Any failure of state officials to comply with state search and seizure or arrest law is meaningless in federal court under the Fourth Amendment. Here, Tennessee law required an original and two copies. One was missing. United States v. Beals, 698 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2012):

Although no court to our knowledge has before addressed the precise question raised here, we find that the answer is squarely governed by the rule that only the Fourth Amendment (to the exclusion of state law) applies in federal prosecutions involving evidence seized by state officials. So long as the Fourth Amendment is satisfied, there is no basis for suppression. Accordingly, we turn to the Fourth Amendment, which requires “only three things” with respect to search warrants. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979). The first is that they be issued only by “neutral and detached” magistrates “capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972); see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring that … inferences [of probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). There is no dispute that Judge Cupp satisfied these criteria when he authorized the search of Ambrose’s garage.

Note: This means, of course, that state officials can avoid suppression in state court by handing the case over to the U.S. Attorney.

The state court’s upholding a lineup as not a product of a Fourth Amendment violation was found to be an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent justifying habeas relief. The case cites and credits a wealth of material about the vagaries of eyewitness identification. Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2012).*

After the traffic stop, reasonable suspicion developed to believe that the defendants were in a methamphetamine conspiracy, and that justified extending the stop. United States v. Castleman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149226 (E.D. Ark. October 17, 2012).*

Search warrant to search a car on the premises is specific enough. It doesn’t have to say where. United States v. Vanderkinter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149253 (E.D. Wis. October 17, 2012).*

The constitutionality of the government’s warrantless obtaining the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number from defendant’s cell phones was a question that did not have to be decided because it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The calls on the phone were obtained on the phone after that. The government already had the phone of the co-defendant and had the calls from that to the defendant. “We cannot imagine that the jury would have rendered a different verdict in the absence of the one, relatively minor, piece of evidence derived exclusively from the retrieval of Green’s IMSI number: namely, that the particular phone he was carrying on the day he was arrested was assigned telephone number (954) 245-2759. We therefore find beyond a reasonable doubt that any error here did not contribute to the verdict, see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, and we leave the Fourth Amendment question for another day.” United States v. Green, 698 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2012).*

Defendant had no standing to challenge the obtaining information from the cell phone at issue. It wasn’t his, and he previously sought to distance himself from the phone. On the motion to suppress, he was pressed about his possession of the phone and he wouldn’t go there. Therefore, he had no standing. United States v. Cannon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156668 (D. S.C. November 1, 2012).*

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the stairwell of his duplex because it was a common area, not curtilage. Shell casings seen there were in plain view. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2012).

Defendant had no standing to challenge the search of the place and cell phones found there because he had no legitimate connection to it. He did, however, have standing to contest the search of four bags he left there when the police were on notice that they were his bags such that the owner of the place could not consent to them. United States v. Hollister, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134091 (D. Minn. July 23, 2012).*

When officers knocked on the door, they were told “this is a house of peace” and were invited in. Once inside, she consented to a search of the premises. United States v. Sroufe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134619 (N.D. Ga. July 16, 2012).*

While the officer’s testimony seemed slightly exaggerated at times, it still showed probable cause to believe the defendants were smoking marijuana in the car stopped at an intersection. Another in the car admitted to smoking marijuana, and that undermined the defense theory that it was planted by the first officer. United States v. McCrimmon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170592 (S.D. N.Y. November 26, 2012).*

Officers had highly specific information from a CI who obviously saw what he was reporting, and that was sufficient for probable cause and nexus for a stop of the defendant’s car. State v. Vasquez, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 971 (November 28, 2012).*

Defendant’s successor habeas was denied. The first petition alleged IAC for not challenging a search of a videotape in defendant’s house consented to by his live-in girlfriend, where the tape showed defendant having sex with her minor daughter. She had the ability to consent. Thompson v. Ballard, 2012 W. Va. LEXIS 951 (November 30, 2012) (memorandum).*

Ohio Plain Dealer: Keep DNA evidence private by Jonathan Witmer-Rich and Brendan Heil:

On Nov. 1, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a startling — and unnecessary — opinion eroding DNA privacy for Ohio citizens. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual’s personal DNA profile. In the court’s words, “[a] person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile extracted from a lawfully obtained DNA sample.”

The case, State v. Emerson, originally involved DNA evidence legally obtained from Emerson through a valid warrant in a rape investigation. Emerson was acquitted of the rape charge, but his DNA profile was kept in the Ohio DNA database. His DNA profile could then be searched again and again, anytime law enforcement compared a sample from a new crime scene with the DNA profiles in the database. Emerson was later convicted of murder, mostly due to a DNA match with a sample found at the scene of that crime.

The case is here.

Franks “reckless disregard” was shown in a wiretapping case. Here, the issue was the government’s claim they could not use additional GPS devices in exhausting other investigative techniques, and then actually did after that. United States v. Hamilton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169290 (W.D. Wash. November 16, 2012). Examples of Franks reckless disregard from the Ninth Circuit used to aid the analysis:

In Stanert, the Ninth Circuit held that an affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth when he stated that a suspect had been arrested without mentioning that the suspect was not convicted, and stated that he investigated a lab blowup at the suspect’s residence a year before without mentioning the suspect had purchased and moved into the residence after the explosion. 762 F.2d at 782. Similarly, in U.S. v. Chesher, the Ninth Circuit held that the affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth by representing that a suspect was a current member of the Hell’s Angels when affiant had been conducting an investigation for some time which would have apprised him that was untrue. 678 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1982). In U.S. v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit held that an affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth when he signed an affidavit written in the first person knowing that it would mislead the magistrate judge into believing he had first-hand knowledge of the facts therein. 714 F.2d 896, 899-901 (9th Cir. 1983). By contrast, in U.S. v. Dozier, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court’s finding that an affiant acted with negligence, rather than reckless disregard for the truth, was “not clearly erroneous.” 844 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the affiant misrepresented the defendant’s prior criminal history because he did not know how to read the rap sheets. He also falsely stated that another agent had told him that he had seen two vehicles on the defendant’s property registered to drug suspects, when in fact, the affiant had conducted a registration check and knew this was not true. See id. at 705-06.

The use of a “Shadow” radio device to find wireless signals in an area associated with suspect IP address subscribers was not a Fourth Amendment search, and defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a radio signal emitting from his house. Going on to defendant’s lawn, however, invaded the curtilage. Then, an ambiguous usage spike didn’t provide probable cause to believe that child pornography was being obtained. United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168893 (D. Ore. November 28, 2012):

Defendant contends Detective Link’s actions fall squarely within the definition of a search under Jones. Detective Link trespassed on defendant’s front lawn to obtain data with the Shadow regarding the location of the suspect station device. The government does not dispute that Detective Link trespassed on defendant’s front lawn and offers no exigent circumstance for Detective Link’s actions. (Resp. [42] at 15). I agree with defendant that Detective Link engaged in a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he physically trespassed on defendant’s protected private property for the purpose of obtaining information.

Four non-exhaustive factors are examined to determine whether an area is part of a home’s curtilage: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 307 (1987); see Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d at 1184 (applying Dunn factors). “These factors do not yield a definite answer; rather they guide courts in determining whether the area is so intimately connected to the home that it should fall under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Here, all four factors are met. The front lawn is next to the home and is included in the mixed enclosure of trees, shrubbery, and fence surrounding the home. The lawn appears well-kept with trimmed grass and trees, a garden, and a dog house. In addition to the enclosures, the lawn had at least two “Private Property/No Trespassing” signs. Because all four factors are satisfied, the front lawn is curtilage. Therefore, defendant’s front lawn is afforded the same Fourth Amendment protection as the home, see Duenas, 691 F.3d at 1081, and Detective Link’s trespass constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment, see Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d at 1186.

. . .

Perhaps some of this missing information in the warrant affidavit could be attributed to the fact that this investigation was the first time the Clackamas County Sheriff’s Office used the Shadow. Nonetheless, an officer must provide the issuing judge with sufficient information to understand the technology at issue. And although the suppression hearing more fully explained the Shadow technology, this information cannot be used retrospectively to evaluate the legality of the warrant affidavit. See Stanert, 762 F.2d at 778.

Consequently, an ambiguous spike coupled with a limited description of the Shadow technology did not establish a “fair probability” that evidence of child pornography crimes would be found in defendant’s residence.

The GUID confirmation also failed to support a finding of probable cause to search defendant’s residence. While the consistent GUID confirmed Deputy Sheriff Schweitzer’s belief that one peer with one computer was accessing multiple Internet connections, none of the IP addresses associated with this GUID was subscribed to defendant’s residence. Therefore, the GUID confirmation actually suggested that defendant’s residence might not have been the location of the suspect station device. This, too, undermined a finding of probable cause.

Mich.L.Rev.: The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment by Orin S. Kerr:

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision on GPS surveillance, United States v. Jones, five justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions had always evaluated each step of an investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search.

This Article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. It explores the choices and puzzles that a mosaic theory would raise, and it analyzes the merits of the proposed new method of Fourth Amendment analysis. The Article makes three major points. First, the mosaic theory represents a dramatic departure from the basic building block of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Second, adopting the mosaic theory would require courts to answer a long list of novel and challenging questions. Third, courts should reject the theory and retain the traditional sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. The mosaic approach reflects legitimate concerns, but implementing it would be exceedingly difficult in light of rapid technological change. Courts can better respond to the concerns animating the mosaic theory within the traditional parameters of the sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.

NACDL Press Release: Former Prosecutors and Judges Join Nation’s Criminal Defense Bar to Support a Warrant Requirement for Law Enforcement Access to Email:

Washington, DC (November 27, 2012) – In a letter to Senators Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley, the Chair and Ranking Member respectively of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, 30 former prosecutors and judges weighed in on November 21 in support of Senator Leahy’s amendment to H.R. 2471. As explained in the letter, this amendment “would provide for a much needed judicial check on when the government can access our private digital information.” Currently, and shockingly to many Americans, there is no warrant requirement for the government to access electronic communications stored by a third-party provider so long as the communication is more than 180 days old. This amendment simply puts electronic communications on the same constitutional footing as private communications sent via the U.S. Postal Service, for example.

See HuffPo: The Government Can Read Your Emails, But a New Law Might Stop Them.

HuffPo: A Fourth Amendment for the 21st Century by Julian Sanchez:

The resignation of CIA Director David Petraeus has thrown a spotlight on the FBI’s sweeping power to sift through the most intimate details of our digital lives — often with little or no judicial supervision. On Thursday, the Senate Judiciary Committee will consider legislation that would modestly improve the outdated law governing police access to our emails and other electronic records — yet even this first step toward meaningful online privacy reform is encountering strong resistance.

Most Americans know that the Fourth Amendment protects us against “unreasonable searches and seizures” — requiring a judge to issue a specific warrant based on “probable cause” before government agents can search our homes, open our mail or wiretap our phones. Most probably assume that the same protection applies to their email conversations and other sensitive information stored in “the cloud,” such as documents, photos, chat logs and records of their Web browsing habits. Unfortunately, under the misnamed Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, that’s not true.

Defendant was the driver but not the registered owner of the car. He didn’t testify at the suppression hearing, so he had to rely on the codefendant’s testimony to give him standing, and that fell way short. United States v. Flores, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167589 (D. Kan. November 27, 2012)*:

In considering a vehicle where a defendant is the driver but not the registered owner, “mere possession of the car and its keys does not suffice to establish a legitimate possessory interest.” Id. (citing United States v. Martinez, 983 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir. 1992)). Flores bears the burden of establishing that a person with authority over the vehicle granted him possession. Id. (citing United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990)). There is no evidence whatsoever to establish that Flores received permission from Ochoa prior to driving the Nissan. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Nissan transferred ownership at any point between September 2011 and February 2012.

Defendant’s stop was valid but arrest for a misdemeanor that didn’t happen in the presence of the officer was invalid, but that does not require suppression of the observations he was under the influence nor prevent the prosecution. People v. Norton, 2012 V.I. LEXIS 49 (Super. Ct. October 15, 2012).

The police search of defendant’s car after his allegedly unlawful arrest was with independent probable cause from the arrest. The police already knew everything. State v. Moreno, __ Wn. App. __, 286 P.3d 725 (2012).*

Respondents showed that the money seized was taken from them so they had standing. State ex rel. Mashburn v. $18,007.00 in United States Currency, 2012 OK CIV APP 75, 2012 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 76 (October 11, 2012).*

Search warrant for hotel room included the locked safe in the closet without having to specifically mention it. United States v. Tapia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168118 (W.D. Mo. November 2, 2012).

Defendant can’t win his 2255 for failing to file a suppression motion where he can’t show that he’d have won it. Ables v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167211 (S.D. Ohio November 26, 2012).*

The frisk of defendant’s car was justified by defendant’s furtive movement that appeared to the officer to remove a gun from his waistband and put it under the car seat. Officers approached the car because of the way it was parked, and the furtive movement apparently was in response to that. The gun was seen in plain view through the window. United States v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167017 (W.D. Pa. November 26, 2012)* (All in all a confusing opinion. The court ends up calling it a “search incident” after describing facts that made the search incident doctrine inapplicable. There was plenty to support the search here without calling it that.)

NYTimes: Courts Divided Over Searches of Cellphones by Somini Sengupta:

Judges and lawmakers across the country are wrangling over whether and when law enforcement authorities can peer into suspects’ cellphones, and the cornucopia of evidence they provide.

A Rhode Island judge threw out cellphone evidence that led to a man being charged with the murder of a 6-year-old boy, saying the police needed a search warrant. A court in Washington compared text messages to voice mail messages that can be overheard by anyone in a room and are therefore not protected by state privacy laws.

In Louisiana, a federal appeals court is weighing whether location records stored in smartphones deserve privacy protection, or whether they are “business records” that belong to the phone companies.

Claimant admitted smoking marijuana two hours before his traffic stop as an explanation for the smell of marijuana in the car. He admitting having cash, but when it was found there was more than he admitted and it was packaged strangely. That was reasonable suspicion of use of the money for drug acquisition for seizure for forfeiture. United States v. Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Five ($19,855.00) Dollars in United States Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164737 (M.D. Ala. November 19, 2012)*:

Though there is nothing criminal about carrying large sums of money, even in unconventional ways, the characteristics of the res and its packaging offer the best support for the reasonable belief that a substantial connection existed between the res and illegal activity. First, Claimant carried approximately twice the amount of cash he first told officers he was carrying; his bag contained almost $20,000 rather than the $8,000 to $10,000 he first indicated. Second, the money was divided into stacks, secured with rubber bands, and stashed inside a microwave popcorn box carried in his backpack. “A common sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do not transport large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and stuffed into packages in a backpack.” United States v. $242,484, 389 F.3d 1149, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). The facts sufficiently and plausibly support a reasonable belief that the res was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for illegal drugs, or that it was otherwise traceable to the illegal drug trade.

NYT: Case Pits Technology-Based Police Search Against Citizens’ Rights by Dan Frosch:

Document: Motion to Suppress Evidence and Responses

AURORA, Colo. — On the afternoon of June 2, the authorities say, a former music teacher named Christian Paetsch walked into a Wells Fargo bank waving a gun and ordered everyone to lie down.

About 15 minutes later, a phalanx of police cars descended upon an intersection a few miles away, blockading dozens of shocked motorists — including Mr. Paetsch, whom the authorities had tracked with a GPS device buried in the $26,000 he was accused of stealing.

But with only the faintest physical description and unsure which vehicle the device was in, the police trained their weapons on all 20 cars at the intersection and ordered people to show their hands. For nearly two hours, the police ordered every driver and passenger to step out of their cars, even handcuffing some of them, before discovering the missing money and two loaded firearms in Mr. Paetsch’s S.U.V.

The case, now winding its way through the federal court system, is being watched by Fourth Amendment lawyers and law enforcement experts. While advanced technology now gives the police the power to shadow a suspect moments after a crime is committed, there are still legal questions over how wide a net the authorities can cast while in pursuit.

I predict the defendant will lose the motion to suppress. Was the police conduct unreasonable? Arguably, but what’s his standing to challenge the seizure of others? And consider this dicta by Justice Jackson dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182-83 (1949), which inevitably will come back to life:

And we must remember that the authority which we concede to conduct searches and seizures without warrant may be exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible, and resorted to in case of petty misdemeanors as well as in the case of the gravest felonies.

With this prologue I come to the case of Brinegar. His automobile was one of his “effects” and hence within the express protection of the Fourth Amendment. Undoubtedly the automobile presents peculiar problems for enforcement agencies, is frequently a facility for the perpetration of crime and an aid in the escape of criminals. But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.

Defendant was stopped for drifting from lane to lane without signaling. The officer suspected DWI, and defendant did not challenge the initial stop. He did challenge the delay in waiting for a DWI Task Force officer to arrive to do the FSTs. The court found the delay reasonable under the circumstances. Bullock v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 9625 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) November 21, 2012) (not yet on court’s website):

When a traffic stop detention is prolonged by a reasonable delay to comply with legitimate police policy, no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 539; Hartman, 144 S.W.3d at 573. 4 But the duration of the delay must be reasonable in light of the law enforcement purposes served. Texas courts of appeals that have reviewed delays for the same law enforcement purposes at issue here—increased experience and expediency in conducting DWI investigations and the need to have officers available to respond to emergency calls—have found delays of twenty minutes or more were reasonable with respect to the public policies served. See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 541-42 (holding twenty-seven minute delay while waiting for DWI officer did not violate Fourth Amendment). The delay here was approximately fifteen minutes—shorter than the delays in these cases. Like the delay in Belcher, the delay here was reasonable in light of the public policies served by the role of the DWI task force. See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 541-42.

An FBI agent stationed in Saipan installed spyware on a computer given his child by his school so he could monitor the computer. When he learned he was being stationed to the mainland and the computer was going back to the school, he had the computer wiped clean by a service tech, but the spyware survived. A while after the computer was returned to the school, he again received emails about the use of the computer visiting child pornography websites, and he turned this information over to the FBI in Saipan. The court discusses at length whether a search occurred and whether it was a government search, but it ultimately decides the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a school computer that was for the use of students. [Really interesting analysis.] United States v. Weindl, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166733 (D. N.M.I. November 20, 2012) (not yet on court’s website):

Even if Weindl had a subjective (albeit unrealistic) expectation of privacy in the PSS laptop, it was not an expectation that society is prepared to endorse. An expectation of privacy does not become objectively reasonable just because a person hides someone else’s property away in his office desk and does not let anyone else use it. A person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer he stole or obtained by fraud. See United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (stolen laptop); United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005) (fraudulently obtained laptop). In Caymen, police got a warrant to seize from the defendant a laptop suspected to have been obtained through credit card fraud. Caymen, 404 F.3d at 1197. After the seizure, they discovered that the defendant had a prior conviction for possession of child pornography. Id. at 1198. They then conducted a warrantless search of the laptop’s hard drive, ostensibly looking for evidence of credit card fraud, and instead found sexually explicit images of children. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the images, and the motion was denied on grounds that the defendant lacked Fourth Amendment standing. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It found that “one who takes property by theft or fraud cannot reasonably expect to retain possession and exclude others from it once he is caught. Whatever expectation of privacy he might assert is not a legitimate expectation that society is prepared to honor.” Id. at 1201.

Houston Chronicle: Drone makers push Congress to open skies to surveillance by Gary Martin:

WASHINGTON – Are unmanned aircraft, known to have difficulty avoiding collisions, safe to use in America’s crowded airspace? And would their widespread use for surveillance result in unconstitutional invasions of privacy?

Experts say neither question has been answered satisfactorily. Yet the federal government is rushing to open America’s skies to tens of thousands of the drones – pushed to do so by a law championed by manufacturers of the unmanned aircraft.

The 60-member House of Representatives’ “drone caucus” – officially, the House Unmanned Systems Caucus – has helped push that agenda. And over the last four years, caucus members have drawn nearly $8 million in drone-related campaign contributions, an investigation by Hearst Newspapers and the Center for Responsive Politics shows.

. . .

Privacy concerns

Some lawmakers remain skeptical. Along with civil rights advocates, they worry over government eavesdropping, surveillance photography and other potential privacy violations.

“The drones are coming,” shouted Rep. Ted Poe, R-Humble, earlier this year from the House floor, as he warned of encroachment by government into the rights of citizens.

A North Dakota court upheld the arrest of a Lakota, N.D., farmer by a police SWAT team using information from a Customs and Border Protection Predator drone over the northern U.S.-Canadian border.