Defendant consented because of a fear for her family’s well being if she didn’t but it was of her own making and the police did nothing to exacerbate it. Therefore, consent was valid. United States v. Lopez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86912 (E.D. Wis. April 5, 2013):

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The District Court originally suppressed and the government appealed because the court didn’t properly explain the application of the exclusionary rule to deter future violations. The Third Circuit reversed. United States v. Wright, 493 Fed. Appx. 265 (3d Cir. 2012). On remand, because the court had already found the level of culpability “low” and barely negligent, the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Wright, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86937 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2013)*:

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WaPo: After NSA leaks, secretive court gets rare scrutiny by Peter Wallsten, Carol D. Leonnig, and Alice Crites:

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The mining company’s long running Fourth Amendment case against New Mexico authorities resulted in a jury verdict of $1 but included attorneys fees for a state administrative proceeding of $16,000. The award was not nominal. The lodestar for fees is “Because the Court finds that Copar Pumice’s claimed hourly rates are reasonable, and because the Court finds that its time spent in litigating this matter is reasonable, the Court calculates the lodestar amount to be $124,401.14 in attorney’s fees with $2,380.17 in expenses,” but it is reduced 10%. Copar Pumice Co. v. Morris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87098 (D. N.M. June 13, 2012).*

Consent search of passenger compartment produced cocaine and marijuana, so officer could search the trunk based on that probable cause. United States v. Denson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87493 (E.D. Tex. May 21, 2012).*

Under the WV implied consent law, a driver who refuses a test is only subject to a test by search warrant, if one is sought. State v. Stone, 229 W. Va. 271, 728 S.E.2d 155 (2012).*

State law permitted safety check roadblocks until the court wised up and declared them unconstitutional. Defendant was stopped under the influence in the interim, and his DUI was dismissed. His driver’s license was administratively suspended, however, and the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings [even where the state is a party]. Miller v. Toler, 229 W. Va. 302, 729 S.E.2d 137 (2012) (dissent):

This Court agrees that if the exclusionary rule is extended to civil license revocation or suspension proceedings there would be minimal likelihood of deterring police misconduct because the real punishment to law enforcement for misconduct is derived by excluding unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal proceeding. When this minimal deterrent benefit is compared to the societal cost of applying the exclusionary rule in a civil, administrative driver’s license revocation or suspension proceeding that was designed to protect innocent persons, the cost to society outweighs any benefit of extending the exclusionary rule to the civil proceeding.

Furthermore, at the time the safety equipment checkpoint occurred in this case, the state troopers were acting lawfully under the decision of this Court in State v. Davis, 195 W. Va. 79, 464 S.E.2d 598 (1995), overruled by State v. Sigler, 224 W. Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009). …

Defendant was observed doing three hand-to-hand drug deals at his front door. When he left the house he was stopped, and the house was entered to freeze the situation to preserve evidence to get a search warrant. The entry was based on exigency, and it did not taint the search warrant. Commonwealth v. Howard, 2013 PA Super 56, 64 A.3d 1082 (2013).

The officer’s testimony that the defendant’s driving was suspicious was based on having both hands on the wheel and both arms extended. That is not reasonable suspicion. Also, the officer apparently let slip during testimony that the defendant’s name was a Mohawk Indian name, and that bordered on racial profiling. Motion to suppress granted. People v Deer, 2013 NY Slip Op 23077, 39 Misc. 3d 677, 960 N.Y.S.2d 891 (St. Lawrence Co. 2013)*:

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The state relied on defendant having no standing and refused to put on proof that the search was legal. The trial judge ruled against the state on the merits, and it’s affirmed. Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 2013 PA Super 20, 62 A.3d 1028 (2013).*

Plaintiff, likely inebriated, accidentally called the police and made suicidal statements. Police arrived and forcibly entered her home and she fought with them, and her arm got broken. The entry into the home was valid on exigent circumstances, as was the use of force. Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2013), affg 842 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

The police came because a neighbor called police that defendant was missing and hadn’t been seen for a while. The police knocked and got no answer. “[W]e conclude that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement was implicated upon consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances taken in unison.” People v. Hill, 299 Mich. App. 402, 829 N.W.2d 908 (2013).*

Texting while driving justified defendant’s stop for inattentive driving on an Army base, and he was found intoxicated. An inventory of the vehicle produced drug paraphernalia. The stop was valid. United States v. Wingle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38862 (E.D. Va. March 20, 2013).*

The frisk of defendant was justified by the officer seeing the outline of a gun in his waistband after a hand-to-hand drug deal. United States v. Blackburn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39626 (W.D. Mo. March 6, 2013).*

Defendant was convicted of robbery. He had no standing in a gym bag left at a friend’s house obtained by search warrant because he never claimed ownership, either in the motion to suppress, by testifying, or to the police when arrested. Jones v. State, 320 Ga. App. 681, 740 S.E.2d 655 (2013).*

Defendant was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. His watery, bloodshot eyes, and smell of alcohol was reasonable suspicion. His admission he had consumed alcohol earlier was probable cause for administering a PBT and then taking him in for a BAC test. Fisher v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 301, 2013 Ark. App. LEXIS 319 (May 8, 2013).*

Officers observed defendant sell sawed off shotgun to a CI, and they got a search warrant for his garage and person. When they arrived and told him of the warrant, he volunteered where the gun was, and it was in his apartment, not the garage, and in plain view there. The search of the apartment was by his consent, and the record supports the trial court’s finding of consent, not a false claim of authority. State v. Santiago, 142 Conn. App. 582, 64 A.3d 832 (2013).*

WaPo Opinion: NSA surveillance may be legal — but it’s unconstitutional by Laura K. Donohue of Georgetown Law:

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WaPo: New documents reveal parameters of NSA’s secret surveillance programs By Ellen Nakashima, Barton Gellman, and Greg Miller:

The National Security Agency may keep the e-mails and telephone calls of citizens and legal residents if the communications contain ‘significant foreign intelligence’ or evidence of a crime, according to classified documents that lay out procedures for targeting foreigners and for guarding Americans’ privacy. Newly disclosed documents describe a series of steps the world’s largest spy agency is supposed to take to keep Americans from being caught in its massive surveillance net. They suggest that the NSA has latitude to keep and use citizens’ communications under certain conditions…. And the rules show that the communications of lawyers and their clients may be retained if they contain foreign intelligence information, although dissemination must be approved by the NSA general counsel.

There was no clear error in the district court’s determination that defendant’s girlfriend he shared a bedroom with consented to a search of the bedroom to look for guns. She admitted it on the stand, too. She was not advised of a right to refuse, but that is only a factor. United States v. Graham, 480 Fed. Appx. 453 (9th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped because his car was illegally parked and that was justification for the officer approaching the defendant and observing him allegedly under the influence. Miller v. Chenoweth, 229 W. Va. 114, 727 S.E.2d 658 (2012).*

Inevitable discovery applied because the search warrant was being sought when defendant was arrested and a search occurred. State v. Myers, 229 W. Va. 238, 728 S.E.2d 122 (2012).

Defendant’s car was searched because of the strong odor of marijuana after he was stopped on the street with reasonable suspicion of drug dealing and they “discovered more than $500 in small, disorganized bills stashed in various pockets.” The search was valid under the automobile exception or the search incident doctrine because he was standing at the door when all this went down. United States v. Carter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11265 (11th Cir. June 5, 2012).*

While Washington law grants automatic standing, somebody with third-party authority can still consent. State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612, 277 P.3d 708 (2012).*

Defendant was stopped because of missing passenger side mirror which was not required by state law or the law of the state where the vehicle was registered. That was a mistake of law, and the stop was invalid. State v. Dunbar, 229 W. Va. 293, 728 S.E.2d 539 (2012).

An FTCA complaint about a search is not barred by the discretionary function exception. Muhammad v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 2d 306 (E.D. Pa. 2012).

Defendant gets to voir dire on consent searches in a drug case. United States v. Goxcon-Chagal, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110769 (D. N.M. August 5, 2012).*

Officer’s statement in SW application that furniture was not visible through the front window was not a Franks violation because furniture was actually found inside. United States v. Sullivan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110793 (S.D. Ga. July 16, 2012).*

Officer outside of his jurisdiction was not acting outside his authority for qualified immunity purposes when arresting the plaintiff. Maughon v. City of Covington, 505 Fed. Appx. 818 (11th Cir. 2013):

… [W]hen determining the scope discretionary authority, a court looks to the general nature of a defendant’s action, not the specific unconstitutional conduct. See Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (providing that “[t]he inquiry is not whether it was within the defendant’s authority to commit the allegedly illegal act”).

Old information from CIs was shown by current information from wiretaps that defendant was “back in business,” and it did not make it stale. United States v. Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10713 (M.D. Ala. January 28, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped for driving on a cancelled DL. A patdown found a bullet in his pocket, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The bullet meant a gun was likely in the car, and that justified a search of the car. United States v. Rousseau, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60821 (D. Minn. April 3, 2013).*

Tinted license plate that was clearly readable did not justify stop. State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288 (Iowa 2013).*

The officer developed reasonable suspicion that the occupants of an RV were engaged in some sort of criminal offense. He got consent. When he found a new cooler, it apparently had been tampered with, and he knew that drug couriers often used new coolers to hide drugs in the insulation. The more intensive search of the cooler was thus justified. United States v. Gaxiola, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60350 (D. Kan. April 29, 2013).*

Officers were not obliged to take defendant on arrest right to jail. Taking him to the scene of another event in the case was permissible. United States v. Dixon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60627 (D. Mass. April 29, 2013).*

The box delivered to defendant had a beeper inside that was supposed to emit a continuous tone when it was opened. It malfunctioned and continued to emit a continuous tone before it left police custody. There were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into defendant’s dwelling to secure the package because the police had no information of imminent destruction of evidence. United States v. Lawson, 499 Fed. Appx. 711 (9th Cir. 2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to suppress a photograph in a camera that was already lawfully subject to search under a warrant. In it was a picture of defendant wearing the same shirt described by the witnesses to this shooting. People v. Marshall, 298 Mich. App. 607, 830 N.W.2d 414 (2012).

Defendant was allowed free access to a storage room in the house searched, but he had no key to it. Consequently he had no reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, no standing. United States v. Gardner, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170258 (E.D. N.C. November 30, 2012).*

PA Independent: PA DNA law resurfaces after U.S. Supreme Court decision by Melissa Daniels:

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HuffPo: FBI’s Robert Mueller: Drones Are In Use In America by Michael McAuliff:

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A drug dog alert at defendant’s front door violated the curtilage. Jardines decided while on appeal. State v. Williamson, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4845 (Tex. App. – Dallas April 17, 2013), Released for Publication May 27, 2013:

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