Dog sniff during the normal course of a traffic stop is not unreasonable. The alert gave probable cause to search the entire vehicle. United States v. $175,722.77 in United States Currency, 307 Fed. Appx. 257 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):
The district court did not err in concluding that the length of the initial traffic stop was reasonable. Seven minutes is a reasonable amount of time to effectuate a traffic stop, and Payne was entitled to conduct a series of checks on Patino and his license. Further, the dog sniff did not unreasonably delay the traffic stop, nor was it an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because the dog sniff occurred simultaneously with Payne’s check of Patino’s license.
Comment: Officers have finally figured out how to do it: run the dog around the car while waiting for the computer check to come back. Now, we know that the officer will tell the computer operator to “give me a couple of minutes” longer so the dog sniff will be within the period of the computer check. Once again, the officers have figured out how to take another right away, and the courts just play along.
Defendant was stopped at a driver’s license roadblock, and he had warrants for his arrest. A search incident to that arrest produced a typewriter which was used to convict defendant of mail fraud. United States v. Lee, 225 Fed. Appx. 132 (4th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).*
Collateral estoppel bars plaintiff’s civil claim over his arrest. He litigated the same question to conclusion in state court. Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33565 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2007).*
Under the undisputed facts, the defendant in a § 1983 case had probable cause to stop the plaintiff, so the plaintiff’s case fails. Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33568 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2007).*
There was a factual dispute in whether defendants used excessive force, including Tasering the plaintiff, to get him into a cell, so summary judgment is denied. Because plaintiff was not a convict, the Fourth Amendment applied, not the Eighth Amendment. Pearson v. Byrd, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33509 (M.D. Ala. May 7, 2007).*
In a probation search § 1983 case, the co-tenant refused consent and officers came in anyway. Randolph does not void the search because the probation agreement permitted the search, and consent was not an issue. Taylor actually lived elsewhere, but he spent a lot of time with his co-tenant, and she was aware he was on probation and had been searched in the past. Taylor v. Brontoli, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33672 (N.D. N.Y. May 8, 2007). (Comment: This case seems almost like the plaintiff sought refuge in a place he could not be subjected to probation searches, but probation search agreements follow the probationer around. Third parties who take in probationers are subject to having their premises searched, too.)
