Defendant had standing to challenge the police entry into his aunt’s backyard. He used to live with her, but he moved out, and she let him keep his dogs in her back yard, and he came everyday with her permission to water and feed the dogs. The yard was fenced by a two wire fence on three sides and a neighbor’s privacy fence on the fourth. It was in her back yard. State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Alaska requires a warrant for a two-party recording, not one party consent. A warrant that was shown to anticipate a drug deal was not overbroad because the police also learned about felon in possession of a firearm. Bearden v. State, 2013 Alas. App. LEXIS 44 (April 10, 2013).*

Defendant’s argument that the Utah state trooper caused him to commit the traffic violation that led to his stop was rejected. There was still reason for the stop. United States v. McCoy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178936 (D. Utah December 18, 2012).

“Based on these facts, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the officers were in the home for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and, given the violent nature of the drug cartel, that the officers possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house posed a danger to them.” United States v. Gutierrez, 503 Fed. Appx. 261 (5th Cir. 2012).*

The search of defendant’s vehicle was valid by inevitable discovery, the court not having to decide probable cause, because the defendant committed felony fleeing attempting to elude the officer, and the vehicle was subject to forfeiture because of a prior heroin find in the vehicle. United States v. Jordan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178972 (D. Kan. December 17, 2012).*

A school resource officer sheriff’s deputy taking a student out of class to the principal’s office to question him about drugs was enough to invoke Miranda. N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852 (Ky. 2013):

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It was reasonable for the officer to tell the occupants of a stopped car at night to put their hands on the dashboard. As he approached, one was shuffling his feet, and that was a furtive movement justifying a frisk of the car. Commonwealth v. Obiora, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 55 (January 8, 2013).

The product of two trash pulls provided probable cause for the search warrant for defendant’s house. The warrant permissibly allowed a search of the cars found on the curtilage that belonged at the premises. United States v. Mitchell, 503 Fed. Appx. 751 (11th Cir. 2013).*

The officer approached a car sitting in a driveway with the engine running when he was responding to a burglary call. The occupants’ responses made no sense, and he ordered them out of the car. Instead, the car was put in gear and they tried to flee. They crashed the car and fled from it. Flight, at least at that point, gave reasonable suspicion [sounds like the officer certainly had it from the answers to questions]. United States v. Hopkins, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3392 (S.D. W.Va. January 9, 2013).*

Defendant was in a rental 4Runner that the police had found large quantities of marijuana in before, rented from a rental agency that seemed to cater to drug traffickers. The movements of the vehicle when being followed was reasonable suspicion that it had picked up drugs for delivery. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28459 (D. Ariz. January 4, 2013).* [How often can the exact same vehicle be found with drugs in it? At what point does the presence of the vehicle itself provide reasonable suspicion? Ever? Never?]

Seeing somebody reach in defendant’s car was consistent here with a hand-to-hand drug transaction, particularly since the officer saw one in the same spot three weeks earlier. State v. Twinam, 2013 Ohio 720, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 639 (2d Dist. March 1, 2013).*

Similarly, reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a car going to a regular drug house for a pickup. State v. Roth, 829 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa App. 2013).*

Pennsylvania sheriffs do not have the statutory authority to establish sobriety checkpoints on their own because their authority to arrest doesn’t include suspicionless stops. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2013), revg 2010 PA Super 83, 996 A. 2d 1070 (2010) (concur here; dissent here):

In terms of such independent authority, we conclude essentially where we began. Again, suspicionless stops are not made based on an in-presence breach of the peace or commission of a felony; rather, they are inherently investigatory. Cf. Commonwealth v. Dobbins, 2005 PA Super 274, 880 A.2d 690, 696 (Pa. Super. 2005) (Del Sole, P.J., dissenting) (“In this case, the sheriffs were conducting an investigation, thus looking for a breach of the peace, not witnessing one.”). Since Leet, majority decisions of this Court have repeatedly confined sheriffs’ non-statutory arrest powers to those for in-presence breaches of the peace or felonies. See Dobbins, 594 Pa. at 87-89, 934 A.2d at 1180-81; Kopko, 586 Pa. at 183, 892 A.2d at 774. Accordingly, the Leet rationale — which defines sheriffs’ common-law arrest powers for present purposes — in no way authorizes the independent establishment and conduct of suspicionless roadside checkpoints by sheriffs or sheriffs’ deputies. As amply related by the common pleas and intermediate courts, suspicionless stops represent a peculiar — and highly regulated — exercise of police powers, which are particularly broad in matters pertaining to highway safety. See Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340-41 (1983).

The members of this Court maintain great respect and express gratitude for sheriffs and their deputies in the performance of indispensable public services within their realm. We reiterate, however, that they are not police officers — nor are they invested with general police powers beyond the authority to arrest for in-presence breaches of the peace and felonies — in the absence of express legislative designation.

We hold that the Sheriffs did not have the authority to independently establish and conduct the suspicionless sobriety checkpoint at which Appellee was arrested.

At the suppression hearing over defendant’s statement, he conceded he wasn’t even in custody, so that made his statement problematic anyway. However, the testimony of an officer changed between the suppression hearing (spontaneous statement) and trial (in a back-and-forth conversation) and defense counsel failed to renew it. Since the thing admitted to involved an acquitted count, defendant can’t show Strickland prejudice, so no error. United States v. Branson-Scott, 714 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was in a rented car stopped for a traffic violation, and he was “overly communicative.” The officer contacted others and found out that defendant’s prior car rentals had dog alerts for drugs but no drugs in the car. A dog alerted on this car, and defendant had white residue in his nose. At that point he was handcuffed, and it was reasonable. The stop was not extended too long. United States v. Foreste, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64962 (D. Vt. May 7, 2013).

Driving on a suspended DL justified a search incident. State v. Smith, 2013 Ohio 1873, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1753 (10th Dist. May 7, 2013).*

The trial court erred in summarily dismissing defendant’s post-conviction petition. He alleged various grounds that the warrantless search was invalid and defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging it. Essentially, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving offenses and the trunk of the car was searched incident to the arrest. Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 1050 (2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion when they sent a wired CI to the defendant’s apartment and defendant said “Okay” and “hold on” and he left from another door. State v. Durham, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (May 9, 2012).*

Defendant failed to show how disclosure of the CI’s identity would have helped in his motion to suppress. Defendant was involved in a controlled buy the CI three days before the search warrant was issued for his house, and the product of the search was the basis of the case against him. It was speculation that disclosing the CI would prove anything relevant. United States v. Murel, 502 Fed. Appx. 291 (4th Cir. 2012):

Below, Murel offered the district court no explanation as to how disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant would be relevant to any defense he sought to present at trial. Instead, Murel merely speculated in a conclusory manner that such confidential informant “could potentially provide relevant and helpful testimony for the defense concerning what occurred and what the CI observed, if anything, at [his residence] in connection with the alleged controlled buy on Jun[e] 10, 2009.” (J.A. 148-49) (Murel’s Motion to Compel Disclosure of Confidential Informant Information).

After reviewing Murel’s arguments, the record, and the relevant legal authorities, we conclude Murel failed to carry his burden of establishing an actual basis for disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant who conducted the controlled purchase from Murel on June 10, 2009. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Murel’s motion to compel disclosure of such confidential informant’s identity. Of significant importance to our conclusion is the fact that although the confidential informant participated in the controlled purchase which resulted in Murel’s arrest and issuance of the search warrant for his residence, Murel’s participation in the controlled purchase is not the subject of his instant offenses. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108 (in determining whether defendant carried his burden of establishing entitlement to disclosure of identity of confidential informant, “[o]ne of the most important factors to be considered is the materiality of the evidence to the defendant’s particular defense”). Rather, Murel was charged with three criminal offenses stemming from evidence recovered three days after the controlled purchase at issue. In sum, Murel has offered nothing more than rank speculation as to how disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant would have been relevant to his defense; therefore, he has failed to carry his burden on this issue. See id. (disclosure of confidential informant’s identity only required after court has determined such informant’s “testimony is highly relevant”).

Lack of a written policy does not make an inventory invalid. Bertine requires a “standard criteria” and following it is all that is required. Leaving defendant’s car in a Wal-Mart parking lot is not required by the police. United States v. Cartrette, 502 Fed. Appx. 311 (4th Cir. 2012):

In the instant case, no one was immediately available to take custody of Cartrette’s vehicle, and a reasonable officer could have concluded that it constituted a nuisance where it was parked, in a Wal-Mart parking lot. Even if we credit Cartrette’s testimony that his brother was nearby – testimony the district court did not find credible, see J.A. 353 – the police were not required to stay on the scene and wait for the brother to return. See Brown, 787 F.2d at 932 (impoundment reasonable when no known individual is “immediately available to take custody of the car”).

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Cartrette’s argument that the Conway Police Department’s lack of a written impoundment policy renders the impoundment unlawful. Bertine requires standard criteria for impounding vehicles, 479 U.S. at 375, but it does not require the criteria to be in writing. Here, the testimony of Officers Ridgeway and Hardee indicates there was a standard procedure to impound vehicles when no one is immediately available to take custody of the vehicle, and that they understood and followed that procedure. The district court was entitled to credit that testimony.

Notes: (1) Wal-Mart allows people with RVs to park on store parking lots overnight, but that does not by any means mean that a vehicle can be left there for days on end. Here, the police were not required to wait for the brother at all. If he were coming that day, what would be the harm in leaving the car on the Wal-Mart parking lot for a half day or even a day? Wal-Mart would clearly not care. But, there is something else more obviously at work: The allegedly non-pretextual search of the trunk of the car that turned up the shotgun. If there was no inventory, well, then, the police could not have found it and this case would not exist.

(2) Bertine requires a “standard criteria,” and a lack of a writing is an open invitation to abuse. Any police department larger than two officers ought to have a written inventory policy by now. Inventory has been recognized over 35 years since South Dakota v. Opperman, probably since before this searching officer was born. It’s not that hard to come up with a policy since almost all departments of any repute have one.

Plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for being a horse thief that was later proved not to be appropriately issued. Nevertheless, the police couldn’t be sued for arresting her on the facially valid warrant. When a plaintiff includes arrest reports and other documents with her complaint, it is appropriate to consider them on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was based on reasonable suspicion for stopping over the stop line of a stop sign and crossing the fog line twice. State v. Epps, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 308 (April 2, 2013).*

Officers entered the house arguable illegally, but written consent came, and there were intervening circumstances that showed the consent purged of any taint. United States v. Whisenton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49322 (E.D. Mo. April 5, 2013).*

“This appeal presents the question whether three officials in a rural county of Georgia are entitled to a summary judgment against a complaint that they violated the civil rights of a father and son who had been involved in an aborted exchange of property between a previously engaged couple. When Dustin Myers and Kelley Bowman ended their engagement to be married, Dustin attempted to retrieve the diamond ring he had given Kelley and other personal property, but that attempt prompted allegations that Dustin had stolen Kelley’s dog, followed by a police chase on rural roadways and a brief arrest of Dustin and his father, Rodney Myers. The end of the police chase, which resembles a scene from a rerun of the 1980s television show, The Dukes of Hazzard, fittingly was captured on a video camera on the dashboard of a police car. … After our review of the videotape and other evidence, we agree with the district court that the Myers’ effort to make a federal case out of these events fails: Murry and Evans did not subject the Myers to excessive force; Evans had probable cause to arrest the Myers; Murry did not act under color of law; and the Myers failed to present any evidence that Murry, Evans, and Hutchins conspired to commit a false arrest.” Also, as for the engagement ring: “Dustin agreed to return the dog in exchange for the engagement ring and some money that he said Kelley owed him.” Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013).*

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The search warrant target’s name over the doorbell of a house isn’t enough to link him to it. While there may be reason to believe defendant had drugs in his bedroom, the affidavit doesn’t link that address to the offense and the probability of evidence being found. Still, the good faith exception applies because it was not bare bones. United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 2013 FED App. 0108P (6th Cir. 2013):

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arstechnica: Texas becomes first state to require warrant for e-mail snooping / Gov. Rick Perry signed HB 2268 on June 14, and it takes effect immediately by Cyrus Farivar:

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The search warrant was based on probable case based on an IP address linked to child pornography downloads. Including a digital camera, however, was a constitutional violation because there was nothing linking defendant’s camera to the probable cause or the manufacture of child porn. Images found in the camera were properly suppressed. State v. Gurule, 150 N.M. 49, 256 P.3d 992 (2011), Certiorari Granted, 266 P.3d 633, 2011 N.M. LEXIS 374 (N.M., June 8, 2011), Writ of certiorari granted State v. Gurule, 2011 N.M. LEXIS 522 (N.M., Dec. 21, 2011), revd State v. Gurule, 2013 N.M. LEXIS 180 (June 13, 2013) posted here:

Instead, the dispositive issue is whether there was probable cause to permit the search of the camera. To the extent that the officers could have looked at images readily viewable at the scene, there is no indication that they did so in this case—it was not until after the camera was seized and a forensic examination conducted months later that the illegal images were discovered. In the absence of any indication that this camera, which did not contain a memory card, was being used for the storage of internet child pornography, or was being used for the independent manufacture of pornography, there was no substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause that the camera would contain child pornography.

The government failed to prove exigency for a warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment. The defendant did not know that the police were outside, and his house was built on stilts so they could see anybody coming or going. United States v. Chaney, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42646 (D. Alaska April 19, 2011).*

Salon.com: NSA spying kills my faith in America / I thought privacy and the Fourth Amendment meant something. What do I tell my kids now? by Cary Tennis:

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USA Today: Google challenges U.S. gag order in NSA flap by Byron Acohido and Jon Swartz:

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Defendant made a straw purchase of an AK-47, and they followed her where she was delivering it. Agents came to the door close on her heels, and they heard it locked. The warrantless entry was based on exigent circumstances. This was not an unreasonable police created exigency. United States v. Jackson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82352 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2013):

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Andrew Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclusionary Rules (Florida Law Review forthcoming), Abstract:

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Politico: DNI: Analysts can’t eavesdrop on domestic calls without ‘proper legal authorization’ by Alex Byers.