Volokh.com: Magistrate Judge Denies Court Order Application for Cell Tower Dumps by Orin Kerr:

The decision is In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 2012 WL 4717778 (S.D. Tex. September 26, 2012) (Owlsey, M.J),, and it rejects an application under the Stored Communications Act for records of all of the cell phone numbers in communication with four different cell towers used around the time and place of a specific crime under investigation. The decision relies primarily on Magistrate Judge Smith’s decision now on appeal before the Fifth Circuit that held that cell-site data is protected under the Fourth Amendment and compelling it therefore requires a warrant. The opinion adds: …

Citizens’ complaints of animal cruelty supported the search warrant for defendant’s property where growing marijuana was found. Also, defendant showed one officer around by consent. Minor inaccuracies in the affidavit for the warrant were not enough to satisfy Franks. Even so, without it there was still probable cause. United States v. Chilinski, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152415 (D. Mont. October 23, 2012).*

Defendant’s stop was justified because his license plate was attached upside down. State law required the license plate be “clearly legible,” and it was for the officer to call it in. Nevertheless, that qualifies. United States v. Dealba, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152708 (D. Nev. September 14, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152707 (D. Nev. October 24, 2012).*

The state trooper’s search warrant application saying that they had found marijuana grows based on smell 108 times when it was really 128 didn’t matter to the finding of probable cause. McGowen v. State, 2012 Alas. App. LEXIS 160 (October 24, 2012).*

Sail Magazine: Coast Guard Boardings and Your Fourth Amendment Rights, Part 1 by Clark Beek:

Sorry, but when it comes to Coast Guard boardings, you don’t have any rights.

I’m surprised how many boaters don’t know this. The US Coast Guard can board your boat any time they want, and look anywhere they want, without probable cause or a warrant. They can do this on the open sea, or while you’re asleep aboard in your marina at midnight. They can look through your bedsheets, in your lockers, in your bilges, in your jewelry box, or in your pockets. They can do it carrying just their sidearms, or they can do it carrying assault rifles. They can be polite about it or they can be rude, but mostly they’re polite.

If you’re an avid boater you can expect to be boarded every year or two.

I explain this to my guests aboard Condesa, some of whom are lawyers, and I’m met with disbelief: “But that’s a blatant violation of your constitutional rights! They need probable cause, or a warrant from a judge!”

“Not on a boat, my friend, not on a boat.”

Reasonable mistake of law in Ohio not a reason to suppress. State v. Reedy, 2012 Ohio 4899, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4290 (5th Dist. October 17, 2012):

[*P15] In the instant case, the facts are not in dispute. Instead, appellant challenges the trial court’s application of the legal standard to those facts. Appellant argues the issue before us is whether appellant’s failure to signal upon turning left from a private parking lot is a violation of the law. We find, though, that answering this question is not central to the analysis. Instead, the issue we must resolve is whether a police officer may stop an individual when the officer reasonably but mistakenly believes the conduct is a violation of the law; the answer to this question is “yes.” State v. Garnett, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1149, 2010 Ohio 5865, ¶ 13, appeal not allowed, 128 Ohio St. 3d 1447, 2011 Ohio 1618, 944 N.E.2d 696, reconsideration denied, 128 Ohio St. 3d 1504, 2011 Ohio 2420, 947 N.E.2d 685, citing State v. Gunzenhauser, 5th Dist. No. 09-CA-21, 2010 Ohio 761, ¶ 16.

Note: But not many other jurisdictions. This is a conflict between states and circuits.

Defendant’s suppression hearing testimony that he did not consent to his search and that he refused to consent barred his argument that his consent was involuntary. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 335 (October 23, 2012)*:

In essence, Elliott asks us to hold the trial court erred (as a matter of law) by not finding (as a matter of fact) that he involuntarily consented to the search, even though he swore under oath that he voluntarily refused to consent to the search. In other words — lest we appear to be splitting hairs — for Elliott to prevail on appeal he must first prove that he perjured himself in the trial court. Such a self-defeating argument ordinarily brings appellate review to a standstill. A criminal defendant, no less than any other litigant, “is bound by [his] testimony on appeal.” Waters v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 72, 79, 569 S.E.2d 763, 766 (2002) (citing Delawder v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 55, 57, 196 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1973)). We need not rest our holding solely on this ground, however, because the other circumstances of this case confirm the trial court’s finding that Elliott was not coerced into consenting to the search.

Note: Unacceptable. The trial court held that he consented. Therefore, the defendant should have the complete right to argue that the trial court was wrong in finding consent, at least as an alternative argument, no matter that the defendant testified to. How does the defendant attack the findings then if his testimony is just rejected? Apparently this court is staffed with former lawyers who never tried a case.

The fact that defendant was a little slow in responding to an officer’s command to put his hands on the steering wheel does not justify a protective weapons search of the car. The officer first called him “reluctant,” then qualified it. In addition, the government used every innocuous fact to attempt to show reasonable suspicion and came up short [damaging its credibility in the meantime; like a lawnmower and weedeater in the trunk must have meant the defendant was trading for drugs]. United States v. Wright, 856 F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. N.C. 2012), Adopted by, Motion denied by United States v. Wright, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29440 (E.D.N.C., Mar. 3, 2012).*

Trash pulls and a records check of the resident showing a drug history was probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for drugs in the house. State v. Mooney, 2012 Ohio 852; 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 745 (5th Dist. February 23, 2012).*

Police responded to a shooting call and asked for permission to look in defendant’s house to see if anyone was shot. Defendant let them in. The officer could see marijuana and scales in plain view in the kitchen and, through a floor heating vent, he saw marijuana in baggies. The officer removed the vent grill and pulled out what he could. Then he went to the basement to get the rest by removing the ductwork. All this was reasonable. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 845, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 737 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and he had a bandana with a marijuana leaf design hanging from the mirror. The officer asked for consent to search his person and then called for back up. He then asked for consent to search the car. The court holds there is no right under state law to have the Fourth Amendment read more broadly to require that juveniles get a warning of a right to refuse a search of a car. State v. Carlos A., 2012
NMCA 69, 284 P.3d 384 (2012).*

Police stopped behind defendant’s car which was double parked in front of a garage at 3 a.m. They had a CI’s report, and the car matched a radio call of it being involved in an incident. The occupant made a furtive movement toward the floor. On the totality, they had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Parker, 467 Fed. Appx. 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room of another that was searched. He was neither the renter nor the additional guest, but he had a key. It was not shown that the key was to that room. “In any event, as he concedes, possession of a key to a hotel room, without more, does not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Cooper, 203 F.3d at 1286 n.7 (citing United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1995)). Nor did Bushay prove that the vehicle he was operating was a vehicle that was ‘registered’ for room 308.” He was not an overnight guest, and he lacked standing to contest a search that produced a gun associated with him. United States v. Bushay, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33653 (N.D. Ga. January 24, 2012).*

Officers entered defendant’s premises under a domestic violence warrant authorized by statute to seize weapons which defendant didn’t challenge. His challenge instead was to the collateral use of the seized weapons, and the court found no bar to prosecution for any crime revealed by the seizure. State v. Harris, 211 N.J. 566, 50 A.3d 15 (2012).*

“In applying the totality of the circumstances test, courts look to numerous factors including the time, place and purpose of the encounter, United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2002); the overall context of the traffic stop, United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 514 (4th Cir. 2011); Defendant’s nervous, evasive demeanor, Branch, 537 F.3d at 338; Defendant’s delay in complying with the Officer’s command to place his hands in plain view, United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2004) and contradictory and inconsistent statements obtained from the driver of the vehicle, Powell, 666 F.3d at 188.” All those factors were present here. United States v. George, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114940 (E.D. N.C. August 13, 2012).*

“No more than reasonable suspicion is required to search a parolee’s home when the search is conducted pursuant to a valid parole condition.” State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. App. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a turn lane violation. Defendant’s detention was based on the fact that he would not make direct eye contact, his eyes were red and glassy, he was looking around the vehicle, and he acted somewhat suspicious. This led the officer to believe that he might be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Aguirre, 2012 Ohio 2014, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1765 (3d Dist. May 7, 2012).*

Defendant has the burden of showing that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. Evaluating all the information, there was a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause. State v. Fruge, 95 So. 3d 1112 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

Officers did a child pornography knock-and-talk after associating defendant’s IP address with downloading child porn. Once in the house, defendant admitted he might have child porn on the computer, but he refused to consent. While defendant was out of the room, the officer clicked on the computer to exit the word processing document on the screen. That was a search in itself. Then, there was no exigency for taking the computer without a warrant that the police did not create. State v. Sachs, 372 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. App. 2012):

We begin our analysis by stating the obvious. When Detective Anderson began clicking on icons on Appellant’s computer screen to view different programs that were not openly visible on the computer screen, he was conducting a search. See United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an officer moving a mouse, deactivating a screen saver, and opening a file on a computer was a search requiring a warrant). For these purposes, using a mouse and/or keyboard to shuffle between files that are not plainly visible on an active computer screen is just as much of a search as opening and looking through Appellant’s filing cabinets or desk drawers. In fact, “the nature of computers makes such searches so intrusive that affidavits seeking warrants for the search of computers often include a limiting search protocol, and judges issuing warrants may place conditions on the manner and extent of such searches to protect privacy and other important constitutional provisions.” Id. at 864. Because “it is important to preserve the option of imposing such conditions when they are deemed warranted by judicial officers authorizing the search of computers,” the generally accepted practice of law enforcement officers is “to stop and seek an explicit warrant when they encounter a computer that they have reasons to believe should be searched.” Id.

Detective Anderson acknowledged that he was looking through the various programs running in the background on the computer in search of evidence. This was, in any sense of the term, a search.

Accordingly, we must next determine whether the trial court could have properly found that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement was applicable in this case. The State contends that the exigent circumstances justified the detective’s actions in accessing the active programs because information in the computer’s RAM (random access memory) would disappear when the officer unplugged the computer to seize it. In other words, the State argues that the “exigent circumstance” of the officer wanting to seize the computer, unplug it, and remove it from the apartment before obtaining a warrant justified his search of the active files on the computer.

“The justification for the exigency exception is time related, i.e., there is a need that will not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant.” Cromer, 186 S.W.3d at 344 (internal quotation omitted). “Exigent circumstances exist if the time needed to obtain a warrant would endanger life, allow the suspect to escape, or risk the destruction of evidence.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “The subjective belief of the officer who conducted the [search] is not determinative. … [W]e look to the circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, and trained officer.” State v. Warren, 304 S.W.3d 796, 801-02 (Mo. App. 2010).

The record in this case simply does not establish any pressing need for the officer to unplug the computer prior to obtaining a warrant. Three officers were present in the apartment and had fully secured the scene. The State failed to prove the existence of exigent circumstances that would preclude an officer from remaining with the computer while a warrant was obtained. The State’s argument in this regard is based entirely upon a presumption of inconvenience for the officers and Appellant’s roommates. Such circumstances are simply not exigent and most certainly do not establish “a need that will not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant.” Id. Though Detective Anderson’s subjective belief is not the standard for determining exigent circumstances, if Detective Anderson truly believed that valuable evidence might be lost through the unplugging of the computer, he should have waited until a warrant was obtained and then conducted his search of the files active on the computer.

Exigency like bull in the china shop. Think about it: If the state’s argument was accepted here, there would be no need for search warrants in child pornography or some other types of cases. Just do a knock-and-talk. If the suspect doesn’t consent, search for the stuff anyway because you barged in and alerted him he was a target.

Massachusetts still applies Aguilar-Spinneli, and it was satisfied here. The issuing magistrate had probable cause to issue the search warrant for defendants’ house where they left the house to go to a drug deal. The CI also described a drug operation in the house. Commonwealth v. Mendes, 463 Mass. 353, 974 N.E.2d 606 (2012):

The affidavit in this case informed the magistrate that the police separately observed each defendant leaving the shared residence and traveling directly to a prearranged location to sell cocaine to CSB. These observations, when considered along with CSA’s detailed description of the drug distribution enterprise operating from the defendants’ residence and CSB’s corroborating information regarding defendants’ modus operandi of delivering the drugs to prearranged locations near that residence, readily establish that this is not a case where the magistrate’s probable cause determination was simply inferred from “the fact that the defendant lives there.” Contrast Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441, 902 N.E.2d 917 (2009). The two “controlled buys” and the particularized information of two credible informants provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for finding probable cause to believe that a search of the defendants’ residence would uncover evidence of illegal drug distribution. See Commonwealth v. Escalera, supra at 644. The search warrant was constitutionally valid.

In a big drug and stolen property raid in Guam, the search scene turned into a real clusterf, and it was admittedly almost completely mismanaged with the press camped out in front of the house and victims of the thefts coming by to claim their property. Ultimately, the press was invited to the back of the property onto the curtilage to look at a marijuana patch. Assuming a Wilson v. Layne violation occurred by inviting the press back there, the court decides that suppression was not the remedy. United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2012):

Assuming that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, we, like the district court, reject the Duenases’ contention that suppression is the appropriate remedy. Because Wilson was a Bivens action, the Supreme Court was not required to address the application of the exclusionary rule. 526 U.S. at 608. The Court expressly declined to decide “whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or developed by the media representatives.” Id. at 614 n.2. We, similarly, have not previously decided whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained by police who have violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the media to intrude into the location of the search.

A Fourth Amendment violation does not automatically trigger the exclusionary rule. Rather, the rule applies only where the benefit of deterrence outweighs the rule’s “‘substantial social costs.'” Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). Application of the exclusionary rule is a fact-intensive inquiry. See United States v. $186,416.00 in U.S. Currency, 590 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “To apply the exclusionary rule to [a] unique set of facts … we must consider the rule’s dual purposes: to deter similar police misconduct in the future and to preserve the integrity of the courts.” Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979)).

The Eleventh Circuit has weighed the benefits and costs of applying the exclusionary rule in an analogous context. See United States v. Hendrixson, 234 F.3d 494, 496-97 (11th Cir. 2000). In Hendrixson, police were accompanied by a television reporter while searching a defendant’s residence for methamphetamine. Id. at 496. The reporter “arrived after the search was in progress and did not move, touch or handle anything in the residence.” Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit found that the media’s presence violated the Fourth Amendment, it declined to suppress the evidence found during the search. Id. The court emphasized that the purpose of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent the police from conducting “general searches” that go beyond the scope of the warrant. Id. at 497 (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). In Hendrixson, the police did not exceed the parameters of the warrant, because the “media presence did not expand the scope of the search,” the search was “actually carried out by the police themselves,” and there was “no allegation that the reporter aided the search; he did not touch, move, or handle anything in the residence.” Id. at 497. The court suggested that the deterrence goals of the exclusionary rule in such circumstances could be better served through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens actions. Id. at 497 n.4.

We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that where the media were present, but did not discover or develop any of the evidence later used at trial, the evidence need not be excluded. Here, the media did not expand the scope of the search beyond the warrant’s dictates; nor did the media assist the police, or touch, move, handle or taint the admitted evidence in any way. Because the GPD complied with the terms of the warrant and the media did not disturb any evidence later admitted, the more appropriate remedy here, as the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Hendrixson, is a Bivens or a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Well, if Hudson doesn’t permit exclusion for a knock-and-announce violation, why should this? Yes, the Fourth Amendment was violated, but how did it aid the police in the search beyond good PR? Bad form, clearly. Fourth Amendment violated, clearly. Yet no suppression required. Thank you SCOTUS.

Officer was in a house with a suspect with a history of threatening with a gun. When the defendant admitted having a gun in the house, the situation for the officer became more “worrisome” and the officer was not obliged to let the defendant retrieve the gun. Officer’s looking for the gun in this situation was reasonable. United States v. Zetterman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122823 (D. Me. November 16, 2009).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress did not allege standing or that the consent was involuntary, and it was denied. United States v. Cerna, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122847 (N.D. Cal. December 21, 2009).*

Parole hold was subject to Miranda requirements, and defendant’s unMirandized statement he had a gun in his house was fruit of the poisonous tree as was the search for the gun. Fowler v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 23, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 35 (January 13, 2010).*

Defendant’s car search was justified by probable cause, so Gant was inapplicable as a search incident. Cain v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 30, 373 S.W.3d 392 (2010).*

Police had a tip about defendant and drugs, and they saw him parked in an abandoned gas station working on his vehicle. They approached to talk to him, and it was all consensual. State v. Banks, 2012 Ohio 2304, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2024 (8th Dist. May 24, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion defendant had cocaine on him when they approached him, and defendant’s tossing an Altoids can as police approached was not the product of an illegal stop. State v. Golden, 95 So. 3d 522 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2012).*

The owner of the vehicle defendant was a passenger in consented to the search of the vehicle. United States v. McNeil, 473 Fed. Appx. 262 (4th Cir. 2012).*

Where the video of defendant’s driving did not show anything other than normal driving, the officer’s testimony was not supported and the motion to suppress the stop should have been granted. State v. Wilkerson, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 551 (July 11, 2012).*

Defendant was detained for a murder and complained that he wasn’t under arrest, and he “actually complains that he was advised of his Miranda rights too many times.” The intervening fact that precipitated his confession was that his alibi blew up on him. The confession was of a free will. Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 2012):

In the instant case, Delhall went voluntarily to the police station without handcuffs and spoke to several officers at length. No threat or force was used. He was not handcuffed during the interview. The intervening event which could reasonably have precipitated his confession was learning that Marcia Berry, his alibi witness, did not support his claim that he was with her when McCrae was killed. Thus, under Brown, the totality of the circumstances tends to show that even if at some point in the consensual interview Delhall was “arrested,” his confession was still voluntary and sufficiently an act of free will to purge any taint of an illegal arrest.

The Sheriff’s Office executed a drug search warrant and saw code violations. They called the code enforcement officers who came and entered illegally. The code enforcement entry didn’t vitiate the search warrant entry. State v. Marr, 95 So. 3d 394 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2012):

The defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized by the Sherriff’s Officers claiming that the search conducted was invalid due to the subsequent presence of Code Enforcement Officers on the scene. The trial court granted the motion and suppressed all of the evidence. We are in agreement with the State’s position that, because the code enforcement inspection took place after the search warrant had been fully executed by the Sheriff’s Officers and because the code enforcement inspection did not directly lead to the seizure of the contraband, the evidence seized by the Sheriff’s Officers should not have been suppressed. … See State v. Vargas, 667 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1995); … cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999) (holding that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of execution of the warrant; not addressing whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered by the media).

Defendant waived his reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed container he gave to another to control and hide. J.W. v. State, 95 So. 3d 372 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2012). [Note: This is a lot like Rawlings where the defendant gave his drugs to another when the police came in.]

Defendant’s 2255 contention that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the PC in the search warrant was way off the mark. The 2255 petition omitted plenty that the search warrant was based on, and there clearly was PC. United States v. Jeffery, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105637 (E.D. La. July 30, 2012).*

On the totality of circumstances, the court finds that defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his house. He was warned of his right to refuse, and he apparently believed that what he had wouldn’t be found. United States v. Fernandez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107182 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2012).*

Narcotics officers executing two search warrants at a motel were justified in detaining those around the scene for officer safety. “The record in this case fully supports the determination that the initial detention of Thompson was a valid investigatory stop. The officers were engaged in executing narcotics search warrants, “… the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 702, 101 S.Ct. at 2594. Moreover, Agent Parker’s testimony that guns are frequently used in narcotic trafficking is a factor which increases the possibility of danger to the officers.” State v. Thompson, 93 So. 3d 553 (La. 2012), revg 58 So.3d 994 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011).

An officer at a sobriety checkpoint observed a vehicle abruptly pull into a parking lot of closed businesses. He went to investigate, and defendant’s vehicle pulled in, too. The police car blocked the exit. This was a stop without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and it was not consensual. Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 727 S.E.2d 456, 729 S.E.2d 428 (2012).*

The search warrant for defendant’s cell phone was based on probable cause, and the nine months between transactions did not make it stale here. The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Sinclair, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63864 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012).*

Volokh: Thirty-Six Circuit Splits in Fourth Amendment Law by Orin Kerr:

That’s according to Wayne Logan’s new article, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, and I know of several more just off the top of my head. Wayne argues in his article that circuit splits are harmful because the law needs to be uniform. He therefore proposes ways that the Supreme Court can be forced to hear more cases where a split exists. In particular, Wayne joins the group of scholars that have argued in favor of appellate court certification of cases to the Supreme Court.

ACLU: Next Monday at the Supreme Court: Trying to Stop the NSA’s Unconstitutional Overreach by Josh Bell:

The next time you send an email or make a phone call to a friend outside the country, consider this: the National Security Agency could be making a copy of your communication and storing it. What about the Fourth Amendment? According to the government, not only is this practice constitutional, but ordinary federal courts should not even be allowed to rule on it.

On October 29th, the ACLU will be at the Supreme Court to argue this very issue in our lawsuit challenging the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, which Congress authorized in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. This unprecedented law allows the NSA to engage in dragnet surveillance of Americans’ international emails and phone calls.