OH8: Dispatch report of stolen car supported stop in good faith, and, under Herring, the evidence should not be excluded

Defendant was stopped because the car came back stolen from dispatch, but it wasn’t stolen. Under Herring, the stop was in good faith, and there would be no deterrence, so the exclusionary rule would not be applied. State v. Geiter, 2010 Ohio 6017, 190 Ohio App. 3d 541, 942 N.E.2d 1161 (8th Dist. 2010)*:

[*P42] “At its core, the good faith exception recognizes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule, to deter unlawful police conduct, cannot be furthered by excluding evidence seized by an officer who had reasonable grounds to believe the search warrant was properly issued. See Leon at 919, 923. Thus, ‘evidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may be properly charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ Herrings [sic], 129 S.Ct. at 701; Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.” (Emphasis added.)

[*P43] For purposes of this case, the word “stop” may be substituted for the word “search” in the foregoing opinions. In applying the relevant analysis, therefore, the trial court properly focused on Nan’s objective reliance on the information conveyed to him via police dispatch. Nan had no reason to question the reliability of the “local system’s” information, particularly to justify a minimally intrusive traffic stop. State v. Commins, Clinton App. Nos. CA2009-06-004 and 005, 2009 Ohio 6415; cf., State v. Jacob, supra.

[*P44] Applying the exclusionary rule under these circumstances would not deter “unlawful police conduct,” since Nan himself could not know his conduct in stopping a car to investigate possible criminal activity would subsequently prove to lack a foundation. In fact, Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, precisely permits such an action.

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