“The address and GPS coordinates alone would prevent another premise from being mistakenly searched. Moreover, the knowledge of the executing officer can be considered in determining the sufficiency of the description. See United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 458 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Musson, 650 F.Supp. 525, 538 (D. Colo. 1986). As the affiant was also the executing officer, his knowledge of the property would have enabled the officers to locate the premises to be searched. Under these circumstances, the Court finds no descriptive defect in the search warrant.” The warrant was a state warrant, so it’s not subject to Rule 41. United States v. Fowler, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110922 (M.D. Ga. August 7, 2013). [Seriously: GPS coordinates aren’t good enough to find a particular place?]
Defendant was stopped for unsafe driving, and reasonable suspicion developed primarily because they were driving from Boston to Cincinnati and back without staying over and air freshener in the back of the van. That and the lengthy computer check justified a 24 minute detention for the drug dog to complete his trip around the vehicle. State v. Thomas, 2013 Ohio 3411, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3501 (August 2, 2013).*
A closed bin with an ill fitting lid was found in a woman’s closet in the place defendant was staying it. She had apparent authority to consent to its search. United States v. Mujahid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110237 (N.D. Ill. August 6, 2013).*
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Defendant’s landlord reasonably believed that he had moved out of his apartment when he left the country for six weeks. Defendant had changed the lock, and the landlord had no communication with him. He found the place trashed with “lots of pot” laying around. The police reasonably relied on the landlord’s representations and apparent authority. Frobouck v. State, 212 Md. App. 262, 67 A.3d 572 (2013).
The Florida one-party consent to recording statute, FSA ch. 934, has not been much discussed in the case, but this court finds that it does not apply to recordings a child sex abuse victim made with her abuser. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy that she would not record him soliciting sex from her in their home. McDade v. State, 112 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA June 7, 2013):
Telling a person to empty her pockets is the same as a frisk. Here, the reasonable suspicion had dissipated by the time it happened. In re V.C.R., 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 484 (May 7, 2013).*
There was a warrant for placing a GPS on defendant’s vehicle and it was done in his driveway near the street without trespass. State v. Harrington, 2013 Ohio 1864, 990 N.E.2d 667 (5th Dist. 2013).
Defendants were convicted of running a meth lab, and the third party consent had apparent, if not actual, authority to consent to the search. State v. Bustamonte, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (May 7, 2013).*
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A Connecticut state judge issued a search warrant for a Gmail account in Mountain View, California. It was briefed by the parties, but remains undecided. Even if it was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Esarey, 308 Conn. 819, 67 A.3d 1001 (2013). See note 17:
We stay our hand with respect to determining whether a judge of the Superior Court has the authority to issue a search warrant for electronic information that is stored on an out-of-state server when the underlying investigation relates to crimes committed in this state. We note, however, that our prior jurisprudence does not suggest a rigid approach to our state courts’ jurisdiction under § 51-1a (b), allowing us to act extraterritorially when a crime at issue has an “overwhelming factual nexus” to Connecticut and its “public welfare.” … [If Google does business in Connecticut, and it does, why can’t a search warrant be issued for evidence to a Connecticut crime? It might violate state law, but a territorial limitation on state law has no Fourth Amendment consequence.]
Defendant could not be stopped because he didn’t use a signal to go straight. Stop suppressed. State v. Paseka, 2013 Ohio 2363, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2311 (6th Dist. June 7, 2013).*
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Where there was no fact issue on defendant’s detention and search question, he is not entitled to a jury instruction on it. Cummings v. State, 401 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App. — Houston (14th Dist.) 2011) (dissenting opinion here):
Appellant complains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to request an article 38.23 instruction. As noted, because there was no fact issue material to the lawfulness of appellant’s detention and arrest, appellant was not entitled to an instruction under article 38.23. See Hardin v. State, 951 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (rejecting claim for ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to request article 38.23 instruction). Appellant’s trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction to which appellant was not entitled is not ineffective assistance. See id. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for new trial regarding alleged ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to request an article 38.23 instruction.
[Note: This is unique to Texas. Everywhere else, a suppression issue is just a question for the court, and the jury gets not say.]
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The issuing judicial officer did not put the affiant under oath when talking to him, but the affidavit presented to the magistrate said it was under oath, and that’s good enough for the “oath or affirmation requirement.” Besides, the GFE would suffice. United States v. Dedeaux, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110307 (N.D. Ind. August 6, 2013):
The sentencing court could not order that defendant be subjected to suspicionless parole or probation searches. Statute governs the searches consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2013):
A BIA officer called for assistance from Wyoming State Police in stopping a truck that was driving erratically. Defendant was stopped for DUI and arrested. A search incident was valid for DUI under Gant. United States v. Ames, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109425 (D. Mont. August 5, 2013).
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing Gant before it was decided. The post-Gant search law makes the search valid. Johnson v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109223 (D. Md. August 2, 2013).*
Defense counsel acted reasonably in concluding that defendant consented to the search of his car. While defendant couldn’t be heard on the video, the totality showed consent. Tobbie v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109670 (M.D. Ga. April 29, 2013).*
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The search incident of the car defendant was a passenger in was invalid under Gant. The search was valid, however, under inevitable discovery because the officer also testified that he smelled marijuana coming from the car, and that independently supported the search. Foster v. State, 321 Ga. App. 118, 741 S.E.2d 240 (2013).*
The stop was based on reasonable suspicion the temporary paper tag had been altered. Hinton v. State, 321 Ga. App. 445, 740 S.E.2d 394 (2013).*
Defendant consented to a patdown. State v. Andrews, 320 Ga. App. 792, 740 S.E.2d 748 (2013).*
“When the officers approached defendant, asking if they could speak with him, defendant said in response, ‘Let me show you what I got.’” That was consent. People v. Ellison, 2013 IL App (1st) 101261, 987 N.E.2d 837 (2013).*
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The court rejects a broad search term on defendant’s supervised release because of his multiple arrests for driving on a suspended license. The search term doesn’t serve any governmental interest. United States v. Postell, 917 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. Ohio 2012).*
The color of the vehicle the officers were looking for was close enough to the one stopped when they had reasonable suspicion; teal or green? Under the circumstances, they “would be remiss” if they didn’t stop it. United States v. Stile, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58266 (D. Me. January 2, 2013)*:
In criminal investigations parlance, reasonable suspicion lies between “inarticulate hunches,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, which cannot justify investigatory stops, and probable cause, which can justify searches and arrests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74. “Reasonable suspicion, then, is an intermediate standard—and one that defies precise definition.” Jones, 700 F.3d at 621 (quoting United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001)). Much like the color teal, reasonable suspicion is best understood in reference to the more easily recognized standards it rests between.
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"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
