these facts amounted to only “mere suspicion” that evidence of the Rochester murders would be present in Anderson’s residence in Columbus or whether these facts rose to the level of probable cause. But the bottom line is that such an inquiry is not necessary. The court’s “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of ‘all of the circumstances.'” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23) (internal quotation mark omitted). Based on the totality of the record before me, I conclude that neither the affiant or the officers executing the search would have any objective reason to question the issuing judge’s determination that probable cause existed. Accordingly, I find that the “good faith” exception applies to this case.

Probable cause for a federal child pornography warrant was established during state proceedings. The search protocol was sufficient. Failure to apprise the U.S. Magistrate Judge that a state child pornography case had venue problems was not a Franks issue for federal court. Federal court had jurisdiction over child pornography too. United States v. Storm, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119480 (D. Ore. August 23, 2012)*:

Probable cause for the federal search warrants was established by the state investigation conducted before the state search warrant was issued, by the execution of the state search warrant, and by examination of the seized digital storage media. The search protocol in the federal warrants is almost identical to that approved in Adjani. Compare 452 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In searching the data, the computer personnel will examine all of the data contained in the computer equipment and storage devices to view their precise contents and determine whether the data falls within the items to be seized as set forth herein.” (quoting the search warrant)) with Def.’s Ex. 9 at 7 (containing identical language). Finally, the federal search warrants expressly state both the criminal conduct suspected and the relevant statutes, and the federal search warrants were sufficiently particular. Accordingly, the federal search was lawful, and Defendant’s motion to suppress is denied.

Salt Lake Trib: Snoop-wary Texans rebel against new ‘smart meters’ by Sarah Kuta of AP:

Thelma Taormina keeps a pistol at her Houston-area home to protect against intruders. But one of the last times she used it, she said, was to run off a persistent utility company worker who was trying to replace her old electricity meter with a new digital unit.

“This is Texas.” she declared at a recent public hearing on the new meters. “We have rights to choose what appliances we want in our home.”

A nationwide effort to upgrade local power systems with modern equipment has run into growing resistance in Texas, where suspicion of government and fear of electronic snooping have made a humble household device the center of a politically charged showdown over personal liberty.

Some angry residents are building steel cages around their electric meters, threatening installers who show up with new ones and brandishing Texas flags at boisterous hearings about the utility conversion. At a recent hearing at the state Capitol in Austin, protesters insisted everyone present recite the Pledge of Allegiance before the meeting could begin.

h/t: PogoWasRight.org

Monitoring usage won’t even require a home visit anymore.

Four hour search incident for a sexual assault investigation was unreasonable. Consent was also rejected. Trial judge ruled against government, and this was an interlocutory appeal. United States v. Murray, 2012 CCA LEXIS 308 (N.-M. Ct. Crim. App. August 21, 2012):

Although the military judge placed undue weight on the safety concerns of the SILA [search incident to lawful apprension] exception over the evidentiary concerns, he nevertheless also discussed the risk that evidence might disappear, and that those circumstances could justify a search, citing to Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). He concluded that those considerations do not apply to this situation in which the appellee was subjected to a four-hour SANE [sexual assault nurse examination] exam conducted by a nurse hours after apprehension under a dubious consent pretext, and that such a search was well-outside the scope of Mil. R. Evid. 314(g)’s exception to the warrant requirement. The trial judge perhaps should have discussed more thoroughly the “destructible evidence” justification for the SILA exception to the warrant requirement, and articulated more careful consideration of whether the evidence seized during the SANE exam was “destructible evidence” within the meaning of Mil. R. Evid. 314(g). Nonetheless, we do not find his conclusion of law that the SANE exam was outside the scope of the SILA exception to be incorrect. Ayala, 43 M.J. at 298.

Nothing in the record indicates that, at the time the SANE examination was conducted, law enforcement personnel believed that the physical examination of the appellee was actually being conducted as a search incident to his apprehension. Special Agent (SA) Harris, the NCIS agent waiting at the hospital for the completion of the exam, believed that it was a consent search, with the consent to be obtained by the SANE nurse conducting the exam. AE I, Attachment 4 at 14-15. Likewise, the SANE nurse testified at the motions hearing that it was a consent exam, and that she was “required to have either the suspect’s consent or … [the] equivalent to a warrant from NCIS to gather the evidence.” Record at 23. If the appellee had not consented, LCDR McMullen would have “stepped out of the room, and … gone to NCIS and said, “I cannot proceed without that search order.” Id. at 30, 64-65.

Obviously, the nurse’s understanding of the basis for the search is in no way dispositive of its admissibility. For that matter, the NCIS agent’s understanding of the basis of the search is not necessarily dispositive. The fact that the SANE exam was conducted with the nurse and the agent believing they had the appellee’s consent does not necessarily preclude its admissibility as a search incident to the appellee’s apprehension. Nevertheless, what the military judge was faced with, and what we are now faced with, is a two-fold problem.

Defendant and a companion were suspected of shoplifting in a Target store, and defendant was a suspected lookout for the other. Both had come and gone from the store repeatedly. When defendant was confronted in the store, there was reasonable suspicion, but he was frisked and told he was free to leave. The loss prevention people, however, were looking for the vehicle to see if shoplifted stuff was in it. Defendant was clearly free to leave, and his companion was already let go. “We acknowledge that this left Little in an unfortunate catch-22—if he stayed, the officers would ultimately discover the car; if he attempted to leave in the car, he would lead the officers to it; and if he left on foot, the officers would eventually find the car and arrest him later. However, this situation resulted from information the officers legally obtained in the course of the lawful investigatory detention, and the officers were not required to cease all investigation simply because they determined they could no longer legally detain Little.” So, there was a second encounter when he went to the car, and that didn’t make the stop unreasonable. State v. Little, 710 Utah Adv. Rep. 58, 280 P.3d 1072 (2012).*

Catch-22 is the name of a novel. It should be capitalized, unless it is now in general use. Since copyrights are good for 70 years after the death of the author, I’d say not yet allowed for general use, but a lot of people do. Joseph Heller created it by his own genius. The value of the word and concept is undeniable, and I don’t use it without thinking of the book, which I read twice in 1968.

A general denial of a motion to suppress preserves all the issues raised. In the suppression hearing, the state only put in the officer’s report and the defendant testified. While the testimony at trial was far more complete, the state failed to prove destruction of the evidence as an exigent circumstance or consent, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. Turrubiate v. State, 365 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App. – San Antonio February 15, 2012) (dissent here), PDR granted 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tex. Crim. App. June 6, 2012). [Note: One would suspect that the state knew the trial judge would deny the motion because of the trial judge’s predictability (i.e., denies all suppression motions, no matter what the merit), so it just didn’t care about the record.]

“The motion judge did not err in essentially concluding that after being read Miranda rights, the defendant consented to the search based on a pragmatic assessment of the circumstances, and not because of coercion or duress.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 294, 962 N.E.2d 203 (2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective, inter alia, because he “did not move to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the search warrant was not issued by a federal judge, was not supported by a proper affidavit, lacked the proper seals or stamps, and was not made available to defense counsel ….” The motion to suppress was litigated on the merits before trial. United States v. Broadnax, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19901 (N.D. Tex. January 11, 2012).*

Maryland adopts the Sixth Circuit rule of United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997), on a motel manager terminating motel residency as also terminating a reasonable expectation in the motel room. Bordley v. State, 205 Md. App. 692, 46 A.3d 1204 (2012):

The Sixth Circuit rejected the defense contention that this warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that “a hotel guest’s use of a room for illegal purposes, and beyond the pre-paid rental period vitiates the guest’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 699. As long as the motel had a “valid and legitimate” reason for terminating the tenancy, “[t]he manager’s consent to the officers’ search of the room was all that was required to avoid constitutional infirmity.” Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, “[o]nce a manager, through private action, took possession of the motel room,” the defendant guest “could no longer assert a legitimate privacy interest in its contents.” Id.

Although we found no Maryland precedent considering the warrantless entry of a locked-out hotel room at the request of hotel management,4 we conclude that here, as in Allen, the legality of the hotel’s consent depends upon whether the hotel locked out the room for a “valid and legitimate reason.” See id. In answering that question, however, we recognize that the Sleep Inn’s asserted reason for locking out Room 118 was not non-payment or misconduct by the registered guest, but rather to safeguard hotel employees and guests.

Defendant’s confusing account of his travel plans was reasonable suspicion. The trial court’s findings of consent to the search was clearly supported by the record. Defendant was unhandcuffed and sitting in the police car during the search. A dog alert made that irrelevant. Thus, a challenge to the search was frivolous. Defendant did not show how his failure to testify at the suppression hearing would have changed anything in light of the video, not that IAC claims can be raised on direct appeal anyway. United States v. Penlton, 463 Fed. Appx. 593 (7th Cir. 2012) (unpublished)*; United States v. Harris, 463 Fed. Appx. 594 (7th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Plaintiff state prisoner failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim that he was unreasonably removed from his cell during a suicide threat. “Insofar as Brown contends that his seizure during this incident was unreasonable, even assuming that a prisoner has any Fourth Amendment right not to be seized and transported from one place to another within a state prison facility, there is no record evidence that this particular seizure was not justified by the same legitimate interest in safety and security.” Brown v. Graham, 470 Fed. Appx. 11 (2d Cir. 2012).*

Defendant’s wife left the house after an argument and went to her father’s to spend the night. She validly consented to a search of the house even though temporarily out. She was a co-owner, had her stuff there, and still lived there with equal control over the premises. United States v. Mooney, 470 Fed. Appx. 778 (11th Cir. 2012).

Stop was justified by following too close, and defendant was properly put into the patrol car for lying about possessing weapons. State v. Demcovitz, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 239 (April 20, 2012).*

Traffic stop led to inconsistent answers and reasonable suspicion which led to valid consent and a hidden compartment with drugs. United States v. Soto, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56304 (E.D. Ark. April 3, 2012).*

The decision of the district court is affirmed based on credibility determinations. The police were investigating a home invasion robbery in Miami-Dade, and they exhausted all investigative leads, so they tried a knock-and-talk at the suspect’s house. When his girlfriend answered the door, she was “very cooperative,” and she called for him. He appeared at the top of the stairs naked, and said he was getting dressed. He disappeared from sight, and the officers heard the metal sound of guns inside, so they barged in [my word] for safety. The entry was lawful, and the further consents were voluntary. United States v. Pupo-Reynaldo, 470 Fed. Appx. 873 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was sued for student loans and defended claiming the law violated the Fourth Amendment. “All of the arguments in defendant’s filings are fanciful and/or incomprehensible.” Summary judgment for government granted. United States v. Dennis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84292 (E.D. N.Y. June 18, 2012).*

Defendant was the subject of a wiretap, and he was confronted on the street about having a gun in his possession. He allowed a frisk and no gun was found. Officers went to his house and knocked. When the door was opened, a gun was seen through the open door. Entry without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances that the gun would disappear if it was not seized. Officers did not arrest on the spot to keep the wiretap viable. “Conversations subsequently monitored contained a statement by Shingles that ‘I’m glad they didn’t find that sawed off.'” United States v. Rodgers, 924 F.2d 219 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smalls, 617 F. Supp.2d 1240 (S.D. Fla. 2008). United States v. Shingles, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41130 (S.D. Fla. March 2, 2012).

Because no suspicion was required to search Asprilla and because probable cause existed that he was residing at his girlfriend’s Ingalls Street apartment, we need not consider whether the search was alternately justified by exigent circumstances.” United States v. Asprilla, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6232 (9th Cir. March 27, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant allegedly threatened a neighbor with a gun, and the neighbor called the police. An officer ran defendant’s name finding a PV warrant out for a prior offense of FIPF. The officer went to defendant’s house, and his wife had apparent authority to consent to a search for the gun. United States v. Schmitz, 469 Fed. Appx. 772 (11th Cir. 2012).*

A search warrant of defendant’s computer 20 months after a single instance of alleged downloading of child pornography based on a report from German authorities resulted in a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ICE elected to use a state search warrant here to avoid Comprehensive Drug Testing. United States v. Schesso, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (W.D. Wash. 2011):

Review of this search warrant is further guided by United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) and U.S. v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th 2010)(CDT III). In CDT III the Court stated that “[t]he point of the Tamura procedures is to maintain the privacy of materials that are intermingled with seizable materials, and to avoid turning a limited search for particular information into a general search of office file systems and computer databases. If the government can’t be sure whether data may be concealed, compressed, erased or booby-trapped without carefully examining the contents of every file—and we have no cavil with this general proposition—then everything the government chooses to seize will, under this theory, automatically come into plain view.” CDT III, at 1170-71. “This would make a mockery of Tamura and render the carefully crafted safeguards in the Central District warrant a nullity.”Id., at 1171. In concluding remarks the Court in CDT III stated: …

With these principles in mind, a review of the application for the search warrant demonstrates that it did not support probable cause for the issuance of a general warrant for the search and seizure of any electronic storage devices for evidence of child pornography crimes. The generalized statements regarding cybercrime and pornography collector profiles do not demonstrate that Schesso had some proclivity or likelihood of committing crimes other than the particular crime(s) described in the single incident of file sharing that occurred on October 20, 2008, particularly when the warrant was not sought for some 20 months after the date of the alleged crimes. The application for the search warrant does not support a warrant for the search and seizure of any and all electronic storage devices found at Schesso’s residence in order to comb through these devices to determine what other crimes may have been committed. The application did not justify a generalized search in this case. The affidavit simply does not support the warrant. The warrant is facially deficient. To rule to the contrary would be to say that if any person ever had a child pornography file or made such a file available to download on a peer-to-peer network, that person is subject to a general search of all of that person’s computer-related equipment without reference to the particular crime or crimes that are known to law enforcement. That is not a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, as that amendment has been interpreted and applied by the courts, and in particular interpreted and applied most recently by the Ninth Circuit in CDT III. See also Dkt. 88 pp. 54-59.

The constitution forecloses unlimited computer searches based on this type of seize-it-all-and-sort-it-out-later warrant that was obtained in this case. This was a general warrant, not justified or supported by the affidavit, and was facially deficient.

The good faith exception did not apply:

The good faith exception is inapplicable in the context of this action where the overbroad warrant is so facially deficient that reliance on it is not reasonable. See United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1985). This is particularly true where the agents knowingly opted to seek a forum that might accept a less particular and specific warrant than a federal magistrate would require (see Dkt. 74 at 5).

The warrant in this case is so broad and deviates so far from well-established Fourth Amendment standards that the searches based on that warrant cannot be defended on the basis of good faith. Exclusion of the evidence is appropriate.

Hearsay is usually admissible in suppression hearings on the question of consent or whether a search warrant was properly issued. Hearsay on a Miranda issue is not. Parker v. State, 89 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 2011).*

Defendant’s arrest for possession of an open container wasn’t legal as to the place of possession, so the search incident that produced crack was invalid. Smith v. State, 75 So. 3d 800 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).*

“We find that the tip from the confidential informant in the instant case contained predictive information from which the officers could reasonably determine that the informant had ‘inside information’ or a ‘special familiarity’ with defendant’s affairs. We conclude that this corroborated information from the CI, in conjunction with Agent Morris’s observations on the scene, were sufficient to provide the officers with the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the officers’ approach of the parked vehicle.” A hand to hand drug deal was seen, too. State v. Molette, 79 So. 3d 484 (5th Cir. 2011).*

Failure to train on the difference between a Payton entry on an arrest warrant of the arrestee’s home and a Steagald entry with a search warrant in the premises of a third person was a jury question on this record. “[A] jury could infer from the testimony of Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Department’s deputies that the State trained law enforcement officers to execute arrest warrants in a manner inconsistent with the rules of Payton and Steagald. There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to allow the question of whether the State breached its duty to train officers in a manner consistent with Fourth Amendment principles to reach the jury.” Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 38 A.3d 333 (2012).*

Officers were in a crack house responding to a wounded person call. Defendant was more concerned about an open drawer than the person wounded, and an officer went to look and found cocaine. The defendant consented to a search of the premises. Commonwealth v. Carlton, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 294 (February 16, 2012).*

“Does a lawful stop of a motor vehicle for moving violations, the observation of a noticeable odor of freshly-burnt marijuana in the passenger compartment, and the recovery of two packages of marijuana from the driver authorize a police officer to do more than was permitted in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 945 N.E.2d 899 (2011)? We believe so.” Commonwealth v. Daniel, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 962 N.E.2d 213 (2012),* Review granted by Commonwealth v. Daniel, 462 Mass. 1101, 967 N.E.2d 634, 2012 Mass. LEXIS 373 (Mass., May 3, 2012).

“There is disagreement over whether there is such an exception to the North Carolina Constitution. Thus, it is possible that evidence not excluded by the federal constitution might be excluded by the North Carolina Constitution.” Here, however, that question cannot be resolved. State v. Banner, 207 N.C. App. 729, 701 S.E.2d 355 (2010).*

Defendant was being followed by a car and he pulled into a driveway to let the car pass. The driveway, however, was that of a police officer coincidentally following him on his way home, and the driveway was the police officer’s house. The officer was acting as a private person when the stop occurred and defendant was found under the influence. State v. Young, 2010 VT 97, 189 Vt. 37, 12 A.3d 510 (2010).*

Defendant’s neighbor had a wireless video system that accidentally recorded video from the defendant’s own system and recorded defendant’s attack on another person. That was a private act and not a governmental act, and it was admissible. State v. Smith, 2010 W. Va. LEXIS 110 (October 27, 2010).*

The search warrant affidavit showed a sufficient “nexus” with defendant’s residence because (1) he was seen leaving it many times to what were either known drug sales or encounters readily inferred to be drug transactions, (2) using multiple cars made it more likely he stored drugs in the residence and not the cars, and (3) he always used the house’s rear entrance, and only its occupants (as well as the owner) had access to a locked basement and storage container at the rear of the house. Commonwealth v. Escalera, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 262 (2011).*

While the question was close, the affidavit did not show a nexus between defendant’s drug activity and his house. There was also a staleness question because the information was seven weeks old, far older than what had been approved before. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 945 N.E.2d 428 (2011).*

Defendant’s girlfriend consented to a search of their apartment. Defendant refused to sign a consent form on the ground that his girlfriend was on the lease, but that was not an express refusal of consent. People v. Burton, 409 Ill. App. 3d 321, 349 Ill. Dec. 829, 947 N.E.2d 843 (2011).*

Based on a CI’s tip, the details of which had panned out completely, as soon as defendant was stopped, the officer reached for the center console and found a gun where the CI said it would be. Also, there was cocaine there. Defendant was not secured at the time it happened, and it “cleanly” fit within the Michigan v. Long protective weapons search exception. United States v. Ware, 465 Fed. Appx. 487, 2012 FED App. 0244N (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).

It was a reasonable condition of supervised release in a child pornography case to submit to searches of any computers or devices which may access the internet. United States v. Grigsby, 469 Fed. Appx. 589 (9th Cir. 2012)*:

The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a condition of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requiring that Grigsby submit to searches and seizures of computers and related devices. “Subjecting computers and other devices able to access the Internet to monitoring, search and seizure is critical to preventing [Grigsby] from viewing or obtaining child pornography.” United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). This condition of supervised release is sufficiently narrow because it applies only to those devices connected to the Internet. See United States v. Quinzon, 643 F.3d 1266, 1272-74 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing an identically-worded condition of supervised release).

When the officer approached this stopped vehicle, he smelled marijuana. When defendant was ordered out of the car, the officer saw hollowed out blunts and loose tobacco which told him that the blunts were to be packed with marijuana. That justified a search of the trunk because that’s a place marijuana could be kept. State v. Morris, 395 S.C. 600, 720 S.E.2d 468 (2011), substituted for opinion filed August 17, 2011.

The defendant juvenile’s car was stopped because of the pointing of a rifle at a law enforcement officer. The police used a dog to sniff the trunk to see if a person was hiding there, but they stopped because the dog was distracted. Finally, they just opened the trunk as “SOP.” There were no exigent circumstances justifying a search of the trunk under New Mexico law. The search of the trunk also failed as a “protective sweep” looking for a person, but the evidence did not support that either. State v. Leticia T., 2012 NMCA 50, 278 P.3d 553 (2012),* Certiorari Granted, May 11, 2012, No. 33,566 & 33,567.

One officer was writing a traffic ticket for the defendant when another officer asked for consent to search the car. Since the request did not extend the stop any, it was valid. State v. Nims, 248 Ore. App. 708, 274 P.3d 235 (2012).*