Defendant was stopped for weaving, and it was likely he was under the influence by his appearance and mannerisms and the smell of alcohol. His nervous behavior with his arms and finding out he was on parole justified the patdown. United States v. Chambers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92227 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2013).*

On a motion to reconsider a Terry stop after a drug deal elsewhere under Bailey, the court decides that there were independent facts for the stop here that separates the case from Bailey. United States v. McGowan, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92896 (N.D. Ala. May 29, 2013).*

Defendant’s furtive movement was hiding a ski mask under his leg, and that justified the officer asking for it. Commonwealth v. Letkowski, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 847, 991 N.E.2d 1106 (2013).*

The grandmother of a child sex victim called 911 and led police into the house to talk to the child. She had apparent authority to consent to a search and seizure of a couch cushion with semen on it. The facts presented to them were enough to conclude she could consent. Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689, 991 N.E.2d 1049 (2013):

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Defendant was ticketed for an expired tag on his car. He’d been handcuffed and his backpack was in the police car. He was unhandcuffed and was free to go, but not until the backpack was searched for weapons for officer safety. The car was inventoried, but nothing criminal was found. The backpack had a little marijuana and paraphernalia in it. The officer smelled marijuana on the defendant. There was no indication of a weapon or cause for the search other than “procedure,” and that’s not enough. Miller v. State, 991 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. App. 2013):

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Officers saw defendant’s Lincoln Town Car parked against a red curb, a fire lane, in violation of the Vehicle Code. They parked and approached, and defendant started to drive off, and they told him to stop, and he did. The fact that the fire lane violation was a civil infraction rather than a criminal violation was not significant under Whren. When they approached him, he made furtive movements, and drugs were validly found at his feet. People v. Bennett, 197 Cal. App. 4th 907, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 595 (2d Dist. 2011).

Illinois’s constitutional privacy provision is written into the constitution, so it does not depend upon penumbras like the federal constitution and it is not in lockstep with the federal courts. Hope Clinic for Women Ltd. v. Adams, 2013 IL 112673, 353 Ill. Dec. 44, 955 N.E.2d 511 (2011).*

CI’s information who was involved in buying drugs from the defendant was probable cause for issuance of this search warrant. State v. Nigro, 2011 ME 81, 24 A.3d 1283 (2011).*

Defendant’s failure to file a motion to suppress was a waiver of the issue. People v Fulwood, 2011 NY Slip Op 5995, 86 A.D.3d 809, 927 N.Y.S.2d 246 (3d Dept. 2011).*

The trial court concluded that the defendant’s girlfriend was in control of the car and had paid for the insurance on it, so she had the authority to consent. People v Young, 2011 NY Slip Op 5991, 86 A.D.3d 796, 927 N.Y.S.2d 221 (3d Dept. 2011).*

Plain view of two firearms cases in the backseat is probable cause to believe the defendant is in possession of firearms. State v. Reininger, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 73, 65 A.3d 865 (2013).*

Defendant’s stop was valid based on a hit on license plate recognition software. Hill v. State, 321 Ga. App. 817, 743 S.E.2d 489 (2013).*

The stop here was reasonably extended because the vehicle had Virginia LPN and the driver had an Illinois DL along with the driver’s inconsistencies. Calcaterra v. State, 321 Ga. App. 874, 743 S.E.2d 534 (2013).*

An officer can engage in “small talk” with a motorist while the DL and LPN are checked on computer. Here, defendant’s escalating nervousness extended the stop because he made the officer concerned that he would do something bad. Moore v. State, 321 Ga. App. 813, 743 S.E.2d 486 (2013).*

A search warrant for documentary evidence of drug dealing and possession includes seizure of a camera and the pictures it may contain. State v. Rogers, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 90 (February 21, 2013).

Defendant was in prison on another murder conviction, and seizure of a letter from his cell that was a suicide note mentioning this murder case was not subject to the Fourth Amendment or the plain view doctrine. Bolin v. State, 117 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2013).*

An order for installation of a GPS device in Pennsylvania requires probable cause, and the officers had it here. The proceedings complied with the state wiretap act, and nothing here was inconsistent with Jones. Commonwealth v. Burgos, 2013 PA Super 26, 64 A.3d 641 (2013).*

While the trial court expressly didn’t believe the officer that he could smell marijuana and suppressed, there was other evidence of marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car that supported a search under the automobile exception. State v. Jackson, 2013 WI App 66, 348 Wis. 2d 103, 831 N.W.2d 426 (2013).*

Officers did a knock-and-talk to investigate a photograph of an alien in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), and it was initially consensual. Because one person locked the door and there was concern of an assault rifle inside, officers could position themselves for safety purposes without making the knock-and-talk become coercive. United States v. Lara-Mondragon, 516 Fed. Appx. 771 (11th Cir. 2013).*

The stop was for speeding. “Defendants point specifically to Sergeant Soles’ direction to Deputy Russell to ‘see if you can get a violation on your own, and if not we’ll use one of mine.’ (Gov’t Ex. 2 (Video from Sergeant Soles’ Patrol Car), 1:15.)” The officer with the speeding stop is credited. Reasonable suspicion then developed. United States v. Williams, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50782 (M.D. N.C. April 9, 2013).*

The failure to get a warrant on probable cause for defendant’s historical cell site location data was harmless error in a bank robbery case where eyewitnesses and other evidence put defendant in the bank. United States v. Johnson, 516 Fed. Appx. 845 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Telling defendant to stand up and turn around for a patdown was an investigative detention, and there was reasonable suspicion for it. Commonwealth v. Clemens, 2013 PA Super 85, 66 A.3d 373 (2013).*

While the motion to suppress statements made in a criminal investigation in a prison was couched in terms of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the Fourth did not apply. United States v. White Feather, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54920 (S.D. Ill. April 16, 2013).*

NYT: N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web by Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson, and Scott Shane:

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Law.com: In Privacy Cases, Google Defends Email Snooping by Julia Love in The Recorder:

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If the officer knows the defendant is a felon, then the incriminating nature of a gun in his possession is “immediately apparent” for plain view. United States v. Walker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185388 (E.D. Tenn. December 27, 2012).

Defendant was arrested for FIPF. Officers with an arrest warrant went to a house in the early morning hours and saw two men in chairs in the yard, apparently asleep. In defendant’s lap was a gun. Officers took the gun and handcuffed him. The gun’s serial number and defendant’s identity would have been run in any event, and that was inevitable discovery, even if the gun was illegally seized. United States v. Mohammed, 512 Fed. Appx. 583 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Questions to a stopped motorist about the purpose of their trip all occurred within four minutes and did not unreasonably extend the stop. United States v. Santellana, 920 F. Supp. 2d 712 (W.D. La. 2013).*

A drug dog’s alert on defendant’s car justified a search of any containers in it, including her purse. United States v. Carter, 516 Fed. Appx. 344 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Officers’ entry into defendant’s curtilage was justified by seeing a gun in his waistband. United States v. Meidel, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35227 (W.D. Mo. March 14, 2013).*

Police executed a search warrant at defendant’s house finding drugs. She was seen approaching in her car, and she was stopped. Because of the search, officers had probable cause to arrest her. When she was stopped, she admitted some drugs in her car. [Apparently she did not contest the lack of a Miranda warning.] State v. Dickey, 827 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2013).*

Handcuffing defendant during a traffic stop was reasonable when he made a furtive movement to the floorboard, refused to show his hands when directed, and the stop was in a high crime area where police had been shot. People v. Daniel, 2013 IL App (1st) 111876, 369 Ill. Dec. 843, 987 N.E.2d 470 (2013).*

Following too close supported defendant’s stop, and marijuana was in plain view. State v. Woods, 2013 Ohio 1136, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1047 (5th Dist. February 26, 2013).

Defendant’s glib comment about consent not being actual consent is affirmed on appeal. United States v. Spencer, 516 Fed. Appx. 53 (2d Cir. 2013).*

SunSentinal: Cop-car cameras capture accidental confessions by Brittany Shammas:

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Law.com: Federal Judge Undoes Key Ruling on Surveillance Evidence by Michael Tarm:

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Because the affidavit for search warrant detailed an ongoing drug operation, two pieces of information 230 and 120 days old were not “stale” to undermine the probable cause. The information was not “time sensitive.” United States v. Sandoval, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125212 (N.D. Iowa September 3, 2013):

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LoJack software put a stolen computer in defendant’s hands logging into her accounts. The police went to her house and got an admission that a computer was there. That was sufficient probable cause for a search warrant for the computer in the house, despite her argument that the computer could have logged in anywhere in the world. State v. Galemore, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (August 29, 2013).*

Defendant was convicted of murder. His consent to search claim was not fleshed out and was cursory and treated as waived. (The conviction was reversed on other grounds.) State v. Bowman, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (August 29, 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was based on two things: the fact an email from the National Precursor Law Enforcement Exchange Program (“PLEX”) that he purchased pseudoephedrine and the fact the LPN didn’t match the vehicle. The latter was enough here. State v. Pollard, 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 72 (August 30, 2013).*

The side and back yards of defendant’s property were curtilage. The knocker on the door, however, was an implied invitation to come to the front door recognized in Jardines. United States v. Jones, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124261 (W.D. Va. August 30, 2013):

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Officer’s observation during traffic stop that defendant possessed a nunchuck was justification for the officer opening the door and removing defendant from the car. It turned out to be a bullwhip, but the officer’s safety concerns were exacerbated by defendant reaching for his right hip. Commonwealth v. Rosado, 2013 Mass. App. LEXIS 140 (August 30, 2013).*

Questions about the driving picking up a passenger from the bus station were reasonable, as was the fifteen minutes the stop took until consent was granted. The passenger said he came in from Toledo and threw away the ticket at the restaurant, and another officer retrieved the ticket at the restaurant saying he came from Detroit “piquing the officer’s interest” and justifying extending the stop. United States v. Locklear, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124234 (E.D. Ky. August 30, 2013).*

Post-conviction claim that officer lied during suppression hearing was barred because it was resolved in the direct appeal. Jackson v. State, 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (August 30, 2013).* (Alabama is still the only court North America that charges for it’s opinions. Why is that?)

Officers came to defendant’s house with an arrest warrant. At the back of the house, they saw two air conditioning units on the second floor with one running in early November, an exhaust system, and the smell of moist marijuana. That was all probable cause for a grow operation warrant. State v. Green, 2013 Ohio 3728, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3870 (8th Dist. August 29, 2013).*

The stop was for a cracked windshield, and suspicious movements of a juvenile passenger required that he be removed for further inquiry. That justified extending the stop. The claimed owner could consent. State v. Saleem, 2013 Ohio 3732, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3875 (8th Dist. August 29, 2013).*

Defendant was already stopped when police approached his car, could smell marijuana, and everybody around it dispersed. There was a prescription cough medicine bottle in the cupholder of the car with a defaced label in plain view. That justified further search of the car. State v. Harris, 2013 Ohio 3735, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3878 (8th Dist. August 29, 2013).*