Defendant contended that he was not a suspect in a crime, but a witness, therefore a search warrant could not issue for his place. To the contrary, a person can be innocent of crime but have evidence subject to a search warrant (Zurcher). United States v. Kelly, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20949 (D. Ariz. February 14, 2013).*

While defendant did not testify, the circumstances showed his reasonable expectation of privacy in the two containers searched. Keeping the containers closed and locked manifested his expectation of privacy. United States v. Gardner, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20527 (E.D. N.C. January 30, 2013).*

The search of defendant’s car was with probable cause. Officers observed a hand-to-hand transaction with defendant standing next to the car, and he drove off and stopped at a business. They followed and talked to defendant, and the odor of marijuana was coming from the car. United States v. Farmer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20933 (E.D. Mo. January 2, 2013).*

While this is a close case, the anonymous CI provided his basis of knowledge to the officer, and that supported credibility for the stop based on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Aviles-Vega, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20220 (D. P.R. January 8, 2013).*

The “post-and-forfeit” provision of the DC Code that permits a defendant to post bond and forfeit it rather than contest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Fox v. District of Columbia, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20524 (D. D.C. February 15, 2013):

Count 4A of Fox’s second amended complaint alleges that the post-and-forfeit procedure violates the Fourth Amendment on its face: “The policy of charging arrestees money under the ‘post and forfeit’ procedure constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and so D.C. Code § 5-335.01 is unconstitutional.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 246. The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

To establish an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Fox must demonstrate that payment of collateral under the District’s post-and-forfeit procedure (1) constitutes a seizure, and (2) that the seizure is unreasonable. Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61–71 (1992). Fox has failed to meet both requirements. A payment under the post-and-forfeit procedure does not constitute a seizure nor is it unreasonable. “A ‘seizure’ of property … occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Id. at 61, quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Further, a “seizure” is not unreasonable if it occurs with the non-coercive, voluntary consent of the owner. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973) (“[I]f under all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily – that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority – then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable.”). Here, the Court has already determined that the post-and-forfeit payment is voluntary:

The fundamental flaw at the heart of plaintiff’s case is that while his papers are generously seasoned with strong language connoting wrongdoing – “force,” “coerce,” “exact,” “deprive,” and “take,” and the allegations all turn upon the city’s alleged policy of “making” arrestees pay money, there simply was no coercion, taking, or deprivation inherent in the voluntary exchange that was offered and accepted in this case.

Mem. Op. at 2–3. The Court added that “the payment was a bargained for exchange whereby both parties obtain a benefit: the arrestee gains both his release and complete finality.” Mem. Op. at 18. Moreover, the reasonableness of the procedure is bolstered by the fact that the statute also provides the arrestee with ninety days to reconsider the decision to pay the collateral and ask for his money back. See D.C. Code § 5-335.01(d)(6). So the District does not meaningfully or unreasonably interfere with arrestees’ possessory interests in property when it accepts their voluntarily tendered collateral.

Fox’s Fourth Amendment facial challenge is further undermined by the Court’s prior determination that “the city has asserted legitimate interests” in the post-and-forfeit procedure, Mem. Op. at 18. …

examiner.com: Washington gun control proposal said to violate Fourth Amendment to Constitution, referring to an assault weapon limit in SB 5737. Section 2(5)(a) provides:

(5) In order to continue to possess an assault weapon that was legally possessed on the effective date of this section, the person possessing the assault weapon shall do all of the following:
(a) Safely and securely store the assault weapon. The sheriff of the county may, no more than once per year, conduct an inspection to ensure compliance with this subsection; …

I suspect the “no more than once a year” is taken from the federal firearm’s licensee law that permits ATF to inspect sales records no more than once a year. An FFL is a highly regulated business by definition, with a history of regulation as stated in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).

Can it be said that possession of an assault weapon is per se to become a highly regulated activity? I don’t think so. Therefore, § 2(5)(a) violates the Fourth Amendment by requiring the homeowner to submit to an inspection of the home from the Sheriff as to whether the gun is safely stored. I don’t even think the Sheriffs would want to be involved. (But query: Is is possible for something new to become highly regulated in short order? We may get to see with this if it passes.)

When some headline screams “Fourth Amendment violated by …,” I have to look. Usually they are wrong or exaggerating. This one isn’t.

Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to ship high tech medical imaging equipment to Iran in violation of the embargo. His overbroad computer search argument under United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing is rejected, and Kozinski’s concurrence isn’t binding. Safe harbor, yes, but not binding. United States v. Nazemzadeh, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18983 (S.D. Cal. February 11, 2013):

In addition to being sufficiently clear, a warrant must also be “legal, that is not overbroad.” SDI Future Health, 568 F.3d at 702. “[T]his means that ‘there [must] be probable cause to seize the particular thing[s] named in the warrant.'” Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d at 857). Therefore, “breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.” Id. Probable cause means a fair probability, not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.).

A. The Warrant Appropriately Granted Permission to Seize Data and Limited Officers’ Discretion as they Conducted the Offsite Search

Nazemzadeh argues the warrant was overbroad because it failed to set forth specific guidelines regarding the search protocol and allowed officers to seize “vast amounts” of data and keep it indefinitely. He claims that the warrant should have included a specific search methodology or listed a specific word search. Nazemzadeh’s arguments are framed as breadth arguments. However, cases analyzing whether search protocols are required frame the question as one of particularity. See, e.g., United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1147-50 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing particularity in response to overbreadth argument).

The parties agree, and are correct, that United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) as applied by United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, is the governing standard, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (“CDT”) (“we have updated Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of electronic searches.”). Tamura, provides when probable cause exists, “all items in a set of files may be inspected during a search, provided that sufficiently specific guidelines for identifying the documents sought are provided in the search warrant and are followed by the officers conducting the search. Tamura, at 595. It further provides, “[i]f the need for transporting the documents is known to the officers prior to the search, they may apply for specific authorization for large-scale removal of material, which should be granted by the magistrate issuing the warrant only where on-site sorting is infeasible and no other practical alternative exists.” Id. Even where documents not covered by the warrant are seized and retained by the government, suppression is not necessarily required. See Tamura, at 597.

Although evidence was suppressed in CDT, that case’s application of Tamura does not mandate suppression here. CDT cautioned that “because over-seizing is an inherent part” of the process of searching electronic records, greater vigilance is called for on the part of judicial officers to strike the correct balance between the government’s interest in law enforcement and the right to be free from unlawful searches. CDT at 1177. While compliance with Justice Kozinski’s concurrence in CDT would provide a “safe harbor” for agents, it is not required, as Defendant asserts. CDT, at 1183 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“The concurrence is not joined by a majority of the en banc panel and accordingly the suggested guidelines are not Ninth Circuit law.”).

Defendants argued a failure of knock-and-announce. The court finds the officers knocked for two minutes and got no answer, even though they could see food on the stove through the window, suggesting somebody was home and not responding. The entry was not unreasonable. United States v. Acton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18591 (N.D. Ala. January 23, 2013),* [clearly reasonable; not even close; SCOTUS has approved of 15 seconds], R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18591 (N.D. Ala. January 23, 2013).*

Undercover officers invited in the house corroborated the CI’s information. United States v. Slaton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18662 (E.D. Ky. February 12, 2013).*

Defendant claimed that there was no probable cause for the search under the warrant, but the court concludes that there is and the affidavit is far more than “bare bones” in its detail. United States v. Greninger, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17911 (E.D. Tex. January 17, 2013).*

During a traffic stop, the officer smelled marijuana and called for backup. When backup arrived, they searched the car. It didn’t matter whether the search occurred before or after the arrest. State v. Sarria, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15323 (Fla. App. 4th DCA September 12, 2012) (on rehearing).

There were questions of fact for trial on due process and Fourth Amendment claims for delaying departure of an ambulance after an accidental shooting that led to a death for delaying medical treatment and unreasonable detention and force at the scene with the witnesses to the occurrence, including pepper spraying and assault with a baton. (Interesting case on qualified immunity.) Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2012),* withdrawn and substituted opinion here posted February 15, 2013.

Law.com/NYLJ: Class Action Granted in Second of Three Stop-and-Frisk Cases by Mark Hamblett:

The second of three major cases alleging the New York City Police Department engages in an unconstitutional pattern of stopping and frisking people without a reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in criminal activity has been deemed a class action.

Southern District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Feb. 11 certified a class in Ligon v. City of New York, 12-2274, a case where black and Latino citizens in the Bronx allege police have been illegally stopping and frisking them as they enter and exit buildings that take part in a police crime-fighting program.

If you are going to allege a failure to particularity, you should also say how and why. Without how and why, the court often has nothing to go on [which is true], and it often is easily remedied by the government, as here. United States v. White, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185938 (W.D. Mo. November 30, 2012), adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18006 (W.D. Mo. February 11, 2013):

Both defendants also contend that the search warrants were invalid because they did not describe the properties in question with sufficient particularity. They do not specifically allege, however, in what manner the descriptions of the places to be searched was deficient.

The test for determining the sufficiency of the description of the place to be searched is whether the place is described with sufficient particularity so as to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched. United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979). Thus, where a search warrant contained information that particularly identified the place to be searched, the court has found the description to be sufficient even though it listed the wrong address. United States v. McCain, 677 F.2d 657, 660-61 (8th Cir.1982). Moreover, where the same officer both applied for and executed the warrant, a mistaken search is unlikely. McCain, 677 F.2d at 661.

In this case, there was ample testimony from Officer Carpenter, the affiant, regarding his efforts to sufficiently identify each property in the affidavits in support of the search warrants. There was also considerable testimony from other officers that would establish the location and description of each property, which were located in a very rural and secluded area. …

Leslie A. Shoebotham, Off the Fourth Amendment Leash?: Law Enforcement Incentives to Use Unreliable Drug-Detection Dogs on SSRN. Abstract:

After United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, the central concern for courts asked to determine the admissibility of positive, canine drug-detection sniffs was whether the sniff was performed by a “well-trained” detection dog – which most courts equated with “reliability” for purposes of establishing probable cause. Florida v. Harris asks the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the dispute concerning what evidence trial courts are permitted to consider in determining whether a drug-detection dog is well trained. This Article responds to the State of Florida’s assertions in Harris that trial courts must defer to law enforcement determinations of canine-reliability, and should be prohibited from performing independent determinations of reliability by examining detection-dog field performance records. The Article argues that clear incentives exist for law enforcement to use unreliable drug-detection dogs (or dogs with only marginal reliability) in the field: (1) financial self-interest, based on civil forfeiture statutes that authorize police to seize cash discovered during a physical search (which, pursuant to statute, may be placed into local, law-enforcement coffers to supplement law enforcement budgets) based on the money’s connection to a drug crime — which is often established by a positive canine alert to the cash, and (2) targeting of certain groups, such as racial or ethnic minorities, for police investigation. Additionally, the State of Florida’s argument that law enforcement is deterred from using unreliable drug-detection dogs because “inaccurate” dogs “put an officer in harm’s way” is a red herring. While traffic stops are dangerous encounters for law enforcement, those dangers are produced by the officer’s decision to stop a particular vehicle — presumably on the basis of probable cause for a traffic violation or other criminal wrongdoing — not a driver’s apprehension upon being stopped that his or her vehicle might eventually be subjected to a canine drug-detection sniff. Therefore, trial court consideration of detection-dog field performance records as part of a court’s canine-reliability determination is an essential firewall to preventing police use of marginal, or even unreliable, drug-detection dogs.

“Public safety exception” applies to asking defendant about a possible meth lab in the car. It isn’t just limited to questions about guns. United States v. Noonan, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17794 (N.D. Iowa February 11, 2013):

First, the court finds that Defendant’s argument that the public safety exception is limited to the context of firearms is without merit. In United States v. Luker, 395 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit held that the public safety exception was applicable where an officer, without first advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, asked the defendant “if there was anything in [the defendant’s] vehicle that shouldn’t be there or that [the officers] should know about.” Id. at 832. The Eighth Circuit held that the defendant’s response was admissible because “[t]he officers were aware of [the defendant’s] methamphetamine use and were concerned about needles or substances associated with such use in the car.” Id. at 833-34. … Thus, the Eighth Circuit has extended the public safety exception beyond the context of firearms.

Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has recognized the public safety hazard posed by the manufacture of methamphetamine. See United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 866 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he manufacture of methamphetamine is an inherently dangerous activity that creates substantial risks to public health and safety.”); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that there were exigent circumstances justifying the officers’ warrantless search of a storage shed where an officer smelled ether and saw equipment that “suggested an on-going manufacture in the shed” and noting that “[t]he potential hazards of methamphetamine manufacture are well documented”); …. Given these dangers, the court finds that the public safety exception is applicable where an officer is concerned about a possible methamphetamine lab. See United States v. King, 182 F. App’x 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that there was no Miranda violation where officers’ questions were aimed at “obtain[ing] safety information … before law enforcement personnel entered the potentially dangerous clandestine methamphetamine laboratory” (quoting United States v. King, 366 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (E.D. Pa. 2005)).

The USMJ granted a Franks hearing and concluded that the statements were not materially false and removing them still left probable cause. Therefore, no suppression. United States v. Houston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175955 (E.D. Tenn. November 21, 2012)*, R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176812 (E.D. Tenn. May 29, 2012).*

In this internet traveler case, defendant twice consented to a search of his computer when he was arrested, and the hard drive was copied. After the defense raised the defense of entrapment, the police could search the copy of the hard drive they made for other chat sessions that belied his entrapment defense, showing that he chatted with four other young girls before this one. Commonwealth v. Buswell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 979 N.E.2d 768 (2012).*

The pro se appellant changed his argument between the trial court and the court of appeals, so his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal is waived. Ivy v. State, 103 So. 3d 766 (Miss. App. 2012).*

The juvenile had an early meeting with her school counselor, and, after the meeting, she had to leave her bookbag because of a school rule against bookbags in the hallway. Four times during the day she came and asked for access to the bookbag which was denied. Based on that, the counselor decided to search the bookbag, and marijuana and paraphernalia was found. The search was without reasonable suspicion of any violation of law or rule, and was unconstitutional. T.S. v. State, 100 So. 3d 1289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

Defendant was stopped on a bicycle for having no light. It should have been viewed the same as a traffic stop with basic questioning. Defendant was asked if he had a weapon and he volunteered he did. That was not unconstitutional. State v. Brown, 2012 Ohio 5532, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4806 (2d Dist. November 30, 2012).

Fleeing from a car stopped for a traffic violation is not being “stopped” for Fourth Amendment purposes. United States v. Sebbern, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170550 (E.D. N.Y. November 30, 2012).*

Plaintiff is a documentary filmmaker who was filming gang members’ interaction with police, and he was arrested by police after conceding to a police demand to move. There was no qualified immunity for arresting a filmmaker recording the police. Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. Super. 13, 56 A.3d 869 (2012):

[W]e conclude that a reasonable police officer in 2006 could not have believed he had the absolute right to preclude Ramos from videotaping any gang activities or any interaction of the police with gang members for the purposes of making a documentary film on that topic. The motion judge erred in holding otherwise.

Defendant’s walking between subway cars justified his stop. United States v. Miles, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135055 (S.D. N.Y. September 20, 2012).*

A fraud investigator had probable cause to stop and detain defendant who was using a likely stolen or counterfeit credit card to buy high dollar gift cards in a store. State v. Moore, 2012 Ohio 4315, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3787 (2d Dist. September 21, 2012).*

Defendant was talking to somebody in an SUV who fled when the police appeared. Defendant got on a bicycle and rode away. He was stopped by the officers and was told to assume the position with his hands on the car. There was no justification for a pat down, and the officers really acted like they don’t know what the constitution requires. State v. Butler, 101 So. 3d 121 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2012)*:

Thus, according to the explicit testimony of the police officers, they exited their police car, ordered the defendant to stop and put his hands on the police vehicle to be patted down. There is no evidence that the defendant was involved in any suspicious or illegal activity prior to the pat-down. In fact, the police officers specifically testified that they had a clear view of the defendant from a short distance and saw no interchange between the defendant and the occupants of the vehicle. Thus, the record before us bears no indicia of any particularized suspicion that this defendant was involved with drugs or drug transactions except for the rationale underlying the proactive patrol, i.e. the area around Danneel and Seventh Streets is considered (like many areas of New Orleans) a high crime area.

Thus, this case appears to exemplify the concern expressed by the Justice Department (and ultimately conceded by the city in the Consent Decree) pertaining to inadequate training of NOPD officers with regard to the constitutional [Pg 10] parameters of search and seizure. See United States Department of Justice, Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department (3/16/2011), pp. 30-31 (NOPD’s lack of adequate policy and training regarding search and seizure have left officers without basic foundation to perform their duties within constitutional boundaries).

. . .

Conclusion

The police actions and testimony in this case exemplify concerns expressed by the Justice Department, and conceded by the City, as to whether officers of the New Orleans Police Department have been adequately trained regarding the constitutional boundaries of search and seizure. See United States Department Of Justice, Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department (3/16/2011), pp. 30-31; see also United States of America v. The City of New Orleans, 2:12-01924 (E.D. La. 7/24/12), pp. 12, 38-44. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence and statement. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction is vacated and the matter is remanded back to the trial court. Although our review of the record reveals two errors patent pertaining to the defendant’s sentencing, because we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the defendant’s conviction, we pretermit discussion of those errors.

Search incident of a car in a DUI case was justified by defendant’s furtive gesture as he was stopping, which turned out to be beer bottles. (Decided under Fourth Amendment and state constitution.) Smith v. State, 980 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. App. 2012).

“The Government has proved the taint of the illegal stop in January 2010 had dissipated before the confession in October 2010. While the agents did not apprise the Defendant of her Miranda rights between these events, the illegal stop is both temporally distant and causally distinct from the confession.” United States v. Ramos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181716 (D. Vt. December 26, 2012).*

Jones not retroactive for a 2254 habeas petitioner as a new rule of law, even if Fourth Amendment claims could be considered on habeas. Successor habeas denied. In re Kubacki, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26319 (10th Cir. December 20, 2012). [Not on opinions page of Tenth Circuit’s website.]

Defendant was stopped by an officer who was curious because defendant was towing a trailer, not the type normally towed by a large tractor trailer truck. Defendant didn’t have answers about all his travel. An EPIC query showed defendant was once involved in a large cash seizure in Michigan. The officer asked for consent, it was denied, and defendant was allowed to go. The officer radioed to other officers who followed defendant again and stopped him for two traffic offenses. Further reasonable suspicion developed, and a drug dog was called which alerted. Cocaine was found during the search, which was valid. The second stop was justified, and defendant doesn’t contest it. Austin v. State, 980 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. App. 2012).*

Stop based on the fact the high center brake light had one of two bulbs out was not illegal as a matter of law. During the stop, the officer could smell burnt marijuana in the car. Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 735 S.E.2d 255 (2012).*

When confronted by the police, defendant hesitated and then bolted. His hesitation wasn’t a seizure. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17246 (E.D. Mich. February 8, 2013):

fn2 To the extent there was any momentary hesitation by Defendant after he was ordered to put his hands on the hood of Van Buskirk’s cruiser, before he took off running, such hesitation would be insufficient to transform the encounter into a Fourth Amendment seizure. See United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We decline to adopt a rule whereby momentary hesitation and direct eye contact prior to flight constitute submission to a show of authority. Such a rule would encourage suspects to flee after the slightest contact with an officer in order to discard evidence, and yet still maintain Fourth Amendment protections.”).

Such a rule could never be judicially enforced. We’d be arguing over whether a hesitation was one second or five and whether one was enough.

Where defendant was followed home after his alleged drug deals, nexus was shown for a warrant for his house. United States v. Toniolo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17305 (E.D. Wis. February 8, 2013), R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17307 (E.D. Wis. January 14, 2013).*

Defendant’s stop near the border was valid and with reasonable suspicion. “Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Border Patrol Agent DeBaun possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. Although each fact in the circumstances previously described, taken individually, may appear innocent, it had significance to a trained law enforcement officer.” United States v. Valencia, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17402 (D. Ariz. February 8, 2013).*

The City moves to stay the 2012 consent decree against it barring use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The motion is denied. United States v. City of New Orleans, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17249 (E.D. La. February 8, 2013).*

Georgia law limits access to cell phone records, and a double murderer was at large and the police were trying desperately to locate him. There is a statutory suppression remedy, but the telephone company turned them over voluntarily when asked by the police, in good faith. This obviated the suppression remedy. Registe v. State, 292 Ga. 154, 734 S.E.2d 19 (2012).*

“In light of Grimes, Reyes, and Newton, as well as subsequent district court precedent, it is crystal clear that the stalking horse theory is not a valid defense to warrantless searches of probationers, parolees, or individuals on supervised release in this Circuit.” United States v. Washington, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159863 (S.D. N.Y. November 7, 2012).*

Plaintiffs sued the government exactly one year after their house was searched and their son arrested. The government was moved to be substituted 18 months later. The two year Federal Tort Claims Act statute of limitations ran on the government. Farmer v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160405 (E.D. La. November 8, 2012).*

“The question in this case is whether a warrant authorizing the search of a residence also authorizes the search of an independently occupied guesthouse located in the backyard of that residence. Agreeing with the district court that the warrant did not state with sufficient particularity that the separate residence of Defendant was a place to be searched, we affirm.” The officers did not know that the described residence also had the guesthouse. It was a separate dwelling with its own curtilage. State v. Hamilton, 2012 NMCA 115, 290 P.3d 271 (App. 2012).

A search warrant for a computer case in defendant’s car produced 23 fictitious driver’s licenses, 12 counterfeit checks, and a laptop computer which were properly seized and admissible at trial. Six cell phones, however, were suppressed. United States v. Shabazz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144453 (M.D. Fla. October 5, 2012).*