Officers had probable cause for an automobile search, but they towed the car and searched it seven days later. The delay was not unreasonable. United States v. Silva, 2012 DNH 164, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134151 (D. N.H. September 19, 2012)*:

But the police officers did not search defendant’s car pursuant to the automobile exception. Instead, they towed the car to a secure lot and applied for a search warrant. The warrant application was presented to the court four days later, on July 23, 2010, a warrant issued, and it was executed on July 26, 2010. That seven (7) day delay in obtaining and executing a search warrant was reasonable under all the circumstances and provides defendant with no grounds upon which to seek suppression of the evidence found during the search. See United States v. McHugh, 769 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1985) (seven day delay between car’s seizure and search not unreasonable).

The PC would not get stale. Either the suspected stuff is still in the car or not. If it were left on the street unlocked for seven days, that’s different. Should the prosecution be penalized for seeking the extra protection of a search warrant for the citizen? I personally don’t think so.

The driver’s consent to search the car likely does not apply to the other occupant’s stuff, and the case is remanded for further fact finding. State v. Harding, 2011 UT 78, 697 Utah Adv. Rep. 54, 282 P.3d 31 (2011), on cert. from State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, 223 P.3d 1148 (2010):

¶1 The sole question before us is whether a police officer may search two backpacks belonging to a passenger in an automobile after receiving only the driver’s consent to search the vehicle. The district court’s factual findings are not sufficiently particularized for us to conclusively make this determination. We therefore remand with instructions for the district court to make additional factual findings.

¶16 Courts applying Rodriguez‘s apparent authority doctrine are generally in agreement that an officer’s search of a passenger’s belongings based only on a driver’s consent is unreasonable where the facts clearly indicate the driver has no authority over the items to be searched. For example, courts are unanimous in holding that it is unreasonable for an officer to search a female passenger’s purse after obtaining only the consent of a male driver because it is unreasonable to believe that the man has authority over the woman’s purse. See United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1240-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Caniglia, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 730, 510 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Akuba, 2004 SD 94, 686 N.W. 2d 406 (S.D. 2004). And a Florida court held that it was unreasonable for an officer to search a passenger’s fanny pack based only on the driver’s consent where the officer had observed the passenger sitting in the car with the fanny pack on her lap. Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 1021, 1021-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Similarly, a federal court held that it was unreasonable for an officer to search a passenger’s briefcase in the trunk of a car without obtaining the passenger’s consent after the driver informed the officer the briefcase belonged to the passenger. United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 505 (1st Cir. 1994).

. . .

¶33 In this case, similar to James, Frank, and Norris, there were four passengers and several bags in the vehicle. In such a situation, the probability that one or more of the bags belonged to one of the passengers is extremely high. Thus, as in James, Frank, and Norris, it likely would have been unreasonable for Officer Westerman to believe that all of the bags in the car belonged to the driver.

¶34 The State makes much of the fact that the backpacks did not contain labels identifying Ms. Harding as the owner. It is true that some courts have emphasized such evidence, see, e.g., Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1998), and we agree that it is a fact that should be considered. But we also believe the value of such information is limited in gauging the reasonableness of an officer’s actions because it is hardly commonplace for people to place labels on the exterior of their belongings.

While the record is not clear that the defendant’s DL remained with the officer when consent was granted, it was seemingly spontaneous and that supported voluntariness. United States v. Cusick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133687 (M.D. Fla. September 19, 2012).* Note: The court minimizes the factual issue of the DL being in the officer’s hand on the question of “free to leave.” With the PATRIOT Act and everybody seemingly requiring a driver’s license to conduct everyday business, one simply is not free to leave when his DL is in the officer’s hand. This is as much or more a seizure of the person as seizure of the suitcase of a traveler in Place interferes with travel. Indeed, if you asked officers what they would do if the motorist drove off without the license, it is a virtual certainty that they would stop the motorist for driving without a license or for just being suspicious. This is important. Watch for it.

“A novel [Fourth Amendment] issue alone cannot be the basis of finding complexity” for excess compensation for appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. United States v. Brandwein, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133926 (W.D. Mo. September 19, 2012).*

Defendant’s arrest for FTA justified a search incident of an envelope in which counterfeit currency was found. “This case is indistinguishable from Robinson. The Court can find no fault with West’s search of Scott and seizure of the suspected counterfeit currency. Because the search and seizure involved no violation of Scott’s constitutional rights, the evidence seized from him will not be suppressed. How far Scott’s possession of the counterfeit currency goes to prove he produced it with the intent to defraud is a question for trial.” United States v. Scott, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133901 (N.D. Ind. September 18, 2012).*

Stop of a car in the vicinity of gunshots heard by the officer and reported to 911 was with reasonable suspicion because it matched the description in the 911 call. United States v. Cusick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133688 (M.D. Fla. May 10, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133687 (M.D. Fla. September 19, 2012).*

Corroborated predictive facts from the CI was reasonable suspicion. United States v. La Fleur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134461 (D. Ariz. September 20, 2012).*

Forbes: Will “Drones” Outflank the Fourth Amendment? by John Villasenor:

In a word, no. The Fourth Amendment, which provides the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” has been a cornerstone of privacy from government intrusion since 1791. It has served us well across more than two centuries of technology advances, and there is no reason to expect that it will suddenly lose its protective power when domestic use of unmanned aircraft becomes common.

techdirt.com: LAPD Joins Feds In Skirting Fourth Amendment With Cell Phone Tracking Devices:

from the rules-are-for-the-people-on-the-other-side-of-the-thin-blue-line dept

About this time last year, details emerged on a new cell phone tracking device being used by the FBI to triangulate suspects’ locations via their cell phone signals. One of these, the StingRay, mimics mobile phone towers, allowing the feds to triangulate someone’s position using signal strength. It had been used successfully to bring Daniel Rigmaiden, wanted for fraud, into custody.

Rigmaiden (who is representing himself) was curious as to how he was located and a question on due process was posed by the judge: …

The USMJ’s recommendation that the court suppress search and seizure of four bags based on somebody else’s consent is sustained. The government’s argument that a seizure first was valid isn’t sustained either. United States v. Hollister, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131098 (D. Minn. September 14, 2012):

Judge Leung recommends suppressing the contents of the bags because “officers could not reasonably assume that L.M. had authority to consent to the opening of the four bags.” R&R at 35. In its objection, the government argues that L.M. had authority to consent to the seizure of the bags, relying mainly on United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2010). But whether L.M. had authority to consent to the seizure of the bags is not the issue; the issue is whether L.M. had authority to consent to a search of the bags.4 As the Eighth Circuit has recently observed, courts must be careful to distinguish between searches and seizures:

“Although our Fourth Amendment cases sometimes refer indiscriminately to searches and seizures, there are important differences between the two …. The Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen — the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy. A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter. As a matter of timing, a seizure is usually preceded by a search, but when a container is involved the converse is often true. Significantly, the two protected interests are not always present to the same extent; for example, the seizure of a locked suitcase does not necessarily compromise the secrecy of its contents, and the search of a stopped vehicle does not necessarily deprive its owner of possession.”

United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

GritsForBreakfast.com: Texas Congressman pushing restrictions on law enforcement’s use of drones without warrant, http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2012/09/texas-congressman-pushing-restrictions.html:

A Texas Congressman has introduced legislation to restrict the use of aerial drones by federal law enforcement without a warrant:

Here’s a description of the legislation from a recent report (pdf) by the Congressional Research Service:

Representative Ted Poe’s Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 (H.R. 6199) would restrict the domestic use of drones. It would only permit use of drones by law enforcement pursuant to a warrant and in the investigation of a felony. Any search would be subject to the same limitations and exceptions as apply in the jurisdiction where the search is conducted. There is an express exclusionary provision so that evidence obtained in violation of the act would be inadmissible in a federal criminal prosecution. Such evidence would also be excluded from administrative hearings. Additionally, no federal agency may permit a private entity from [sic] monitoring an individual. The bill has an exception for searches conducted within 25 miles of the national border.

The Moral Liberal: Statement on HR 5949, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act by Congressman Ron Paul

Mr. Speaker: I rise in strong opposition to the reauthorization of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, as it violates the Fourth Amendment of our Constitution. Supporters of this reauthorization claim that the United States will be more vulnerable if the government is not allowed to monitor citizens without a warrant. I would argue that we are more vulnerable if we do allow the government to monitor Americans without a warrant. Nothing makes us more vulnerable than allowing the Constitution to be violated.

Lawyers.com: Cops Can Use Your Friends on Facebook – for Now by Michele Bowman:

Law enforcement pulled another surprising move recently in the case of Melvin Colon, an alleged gangster from the Bronx, when cops convinced one of his Facebook friends to let them have access to Colon’s page. As a result, cops secured photos and posts that helped to indict him for gang-related racketeering, murder, and drug charges.

Colon fought the indictment, brandishing his Fourth Amendment right to privacy and arguing that he had a legitimate expectation that his friends would keep his posts about rival gang members and threats of violence to themselves.

Wrong, said U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III in an order dated August 10. …

NYTimes Editorial: California and the Fourth Amendment:

On Wednesday, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is scheduled to reconsider whether California violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against searches and seizures by requiring police to take DNA samples from people arrested but not yet convicted of felonies. California’s law is ostensibly aimed at accurately identifying those arrested, solving crimes and exonerating the innocent. It is also, unfortunately, unconstitutional.

The Ninth Circuit has a link on its homepage for this case.

NYLJ: Wiretaps and Fourth Amendment: Lessons From the Galleon Prosecutions by Robert C. Gottlieb and Derrelle M. Janey

Robert C. Gottlieb, a founding member of Gottlieb & Gordon, and Derrelle M. Janey, an associate with the firm, write that law enforcement seems committed to employing electronic surveillance to develop evidence within the hedge fund and hedge fund-related community; therefore, there are several key points for the criminal defense bar to consider.

Salon.com: Big Brother is in your car / If you’re on the road, the government likely knows where. Surveillance of drivers is increasing, and appears legal by Jon Campbell:

If you’re traveling on public roadways in 2012, there’s a very good chance you’re being watched, by one government agency or another. License plate readers (LPRs) are proliferating at a rapid clip, and they’re being used by law enforcement at virtually every level of government.

Once used mostly by local cops to catch car thieves and unregistered drivers, LPR systems have morphed into what privacy activists call an increasingly pervasive network of mass surveillance. Databases all over the country maintained by local police departments – and now federal agencies too — contain hundreds of millions of location scans, and provide a searchable record of the movements of all kinds of drivers, from murderers to pizza delivery guys, and from soccer moms to serial rapists.

Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his brother’s basement apartment because of their family ties. “[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, Carlos has a similar expectation of privacy in his brother Eduardo’s basement apartment because the court finds sufficient indications of Carlos’ acceptance into the household of Eduardo in addition to the fact that their familial tie as brothers ‘is clearly a relationship which pre-dates the apartment’s use for illegal conduct.’ Heath, 259 F.3d at 533.” United States v. Miranda-Cortez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131560 (D. Utah September 14, 2012).*

Standing for return of property under Rule 41(g) is low. Wiebe v. National Security Agency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131708 (D. Md. September 14, 2012):

Initially, the Government contends that Petitioners lack standing to pursue their claims because they have no possessory interest in government property. That argument is unavailing. Rule 41(g) petitioners have standing if they are able to show a “sufficient interest” in the seized items. Matthews v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (E.D. Va. 1996). This is a “comparatively low” threshold, merely requiring the movants to allege ownership and to provide some evidence of ownership. Id.; see also United States v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that although a party need not have an “ownership” interest in seized property to have standing, mere unexplained possession of property is insufficient).

Officers responded to a de facto anonymous 911 call that defendant was beating his girlfriend, the caller’s sister. The police arrived and found nothing that would support that domestic violence was going on. They frisked defendant and found no gun. They searched the house and found a gun. Objectively, searches were invalid under the “emergency-aid test.” New Jersey law should now comport with federal law on this issue. State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 47 A.3d 737 (2012):

In light of recent federal precedent, we conclude that the second factor in the emergency-aid test set forth in Frankel, which addresses the officer’s subjective motivation, is no longer consonant with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Since Frankel, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that, in the emergency-aid context, the subjective motivation of a police officer is irrelevant in determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-05, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, 658 (2006). Rather, the test is simply one of objective reasonableness — viewing the circumstances objectively, were the actions of the officer justified. Ibid.; Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. __, __ , 130 S. Ct. 546, 548, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410, 413 (2009) (“This ’emergency aid exception’ does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. It requires only ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing,’ that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.'” (citations omitted)).

The Ninth and Tenth Circuits had a three-part emergency-aid test — almost identical to the one in Frankel — and eliminated the subjective-motivation factor in the wake of Brigham City. United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).6 We now do the same to align our jurisprudence with federal law.

Issue: “Should Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution be interpreted to require individualized probable cause of a code violation in a particular building, as a prerequisite to the issuance of an administrative search warrant, even though that position was rejected by the United States Supreme Court when it interpreted the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 45 years ago?”

Syllabus: “Under Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967), reasonable inspections of rental property, conducted pursuant to warrants issued after a balancing of the need to protect public health and safety against the degree of intrusion upon privacy interests, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment, even without a showing of individualized probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling is in violation of minimum standards prescribed by a building or safety code. A challenged Minnesota municipal ordinance that (a) requires advance notice to property owners and tenants; (b) limits inspections to ordinary business hours; (c) imposes restrictions on the scope of inspections; (d) prohibits the disclosure of information to law enforcement agencies unless an exception applies; and (e) requires a showing of reasonableness to obtain a warrant from a judicial officer is not facially invalid under Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.” McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 816 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. App. 2012).

The state opposed the “sweep” of defendant’s house without citing Buie or any justification other than officer safety, but the officers could not articulate a factual basis for the need for a sweep. The entry into his house was unjustified. People v. Werner, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1195, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (6th Dist. 2012):

… The test under Buie therefore requires a reasonable suspicion both that another person is in the premises and that that person is dangerous. (3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (4th ed. 2004) § 6.4(c), p. 377.) The existence of such a reasonable suspicion is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by looking at the “totality of the circumstances” to ascertain whether the police had or whether the officer has “a particularized and objective basis” for his or her suspicion. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.)

A protective sweep is not limited to situations immediately following an arrest; it may occur in conjunction with a suspect’s detention (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 679), or a valid probation search (People v. Ledesma (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857, 864 (Ledesma)). And in some instances, an entry of a residence solely to conduct a protective sweep may be justified to ensure the safety of officers effectuating arrests just outside. (People v. Maier (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1670, 1675; see also Ledesma, at p. 864, fn.3.) “[I]n some circumstances, an arrest taking place just outside a home may pose an equally serious threat to the arresting officers as one conducted inside the house. [Citation.]” (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 679, italics omitted.) The facts known to the officers before they perform such a protective sweep must still satisfy Buie; there must be “articulable facts” considered together with the rational inferences drawn from those facts, that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to entertain a reasonable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors a person posing a danger to officer safety. [Citation.]” (Celis, at pp. 679-680, citing Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 327, 334.)

…

Here, there are even fewer facts than in Celis that justifed a protective sweep. Unlike in Celis, the deputies in this case had no information whatsoever that anyone lived in the home besides defendant and Ingram; in fact, they had been told by Ingram that no one was inside. Further, the deputies had no evidence that Ingram was dangerous or had any criminal history. …

h/t to a reader

In a murder case, officers seized defendant’s car, allegedly without probable cause, but shortly thereafter had a search warrant for the car. Whether the initial seizure was invalid really doesn’t matter. Segura applies. Browne v. People, 56 V.I. 207 (2012).*

As to Browne’s co-defendant, the government’s claim he lacked standing to contest a search of the car was not raised in the trial court, and it is waived. Melendez v. People, 2012 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 8 (February 2, 2012):

As an initial matter, we must determine whether the People can assert for the first time on appeal that Melendez does not have standing to challenge the seizure of Jeffrey’s vehicle. In United States v. Butler, 405 Fed. Appx. 652, 654 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that if the government fails to raise the issue of standing in the trial court, the issue is waived on appeal. The court reasoned:

Unlike Article III standing, which cannot be waived, Fourth Amendment standing can be waived if not raised and properly preserved. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (“[T]his Court’s long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.”); see also United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 240 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004) (“‘Standing to challenge a search or seizure is a matter of substantive Fourth Amendment law rather than of Article III jurisdiction, meaning that the government can waive the standing defense by not asserting it.'” (quoting United States v. Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1050 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002))); United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he issue of [F]ourth [A]mendment standing could be waived if the government has failed to raise it in a timely fashion during the litigation.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

Id. In addition to those cited in Butler, other federal circuits have also held that failing to raise the issue of standing in the trial court bars the government from raising it on appeal. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 827 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mendoza, 722 F.2d 96, 97 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983).7 We agree with the majority of the Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue and find that by failing to raise the issue of standing in the Superior Court, the People have waived the issue on appeal. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) (warning that the government can “lose its right” to challenge “standing” “when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below … or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation”). Accordingly, since the People failed to assert that Melendez lacked standing to challenge the seizure of Jeffrey’s vehicle in the Superior Court, we deem this argument waived and proceed to the merits of Melendez’s claim.

Defendant was suspected in the murder of his wife, and he was on the lam with their son. He was tracked to a hotel room that night, but the police waited until the next day to make an entry, which, of course, led to the argument that they had no exigent circumstances. The court finds that they had probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in the murder and the son was likely a witness. And, with probable cause, he could be arrested without a warrant under VI law and the Fourth Amendment. However, the police knew he was at the hotel but not the room, and there was nobody to ask, and that’s why they waited until morning. If they could have isolated the room, then they could have gotten an oral or telephonic warrant if necessary [n.13]. As soon as they had a room number, they went in. Nicholas v. People, 56 V.I. 718 (2012):

Here, the police clearly possessed exigent circumstances at the time they entered the hotel room. “Circumstances involving the protection of a child’s welfare, even absent suspicions of criminal activity, may present an exigency permitting warrantless entry, but only if the officer reasonably believes that ‘someone is in imminent danger.'” Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996)). At the time the police gathered the relevant information—that Nicholas was in Room 205 of the Bella Vista Hotel with his son—they had reason to believe that D.N. witnessed his mother’s murder and may, in fact, have been the only eyewitness. (S.A. 144.) They knew that a gun was used in the killing but was not left at the crime scene. (S.A. 172.) The police had statements from neighbors establishing that Nicholas entered the apartment that morning. (S.A. 238.) Shortly after he entered, the neighbors heard the sound of a gunshot and a loud thump, and Nicholas was seen leaving the apartment in a hurry with his son. (S.A. 143, 144, 200; J.A. 113-15.) Although the police had no evidence that Nicholas ever threatened his son, they knew that he had both a motive and the opportunity to silence his son, the only likely eyewitness. Therefore, the police acted reasonably and the trial court correctly found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and search. See United States v. Thompson, 357 Fed. Appx. 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding exigent circumstances where witnesses to a shoot-out saw a participant to the crime pull a child out of a bullet-ridden vehicle and enter an apartment); United States v. Parris, 229 Fed. Appx. 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007) (determining that it was reasonable for police to enter a home without a warrant where a man who had been firing a weapon outside the house had entered the home, where children were inside and appeared afraid, and where the police could not see inside well enough to determine if anyone was injured or being held against their will); State v. Aviles, 891 A.2d 935, 945 (Conn. 2006) (concluding that police acted reasonably when they entered the room of someone suspected of having committed murder within the last twelve hours and where the murder weapon had not yet been recovered, because the assailant might still have possessed the gun and might still have been willing to use it); Columbus v. Montgomery, No. 09AP-537, 2011 WL 983080, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished) (finding exigent circumstances where children may have been sexually abused and were inside an apartment, possibility with the alleged assailant, even though there was no evidence of ongoing violence).

Man with a gun report did not create a presumption that the gun was unlicensed or otherwise criminally possessed, so a stop and frisk was not justified. [Case does not cite the Second Amendment.] People v. Murrell, 56 V.I. 796 (2012):

We agree with Murrell that, if this Court were to apply the Ubiles and Lewis decisions, there is no question that the Superior Court correctly granted Murrell’s motion to suppress. As in Lewis and Ubiles, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Douglas received any information that Murrell possessed an unlicensed firearm or a firearm with an altered serial number, nor is there any evidence from which Douglas could have inferred that Murrell was engaging in criminal behavior. On the contrary, Douglas unambiguously testified at the suppression hearing that he only had reason to believe that Murrell lacked a license after Murrell told him that he did not have one, which did not occur until after Murrell had been told to place his hands on the hedge and Douglas obtained the loaded firearm out of Murrell’s pocket. (J.A. 53-54.) Therefore, were we to concur with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that local Virgin Islands law does not contain a presumption that an individual lacks a permit to carry a firearm, we would easily conclude that the Superior Court committed no error in granting the motion to suppress the firearm and the ammunition.