D.Mont.: Polygraph not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes

A polygraph is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Woodenlegs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89888 (D. Mont. August 12, 2011):

The only federal court to publish an opinion addressing the issue of whether a polygraph examination is a Fourth Amendment search has rejected Defendant’s argument. In Stehney v. Perry, 907 F. Supp. 806, 822 (D.N.J.1995), aff’d 101 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1996), the court ruled that a polygraph does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, although this Court does not typically cite to unpublished opinions, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this argument in their unpublished opinion in United States v. Jordan P.W., 168 Fed.Appx. 150 (9th Cir. 2006) when they stated: “We reject W.’s argument that a polygraph examination constitutes a search or seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment and know of no authority supporting it.”

Even if a polygraph examination was a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, Defendant gave his consent to the polygraph before it was administered and even suggested that he be allowed to take a polygraph when originally questioned by law enforcement.

Defendant was in possession of child pornography “approximately five months ago” before the search warrant, showing pictures to others. It was a fair inference that he still had it for the search warrant to issue. Steele v. State, 355 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App.—Houston (1st Dist.) 2011)* (dissent; dissent).

“[*P12] The dispositive question concerning application of the automobile exception is whether probable cause supported the search. … Sommer concedes probable cause supported the search of his vehicle.” A vehicle is inherently mobile, even when the defendant is in jail. State v. Sommer, 2011 ND 151, 800 N.W.2d 853 (2011).*

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