Fourth Amendment news–Effect of Kyllo in Ninth Circuit’s Borowy from 2/17?

Susan Brenner on CYB3RCRIM3, published Kyllo and “A Forensic Software Program” poses this question: Is use of sophisticated software to search a computer a Kyllo-type search?

She is discussing United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (posted here). Apparently Kyllo was belatedly injected into the case, and possibly not raised in the motion to suppress. The Ninth Circuit did not foreclose the possibility Kyllo would apply, not just here.

At one level, a Kyllo argument seems a viable option in circumstances like those at issue in the Borowy case because they are analogous to the circumstances at issue in Kyllo, at least in one respect.

In both instances, law enforcement captures information that is being broadcast from inside a home (the most sacrosanct “place” for 4th Amendment purposes). The Kyllo Court found, correctly IMHO, that the fact the officer was outside the home when he captured the heat signatures emanating from Kyllo’s home did not prevent his actions from constituting a 4th Amendment search. Any other result would take us back to the bad old days when Olmstead was the law. (As I’ve noted in other posts, in Olmstead v. U.S. the Supreme Court held it wasn’t a search for federal agents to use a tap on a phone line outside Olmstead’s home to listen in on his phone calls. The Supreme Court reversed Olmstead in Katz.)

I’m not, however, sure a viable Kyllo argument is possible when it’s directed at law enforcement’s using P2P software to access files someone has made available for sharing online. Like other defendants who’ve been caught because they were sharing child porn via P2P networks, Borowy claimed he didn’t realize he was sharing files because he thought he’d disabled the file-sharing feature.

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.