The Missouri Highway Patrol followed defendant from Kansas City MO to Kansas City KS, and their actions in Kansas allegedly in violation of Kansas law are not pertinent to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. “In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, we reject Mr. Jones’s argument that the Missouri officers’ seizure of him in Kansas effected a Fourth Amendment violation simply because they were acting outside of their jurisdiction and without authority under Kansas law.” United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2012):

It is “well established in this circuit that in federal prosecutions the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment protected rights must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of state police officers.” United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); …; see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008) (holding that “warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988) (“We have never intimated, however, that whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in which the search occurs.”); … More specifically, “officers’ violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation.” United States v. Mikulski, 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003); accord Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty. Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A violation of a state statute is not a per se violation of the federal Constitution. The federal government is not the enforcer of state law.”); …. Accordingly, Mr. Jones’s argument that the Missouri officers’ actions effected a Fourth Amendment violation simply because they were acting outside of their jurisdiction and without authority under Kansas law is mistaken.

. . .

While “compliance with state law may be relevant to our Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis” in some circumstances, “we have never held it to be determinative of the constitutionality of police conduct.” Gonzales, 535 F.3d at 1182; see Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 899 (“State law is not determinative of the federal question, but rather may or may not be relevant to the determination of the federal question.”). In Gonzales, we explained that “compliance with state law is ‘highly determinative’ only when the constitutional test requires an examination of the relevant state law or interests.” 535 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 896-97). No such examination was required in Gonzales:

[W]e need not examine state law or interests. The federal test for determining the validity of a traffic stop simply requires us to determine whether a traffic violation has occurred …. It does not require an examination of a state’s law or interests, but focuses instead on whether the stop was reasonable under the circumstances.

Id. at 1183 (citation omitted). We do not perceive such an examination of state-law interests to be required here either. The Missouri officers’ encounter with Mr. Jones principally implicates federal legal standards related to the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment seizure and, at least under the circumstances of this case, we see no need to assess state-law interests.

Written 12/20, and set to post at 6:11 am EST, 11:11 UTC, the time the “world is supposed to end.”

Officers were conducting a buy/bust in Kansas City to arrest the seller, but he got into an apartment building before they could move in on him and ran to an upstairs apartment. The officers encountered the renter of the apartment who told them the only person who should be in there was her boyfriend, Anderson. She permitted them to enter, and it was valid. United States v. Anderson, 688 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 2012).*

When defendant went on state parole, he signed a consent to parole search at anytime by any officer, and it was valid. The finding of drugs was in plain view. United States v. Patterson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105914 (W.D. Tenn. March 30, 2012).*

The evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion defendant consented to a blood draw against his attorney’s advice. State v. Jacobs, 2012 WI App 104, 344 Wis. 2d 142, 822 N.W.2d 885 (App. 2012).*

Police received a telephone call from a citizen informant, with a higher indicia of reliability, that three people were sitting in a green car behind her residence smoking drugs. When officers arrived, they found the described car and could smell burning crack cocaine, although nothing was visible. The stop was reasonable, and the smell was probable cause for a search, but not arrest at that first moment. State v. Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, 263 P.3d 557 (2011).*

Defendant lacked any standing in the house searched because he was a casual visitor at best; no key, no clothes there. He never pled or attempted to show standing. Besides, the owner’s teenage children consented. Ordway v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. 2011).*

The stop of defendant’s rental car was reasonably extended because neither the driver nor passenger was listed on the rental agreement, and the car was not supposed to be outside of North Carolina. There was nothing in the passenger compartment associated with travel and it had an air freshener. Morgan v. State, 311 Ga. App. 740 (September 21, 2011).*

The search of defendant’s car after he was arrested for driving to meet a fictitious teenager for sex was justified as an inventory search. The court of appeals holding that it was justified as a search incident when he was arrested 75′ away from it is vacated. Fuson v. State, 2011 Ark. 374, 383 S.W.3d 848 (2011).* [Disclaimer: This was on a petition for review from the Court of Appeals (noted here) which held that the search of the car was valid as a search incident, ignoring the fact defendant was handcuffed face down 75′ from the car at the time of search. I wrote the petition for review for defense counsel to seek to extinguish that holding, which we were at least successful at. In any event, there was a fairly compelling harmless error argument that could have been made since the search only provided corroboration of something else. Inventory was a valid alternative ground, but search incident was laughable.]

The victim “informant” here believed that defendant had pigs stolen from him at defendant’s property. The informant and an officer got to defendant’s house and saw a sign “pigs for sale,” but defendant wasn’t there. They walked to where the pigs were to see if any of the informants were there, and saw marijuana growing there. The entry on to the curtilage was essentially by invitation of the sign. Percefull v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 378, 383 S.W.3d 905 (2011).

An anonymous CI called 911 to report a possible drunk driver. The officer saw the car and followed it and confirmed the report by the defendant’s driving. That justified the stop. State v. Bright, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (May 27, 2011).*

The detailed CI information here justified the stop of defendant as a heroin dealer. United States v. Hunt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56707 (W.D. Tenn. April 8, 2011).*

Defendant was a school resource officer, and his desk was searched in a fraud investigation seizing his computer and bank statements. The search was not sustainable as a workplace search under Ortega and United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2002), judgment vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 802, 123 S.Ct. 69 (2002). United States v. Johnson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67294 (W.D. La. May 14, 2012), R&R 871 F. Supp. 2d 539 (W.D. La. March 20, 2012):

Under Slanina, the Government is correct that the status of the “searcher” as a “law enforcement officer is not dispositive,” and that “‘work related misconduct’ can include criminal activity unrelated to the job.” [Doc. No. 31, p. 4]. However, the Government asks the Court to ignore the “critical distinction” between this case and Slanina: whether an investigation was “wholly criminal” or had the dual purpose of an internal investigation into work-related misconduct and into the possible commission of a crime. In this case, there was no dual purpose; the single purpose of this investigation was Johnson’s possible commission of a crime. On September 8, 2008, Sergeant Charles Roark of the MPD, opened a criminal investigation into the sale of stolen merchandise through an eBay account in Johnson’s name. On September 12, 2008, Sergeant Roark asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to become involved. By the time they searched Johnson’s desk at Carroll Junior High School on February 20, 2009, Sergeant Roark and Agent Chesser had been involved in a joint criminal investigation of Johnson for six months. Under these circumstances, the MPD’s interest in the prompt and efficient operation of its workplace is not compelling in the least. The search of Johnson’s desk should not be reviewed under the O’Connor exception, as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, and Magistrate Judge Hayes properly recommended the exclusion of the evidence found as a result of the search of Johnson’s desk.

Defendant consented to a search that led the officer to determine that a dog sniff was required. He explained it to the defendant, and defendant’s acquiescence expanded the consent. The officer did not have to remove a duffle bag from the car before having the drug dog smell it. United States v. Hill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79250 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2012).*

Plaintiff sufficiently pled trespass by border patrol officers coming on his property and assault and battery for nearly driving into him because he attempted to take their picture with his cell phone camera. Moher v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Mich. 2012).*

Defendant was in custody, but the state can meet his heavy burden of showing consent without having Mirandized the defendant. People v. McCray, 2012 NY Slip Op 4579, 96 A.D.3d 1480, 946 N.Y.S.2d 744 (4th Dept. 2012).*

While the issue is pending in SCOTUS, the taking of DNA in a pending alleged sex offense is a reasonable search. The court declines to stay the order pending the case in SCOTUS. United States v. Robinette, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7903 (E.D. Cal. January 18, 2013):

Obtaining and analyzing DNA is a search or seizure which implicates Fourth Amendment concerns. But such procedure is reasonable in these certain circumstances, given the minimal intrusion which it entails and the legitimate government interest in the identification of the individual and the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA. The manner in which the DNA is used is not significantly different from the use of fingerprints. The court also considers the nature of the crimes charged against Robinette for which probable cause has issued. The court finds that while obtaining and analyzing the DNA or saliva of Robinette based on probable cause for committing sex offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and seizure.

In this identity theft case, inventory of defendant’s wallet was reasonable and it would have occurred in any event on booking. United States v. Bell, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7766 (S.D. Fla. January 18, 2013):

The Court finds Detective St. Fort’s inventory search of Bell’s property was conducted in accordance with his department’s established booking procedures requiring an arrestee’s personal property to be “seized” and “documented.” The removal and documentation of the items found in the defendant’s wallet is similarly consistent with the descriptors solicited on the arresting agency’s personal property form. Additionally, the Court finds that this policy to be consistent with the recognized administrative purposes of the inventory search. Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992). The Miramar Police Department’s policy is clearly designed to identify each item taken from an arrestee.

In practice, Detective St. Fort’s scan of Bell’s property was just thorough enough to allow for a specific description of each item. This is especially important for the kinds of property contained in a person’s wallet: valuable items such as money, debit and credit cards. St. Fort’s scan also enabled him to detect several obvious irregularities on two of the debit cards in the defendant’s possession. To the extent this review of the items contained in the defendant’s wallet constituted a search, it was well within the scope of the inventory exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. …

Defendant refused to tell the officer his cell phone number, and the officer ordered him to put it on the dash. This was not by consent, and the cell phone is suppressed. United States v. Claude, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7350 (E.D. Pa. January 16, 2013)*:

In this case, defendant did not give consent to search for his cellphone. As defendant sat in his vehicle, Officer Walter stood over him and questioned him about his cellphone. Officer Walter did not advise defendant of his constitutional rights before or during this questioning. Officer Walter initially asked defendant for his cellphone number, and defendant declined to provide the number. This refusal demonstrates that defendant had no desire to voluntarily give Officer Walter information about his cellphone. In response to this refusal, Officer Walter ordered defendant to “[p]lace [his] cellphone on the dashboard,” and he complied. (Tr. at 45-46.) This mere “acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” does not constitute voluntary consent. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49.

…

Without consent, the action of Officer Walter was the equivalent of an unlawful search. The cellphone in this case was not in plain view, and defendant did not agree to produce it until ordered to do so. Thus, Officer Walter’s directive to defendant to “[p]lace [his] cellphone on the dashboard” amounted to an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant was being investigated by the ATF. He was followed to the Atlanta airport, and he checked a gun through luggage with Spirit Airlines. The airline didn’t ask if the gun was unloaded, but, even if they did, they take a passenger’s denial at face valid. Defendant filled out all the proper paperwork to fly with a gun, and noted it was checked unloaded. TSA’s Air Marshals were called to deal with the situation. They decided to search the bag at the behest of the ATF officers there. The search of the bag was not a proper administrative search, and TSA has no criminal investigative purpose. Defendant’s bag had already been cleared by TSA on an x-ray inspection. United States v. Muhammad, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5677 (N.D. Ga. January 14, 2013):

While airport and air travel safety is a major concern, the Court finds that the Government has not met its burden of showing a valid administrative search occurred. Based on the evidence presented, or lack thereof, the Court must agree with Muhammad that it appears the search of his luggage was not for an administrative purpose, but rather was for an investigatory purpose. This is not the type of case in which during the course of a search a “second, subjective motive” was developed. Instead, the desire to investigate Muhammad for alleged criminal conduct spurred and shaped the ensuing search, and the totality of the events and circumstances on December 23, 2010 undermine the Government’s argument to the contrary.

. . .

Instead, the search was spurred by Agent Southall’s involvement—again, an ATF agent who was only present at the airport to investigate a criminal suspect. 9 While Agent Southall’s own experience may have been that his own guns were physically checked when he declared them, this does not show that proper protocol was not followed with Muhammad’s bag and thus there was a need to perform the search at issue. Again, the search occurred after Muhammad’s bag had already been cleared by TSA screeners. McCarty, 648 F.3d at 835 (“[W]here an action is taken that cannot serve the administrative purpose—either because the threat necessitating the administrative search has been dismissed, or because the action is simply unrelated to the administrative goal—the action clearly exceeds the scope of the permissible search.”).

. . .

3. Investigation Shaped the Search

Third, while Air Marshal Barber testified that he conducted the search due to safety concerns, the oddities and occurrences on the date in question take this search out of the realm of a valid administrative search. For example, if the purpose of the search was really to allay safety concerns, Air Marshal Barber or other TSA agents could have stopped Muhammad at the oversized baggage checkpoint and had the weapons physically inspected then. Instead, all parties involved waited until after Muhammad left this screening area. The only reason the Court can see for why this “need” for an inspection of the declared gun was not brought to the screeners’ attention at the time Muhammad was present, was out of concern for damaging the underlying investigation.

R&R: United States v. Muhammad, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184741 (N.D. Ga. October 16, 2012).

Wired.com: School Kicks Out Sophomore in RFID Student-ID Flap by David Kravets:

A Texas high school on Friday barred a girl from attending class as part of the fallout from a legal flap that began when the sophomore refused to wear around her neck an RFID-chip student ID she claims is the “Mark of the Beast,” lawyers connected to the brouhaha said.

The Northside Independent School District in San Antonio began issuing the RFID-laden student-body cards when the semester began in the fall. The ID badge has a bar code associated with a student’s Social Security number. The chip monitors pupils’ movements on campus, from when they arrive until when they leave.

Reason.com: Albuquerque’s Solution for School Safety: Total Surveillance by J.D. Tuccille:

Rare though they are, horrific events like the Newtown shooting inevitably provoke a variety of responses. The intent is to head off a recurrence of the sort of crime that, truth be told, very likely can’t be completely prevented, if for no other reason than that so many of the perpetrators seemingly have little interest in surviving their deeds. But some of the responses, like encouraging people to take responsibility for defending themselves and those around them, offer the possibility of reducing the damage done by rampage killers. Some responses, like gun restrictions and video-game censorship, put widespread civil liberties at the mercy of opportunistic control freaks. And some responses seem designed to turn public schools into replica prisons. On that last point, I’m talking about Albuquerque’s scheme for multi-school surveillance, centrally monitored at the Albuquerque Public Schools Police headquarters dispatch center.

NYTimes: Unpopular Full-Body Scanners to Be Removed From Airports by Ron Nixon:

After years of complaints by passengers and members of Congress, the Transportation Security Administration said Friday that it would begin removing the controversial full-body scanners that produce revealing images of airline travelers beginning this summer.

Now much did former DHS Chief Chertoff’s scanner consulting company make of this deal?

The court finds discrepancies in the officer’s version of how defendant allegedly consented to a search of his apartment. The AUSA simply asking “did he consent” doesn’t show voluntariness. What else happened? Nothing is explained, and the court refuses to find it voluntary. United States v. Franco-Felix, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6489 (D. N.J. January 16, 2013)*:

Here, Officer Valentin has not testified about what was said by Mr. Franco-Felix beyond short responses to the questions of where he lived and was coming from and one-word assents to the critical question of consent to search the apartment. In particular, Officer Valentin testified that he asked Mr. Franco-Felix if they could search his apartment to see if he had any more throw pillows. He claims that Mr. Franco-Felix simply said yes to this request without asking a single question, despite the fact that he was on his way to work at the time and the apartment was several miles away, in the opposite direction of his place of employment. The Court finds this implausible and notes that Officer Valentin’s testimony is directly contradicted by that of Mr. Franco-Felix. In any event, Mr. Franco-Felix is not college-educated and does not speak English and the Court is not convinced that he understood what he was being asked. Put another way, what Mr. Franco-Felix did and how he appeared do not square with that to which he purportedly consented.

Defendant’s computer was set to share files on his wireless network. A neighbor’s wireless router failed, and her computer which regularly shared files, too, automatically picked up defendant’s system, and she saw folders indicative of child pornography. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the files that could be shared by anybody who accessed his wireless network. United States v. Ahrndt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7821 (D. Ore. January 28, 2010).

Update: Remanded for more fact finding, United States v. Ahrndt, 475 Fed. Appx. 656, 657 (9th Cir. 2012), and suppressed. United States v. Ahrndt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7223 (D. Ore. January 17, 2013) (post here).

NYTimes: Web Hunt for DNA Sequences Leaves Privacy Compromised by Gina Kolata:

The genetic data posted online seemed perfectly anonymous — strings of billions of DNA letters from more than 1,000 people. But all it took was some clever sleuthing on the Web for a genetics researcher to identify five people he randomly selected from the study group. Not only that, he found their entire families, even though the relatives had no part in the study — identifying nearly 50 people.

The researcher did not reveal the names of the people he found, but the exercise, published Thursday in the journal Science, illustrates the difficulty of protecting the privacy of volunteers involved in medical research when the genetic information they provide needs to be public so scientists can use it.

Other reports have identified people whose genetic data was online, but none had done so using such limited information: the long strings of DNA letters, an age and, because the study focused on only American subjects, a state.

Defendant posted threats to kill police to his Facebook page, and the government got a warrant for all his postings and other data about him (“likes,” “friends,” “pokes”). He claimed that the scope of the warrant exceeded the probable cause, but the court disagreed. The nature of the threat permitted breadth here. United States v. Wheeler, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6497 (D. Colo. January 16, 2013):

As the Government points out, at the time the Warrant was issued, Agent Kavanaugh was investigating an ongoing threat to the safety of Grand Junction residents. He did not know whether there was an actual plan to bomb the daycare and kill police officers or whether the comments on Defendant’s Facebook page were idle threats. The fact that Defendant was ultimately charged only with making threats does not dictate the limits of the scope of the Warrant at the time it was issued. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1962). Instead, the Court must determine whether the Affidavit established probable cause to issue the warrant, considering the totality of the circumstances at the time the Warrant was issued.

. . .

Defendant contends that the Affidavit did not establish probable cause to search for the vast majority of the information that was permitted under the Warrant. (ECF No. 75 at 4.) For example, Defendant contends that there is no probable cause to search for his “Friends” list, what pages he “liked” or became a fan of, who he may have “poked”, or what items he sold on Facebook’s Marketplace. (Id. at 4-5.) In essence, Defendant is not arguing about whether there was probable cause to issue the Warrant at all; rather, Defendant is challenging the scope of the warrant and whether the Affidavit established probable cause for such a warrant.

The Court finds that the Warrant was not overbroad and that the Affidavit established probable cause to search for all of the aspects covered by the Warrant. The comments posted on Defendant’s Facebook page repeatedly referred to Defendant’s “religious operatives and followers” and instructed them to kill cops (generally and a particular list of officers) and to “commit a massacre in the stepping stones preschool and daycare, just walk in and kill everyone”. (Aff. ¶ 7.) The comments also said that “nobody in america knows who i have been associating with outside america, we are ready, we are coming back, and we are doing this. and just like i told them, when the cuffs go on the bombs go off.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Thus, the comments on Defendant’s Facebook page plainly indicated that Wheeler was not acting alone, but it failed to provide any insight into with whom he may have been conspiring.

The Affidavit, in turn, states that the purpose of the Warrant is to seize “conspiratorial communications with others” regarding “[t]hreats and threatening communications, incitements to violence, [and] threats to use destructive devices”, as well as obtaining “[r]ecords relating to who created, used, or communicated with the user ID, including records about their identities and whereabouts.” (Id. att. B.) Given the comments on Defendant’s Facebook page about the involvement of others in his plans, Agent Kavanaugh could have reasonably believed that information obtained from Facebook, such as who Defendant’s “friends” were, what pages he “liked”, and who he “poked”, would provide insight into who these other actors were and where they may have been located. The identity and location of these other actors is evidence related to the crime for which Plaintiff was being investigated. Accordingly, Agent Kavanaugh’s Affidavit established probable cause for the search of Defendant’s Facebook account. Roach, 582 F.3d at 1200 (probable cause exists where the totality of the information establishes the fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place).

“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001). Given the totality of the circumstances facing Agent Kavanaugh at the time he applied for the Warrant, the Court finds that the scope of the Warrant was reasonable. The Court further finds that the Affidavit upon which the Warrant was issued sufficiently established probable cause to believe that the search would lead to evidence of a crime. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Fruits of an Illegal Search is denied.

Note: The word “standing” never appears in the opinion. Apparently the court assumed defendant’s standing to challenge a search of his Facebook account in Facebook’s servers. Some courts wouldn’t be so kind, I don’t think, and would apply Smith v. Maryland to it. (I’m kind of surprised a First Amendment free association claim wasn’t made because the warrant sought information about his friends.)

The Arkansas Senate proposes drug testing those seeking unemployment benefits. The bill, SB58, has 15 Senate sponsors, so there’s a good chance it will pass:

(a) “Physically and mentally able to perform suitable work” includes passing a United States Department of Transportation-qualified drug screen or a drug screen approved by the Department of Workforce Services as specified in subdivision (3)(A)(ii)(c) of this section.

(b) An applicant for unemployment benefits shall submit to a drug screen to be tested for illegal drugs through a program established by the Department of Workforce Services.

(c) A drug screen under this subdivision (3)(A)(ii) shall be administered to a random sampling of applicants before the first weekly benefits payment and before the thirteenth week of weekly benefits payments.

(d) A person who refuses to submit to a drug screen required under subdivision (3)(A)(ii)(b) of this section or who has tested positive for illegal drugs in a drug screen required under subdivision (3)(A)(ii)(b) of this section is not eligible to receive benefits.

It looks like it will be a good year at my law firm when I sue the state, if this is actually enacted. The primary sponsor is considered by his cohorts to be a constitutional oracle, at least he was at the last session, for some unfathomable reason (tells them what they want to hear), but he only recognizes two of the Bill of Rights: The Second and Tenth Amendments. The rest are white noise.

Remember: (1) every similar provision around the country has either been struck down or withdrawn when the legislature came to their senses; (2) Arkansas passed its creation science statute back in 1981, and it cost the state about half a million in attorney’s fees in 1982 dollars, and they knew it when they passed it what they were getting into. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); meaning: (3) the Arkansas legislature still, 32 years later, doesn’t care if it is violating the constitution when it passes stuff.

Perhaps Gov. Mike Beebe will veto it and give SB58 the constitutional burial it deserves, putting it out of its misery.

NYTimes: Philadelphia “Police Accused of Retaliatory Arrests” for videorecording them by AP:

The Philadelphia police have shown a pattern of wrongfully arresting people who videotaped officers in public, according to a federal lawsuit filed Wednesday. The complaint by the American Civil Liberties Union was drawn up on behalf of a Temple University photojournalism student, Chris Montgomery, 24, who was charged with disorderly conduct for using his cellphone to record the police during a large altercation.

NYTimes: Felony Charges for Officer Accused of False Arrest by Russ Buettner

A New York City police officer was charged with 10 felony counts of filing a false document in connection with what prosecutors said was an unwarranted arrest of a man in a Harlem housing project last year.

The officer, Isaias Alicea, was arraigned on Wednesday in State Supreme Court in Manhattan on the felony counts and on two misdemeanor counts of official misconduct. The felony charge carries a maximum sentence of four years in prison.