IA: Consent search of house was invalid, but consent search of car was valid

The search of defendant’s car was by consent, but after that, the search of defendant’s residence was not. He was trying to make a plane to his mother’s funeral and wasn’t going unless he consented, and he was transported to his house 19 minutes in handcuffs. That was inherently coercive, and the facts found by the trial court are supported by the record. State v. Dougherty, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 87 (February 9, 2011):

The district court credited that testimony in finding, “It was well known that going to his mother’s service was very important to the Defendant and that he had only a limited time within which he could make his flight.” Giving due deference to this implied credibility finding, we agree with the court that Dougherty’s consent was not voluntary because of the subtle coercion employed by the officers in this case. See Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 469. But see United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 593 (“Raised expectations and hopes for leniency do not amount to coercion or improper inducement.”).

We reach this conclusion though there is other evidence that tends to support finding Dougherty’s consent was voluntary, such as his signing of the written consent form and an officer’s statement to him that he could possibly go to jail that night. See Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 469 (reaching similar conclusion). However, that statement and the execution of the written consent form followed the coercive tactics detailed above, which also included a nineteen-minute car ride in the back of a squad car to the house in Tiffin during which Dougherty remained handcuffed. Upon examining the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district court that Dougherty did not voluntarily consent to the search of his residence. 5 Our inquiry does not end here, however, as the State asserts Dougherty’s probation agreement provided an alternative ground for the officers’ search of the residence.