N.D.Ohio: No contact order deprived defendant of standing

A person under a no contact order has no standing when he’s found where he was ordered not to be there. United States v. Dye, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47287 (N.D. Ohio April 27, 2011):

While not binding, the Court finds the decision in Morrison [Commonwealth v. Morrison, 429 Mass. 511, 710 N.E.2d 584 (1999)] to be instructive. It seems incredible that the defendant could maintain that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of a person with whom he had been ordered by the court to have no contact. At the motion hearing, defense counsel attempted to distinguish this persuasive authority on the ground that the protective order in this case did not prohibit the defendant from being present at the Fairlawn property, rather it merely prohibited contact with Ms. Butler. Counsel further noted that, even if this prohibition effectively meant that the defendant must not enter the Fairlawn property, “[t]he inability to be present at that point in time, [… did not] change the fact that that’s still his residence.” (TR at 45.) The fact remains, however, that the protection order prohibited contact with the owner of the Fairlawn residence, who resided at the Fairlawn residence with her son. Because the defendant’s presence in the Fairlawn residence was likely to bring him in contact with the subject of the no contact order, he was prohibited from being at the residence; this is particularly so because Butler was at the residence at all times relevant to the search. The Court therefore finds that, at the time of the search, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. As such, the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search.

The court also said:

The Court begins by noting that, in reviewing the defendant’s motion [to suppress], the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the government. United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1221 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oliver, 126 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 (S.D. Ohio 2000).

This should be true only to the extent of which side carries the burden of proof. If there was a search warrant, the presumption of regularity applies. If there wasn’t, the government carries the burden of proof, so the facts should not be viewed most favorably to it in the motion.

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