The threshold for supporting a CI is low, but it still has to be met, and here it wasn’t. There was no showing at all in the affidavit for SW how the CI was reliable, just a conclusory statement. Then the police entered the curtilage, admittedly illegally, to make observations which supported the claim of PC, but they really didn’t, except for a marijuana smell. The warrant was suppressed, and the factual findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence, so suppression is affirmed. State v. Benters, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1237 (December 3, 2013).

“Defendant further contends that subjecting him to SBM [satellite based monitoring as a convicted sex offender] violates his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under our federal and state constitutions. This Court recently addressed and rejected this precise argument in State v. Martin, __ N.C. App. ___, 735 S.E.2d 238 (2012). Accordingly, this argument is overruled.” State v. Jones, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1233 (December 3, 2013).

A warrantless blood draw was with exigent circumstances under McNeeley. Defendant was stopped at a DUI checkpoint, and he was apparently under the influence. Based on that, he was given a FST, and he apparently failed. He was taken to a mobile BAC machine, and he refused the test. Because the nearest hospital was 15 minutes away, and a warrant at the jail would take hours, it was reasonable to conclude that the blood draw was necessary because of dissipation of BAC. State v. Dahlquist, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1231 (December 3, 2013):

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There is no such thing in Illinois as a “motion to quash arrest.” People v. Ramirez, 2013 IL App (4th) 121153, 996 N.E.2d 1227 (2013):

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Comment by government through witness that defendant refused to consent to a search would have been reversible error but for the other substantial evidence of guilt. Therefore, it was harmless error. United States v. Cooper, 714 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Nexus here is shown by the CI’s statement that defendant admitted to him that there was child pornography in the home. United States v. Saffell, 526 Fed. Appx. 470 (6th Cir. 2013).*

All things considered, officers who encountered defendants ended up with reasonable suspicion then probable cause during the encounter. Finding a speedloader means that a revolver is nearby. The police reports referred to the patdown as a search incident but it wasn’t, and the USMJ dealt with that at the suppression hearing criticizing the officer’s use of words, and that supports the credibility determination. United States v. Royal, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 8581, 2013 FED App. 0421N (6th Cir. April 26, 2013).*

A motorist who had three police cars stop him but who got out of the car and was making moves like he was going to flee was not seized until he actually submitted to the detention when the officers put their hands on him. His own actions gave reasonable suspicion for a further detention. United States v. Logan, 526 Fed. Appx. 498 (6th Cir. 2013):

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Defendant who voluntarily returned to his home in his own car voluntarily consented to a search of the house. United States v. Rodas, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72970 (D.S.C. May 23, 2013).*

Officers learned of file sharing of child pornography at a particular IP address. Sharing the wireless router was someone not living in that house. There was no CP in the house. The car next door was registered to a person with the same first name as on the other computers accessing the router. They did a knock-and-talk and let him go to work and got a SW for the house. United States v. Keiter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73233 (D.Neb. April 29, 2013).*

Defendant’s claim of a lack of particularity in the search warrant was not timely made before trial so it is waived. United States v. Kaplan, 526 Fed. Appx. 208 (3d Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was handcuffed and going to be searched, and the officer asked him if he had anything on him that would stab the officer. He said he had a gun. That was not a custodial interrogation designed to elicit an incriminating response about a gun. [Besides, the frisk was going to occur anyway.] United States v. Nagy, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73197 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2013).*

To raise a “global contamination theory” of money leading to a dog alert, it is the defense’s duty to put on evidence in the Eleventh Circuit which doesn’t follow it. United States v. Currency, $21,175, 521 Fed. Appx. 734 (11th Cir. 2013). [Note, case law has recognized this “theory” as a fact for nearly 25 years.]

Defense counsel’s failure to object to seizure of GSR from defendant’s hands was not IAC because any objection was meritless. Durden v. State, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 485 (June 3, 2013).*

Defendant’s stop and frisk was justified by his standing in the middle of the street, his hostile response to the officers, and the bulge in his pocket. United States v. Williams, 526 Fed. Appx. 29 (2d Cir. 2013).*

The district court erred in finding the officer’s use of force in striking a man while he was down after the police car ran over his motorcycle while he was fleeing. The parties had differing views of the evidence, and the video didn’t capture it all. A jury will have to decide. Coker v. Ark. State Police, 734 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2013).*

FedEx employee was acting as private citizen for search of a package in transit. The police were called and they arrived after the search was ongoing. United States v. Storey, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158017 (N.D. Okla. November 5, 2013).*

Defendant’s case was final and he did not appeal his GPS ruling to the state supreme court before Jones was decided. Another defendant’s case was appealed and remanded after Jones. Therefore, he cannot withdraw his plea to make Jones apply retroactively to him. It is essentially defaulted. State v. Kelly, 2013 Ohio 3675, 997 N.E.2d 215 (12th Dist. 2013).*

The officer encountered defendant walking from a car stuck in a snowbank left in reverse. The defendant appeared to be under the influence, and simple questions received an evasive response. The officer had reasonable suspicion, and defendant actually blew .246. State v. Sullivan, 2013 VT 71, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 70 (August 23, 2013).*

Defendant was pulled over for a failure to signal violation. While the officer was in the patrol car running the DL, he observed defendant’s furtive movement to his leg. Then the officer found out about a prior for assault and resisting. These two factors together gave reason for a patdown. State v. Tritt, 2013 Ohio 3644, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3773 (2d Dist. August 23, 2013).*

EFF Amicus Brief: Video Surveillance of a Home for a Month Without a Warrant Violates Fourth Amendment by Hanni Farkhoury:

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The Hill: Door-to-door drones spook lawmakers by Brendan Sasso and Keith Laing:

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NPR: Why FISA Court Judges Rule The Way They Do by Carrie Johnson:

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Movant was a government employee whistleblower who benefitted financially from qui tam action, so the government sought a grand jury indictment for mail fraud, wire fraud, bribery, and conspiracy. After the investigation wound on for years without indictment, the affidavit for search warrant for his stuff was unsealed years ago which he never found out about because he was never served. The docket was sealed, so that’s why he didn’t know. The docket and affidavit are ordered unsealed. In re Search Warrant, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169224 (D.D.C. November 26, 2013).

Entry found to be by valid consent on the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Soto-Garcia, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168868 (N.D. Ga. September 5, 2013).*

Extended GPS monitoring in 2010 (Jones was 2012) without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Good faith rejected. State v. White, 2013-Ohio-5221, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5428 (5th Dist. November 22, 2013):

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Merely asking for a “four corners review” of a search warrant affidavit is not a valid motion to suppress. Considering it anyway, there was probable cause. United States v. Reyes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169487 (D. Minn. August 14, 2013):

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HuffPo: Americans Want Congress Members To Pee In Cups To Prove They’re Not On Drugs:

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Defendant was stopped for riding a bicycle in the center of the road and at night without a headlight. Once stopped, he wouldn’t keep his hands out of his pockets, and that justified a frisk. United States v. Barker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169728 (M.D. Fla. October 22, 2013).

There was probable cause for the search warrant on the totality for cocaine and marijuana (although a really small amount). The court declines to engage in “contraband-balancing,” and there is probable cause. United States v. Thurmond, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169263 (N.D. Iowa November 27, 2013).*

Defendant was “staying” with a friend and kept belongings there, so he had standing. The entry was by consent and the plain view was valid. The ensuing search warrant was validly issued. United States v. Galvez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169678 (D. Neb. October 16, 2013).*

Defendant was seen retrieving drugs from his car in a high crime area at night. When he was arrested, that justified a search incident of the car for more because it was reasonable to believe more would be found there. Suppression order reversed. People v. Crum, 2013 CO 66, 312 P.3d 186 (2013). [Note: This is the same as finding nexus to drugs in a house because the accused left the house to go to a drug deal.]

Since the CI’s recordings of his dealings with the defendant are admissible in federal court, they could form the basis of a search warrant application. United States v. Garecht, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159708 (C.D. Ill. October 11, 2013).*

Defendant clearly waived his motion to suppress in his guilty plea, with defense counsel directly asking about it. United States v. Forehand, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161063 (N.D. Fla. October 7, 2013).*

Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps in its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (2013)

Celia Goetzl, Government Mandated Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients: Special Need or Unconstitutional Condition? 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1539 (2013)

David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1095 (2013)