The defendant was in a car in a high crime area and he went to a drug house. That alone was not reason enough to stop him. More significantly, the officer’s statement the area was a high crime area was conclusory. State v. Roberts, 947 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. December 13, 2006):
Had Captain Wiltz and Deputy Stolis articulated in their testimony the facts that supported their conclusions (1) that it was a known drug buyer whose car Mr. Roberts exited, (2) that it was a known drug seller whose trailer Mr. Roberts entered, and (3) that the area in which Mr. Roberts was seen was a high crime area, the record might have supported the assertion that Captain Wiltz had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. What we have, however, is a record that is devoid of the articulable facts from which Officer Wiltz could have drawn reasonable inferences that Mr. Roberts was involved in an illegal drug transaction. To justify an investigatory stop, the Dank case requires the articulation of the facts upon which the conclusions reached by Captain Wiltz and Deputy Stolis were based. The stop may have, in fact, been justified, but the State has the burden of proving that it was, and the State has not carried its burden of proof. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D).
Without any factual basis to support the conclusion that Mr. Roberts was in a car and a trailer belonging to a known drug buyer and a known drug seller, respectively, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties were, in fact, what they were said to be. There is nothing in the record to evidence that either party had been arrested, charged, or convicted in connection with any illegal drug activity. Similarly, there was nothing in the record, other than the conclusory statement that Mr. Roberts had been in a high crime area, to evidence that the area was, in fact, a high crime area. There was nothing in the record to reflect what crimes had been committed in the area or even that there had been any arrests in the area.
When Captain Wiltz was asked why he conducted a “pat down” of Mr. Roberts, Captain Wiltz stated that he did so “[f]or the reason that he was in and out of a high crime area.” He further said that “[h]e had given me a lie [about bumming a ride] basically about where he had been and why he was there.” Although Captain Wiltz’s testimony reflected that he was concerned for his safety, being in a “high crime area” without more does not lead to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. Additionally, an unverified statement likewise does not lead to such reasonable suspicion. (bracketed material added)
A South Carolinian was stopped in Georgia for an obscured license plate, and the officer had the driver get out to see. The defendant was a passenger in the vehicle. The driver consented to a search of the vehicle during the stop, and the defendant was unusually fumbling with his coat. The officers became suspicious of that, and it was confirmed by the videotape. They decided to patdown the occupants, and plain feel gave away the kilo. State v. Davis, 283 Ga. App. 200, 641 S.E.2d 205 (January 5, 2007).*
Defendant was stopped for speeding, and a records check revealed that defendant was the subject of two restraining orders for domestic violence. As officers approached the vehicle, they could see shotgun shells on the dashboard and shotguns visible in the back. When defendant was asked why he was speeding, he said it was because he had to get to a town in that direction because his nephew had been in an accident. The officer remembered a radio report of an injured boy, and the officer told the defendant that the injured boy had been released from the hospital. The defendant was excessively nervous and would make no eye contact. The first officer filling out the ticket asked the second officer to get the name of the nephew, and the defendant did not know it. At that point, they considered a frisk for officer safety, which the court found reasonable. “The pat-down in turn led to the discovery of the contraband on Yeomans’ person, which, in turn, indisputably provided probable cause to arrest Yeomans. A thorough search of the car, as well as a further search of Yeomans’ person at the jail, inevitably and properly followed.” The motion to suppress was properly denied. (n.7: A motion to reconsider was filed after the codefendant succeeded in state court on his search issue, but it was denied.) United States v. Yeomans, 211 Fed. Appx. 753 (10th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
Plaintiff first sued under § 1983 in federal court and lost. He then refiled in state court and added state law claims. The state case was barred by res judicata. Parks v. City of Chattanooga, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (January 4, 2007)*:
The state law claims asserted in the present case certainly could have been asserted in the previous two lawsuits and they would have been decided by the federal district court given that the federal district court exercised its supplemental jurisdiction in both cases and did not decline to decide any of the state law issues. The state law claims in the previous lawsuits were given the federal district court’s full attention and were decided on the merits. The federal district court had the power to afford the plaintiff the full relief sought by him in those previous cases and could have done so had the previous lawsuits contained the present state law claims. Therefore, there was no “formal barrier” preventing the plaintiff from bringing all of his claims together. The final judgments on the merits in the first two cases were rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and involved the same defendants that are sued in the present case. All of the claims asserted in all three lawsuits arise out of the same series of events. We conclude that the claims in the present case fall squarely within the claim preclusion doctrine. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the present case because the claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Because we conclude that all of the claims asserted by the plaintiff in the present lawsuit are barred by res judicata, we need not decide whether those claims were filed outside the statute of limitations period or whether a genuine issue of material fact had been created. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s remaining two issues are pretermitted.
