Politico: Digital era confounds the courts by Tal Kopan:
Starting next week, the nation’s top court will see three significant tech cases.
The Founding Fathers weren’t big on texting.
Courts have long struggled to deal with key questions at the intersection of individual privacy and ever-advancing technology with little guidance from the Constitution or from prior cases – now judges and experts are hoping that’s about to change.
Rochester Democrat and Chronicle: FluxData takes cameras to the sky: Local imaging company puts its equipment aboard unmanned aerial vehicles by Jinelle Shengulette:
Chicago Sun-Times: Attorney for teen terror suspect wants to see secret evidence by Kim Jansen:
The Hill: Pressure builds on Boehner for NSA vote by Brendan Sasso:
Geoffrey J. Derrick, Qualified Immunity and the First Amendment Right to Record Police, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 243 (2013).
This is important because it almost always arises in the context of an arrest for photographing or videorecording.
NYT: Officers Are Told Race Can Be a Factor in Street Stops, but Not the Only One by J. David Goodman:
Defendant was stopped for doing 45 in a 35. He was overly polite, and the officer found that suspicious and had a drug dog go around the car ten minutes into the stop. Overly polite and somewhat nervous is not suspicious conduct warranting detention for a dog sniff. State v. Fontaine, 2013-Ohio-5257, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5466 (8th Dist. November 27, 2013):
NYT Editorial: More Disclosures About Stop-and-Frisk:
Mayor Michael Bloomberg has often defended New York City’s discredited stop-and-frisk program by arguing that it is necessary to cut crime. That claim was never credible; crime declined in cities that did not detain citizens millions of times over the course of the decade, as New York did, often without legitimate reason.
The government failed in its heavy burden of proving the validity of the protective sweep it conducted on the defendant’s apartment as all the occupants were arrested as they came out one by one. United States v. Wynn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168368 (S.D. Ohio November 25, 2013):
Defendant was a homeless graphics designer, and he had a campsite next to a cemetery. Every day he packed his valuables, including a computer, in a suitcase, and hid it in the woods away from his campsite. Significantly, he admitted that he expected it to be seen by somebody sooner or later. A person walking by saw the suitcase and retrieved it, taking it to the police. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the suitcase. Even if he did, it was reasonable for the police to open it to look for evidence of ownership, and that included looking in the computer for evidence of who owned it. United States v. Wilson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168493 (E.D. Ky. November 20, 2013).
Two trucking companies operated at one location and shared office space, computers, and employees. When a search warrant for records of one was executed, the officers were aware of the overlap, and some records of the other were seized. The search was still reasonable, and, even if the overseizure was an issue, the records of the overseizure would be seized. United States v. Dahl, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168602 (D. Minn. November 15, 2013).*
The CI gave accurate predictive information, so there was probable cause under a common sense reading of the affidavit. United States v. Bravo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168782 (D. Neb. October 10, 2013).*
Since the police acted on a tip from an informant who had proved uniformly reliable on several prior occasions, and the police corroborated that information through their own surveillance, their decision to stop the vehicle was supported by probable cause. The police did not need a warrant to search the vehicle once it was moved to the police station since the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. For the same reasons the police had probable cause to stop the vehicle, they had probable cause to search it. The automobile exception permitted the police the same latitude to conduct the search without a warrant back at the station as it did at the place of the stop. United States v. Thompson, 545 Fed. Appx. 167 (3d Cir. 2013):
A BOLO for a Dodge Charger that was “silver or dark” with an unknown number of black males in it was insufficient to justify a stop three miles from the scene of the alleged crime. Allen v. State, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 982 (November 22, 2013).
The evidence supported consent. “Agent Geer testified that Mr. Djenasevic was ‘eager to cooperate’ and told officers that there was nothing in the condominium and that officers were free to search it using the key on his key ring. Sergeant Ronald Graham also testified that officers used a key to enter the condominium.” United States v. Djenasevic, 545 Fed. Appx. 946 (11th Cir. 2013).*
Considering the “great deference” given search warrants, the court concludes that there was probable cause to believe that drug trafficking information would be found in defendant’s house. It was based entirely on an officer’s assertion in the affidavit, but the court credited it because of that deference. United States v. Rodriguez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168520 (D. Ore. November 26, 2013).*
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed under the Fourth Amendment or the state constitution. State v. Clark, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 1392 (November 26, 2013).
Defendant’s known drug history, presence of marijuana, and five GPS units in the back seat (suggesting they were stolen; who has five?) was reasonable suspicion for further detention. State v. Sinha, 2013-Ohio-5203, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5414 (12th Dist. November 25, 2013).*
Officers had probable cause to search defendant’s truck after they smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from it as they approached and saw a shotgun lying in plain view when they looked inside. State v. Gregory, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1027 (November 25, 2013).*
The district court misinstructed the jury on municipal liability, instructing that the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated in the plaintiffs’arrest. A huge number of officers raided a club in Houston. Reversed. Boyd v. City of Houston, 548 Fed. Appx. 100 (5th Cir. 2013).*
Defendant consented to a search of his car and residence, and a second search under a search warrant was justified by information that the police would find stolen property there. United States v. Clark, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167539 (N.D. Ga. October 28, 2013).*
Defendant was on probation for forgery. His PO came to his house and found him in possession of a laptop computer, provided by defendant’s employer for his work. The PO seized the laptop and wanted to search it because he had reason to believe defendant traveled in violation of his conditions. The defendant consented, but the employer revoked consent under Randolph. The employer filed a motion for return of the computer in the probation case. The court still had jurisdiction over defendant’s probation to do something, and it was proper for the employer to file a state Rule 41 motion for return of the property. While the laptop is not ordered returned, the state needs a search warrant to search the laptop because it’s the employer’s. State v. Ruck, 2013 Ida. LEXIS 303 (November 26, 2013):
Civil Rights Blog: The Third Amendment, Privacy and Mass Surveillance:
Defendant was arrested after eight officers entered his business with guns drawn. After he was handcuffed, the guns were holstered, and he was asked for consent. The consent was voluntary. In fact, he signed a form saying that he wasn’t coerced: “No evidence exists that the agents pressured Sinclair to execute the form through promises, threats or other coercive means. Indeed, the form that Sinclair signed contained the printed statement, “‘I have not been threatened, nor forced in any way.’” United States v. Sinclair, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167475 (W.D. N.Y. May 10, 2013), adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166622 (W.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2013).*
While the language of the affidavit was intended to enhance the eyewitness identification related in it, the court doesn’t find that it amounts to a Franks violation. “While I agree that the language quoted above from the affidavit could have been articulated more clearly with respect to the four eyewitness identifications and the language appears deliberately chosen by affiants to strengthen the identification, in and of itself the language is not so misleading as to call the probable cause determination into question.” United States v. Jackson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167892 (M.D. Fla. October 18, 2013).*
Odor of marijuana around the driver did not give probable cause to search the passenger. State v. Malunda, __ N.C. App. __, 749 S.E.2d 280 (2013):
The borrower of a car has standing to contest GPS installation. Even Jones was driving his wife’s car. People v. Leflore, 2013 IL App (2d) 100659, 996 N.E.2d 678 (2013):
Officers seeing a bullet in plain view triggers justification for a Long protective weapons search. It is enough for an officer to reasonably suspect the presence of a gun. People v. Colyar, 2012 IL 111835, 996 N.E.2d 575 (2013), rev’g People v. Colyar, 407 Ill. App. 3d 294, 346 Ill. Dec. 921, 941 N.E.2d 479 (2010) (posted here).
Defendant was driving a vehicle loaned to him, but it was stolen. He claimed he had no idea it was stolen. The government claimed no standing from “wrongful presence.” The court concluded that he showed no reasonable expectation based on all the facts, none of which helped him. United States v. Singletary, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55940 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2013)*:
Here, Singletary fails to demonstrate any factors to support a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. He does not allege that he had permission to drive the vehicle from the registered owner, Bherlyn Saballos. He does not allege that he had a key to the vehicle. In fact, the officer had to use a screwdriver to turn off the vehicle because the ignition was totally destroyed. Singletary does not even allege that he had permission from anyone to drive the vehicle. When asked to whom the vehicle belonged, his only reply was “Some wetback.” Based on these facts, Singletary has failed to assert a legitimate privacy interest in the vehicle.
