TN: Minimal probable cause enough

There was minimal probable cause to justify the search of defendant’s car in a murder case. He was the last person seen with her, and he was vague and inconsistent under questioning. State v. Richardson, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 115 (February 11, 2010)*:

Looking at the case herein, the investigation revealed that Appellant was the last person seen with the victim alive. Officers knew that Appellant had given the victim a ride in the Lumina on the night before the victim’s body was discovered. Appellant was vague and inconsistent under questioning about whether the ride Appellant gave the victim was for money or not. The car was parked in a public lot and Appellant had informed the officers that other people had access to the vehicle. Officer Mullins expressed concern about the mobility of the vehicle and the preservation of any evidence that might have been inside. Further, officers knew that the victim’s body had been transported from the scene of the murder to the location where the body was found. Although, this case presents a close question, we believe there is at least minimal probable cause to seize the Appellant’s car and tow it to a secure location. This issue is without merit.

[Note: Close only counts in horseshoes, government work, nuclear war, and probable cause (which is a subset of government work).]

Blood alcohol dissipates, and it is an exigent circumstance which will ordinarily permit dispensing with a warrant. State v. Machuca, 347 Ore. 644, 227 P.3d 729 (2010):

It may be true, phenomenologically, that, among such cases, there will be instances in which a warrant could have been both obtained and executed in a timely fashion. The mere possibility, however, that such situations may occur from time to time does not justify ignoring the inescapable fact that, in every such case, evidence is disappearing and minutes count. We therefore declare that, for purposes of the Oregon Constitution, the evanescent nature of a suspect’s blood alcohol content is an exigent circumstance that will ordinarily permit a warrantless blood draw of the kind taken here. We do so, however, understanding that particular facts may show, in the rare case, that a warrant could have been obtained and executed significantly faster than the actual process otherwise used under the circumstances. We anticipate that only in those rare cases will a warrantless blood draw be unconstitutional.