CA1: “Do what you have to do” was consent

Defendant consented to the search of his car, and the district court credited the testimony of the officers and not him about consent. His statement “do what you have to do” was construed as consent [that’s kind of dangerous, isn’t it?]. In any event, there was probable cause and the automobile exception applied. United States v. Franklin, 630 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2011)*:

Franklin’s other primary argument on this point that the officers’ testimony is suspect because it is not corroborated by a consent form — likewise holds no water. A consent form certainly would have made the prosecution’s task easier, but it was not necessary, and its absence does not undercut the officers’ consistent testimony. Indeed, our case law is clear that “[w]ritten consent is not essential to the establishment of a valid consensual search.” United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555 (1st Cir. 1993).

A consent form was particularly unnecessary here given other evidence sufficient to establish consent: specifically, uncontested testimony that Franklin told the officers to “do what you got to do.”

Statement from the previously reliable known CI was sufficient on the totality of circumstances to show PC for the search warrant, and it was not “bare bones.” United States v. Patterson, 406 Fed. Appx. 773 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished),* cert. denied 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3525 (U.S., May 2, 2011).

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