No reasonable cause is needed for officer to open door of apparently disabled driver. This is a natural extension of Mimms and Wilson where the driver can be ordered out of the car without justification. United States v. Meredith, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4235 (5th Cir. February 26, 2007):
We offer no opinion on whether these facts and circumstances were sufficient for Officer Micheu to form the reasonable suspicion necessary before he opened the vehicle’s passenger-side door and pierced the vehicle’s interior airspace. Instead, we take this opportunity to recognize the natural extension of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Mimms and Wilson, viz., that the officer needed no suspicion to open the door and perform a brief visual check of the disabled occupant any more than he needed suspicion to order the occupants to step out of the car in the first place.
In Mimms, the Court held that once a vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, safety concerns permit law enforcement officers to order the driver out of the vehicle. In Wilson, the Court extended its holding in Mimms to permit law enforcement officers to order any passengers in the vehicle to exit.
Checkpoint stop was valid as a traffic safety checkpoint, even though one officer testified it was to curb burglaries and drug trafficking. At least the District Court’s findings are not contrary to the evidence. United States v. Regan, 218 Fed. Appx. 902 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):
In this case, testimony at the suppression hearing supports the district court’s finding that the checkpoint was implemented primarily to respond to traffic safety concerns. District Court Opinion at 12 (“The Government has shown that the primary purpose of the checkpoint in question was not to engage in general crime control, but instead to police the intersection for drunk driving, to perform routine checks for drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration, and to enforce compliance with general traffic laws.”). The Monroe County Sheriff’s Office policy regarding checkpoints indicated that they were to focus on the problem of road safety. In addition, Officer Duncan and Cpl. Grindstaff reported that the purpose of the checkpoint was to respond to complaints of motorists running the four-way intersection at Teagle and Brownlee Roads, that the intersection was plagued with intoxicated drivers coming from neighboring counties, and that each vehicle was stopped to check the motorists’s license and proof of insurance. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 445, 110 S. Ct. at 2481; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401.
Furthermore, even though Deputy Blanks stated at one point that the purpose of the checkpoint was to respond to a high volume of burglaries and narcotics offenses in the area, that did not invalidate the lawfulness of the checkpoint. As the district court noted, Deputy Blanks was not employed by the sheriff’s office in a supervisory capacity; instead, he was in training at the time of the checkpoint. Thus, he did not have a role in approving the checkpoint. In addition, Deputy Blanks’s statement was not corroborated by other documentary and testimonial evidence, and, at the suppression hearing, he clarified that the checkpoint had a dual purpose.
With respect to the balancing of competing interests, the district court did not err in finding that the checkpoint advanced an important state interest as compared to the level of intrusion on individual’s privacy. First, the district court did consider the competing interests implicated in carrying out the checkpoint, namely, the county’s interest in maintaining highway safety, the checkpoint’s effectiveness at achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy, and concluded that the balance of the interests weighed in favor of finding the checkpoint reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the after arrest reports and suppression hearing testimony confirmed that the checkpoint was executed for the important state interest of ensuring compliance with the state’s driver licensing and vehicle registration laws, and to check for drunk drivers. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 445, 110 S. Ct. at 2481; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657-58, 99 S. Ct. at 1398. The documentary and testimonial evidence also showed that every motorist who drove through the intersection during the checkpoint was stopped. Thus, the officers did not engage in randomized stops; instead, every vehicle was stopped and every motorist was asked for documentation. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S. Ct. at 1400.
The evidence shows a checkpoint designed to comply with the Constitution. Even though records of the time required to conduct the document inspection were not kept, at the hearing Duncan testified that the checkpoint stop lasted an average of one or two minutes. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (upholding a less than one minute checkpoint stop for document inspection and external sniff by a K-9 unit). Evidence presented at the hearing showed that the sheriff’s office had received complaints of traffic safety violations at the intersection.
Comment: As far as I’m concerned, the presence of a drug dog at a “traffic safety checkpoint” invalidates it because it shows a true ulterior motive. The 11th Cir. has already rejected that argument. This is a bad line of cases, so watch for it.
In an identity fraud case, defendant’s brother turned over documents received at their house in another person’s name, a person whose wallet was stolen. The brother took documents to the police, and then went back and got more in a search of the defendant’s room. In the third search, the police could be seen as having instigating it. Even if the court suppressed the third search and all the information from that is excised from the search warrant application, there still was probable cause for a search warrant on the remainder. United States v. Silva, 502 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Mass. 2007).*
District Court suppresses a stop of a man on the street who apparently mistakenly flagged down an undercover car that he thought was a livery cab. Two officers got out of the car and confronted him because that was what they were doing on the street anyway. Motion to suppress granted because the court finds the officers’ explanation implausible. United States v. Williams, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13070 (E.D. N.Y. February 26, 2007).*
Motion to suppress was granted in the search of a guest at a house. [The government even argued that the defendant had no standing to contest the search of his own person, which is ludicrous.] United States v. Tate, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13017 (N.D. Ohio February 26, 2007)*:
Defendant Tate’s Motion to Suppress has merit for two independent and sufficient reasons: (1) Jackson’s consent to search was not an intervening act of free will sufficiently removed from the detectives’ illegal search so as to purge the taint of their unlawful activity; and (2) the search of the boot did not fall within (a) the parameters of Jackson’s consent to search; (b) a limited, self-protective frisk; or (c) the plain view of an officer. For these independent and sufficient reasons, the crack and confession must be suppressed.
A. Standing
The government argues that Defendant Tate was merely a transitory house guest with no legitimate expectation of privacy. As such, the government argues that Tate lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search that revealed crack in his boot. The Court disagrees.
Both Jackson and Tate testified that the defendant had been staying overnight at the apartment approximately three to four nights per week since the summer. The presence of an additional fold-out bed in the living room supports this notion. Likewise, both Jackson and Tate testified that the defendant ate meals at the apartment, kept toiletries at the apartment, and occasionally received mail at the apartment. Additionally, both Jackson and Tate testified that the defendant kept a significant amount of clothing at the apartment, as well as numerous pairs of shoes. Jackson testified that although Tate did not pay rent, he helped out by purchasing groceries on a regular basis.
The Court credits the testimony of both Jackson and Tate as it relates to the defendant’s regular overnight presence in the apartment. Defendant Tate was not merely a transitory house guest, a first time visitor or a guest in the apartment for a business purpose. Rather, as a regular overnight guest who kept a significant amount of personal possessions at the apartment, the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to warrant standing to challenge the search.
(In trial today; I’ll get back when I can.)
