W.D.Tex.: Consent to search car for stolen electronics included turning on a camera; and no standing in a stolen camera, anyway

Defendant clearly consented to a search of his car for stolen property, specifically electronics. Turning on a camera to look at the pictures did not exceed the scope of the consent, and the defendant had to understand that was likely from the blanket consent. Even if consent was exceeded, he had no standing in the stolen camera anyway. United States v. Guevara, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52803 (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2010):

However, given that the officers were searching for stolen goods (and specifically electronics), it is entirely natural they would closely inspect any electronics in the car, and attempt to ascertain whether they belonged to Defendant or anyone else. It is well-settled if a defendant chooses not to place any explicit limitations in his response to an officer’s general request to search, this is considered evidence of general consent to search. Id. (citing United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1994)). For instance, law enforcement officials are not required to separately request permission to search each container within a vehicle for which they have received consent to search. Id. (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly stated “the defendant, as the individual knowing the contents of the vehicle, has the responsibility to limit the scope of the consent.” Id. (quoting United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 1995). By assuring the officers there were no stolen goods in the car, Defendant granted consent without giving the officers any basis to think he was asserting an expectation of privacy in any of the goods in the vehicle. Because the officers did exactly what they had obtained consent to do–conduct a general search of the car for stolen electronics–the Court finds they did not exceed the scope of Defendant’s consent in this case.

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The Fifth Circuit, along with other courts, has held (albeit in the slightly different context of electronic monitoring) a defendant cannot demonstrate a “legitimate expectation of privacy” such as is required to invoke the Fourth Amendment where the property in question is contraband or stolen goods, because persons can have no legitimate expectation of privacy in articles of this nature, which they have no right to possess. See, e.g., United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1119 (5th Cir.1978) (holding “possessors of [contraband] have no legitimate expectation of privacy in substances which they have no right to possess at all.”); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977) (same). Likewise, it is well-settled a defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle, and thus has no standing to contest a warrantless search of the vehicle. United States v. Hensel, 672 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1981). This reasoning is sound, and applies with equal force to the case at hand. Defendant cannot assert any legitimate expectation of privacy in a digital camera, which was stolen property and which he therefore had no right to possess. Thus, Defendant has no standing to object to the officers’ search of the camera’s contents, even if it did exceed the scope of his consent.