Defendant claimed newly discovery evidence of a possible Fourth Amendment violation after the suppression hearing was denied. Brady doesn’t require the government to disclose every shred of evidence as to a Fourth Amendment claim on the chance it will somehow develop into impeachment. United States v. Vang Lor, 706 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2013):

We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Brock. A defendant is not deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate simply because he does not discover all potentially relevant evidence until after his suppression hearing. Under Stone, habeas corpus relief is unavailable as long as the Government afforded “an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added). Absent ineffective assistance of counsel or government concealment, a defendant cannot claim that the mere existence of undiscovered material evidence deprived him of an opportunity to litigate his claim. …

Defendant says this case differs from Stone and Brock because the Government withheld the impeaching evidence. Whether or not Brady applies at the suppression stage, we can at least assume that Defendant might be deprived of a “full and fair evidentiary hearing” if the Government withholds material evidence. Cook, 997 F.2d at 1318. But nothing suggests the Government covered up evidence. The Wyoming Highway Patrol did not put Trooper Peech on paid leave until October 2007, four months after Defendant’s suppression hearing. No one involved in this case, other than Peech himself, apparently knew about the false dispatch report at the time of Defendant’s suppression hearing.

Defendant cites our cases indicating that “[f]or purposes of Brady, knowledge by police or investigators is imputed to the prosecution.” Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). But, even if this Brady authority applies, Trooper Peech’s knowledge of his own false dispatch report can hardly be imputed to the Government. The Supreme Court has explained that “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995). But Brady “does not require the prosecution to divulge every possible shred of evidence that could conceivably benefit the defendant.” Smith, 50 F.3d at 823. We do not think prosecutors have a duty to investigate officers’ actions in entirely unrelated cases just in case some impeaching evidence may show up. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972) (saying prosecutors should establish procedures “to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it” (emphasis added)). Nor would Trooper Peech have thought he had a duty to disclose the information at the time since it was part of an unrelated, secret DEA investigation. Of course, things might have been different if the Wyoming Highway Patrol had begun investigating Peech for possible misconduct before the suppression hearing. But nothing indicates that was the case. So even assuming the Government has a Brady-like duty to disclose all material evidence prior to a suppression hearing, that duty does not extend to discovering every tidbit of information that is, or could ripen into, impeachment evidence.

Plaintiff was stopped for violation of a noise ordinance but he was arrested because he argued some with the officer on video. The Court of Appeals found it was protected speech, and plaintiff was retaliated against under the First Amendment, even if there was probable cause. Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2013):

Ford invoked his right to free speech. Urlacher replied:

I have the freedom to take you to jail, too. And that’s what’s going to happen. . . . You exercise [your freedom of speech] all you want, okay? If you just cooperate and treat the police like humans, we’ll treat you like that. But when you act like that, like an animal, you’ve got to get treated that way, you know.

You’re going to jail for numerous reasons. The crime you’re going to jail for is the city noise ordinance. A lot of times we tend to cite and release people for that or we give warnings. However … you acted a fool … and we have discretion whether we can book or release you. You talked yourself—your mouth and your attitude talked you into jail. Yes, it did.

Urlacher later testified that he booked Ford (1) because he violated the city noise ordinance, which gives him discretion to book a person “if I feel like it,” and (2) because he “failed to listen[,] … failed to act civil, … failed to take responsibility for his actions, [and because of] his rageful [and disrespectful] behavior towards the law enforcement,” which put public safety at risk. (emphasis in original)

A GPS device was placed on defendant’s vehicle with a warrant, and the vehicle was moved to install it when the vehicle was once stopped. That was reasonable under the warrant and the Fourth Amendment, given the probable cause. State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (2013), affg State v. Brereton, 2011 WI App 127, 337 Wis. 2d 145, 804 N.W.2d 243:

[*P41] Moreover, the probable cause that the officers had at the time of the stop of Brereton’s vehicle was sufficient to justify the officers’ decision to continue the seizure of the vehicle and move it to a location where a GPS device could be installed more safely and effectively. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9 (reaffirming that where officers have probable cause to justify the warrantless seizure of an automobile, they may conduct an immediate search of the vehicle, and if an immediate, warrantless search on the street is justified, moving the vehicle for a search at another location is equally permissible).

[*P42] Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ross, Chambers, and White provide explicit support for the methods chosen by the officers in this case. After seizing Brereton’s vehicle pursuant to probable cause that the vehicle was or contained evidence of the rash of local burglaries, the officers elected to move the vehicle from its location along Highway 51 to the impound lot, where officers awaited judicial authorization prior to installing the GPS device. Cf. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52. After receiving such authorization, officers installed the GPS device. Accordingly, under the relevant Supreme Court precedent, with probable cause for the seizure, neither the fact that officers moved the vehicle to install the GPS, nor the amount of time that officers held the vehicle can be said to be unreasonable in light of law enforcement’s substantial interests in safety and in the effective installation of the GPS device that was used to search the vehicle.

Julian Simcock, Note: Florence, Atwater, and the Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections for Arrestees, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 599 (2013):

If there is an animating imperative behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, it is this: when confronted with a question regarding strip searching arrestees, courts must seek a careful balance. Decades later, the Court appears to have deviated from Bell’s moorings. Last Term, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Court examined the constitutionality of blanket search policies that require that all arrestees be strip-searched regardless of individualized suspicion or the nature of the offense. I argue in the following analysis that Florence constitutes an unnecessary erosion of Fourth Amendment protections for arrestees.

A warrant for a computer implies that its contents were subject to seizure. “The search of the contents of the computer is implied by the use of the phrase ‘computers and all related electronic storage devices.’ This makes sense, since oftentimes a computer is of little or no evidentiary value apart from an examination of its contents.” State v. Bates, 2013 Ohio 1270, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1172 (6th Dist. March 29, 2013).

The record supports the trial court’s finding that defendant consented, so the search must be sustained. State v. Vaughn, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (March 28, 2013).*

The claim that the warrant was based on false or misleading information was not shown by the defense. One big alleged mistake proved to be completely immaterial. Therefore, the motion for a Franks hearing was denied. United States v. Harris, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43375 (D. Vt. March 27, 2013).*

The record supports the conclusion that there was a bona fide emergency justifying the entry into the house. The defendants weren’t under investigation for drugs before the entry. [Truly applying good faith to a warrantless entry.] United States v. Brandwein, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187273 (W.D. Mo. May 24, 2012):

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Defendant voluntarily consented to the searches. Counsel’s attempt to be candid about the lack of strength of his argument was seized on by the appellate court as a near waiver, which it wasn’t. [Sometimes you just can’t trust appellate courts.] State v. Pugh, 2013 Ohio 1238, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1126 (2d Dist. March 29, 2013):

As an initial matter Pugh came close to conceding the validity of the second search during the suppression hearing. After arguing that Selmon’s consent to the first search was involuntary, defense counsel added: “Candidly, Your Honor, on the second search I don’t feel my argument is as strong as in the first case. And I’ll leave it at that.” (Tr. Vol. I at 86). In any event, the trial court correctly found that Selmon validly consented to the second search and that Pugh’s consent was unnecessary.

The officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to further detain defendant based on the contents of the vehicle, defendant’s nervousness, the inconsistent factual accounts given by defendant and the passenger, and, most importantly, the fact that neither defendant’s nor the passenger’s name appeared on the rental agreement. Defendant finally voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle, without reserve or hesitation. State v. Calimeno, 2013 Ohio 1177, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1066 (8th Dist. March 28, 2013).*

WaPo.com: Fourth Amendment creates new fault lines by Robert Barnes:

The oral arguments last week on same-sex marriage showed clearly the Supreme Court’s familiar fault line between liberal justices nominated by Democratic presidents and conservatives named by Republicans.

But a decision that got a little lost in the shuffle displayed a different kind of split on the court. And it may become more noticeable as the term continues and the justices dig deep on a part of the Constitution that has divided and vexed their predecessors as well.

The question is how to balance law enforcement interests against the right that the Fourth Amendment gives citizens to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

In last week’s takedown of a legendary drug-sniffing police dog named Franky, it was an unlikely sounding coalition of conservatives and liberals unwilling to defer to law enforcement.

Using a co-conspirators’ code word at the door to get defendant to open it was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It was also not consent obtained by deception. United States v. Poom-Medina, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45469 (D. Ariz. March 29, 2013).

A protective weapons search in this case was valid because the totality of circumstances supported it. United States v. Scott, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44124 (W.D. Mo. January 23, 2013). But, the court cautioned:

Reckless application of the Long protective search rule has the potential to effectively eviscerate the general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment when a vehicle stop is undertaken by law enforcement officers. Unlike the limitations imposed on a valid “automobile search” and a “search incident to arrest,” the Long protective search rule (like the Terry analysis) is constrained only by the reasonable suspicion requirement.

A question of fact remains whether it was objectively reasonable to make plaintiffs take the car they were driving in to a border station for a vehicle x-ray. Henry v. County of Niagara, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45939 (W.D. N.Y. March 29, 2013).*

While Ohio law requires PC to search a parolee, the Fourth Amendment doesn’t in federal court. United States v. Hill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45754 (S.D. Ohio March 29, 2013):

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Indiana University Resident Advisors in the dormitories conducted a quarterly announced “health and safety inspection” of dorm rooms, and a small quantity of marijuana was seen in plaintiff’s room. The RAs were not “state actors.” A campus police officer came when called, and his warrantless entry was lawful. While students have some reasonable expectation of privacy in the dorm rooms, it isn’t absolute. (“See Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir. 1987), abrogated in part on other grounds by Leroy v. Ill. Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that on-track dormitory rooms for racetrack employees must be considered ‘homes’ under the Fourth Amendment); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997 (D.N.H. 1976) (‘A dormitory room is a student’s home away from home, and any student may reasonably expect that once the door is closed to the outside, his or her solitude and secrecy will not be disturbed by a governmental intrusion …’)”) The marijuana could be used against him in a student disciplinary proceeding. Medlock v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44408 (S.D. Ind. March 28, 2013).

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When defendant makes no objection to a search and seizure, the presumption remains that the issuing magistrate did his duty. Davidson v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1224 (Tex. App. – Texarkana February 8, 2013).*

The warrant for defendant’s DNA was properly issued. Although there were inconsistent statements, defendant had sex with the mother of the child from age 10 to 15, and the child was born during that time. PC still existed. Rhodes v. State, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 44 (February 5, 2013).*

During surveillance of a downstairs apartment, people would sometimes leave it and go upstairs for a minute. When the police came with a warrant for the downstairs apartment, they had reasonable suspicion to go to the upstairs apartment, too, here for officer protection while on the scene. Once there, the crack in defendant’s shoe was in plain view. State v. McAllister, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 108 (February 7, 2013).*

Since officers had probable cause for defendant’s arrest, removing him to the police station for interrogation was not a constitutional violation. United States v. Slaughter, 708 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Following the analogous United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2011), defendant has standing to challenge GPS tracking of a vehicle he legitimately borrowed when he was in control, but not otherwise. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2013):

Contrary to the assertion of the dissent, we do not hold that only the person with legal ownership has a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time a tracking device is installed on a vehicle. If we had so held, we could not have concluded, as we do, that James Gibson has standing to challenge the installation of the tracking device on the Avalanche when it was in his possession and control. Instead, we conclude that James Gibson has not established that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Avalanche only when it was searched on February 20, 2009, because he was not the legal owner of the Avalanche, he has not established that he had exclusive custody and control of the Avalanche, and he was neither a driver of, nor a passenger in, the Avalanche when it was searched.

Defendant had no standing to contest the stop based on pre-Jones GPS on a vehicle he wasn’t driving at the time. He had possession when it was installed, but it wasn’t his car and he wasn’t driving when it was stopped. Following United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2013). Therefore, Davis good faith does not have to be reached. United States v. Kabba, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28870 (D. Mass. March 4, 2013).*

Defendant had standing to challenge the pre-Jones use of a GPS on a vehicle he was driving at the time, even if he didn’t own it. He loses, however, under the Davis good faith exception, that the law permitted it at the time. United States v. Batista, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28710 (W.D. Va. February 27, 2013).*

Defendant’s Miranda/Edwards rights were admittedly violated by the government, but that violation did not void defendant’s consent obtained after lawyered up. United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia, 708 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2013).

Suit against the county fails in its allegation that the county had a municipal custom of violating the Fourth Amendment from one discrete claim. Ogle v. Hocking County, 2013 Ohio 597, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 527 (4th Dist. January 31, 2013).*

Defendant pled guilty thereby waiving his alleged search claim. He can’t show that his guilty plea was a product of objectively unreasonable advice. United States v. Belk, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24257 (D. S.C. February 22, 2013).*

Requiring students to leave their belongings in a room for a drug dog to scan them did not violate the student’s Fourth Amendment rights under T.L.O. and Acton. The court distinguishes Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 2004), holding physical searches of belongings left in a room violated Fourth Amendment. Burlison v. Springfield Pub. Schs, 708 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013):

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Defendant admitted in the suppression hearing that the officer, if believed, had reasonable suspicion, and there was little on which to challenge the officer’s credibility at the hearing. Having conceded that, he couldn’t change his argument on appeal to include a lack of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jackson, 490 Fed. Appx. 707 (6th Cir. 2012)*:

Because Jackson waived below any challenge other than one based on credibility, our review of the denial of his suppression motion is limited to that issue. United States v. Collins, — F.3d —, No. 10-6454, 2012 WL 2094415, at *2 (6th Cir. June 12, 2012) (“When a defendant raises an argument by motion but then abandons the argument before the district court, the defendant has waived the argument and this Court cannot review that issue even for plain error.” (citations omitted)).

Defendant’s arrest for trespass was invalid, so the taking of his fingerprints at the jail is suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. United States v. Eppenger, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142483 (D. Nev. July 24, 2012).

The inventory of defendant’s vehicle was appropriate. United States v. Abram, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142479 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2012).*

The appeal is based on the asserted incredibility of the officer’s testimony, but it wasn’t “contrary to the laws of nature or so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Dixon, 491 Fed. Appx. 120 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was arrested for criminal impersonation for giving false name, address, and DOB to officer during a traffic stop, and that supported his search incident. Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223 (Del. 2012).

Validity of consent issue is not one normally appealable by the state in Arkansas. State v. Myers, 2012 Ark. 453, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 486 (December 6, 2012)*; Same; consent in advance for parole search. State v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 454, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 484 (December 6, 2012).*

Trial court’s crediting officer’s testimony that defendant failed to stop at a red light was sufficient to justify a stop. State v. Turk, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 985 (December 5, 2012).*

Binding circuit precedent not really required for pre-Jones GPS monitoring to be valid under the good faith exception. A substantial consensus of lower courts is enough for good faith to apply. United States v. Oladosu, 887 F. Supp. 2d 437 (D. R.I. 2012).

The affiant officer’s “statement of the frequent existence of electronic records kept on drug dealers’ cell phones” coupled with other probable cause to arrest was probable cause to search defendant’s telephone. United States v. Sias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116841 (D. Neb. August 20, 2012).*

Probable cause was shown for the search of defendant’s computer, even though the warrant was issued nine days after seizure. Defendant was in custody in the interim, too, and he didn’t argue detention of the computer was unreasonable under United States v. Place. United States v. Farmer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117843 (N.D. Ind. August 20, 2012).*