D.Mass.: Police could not wait an hour after a traffic violation to use it as a basis for a stop

The government could not use a traffic offense that occurred one hour earlier as a basis for a stop. Here, however, there was separate reasonable suspicion for the stop. United States v. Mendonca, 682 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2010):

The government contends that the vehicle stop was permissible based upon the traffic violations observed by Sergeant Mello and relayed to Officer Saisselin. It argues that postponing the stop for roughly one hour “was not unreasonable” in light of the totality of the circumstances, including ongoing surveillance and Mendonca’s arrest history. The government also cites two cases upholding a traffic stop as reasonable where officers delayed between the infraction and the stop. See United States v. Henderson, 229 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D. Mass. 2002); State v. McComb, No. 21963, 2008 Ohio 425, 2008 WL 314906, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2008).

The government’s argument is unpersuasive and, accordingly, the stop will not be upheld based upon the traffic violations. In short, the government has not satisfied the Court that the lengthy delay between the infractions and the stop was reasonable or permissible. Cited cases are all clearly distinguishable because in none did the hiatus approach the duration of the delay here (one hour) nor, in any of those cases, did the defendant park and load suspicious packages into the vehicle in the meantime. Although a slight delay to gain a tactical advantage is entirely reasonable, see also United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 779-80, 782 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sweeney, No. 07-cr-400, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95363, 2007 WL 4522237, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2007), no such tactics were necessary here where Mendonca 1) was driving in broad daylight, 2) in a relatively safe area and 3) parked of his own volition.

Here, the obvious rationale for the stop was to inspect what Mello and his team thought to be suspicious activity at the Extended Stay. Although pretextual stops based upon traffic infractions are generally permissible, see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, the government has failed to justify the stop on such grounds here. In sum, a completed traffic misdemeanor cannot hang over a suspect indefinitely until a time at which he has engaged in some other suspicious activity that officers believe warrants a pretextual stop.